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Abstract 
Entrepreneurship is important to the development of market economies, in particular founding or 
‘starting-up’ new enterprises from scratch.  Researchers constantly seek to break down the 
heterogeneous nature of entrepreneurial behaviour and one suggestion is to focus on experienced 
habitual entrepreneurs who have owned and managed multiple businesses.  Studies have shown 
that the habitual typology can be divided into more homogenous sub-types.  Researchers make a 
distinction between serial entrepreneurs who focus sequentially on one business at a time and 
portfolio entrepreneurs who own and manage multiple businesses simultaneously.  More is known 
about portfolio entrepreneurship and drawing on this work a comprehensive set of postulates is 
beginning to emerge to explain the differences between novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.  
Therefore, there is an urgent need to focus on the serial entrepreneur.   
The principal research question is: How is one venture related to the next in the series?  Crucially, 
serial founders possess repeated experience of entry, exit and re-entry into entrepreneurship.  Exit 
from a venture they founded can be positive or negative, i.e. the sale of a business or a managed 
closure or outright failure.  Serial entrepreneurs have to manage the consequences of exit and also 
make decisions regarding re-entry.  An improved  understanding of their cyclical, flow-like processes, 
punctuated with the ‘critical incidents’ of entry and exit is key to understanding the economic 
selection of entrepreneurs and the accumulation and use of entrepreneurial human capital.  
Researchers expect ventures to be related and follow industry corridors.  This study explores the 
nature of corridors and goes further by asking if ventures are imitative (i.e. serial entrepreneurs are 
more cautious) or innovative (i.e. bring new means-ends combinations into existence).   
Using the commentaries of persistent and active entrepreneurs and details of their ventures, it is 
clear that experienced founders use particular modes when creating new businesses.  Also an 
unsuccessful exit through closure or outright failure is normal, a common occurrence in a serial 
career.  The study of 112 start-ups reveals that the outcome of the previous venture has a strong 
bearing on what happens next.  Successful exits often lead to start-ups in different industries 
thereby spreading innovation.  Failure of a novice venture leads to a return to essentially the same 
opportunity to try again.  Persistent serial entrepreneurs can recover from unaffordable losses by 
returning to employment.  Exit conditions are also important in understanding portfolio 
entrepreneurship. Novice or serial ‘singleton’ entrepreneurs transition to portfolio entrepreneurship 
when their current business is not exited. Unrelated ventures are almost invariably unsuccessful, and 
consequently attempts to transition are not always successful.   
13 
 
Serial entrepreneurs obtain economic benefit from previous ventures through the phenomenon of 
serial diversification, recycling and reusing knowledge and other resources. There is evidence of 
learning from experience over the course of a career, as the frequency of negative outcomes falls 
and each venture in the series survives longer, substantially increasing its chances of a successful 
exit.   
On the basis of these findings a new theory of serial entrepreneurship is proposed for further 
research, and recommendations are made for policy-makers, practitioners and entrepreneurship 
educators.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction  
If you can dream—and not make dreams your master;    
If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim;    
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster  
And treat those two impostors just the same;  
By Rudyard Kipling, If (1895) 
 
1.1 Section 1. Introduction to the Research Topic  
“Perhaps most fascinating and promising of all entrepreneurial starting points are those that occur in 
series. It fairly frequently happens that one entrepreneur will start a venture, possibly succeeding in 
it, possibly not, and, regardless whether it succeeds or not, go on to start a second new venture, a 
third, and so on, building an entire career on entrepreneuring” (Vesper 1980:80).  
Serial entrepreneurship emphasises starting several new ventures in sequence. Each one results in a 
definite outcome and exit, and then a return to entrepreneurship to start again.  ‘Start-up’  is an 
important source of new enterprises in market economies. Serial entrepreneurship is a specific sub-
type of habitual entrepreneurship.  Habitual ‘habit forming’ entrepreneurship includes all forms of 
multiple experiences of the entrepreneurial process including acquisition and inheritance of existing 
businesses.    
Serial entrepreneurs are distinct from other entrepreneurs because of their unique experience and 
expertise in the cyclical pattern of venture creation, exit and re-entry.  In contrast, portfolio 
entrepreneurs (the other main sub-type of habitual entrepreneurship) are characterised by founding 
and managing several firms in parallel.  Portfolio founders therefore rarely, if ever, exit from the 
owner/manager status, and therefore, entrepreneurship.   
1.1.1 Position and Contribution 
The thesis is positioned within the wider field of habitual entrepreneurship.  It makes a specific study 
of serial ‘one at a time’ sequential founders of new firms.  It is an exploratory study that addresses 
long standing calls (e.g. Starr and Bygrave, 1992; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks, 2005) to 
make a longitudinal qualitative investigation of the how, when and why of the careers of multiple 
founders, specifically:  How are the ventures of serial starter entrepreneurs related to one another? 
Answering this question is made more timely due to recent and new theoretical developments in the 
15 
 
theory of habitual entrepreneurship by Parker, (2014) and Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle (2013), 
who ask for empirical tests of their new postulate and additional theoretical developments.   
Understanding the relationship between the ventures of a serial entrepreneur requires answers to a 
number of subsidiary research questions investigating the nature of serial entrepreneurship, 
including:  What type of opportunities do serial entrepreneurs recognise, pursue and exploit through 
business formation?  Are these opportunities related?  What is the source of these opportunities? 
Are they imitative or innovative?  Do serial entrepreneurs learn from experience and improve their 
outcomes over a career?  How does the experience of success and failure influence the choice and 
performance of subsequent ventures?   
To answer these questions the thesis examines the career histories of 21 serial entrepreneurs and 
their 112 start-up ventures triangulated by 3 cases of portfolio entrepreneurs, and 2 cases of careers 
that contain a mixture of inherited, acquired and founded ventures.  The study uses a pragmatic 
within and across-case comparative analysis methodology (Glazer and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2014).   
Limitations of the Study  
There are some limitations to the reliability, validity and transferability of the study’s findings.  While 
the sample size is higher than other comparable studies, all the 26 case studies are of surviving 
‘persistent’ entrepreneurs who were still active at the time of the study. Serial entrepreneurs who 
have retired or who left entrepreneurship permanently part way through their careers are not 
included in this study.  It is a study of persistent and also successful serial entrepreneurs, where 
success is defined as surviving and currently thriving.  Consequently, the sample is subject to survivor 
bias (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) where transferable generalisations can only be attempted for 
similar groups of persistent serial entrepreneurs.  With the exception of two case studies the data 
relies on the lead entrepreneur as the sole informant.  The entrepreneurial career histories captured 
are not complete. Further research is required to determine the overall outcome for all of their 
start-ups.  The study may also be accused of only investigating successful cases after completion 
(Davidsson, 2004).  However, the study sample is not restricted to surviving ventures and includes a 
significant number (40%) of closures and outright failures.  With an intentional focus on serial 
entrepreneurs, there are just three cases of portfolio entrepreneurs in the study.  Accordingly, the 
findings on the differences and similarities between serial and portfolio entrepreneurship have less 
strength.  
1.1.2 Why Research Serial Entrepreneurs? 
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Serial entrepreneurship is of research interest because it is synonymous with greater 
entrepreneurial experience and expertise of the opportunity centric process of entrepreneurship.  
Researchers constantly seek to unpick the heterogeneous nature of entrepreneurial behaviour, and 
one suggestion by Macmillan (1986) is to focus on experienced habitual entrepreneurs.  Serial 
entrepreneurs have specific characteristics of interest to researchers.  First, serial founders, as 
opposed to acquirers and inheritors of existing businesses, originate new ventures.  Second, serials 
exit their ventures and unlike builders of portfolios of businesses do not maintain a permanent 
group (Iacobucci, 2002) or cluster (Rosa, 1998) of enterprises.  Crucially, serial founders possess 
repeated experience of entry, exit and re-entry into entrepreneurship.  Exits contrast between 
successful exits, i.e. sale as a ‘going concern’, and unsuccessful exits, i.e. a managed closure or 
outright failure.  Therefore, for serial entrepreneurs to remain in an intrinsically risky career, to use 
Kipling’s words quoted above, they must have learned to treat those two impostors of success and 
failure just the same.  
Economic Impact  
There are important practical reasons to study serial entrepreneurs.  Habitual entrepreneurs are 
essential contributors to economic growth (MacMillan, 1986; Ucbasaran Westhead and Wright, 
2008).  Individuals who found more than one business create a disproportionate share of 
entrepreneurial firms and have a significant economic impact (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  The 
contribution of habitual entrepreneurs to job creation is conservatively estimated at half of all new 
jobs (Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle, 2013).  Entrepreneurial exit is an important process that has 
a significant effect on firms, industries, and the economy (DeTienne, 2010).   
An improved understanding of the behaviour of serial entrepreneurs is of interest to all stakeholders 
in an entrepreneurial economy.  Public policy makers, banks and the venture capital industry want to 
be able to ‘pick winners’ (Storey, 1994).  Similarly, educators and business support agencies want to 
pass on recipes for entrepreneurial persistence and success.  Furthermore, all stakeholders would be 
better informed if they could differentiate the behaviours and contribution between serial, potfolio 
and novice (i.e. one time) entrepreneurs (Parker, 2014; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2006).  
Percentage of Serial Entrepreneurs  
Habitual entrepreneurship is an important form of economic activity as is illustrated in the 
proportions of different types of entrepreneurs sampled in the research outputs listed below. 
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Table 1.1 Relative Proportions of Novice and Habitual Entrepreneurs 
Some entrepreneurs are prolific creators of businesses. Founding three or more businesses is an 
accepted standard to achieve expert status (e.g. Baron, 2006, Baron and Ensley, 2006). The 
proportion of habitual entrepreneurs creating three or more businesses are reported as: 34% (Chen, 
2013), 20% (Schollhammer, 1991) and 12% Parker (2013).  The findings of this thesis are derived 
from a sample of serial entrepreneurs where over 80% created three or more new enterprises.  
1.2 Section 2. Habitual Entrepreneurship: Gaps in the Literature   
There are strong current academic grounds for further study into this phenomenon.  Progress is 
being made toward the development of a theory of habitual entrepreneurship that explains the 
different behaviours and outcomes of serial, portfolio, and novice entrepreneurs.  This thesis is 
positioned to make an empirical and theoretical contribution to the recent work by Plehn-Dujowich 
(2010), Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle, (2013) and Parker (2014).  
To explain the position, contribution and relevance of this exploratory study of serial 
entrepreneurship, more precisely the key themes, questions and controversies of the field of study 
are introduced in this section.    
 
1.2.1 An Upward-Sloping Experience Curve?  
The potential benefits of researching habitual entrepreneurs were first highlighted by MacMillan 
(1986) who called for the codification of their skills and techniques to really learn about 
entrepreneurship. However, Starr and Bygrave’s (1991) analysis of six cases in the then new 
computer industry cast doubt on MacMillan’s hypothesis of an upward sloping experiential learning 
curve.  Instead, Starr and Bygrave (1991) induced a theory of experiential ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’.  
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Schollhammer’s (1991) quantitative study also finds a non-linear relationship between experience 
and business performance.  Starr and Bygrave’s (1992) follow-up paper asks for attention to be paid 
to the contribution of different types of human capital such as start-up and specific industry 
experience.  The paper provides the genesis of this thesis by asking for specific research into how 
one business is related to the next or the nth new business.  
1.2.2 Experience, Expertise and ‘Picking Winners’ 
The search for successful or winning entrepreneurial behaviour is a major theme of entrepreneurial 
research.  Despite inherent difficulties of finding a reliable positive relationship between experience 
(i.e. the number of start-ups) and venture performance, first posited by Starr and Bygrave (1991), 
studies to discern the impact of increasing human capital of successful habitual entrepreneurs on 
successive venture outcomes has remained a focus of research.  The collective results of many 
quantitative studies are inconsistent (Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch, 2011).  Furthermore, the 
hypothesis that habitual entrepreneurs should perform better than novices is also not consistently 
supported (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2006; Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, and Binks, 
2005).  Consequently, Starr and Bygrave’s original assets and liabilities theory of habitual 
entrepreneurship derived from qualitative research continues to influence current thinking (e.g. 
Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright, 2009).  Consequently, there remain calls for more qualitative 
longitudinal cross-industry studies to unpick some of the complex processes that lie behind the 
relationship between entrepreneurial experience and returns to entrepreneurship.  This 
investigation of serial entrepreneurship is a response to these calls. 
1.2.3 The Relatedness of Ventures: The Corridor Principle 
A basic theory of the career path of habitual entrepreneurs and the origins of the opportunities they 
choose to exploit is proposed in the corridor principal (Ronstadt, 1986; 1988).  The corridor principal 
proposes simply that having one business leads to new opportunities not available to nascent 
entrepreneurs contemplating entry into entrepreneurship for the first time.  Furthermore, the 
career path of a habitual entrepreneur may be held in a corridor by path dependencies and other 
restrictions related to available resource options (McGrath, 1996) and prior experience 
(Venkataraman, 1997).  Habitual entrepreneurs are somewhat immune to new knowledge (e.g. 
Gruber, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2012; 2013).  Overall, it is expected that ventures 
within a series will be related to one another.  This study provides evidence as to how related they 
are in practice and the underlying process that determines the degree of relatedness.  
1.2.4 Imitative or Innovative Ventures?  
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Do the corridor principle and related effects, such as path dependency, make serial entrepreneurs 
intrinsically less innovative?  The sources and degree of newness have traditionally received scant 
attention in the literature (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012) and there is current research into the 
effects of corridors and prior knowledge on innovation (e.g. Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 
2013).  A narrow corridor of ventures related by prior knowledge (Shane, 2000), while consistent 
with the economic theory of increasing returns to the specialisation of entrepreneurial labour, 
appears to run counter to the entrepreneur’s role as innovator.  Schumpeter’s (1934; 1942) idea of 
the innovative and creative entrepreneur, and Kirzner’s (1973) alert entrepreneur pursuing new 
opportunities hitherto unnoticed by others, are central to the theory of entrepreneurship.  
Innovative opportunities are considered to have greater wealth creation potential (Fiet, 2002; 
Shane, 2000), and hence greater economic significance.  Entrepreneurship is also exercised by 
imitators who exploit opportunities exposed by the innovators (Kirzner, 1973).  The exploitation of 
imitative opportunities is a necessary economic activity to spread information about new more 
efficient resource combinations throughout the economy.  The prevailing wisdom is that existing 
entrepreneurs are bounded by current knowledge, so much so that Aldrich and Ruef (2006) assume 
that only nascent entrepreneurs are innovative and create new forms of business.  
In fact, there is some evidence that habitual entrepreneurs use their experience to find more and 
more innovative opportunities (Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright, 2009), and recent research 
(Gruber, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2012; 2013) suggests that the value of external 
information sources outside a narrow corridor is constrained by prior knowledge.  Accordingly, this 
thesis contributes further theory grounded in new empirical evidence, as to the nature of venture 
corridors, career paths and the origins of innovative and imitative opportunities.  
1.2.5 The Coexistence of Entrepreneurial Persistence and Failure   
Serial entrepreneurs are unique in that they exit one venture before starting the next.  The 
entrepreneurial process is more than just the creation of a new venture and does not end with 
creation, it ends with exit (DeTienne, 2010).  Venture exit is an important economic force.  Exit 
drives the economic theory of entrepreneurial selection (Lucas, 1978; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 
1995). Moreover, exit experience is a type of entrepreneurial human capital often overlooked in the 
research literature.   
Some human capital and performance studies (Parker, 2010; Schollhammer, 1991, Toft-Kehler, 
Wennberg and Kim, 2014) show that returns to entrepreneurial experience are non-linear i.e. ‘up 
and down’.  Therefore, over the course of a career, many if not most serial entrepreneurs do not just 
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inherit an assets and liabilities balance sheet of human capital, but must also face alternating periods 
of relative economic success and relative difficulty.  Exit after an outright failure, with a bankrupt 
firm, results in serious economic and other consequential losses.  Exits after the successful sale of a 
business as a ‘going concern’ can increase personal wealth substantially and provide available 
liquidity for the next venture.  Persistent serial entrepreneurs must be able in some way to smooth 
out the effects of these ‘swings and roundabouts’.  This essential part of the serial entrepreneurial 
process is of great interest to researchers.    
How serial entrepreneurs deal with the negative consequences of the venture failure ‘impostor’ has 
become an important and contemporary theme (e.g. Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1997; Sarasvathy, 
Menon, and Kuechle, 2013).  Both successful and unsuccessful exits lead to a change in personal 
wealth, the revaluation of prior knowledge, and completely new learning that together must impact 
the process of re-entry.  The entrepreneurial process of repeatedly climbing back into the 
‘entrepreneurial ring’ to compete again requires deeper investigation if we are to understand the 
sequence of ventures.  
1.2.6 Serial vs. Portfolio Entrepreneurship  
Another reason for studying serial entrepreneurs is that recent research suggests that there are 
significant economic performance differences between serial and portfolio entrepreneurship 
(Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012a; Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 2010).  
Unlike serials who exit their firms before starting the next, portfolios found clusters or groups of 
businesses.  Several studies by Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright show that serial entrepreneurs 
are, in some ways, more similar in behaviours and outcomes to much less experienced novice ‘one-
time’ entrepreneurs.  Indeed, recent progress in the development of a theory of serial vs. portfolio 
vs. novice entrepreneurship by Parker (2014) rests on this evidence of relative performance.  Serials 
perform less well because they have less ability to implement opportunities compared to portfolio 
entrepreneurs and take on more risky opportunities (Parker, 2014).   
The theory of serial and portfolio entrepreneurship has been developing separately for a while.  
Research of portfolio entrepreneurs has stolen the march on the study of serial entrepreneurs.    
Empirical research of diversifying portfolio entrepreneurs led by Rosa (1998), and extended to 
farmers (Alsos and Kaikkonen 2004; Alsos, Ljunggren and Pettersen, 2003; Alsos and Carter, 2006) 
and small manufacturers (Iacobucci, 2002, Iacobucci, and Rosa, 2005) stress the importance of 
resources.  Perhaps controversially, Iacobucci and Rosa (2004) maintain that the relatively modern 
evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974) better explains 
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portfolio entrepreneurship than the longstanding theory of individual entrepreneurship (Cantillion, 
1775).  Parker (2014) postulates that resource-based advantages provide portfolio entrepreneurship 
a clear economic advantage over serial entrepreneurship. 
The theory of serial entrepreneurship is not static.  It is postulated that serials benefit from a form of 
pseudo sequential diversification over their careers (Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013).  This 
study is an opportunity to close the gap between serial and portfolio research by exploring recent 
theoretical advances.  The study reviews other related areas of research such as incubation (Cooper, 
1985) and entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and Harrison, 2006), and make additional contributions 
to the theory of serial entrepreneurship derived from a multi-voiced narrative of the careers of 24 
entrepreneurs.  This thesis is a timely and relevant addition to a developing field of 
entrepreneurship. 
1.3 Section 3. Outline of Subsequent Thesis Chapters 
1.3.1 Chapter 2 Theories of Serial Entrepreneurship 
This chapter reviews the wide range of explanatory frameworks applicable in an exploratory study of 
serial entrepreneurs.  It summarises and guides further detailed analysis and review in the following 
chapter. 
1.3.2 Chapter 3 The Constructs of Serial Entrepreneurship Research  
Serial entrepreneurship sits within the broader field of habitual entrepreneurship.  This chapter 
introduces the main constructs of habitual entrepreneurship to distinguish between serial and 
portfolio founding and other forms of habitual entrepreneurship.   It provides insights into how 
current literature must be assessed, and reviews the choices of construct required by the researcher.  
1.3.3 Chapter 4 Habitual Entrepreneurship: Theory and Evidence  
This chapter scrutinises and evaluates in detail what is known about habitual entrepreneurs and the 
main sub-types of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.  The chapter is divided into a number of 
sections which were summarised and introduced in Chapter 2.   
1.3.4 Chapter 5 Research Questions, Constructs and Measurement 
The literature review is followed by the development of the exploratory research questions of the 
thesis by responding to calls made from within the extant literature, and synthesising key themes in 
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the literature. The chapter defines additional research constructs and measurement techniques 
required to answer the research questions. 
1.3.5 Chapter 6 Research Methodology 
The chapter sets out the methodological approach used to address the research questions.  It shows 
that the research employed a pragmatic and scientific approach using case studies of 
entrepreneurial careers and venture genealogies.  The chapter explains the research paradigm 
adopted, the research design and its implementation including an assessment of the reliability and 
validity of the thesis.   
1.3.6 Chapter 7 Data Analysis and Research Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the exploration of 26 case studies of habitual entrepreneurs.  
The findings focus on the study of 24 multiple founders, 21 serial entrepreneurs and 3 portfolio 
entrepreneurs.  2 mixed cases are also analysed. The results of the study are interpreted and 
conclusions drawn that address the research questions.   
1.3.7 Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter provides an overview of the study outcomes.  It examines the implications of the study 
for both the theory and practice of entrepreneurship.  The limitations of the study are discussed, 
concluding with recommendations for future research. 
1.4 Chapter Summary  
This thesis is positioned to make an empirical and theoretical contribution to the understanding of 
serial entrepreneurship.  This is an in-depth within and cross-case analysis of the careers of 21 serial 
entrepreneurs and their 112 start-up ventures conducted using a pragmatic methodology, 
supplemented and triangulated with 3 cases of portfolio entrepreneurs, and 2 cases of careers that 
mix inherited, acquired and founded ventures.  Collectively these cases offer a multi-voiced narrative 
of their perspective on the experience of serial entrepreneurship and contrasting forms of habitual 
entrepreneurship.  Serial entrepreneurs are distinct from other entrepreneurs because of their 
unique experience and expertise in the cyclical pattern of venture creation, exit and re-entry.  This 
thesis is a timely and relevant addition to the developing field of serial entrepreneurship.  
  
23 
 
2 CHAPTER 2 
                                 Theories of Serial Entrepreneurship 
This chapter introduces the relevant literature. Serial entrepreneurship sits within the broader field 
of habitual entrepreneurship.  Researchers have not always distinguished between the different sub-
types of habitual entrepreneur: founders, acquirers, inheritors, serials and portfolios.  This chapter 
reviews the wide range of explanatory frameworks applicable to an exploratory study of serial 
entrepreneurship.  Chapter 3 reviews the definitions of the various forms of habitual 
entrepreneurship and critically appraises the use of constructs in the extant literature.  Following 
this discussion, Chapter 4 provides a considered and detailed review and analysis of the empirical 
contribution of the literature of habitual entrepreneurship relevant to this specific study of serial 
entrepreneurs.   
2.1 Section 1.  Economic Theories of Entrepreneurial Participation and Selection 
Birley and Westhead (1993) characterised the field of habitual entrepreneurship as having no single 
theory to facilitate hypothesis formation and testing.  However, rapid progress is now being made.  
Plehn-Dujowich (2010) has extended economic theory to serial entrepreneurship allowing a return 
to entrepreneurship after firm failure.  Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle (2013) posit that serial 
careers can succeed even if some firms fail due to learning that causes a form of pseudo 
diversification.  Parker (2014) has proposed a theory of novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurship.  
Here portfolio entrepreneurship is posited as being economically superior to both serial and novice 
entrepreneurship.  All ask for further empirical research and theoretical development.  Overall, as 
the review of the literature will demonstrate, there remain many unanswered calls for further 
research.  In particular, there are significant gaps in our understanding of serial entrepreneurs.     
2.1.1 Returns to Entrepreneurship: Risk Taking vs. Entrepreneurial Ability 
Economic theory views entrepreneurship within a general model of income choice between 
employment and entrepreneurship.  An individual’s income varies according to their willingness to 
bear entrepreneurial risk (Knight, 1921), and in equilibrium the wage adjusts to the point where the 
supply of workers is equal to the entrepreneurial risk bearing demand for labour (Khilstrom and 
Laffont, 1979). Risk bearing capacity is still important in current thinking.  Serial entrepreneurs are 
posited to have a higher risk preference than portfolio and novice entrepreneurs (Parker, 2014).  
Theories of entrepreneurial choice determined by risk preference are heavily criticised by Shane 
(2000) and Samuelsson and Davidsson (2009) for assuming that all entrepreneurs have the same 
24 
 
ability.  The alternative economic theory is that entrepreneurs are matched to suitable opportunities 
according to their ability.   
Human Capital and Entrepreneurial Ability 
Ability based economic theories emphasise the distribution of entrepreneurial talent as a form of 
human capital. The term entrepreneurial ability is often used interchangeably with talent, business 
acumen or judgement.  Ability is the human capital component required to generate superior 
economic rents from a given set of resources and circumstances (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  For 
Lucas (1978), talent is a fusion of entrepreneurial, managerial and ownership human capital that is 
matched to firms, such that in equilibrium the most able entrepreneurs run the best performing 
firms. As an entrepreneur’s talent is not known in advance, individuals can only learn about their 
actual acumen by running a business (Jovanovic, 1982).  If they learn they are economically efficient, 
they stay in the industry and expand output; if inefficient they exit and return to employment.  Here, 
entrepreneurial learning has a narrow definition; it is only learning about one’s ability.   It is also 
context dependent in being industry specific.  Favourable costs will raise the firm’s expected 
earnings in that industry, however, not to the same extent in another industry (Jovanovic, 1982).  
Furthermore, ability should not be confused with expertise.  Expertise is assumed to be capable of 
development through experience and learning (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Politis 2005).  Talent is 
assumed to be fixed.  
2.1.2 Economic Selection by Ability: Exit and Re-entry 
Holmes and Schmitz (1990; 1995) extend Lucas’s (1978) thesis of the economic selection through 
entrepreneurial talent to include habitual entrepreneurship.  As new and better opportunities arise 
in the economy, entrepreneurs must transfer the current viable businesses through sale, delegation 
or abandonment in order to pursue them.  Therefore, entrepreneurs are subject to a dynamic 
economic division and specialisation of labour, matching entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities.  
Those with high ability, (i.e. a Ricardian comparative advantage in entrepreneurship), transfer and 
start new firms.  Low ability types prefer to keep existing businesses and/or acquire firms.   
Furthermore, and supported by some evidence, Holmes and Schmitz predict that when examining 
the pattern of success and failure, the probability of business failure (a mismatch between the 
opportunity and the entrepreneur) decreases with the age of the business.  In addition, it is the high 
quality businesses that are sold.  Plehn-Dujowich (2010) refine their work into a theory of serial 
entrepreneurship.  Serial entrepreneurs either maintain the current business, or shut it down and 
then either exit entrepreneurship, or launch a new venture incurring a serial start-up cost.  High-skill 
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serial entrepreneurs shut down businesses of low quality until a high quality business is found.  High-
skill serial entrepreneurs never permanently exit entrepreneurship because they enjoy a 
comparative advantage in start-up costs, access to start-up capital, and are able to earn above the 
returns available to their labour.  
Therefore, persistent serial starter entrepreneurs are more likely to have high ability.  Researchers 
would expect to observe start-ups following exits from relatively short lived ventures, of which there 
may be several until the right one is found, and start-ups following an exit by sale of relatively long 
lived and hence high quality businesses. The theory is not completely clear on what happens 
following the sale of a high quality business. Logically, if the serial entrepreneur has not reached 
retirement age they return to start a business of at least similar quality.    
Plehn-Dujowich’s extended model that follows that of Holmes and Schmitz is still rather tentative in 
its treatment of outright failure or bankruptcy, assuming an orderly, managed closure.  The effects of 
outright and costly failure on re-entry remain in need of further thought.  Start-up costs following a 
failed venture are likely to be much higher than those after a successful exit by sale.  Costs include 
dealing with previous economic losses and the cost effects of barriers to start-up resources, 
including the loss of creditworthiness, reputation and other forms of tradable social capital, and also 
the costs arising from a loss of self-confidence.   There is probably a finite number of tries before a 
serial entrepreneur finds either a suitable opportunity that generates success or quits 
entrepreneurship.  It can be expected that the number of tries increases in proportion with the 
ability of the serial entrepreneur to find opportunities and husband and redeploy resources during 
their career.  
2.1.3 Liquidity Theory and Entrepreneurial Intentions 
One such resource, liquidity (i.e. the ready availability of financial capital) is likely to have significant 
impact on the probability and type of re-entry.  Capital markets do not provide enough liquidity to 
entrepreneurs due to the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection (Knight, 1921).  Liquidity 
constraints ensure the would-be entrepreneur must bear most of the risk inherent in his or her 
venture.  Only later once the firm is established do institutional investors perceive less risk and 
provide capital (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).  Therefore, for new entrants and the less successful 
returning serial entrepreneurs, personal savings and loans from friends and relatives are critical to 
business formation.   
In contrast, successful talented serial entrepreneurs selling high quality businesses will be more 
liquid after exit.  Consequently, they will have more options for the type and size of opportunity to 
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pursue, and are more likely to achieve greater returns.  However, if an entrepreneur is unable to 
remain liquid on exit, or cannot convince financiers of their innate talent, or that they have learned 
from their experiences, they are unlikely to return to entrepreneurship.  Less successful serial 
entrepreneurs are likely to return via opportunities that have low costs of detection and 
exploitation.   Personal resources are likely to be an explanatory feature of the career trajectories of 
serial entrepreneurs.  There is some evidence (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks, 2005; 
Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997b) that serial entrepreneurs have a distinct preference to start-up 
using their own resources, thereby self-limiting their liquidity.   
2.2 Section 2. Human Capital Theories of Habitual Entrepreneurship  
Habitual entrepreneurship is essential to the economic selection and matching of entrepreneurs to 
opportunities. This process results in widespread and important economic efficiencies.  Other 
theories of habitual entrepreneurship can be positioned within this process from the perspective of 
the interaction of opportunities, individual entrepreneurs, and their firms.  Chief among them is 
individual human capital theory and related areas of learning, cognition and teams.  Like economic 
selection, human capital theories predict that the serial entrepreneurs will start businesses for which 
they have the requisite talents, skills and abilities.  Human capital is dynamic in that entrepreneurs 
are exposed to new information.  They process information using their ability to think and to learn to 
update and revalue their situation and subsequent future decisions and actions.  
2.2.1 Entrepreneurial Human Capital  
The bulk of habitual entrepreneurship research takes an individual human capital perspective.  The 
basic premise of human capital theory (Becker, 1964; 1993; Castinas and Helfat, 1992; 2001) is 
founded on economic principles.  Entrepreneurs should earn a return commensurate with their 
human capital, their abilities, skills and talents.  Therefore, entrepreneurial human capital should be 
positively related to firm performance.  Innate talent is measured by researchers indirectly from the 
economic performance of the entrepreneur’s firm.  Other direct measures of economic returns to 
human capital, such as private personal income or net wealth are more difficult data to access and 
much less used.   As it is difficult to measure talent directly, it is assumed to be cognitive in nature 
(e.g. Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  Other researchers focus on more accessible measures of human 
capital such as counts of discrete instances of start-up experience (e.g. Cassar, 2014; Oe, and 
Mitsuhashi, 2013).   
Human capital is most often conceptualised as a stock.  Stocks of human capital are employed as 
situational talents, abilities, skills or expertise.  Depending on the theoretical stance taken, relevant 
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entrepreneurial human capital can be either innate and largely fixed, or variable and accumulated 
through learning.  Human capital when conceptualised as a variable stock also encompasses notions 
of depreciation, dissipation and unlearning (e.g. Parker, 2013).  Successful serial entrepreneurs 
either possess fixed innate talents (Jovanovic, 1982), or alternatively accumulate the right kinds of 
experience rising up a learning curve reusing learning in subsequent ventures (MacMillan, 1986; 
Politis, 2005; 2008). A compromise view proposed here drawn from the review of the literature, is 
that serial entrepreneurs do learn and that talent and learning are intrinsically the same cognitive 
ability.  Effective learning is a type of talent that enhances ability through experience and repeated 
practice.  
Assets and Liabilities Theory 
However, human capitaI theory relies on there being ‘spill-over’ effects from one venture to the 
next. In the assets and liabilities theory of habitual entrepreneurship Starr and Bygrave (1991) 
question the assumptions of the existence of a learning curve and that accumulated human capital is 
always an advantage in the next venture.  Their qualitative study of a handful of habitual 
entrepreneurs within the US computer industry reveals that success in one venture does not always 
confer a transferrable advantage to the next.   Prior experience builds a set of mainly intangible 
cognitive and social capital endowments. These can act either as assets or liabilities in the specific 
context of the next venture.  
 Reuber and Fischer (1994; 1999) provide a powerful critique of all simplistic human capital and firm 
performance studies.  They maintain it is not the stock of human capital that is the independent 
variable, rather it is what happens during the course of a venture or the ‘flow’ effects of learning 
that are most important.  Therefore, major events such as failure are likely to be significant in the 
formation of very specific entrepreneurial human capital.  It is the skill or ability to make sense of 
and learn from these ‘transformational’ events documented in qualitative studies by Cope (2003; 
2005; 2011) that is expected to be a feature of serial entrepreneurship.  As already noted, 
Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle (2013) predict that persistent serial entrepreneurs recover from failure 
and transfer what they have learned into the next venture.  
Entrepreneurial Teams 
Another weakness of human capital as the explanatory variable is that it ignores the contribution of 
the whole founding team and other members of what de Koning (2003) calls the ‘inner circle’.   
Team diversity and stability are associated successful behaviours (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1990).  However, this benefit may limit the range of venture opportunities due to ‘group think’ 
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(Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 2012) because it has been shown that serial entrepreneurs tend to work 
with the same trusted partner in several start-ups (Gemmell, Boland and Kolb, 2012). 
Human Capital and Venture Performance 
In spite of the inherent difficulties very many studies test the intuitive hypothesis that stocks of 
human capital will be positively associated with venture performance.  Much of what we know 
about habitual entrepreneurship comes from these studies. Within this body of research empirical 
studies by Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright with their collaborators since 1997 explore the behavioural 
and performance differences between novice, portfolio and serial entrepreneurs.   
Overall, as posited in the assets and liabilities theory (Starr and Bygrave, 1991), the evidence shows a 
positive relationship between stocks of human capital and performance but it is at best inconsistent 
and returns to performance are often non-linear (Parker, 2013; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 
2014; Schollhammer, 1991).  The most recent longitudinal studies of habitual entrepreneurs 
predicated on the learning from experience theory of human capital (e.g. Oe and Mitsuhashi, 2013; 
Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014) indicate that context specific human capital, such as industry 
experience when starting a business in the same industry ‘corridor’ is usually advantageous.  This 
conclusion adds to early work by Vesper (1980) and Schollhammer (1991) that noticed that many 
habitual entrepreneurs tend to start subsequent businesses in the same or a related industry.  The 
ventures of serial entrepreneurs are likely to benefit economically from the maintenance and reuse 
of industry content and context specific human capital (Chandler, 1996), and most likely also other 
resources that promote the specialisation of entrepreneurial human capital and returns to 
experience.    
Entrepreneurial Talent 
The alternative innate talent theory of human capital has also produced recent empirical work in 
support of its hypothesis (e.g. Chen 2013; Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  Here following Jovanovic’s 
work, entrepreneurial learning is only learning about one’s abilities and precludes experiential 
learning by doing.  Entrepreneurial talent is discovered and remains fixed, as no amount of 
entrepreneurial experience leads to talent enhancing learning.  In a special form of selection theory 
called ‘success breeds success’ (Eesley and Roberts, 2012), talented entrepreneurs are more likely to 
succeed in their initial ventures, and these successes are then likely to motivate them to found more 
and similarly successful firms.  Failed but returning serial entrepreneurs are assumed not to learn, 
being as successful as novice entrepreneurs (Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2010).  Furthermore, 
Eesley and Roberts (2012) contend that the most highly talented do not rely on industry experience, 
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though it can be useful. Therefore, researchers can be expected to observe talented serial 
entrepreneurs succeeding in different industries, pursuing the best opportunities, wherever they 
may be.  
Relative Performance: Novice vs. Serial vs. Portfolio Entrepreneurship 
In a related stream of the literature, the relative performance of novice, serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs is compared.  Evidence suggests that portfolio entrepreneurs have different 
behaviours and perform better than both serial and novice entrepreneurs (Robson, Akuetteh, 
Westhead and Wright, 2012a; 2012b; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks, 2005). The 
explanation postulated by Parker (2014) is that portfolio entrepreneurs benefit from related 
diversifications in the same industry, and also unrelated diversifications to spread portfolio risk.   
The very large area of human capital inspired research literature is assessed in the first three 
sections of the next chapter, and the literature on entrepreneurial teams as it applies to habitual 
entrepreneurs is reviewed in Chapter 4, section 6.  Overall, one can conclude that deep industry 
specific experience is more valuable than broad experience, and learning and talent are related 
cognitive abilities.  
2.2.2 Entrepreneurial Cognition 
Entrepreneurial talent is ascribed by researchers to cognitive ability (Eesley and Roberts, 2012; 
Mitchell, Busenitz, Bird, Gaglio, McMullen, Morse and Smith, 2007).  As cognition is a ‘resource’ 
required for learning and for the synthesis of new and prior knowledge when making judgments, it is 
subject to economic theories of resource allocation.  The comparative advantage of entrepreneurs 
stems from two scarce economic resources: access to information and the cognitive ability to 
process it (Casson, 2005b; Venkataraman, 1997).  By dint of their greater experience and expertise, 
habitual entrepreneurs should have more of both.  Expert entrepreneurs are expected to 
demonstrate superior cognitive abilities such as metacognition and mindfulness honed through 
practice (Baron and Henry, 2010; Rerup, 2005).  People will discover and exploit specific 
opportunities that others cannot see when information asymmetries and history-dependent 
accumulation of experience exist (Shane, 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  However, specific 
cognition processes are difficult to isolate and measure outside of controlled laboratory 
experiments.  Nevertheless, persistent serial entrepreneurs can be expected to be observed using 
opportunity specific sources of information judiciously and creatively, and with some self-awareness.    
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The relevant literature on expert cognition and its relationship to the entrepreneurial talent of 
habitual entrepreneurs are further reviewed and discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.  
2.2.3 Entrepreneurial Learning: Success and Failure 
The fixed nature of talent and the absence of talent enhancing learning are rejected by most 
contributors (e.g. Politis, 2005; 2008) who maintain the existence of an entrepreneurial learning 
curve proposed by MacMillan (1986).  The serial entrepreneur learns how to augment their original 
endowment of entrepreneurial skills and talents thus changing their expectations of future profits 
from entrepreneurship and making them more likely to re-enter even if their venture fails (Stam, 
Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  Should they fail and need finance to start again they can 
demonstrate to financiers what they have learned and convince them to back them again. Indeed 
the venture capital industry values experience (Hsu, Haynie, Simmons, and McKelvie, 2014) and 
failed serial entrepreneurs with suitable experience do still receive venture capital backing 
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2010).  
Learning from Failure  
As previously noted, learning and failure are related streams of literature of habitual 
entrepreneurship, where ‘learning the hard way’ (Stokes and Wilson, 2002) should lead to a 
profound reassessment and learning by the entrepreneur (Cope, 2011).   In effectual theories of 
expert entrepreneurship, failing firms and successful careers are not mutually exclusive (Sarasvathy, 
2001; Sarasvathy, 2004; Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle, 2013).  Habitual entrepreneurship requires 
talented cognitively intelligent individuals to ‘infect’ the next venture with learning from both 
success and failure.  
Entrepreneurial learning forms a substantial part of the literature related to habitual entrepreneurs 
and is reviewed in Chapter 4, section 5.   
2.2.4 Venture Exit: The Missing Piece?  
Exit is an essential part of the entrepreneurial process (DeTienne, 2010).  It is needed for economic 
models of selection, and requires a financial decision to ‘harvest’ or ‘liquidate’ an investment 
(Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 2010).  However, exit experience is generally missing 
from the list of types of entrepreneurial human capital used in venture performance studies.  By 
definition, serial entrepreneurs have more experience of exit and re-entry than other entrepreneurs.  
How serial entrepreneurs are affected by a positive or negative exit is of central interest in 
understanding the relationship between a serial entrepreneur’s sequence of start-ups.  Clearly, it is 
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central to both sides of the business performance equation. The post-conditions or outputs of one 
venture, including learning, liquidity and other resource positions form the pre-conditions or inputs 
for the next.    
In reality success and failure may not be such contrasting ‘black’ or ‘white’ outcomes (Headd, 2003, 
Rerup, 2006). Entrepreneurs have different performance thresholds of actual performance that 
trigger the decision to terminate their businesses (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo 1997), and by 
extension should show differential levels of determination and persistence in the face of difficulties. 
The literature on venture exit is reviewed in section 7 of Chapter 4.  
2.3 Section 3. The Corridor Principle, Path Dependencies and Real Options  
The theme of this review of the literature is that habitual entrepreneurship can be positioned within 
a process that matches experienced entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities.  Human capital theory 
explains the actions of individual entrepreneurs.  In essence they predict that serial entrepreneurs 
are subject to the economics of the division and specialisation of labour that will have a bearing on 
the sequence of start-ups.  Another group of theories take a wider resource perspective.  These 
approaches reveal more about the likely sequence of ventures started by a serial entrepreneur.   
2.3.1 The Corridor Principal  
A key postulate is that the current business is instrumental in determining the future trajectory of 
habitual entrepreneurs. They follow ‘corridors’ of related ventures.  A current venture enables the 
perception of opportunities not available to nascent entrepreneurs.  The corridor principle 
(Ronstadt, 1984; 1988) holds simply that one business leads to another and the corridor or ‘direction 
of travel’ of a serial entrepreneur’s career is likely to have a mixture of serendipitous, evolutionary 
and perhaps irreversible (i.e. path dependent) qualities.  Lower economic returns from earlier 
ventures may be acceptable if they provide entry to subsequent ventures with higher returns 
(Ronstadt, 1988).  Individual ventures then generate ‘options’, to the next venture and are not an 
end in themselves.  This view is more subtle than that taken in conventional business performance 
studies, but is consistent with the views of effectual theorists (e.g. Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle, 
2013) who maintain that it is the overall career of a serial entrepreneur that should be assessed.   
The corridor principle is conceptually rather opaque, without a strong predictive framework, other 
than that ventures will be related in some way.  Theoretically entrepreneurs can follow a number of 
different types of corridor, such as: industry, technology, or even more specific product or customer 
corridors.   
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Path Dependencies: Does History Matter? 
The corridor principle links the future path of a serial entrepreneur to their past.  Therefore, 
research should involve an assessment of the past as a source of explanatory variables, i.e. there is 
an explicit assumption as Arthur (1989) shows that ‘history matters’.  Human capital theory with its 
emphasis on the assets and liabilities of prior experience and spill-over effects is inherently path 
dependent.  Baron and Ensley (2006) find evidence for well-developed cognitive templates that 
facilitate the reuse of experience. The most influential economic theory of entrepreneurial learning 
by Minniti and Bygrave (2001) predicts reinforcement of existing patterns of behaviour even though 
they may be sub-optimal, and the search for opportunities is similarly constrained within known 
information channels (Fiet, 1996) and knowledge corridors (Venkataraman, 1997).   
When our understanding of corridors, path dependencies and human capital theory are combined 
with some evidence (e.g. Chen, 2013; Schollhammer, 1991), it is expected that the majority of 
portfolio and serial entrepreneurs are most likely to start new ventures in the same industry corridor 
so as to specialise and reuse prior knowledge.  
2.3.2 Real Options Theory 
While a corridor gives preferential access to future opportunities, perhaps constrained by past 
choices and investments, real options show how the corridor might provide a platform, a jumping-
off point through a set of relatively low-cost options for future action.  Options exploit the 
entrepreneur’s base of accumulated human capital and other resources.  The real options theory of 
habitual entrepreneurship (McGrath, 1996) incorporates uncertainty (Knight, 1921), the resource 
view (Wemerfelt, 1984), asset parsimony (Starr and MacMillan, 1990), evolutionary economics 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and entrepreneurial opportunities (Bowman and Hurry, 1993).  Real 
options need the presence of an opportunity to amplify them (McGrath, 1997) where the net 
present value of future opportunities is increased by making incremental resource investment in an 
uncertain decision space (McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow, 2004).  Option development involves 
costs such as market research or development and trial of a test product (McGrath, 1996), or as 
proposed by Ronstadt (1988) starting a new venture.  Social capital in the absence of real assets can 
be used to obtain real resources at reduced costs (McGrath, 1996).  The habitual entrepreneur’s 
social network gives access to a large number of options and latent opportunities.  Social capital can 
reinforce existing corridors or open new corridors.  Should the window of opportunity close the 
investments are lost.  Even in negative circumstances of losses and venture failure, habitual 
entrepreneurs using real options are likely to see these events as part of a wider learning and 
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information acquisition process (McGrath, 1999).  A view taken up in later effectual theories of serial 
entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle, 2013) emphasises small scale entry and 
experimentation.  In summary, real options predicts that serial and portfolio entrepreneurs will be 
observed evolving their next venture from a set of options, related to previous experience such as 
previous ventures. 
The important role of social capital in complementing human capital and other resources is reviewed 
and discussed in Chapter 4, section 6.  
2.3.3 Knowledge and Resource Corridors 
Many contributors emphasise the strong effects of corridors in predicting start-up decisions by 
habitual entrepreneurs.  
Habitual entrepreneurs become specialised and stuck in a particular industry or wedded to one kind 
of technology.  Path-dependent developments will make it increasingly difficult for agents to deviate 
from their initial decisions (Gruber, 2010).  However, returns to specialisation make perfect sense 
when the industry is growing, but not when better opportunities are available in other industries.  
Economists look to entrepreneurs to innovate and even create new industries.  Narrow corridors 
seem incompatible with Schumpeter’s (1934) innovative entrepreneur. 
Knowledge Corridors   
There are also ‘knowledge corridors’ (Venkataraman, 1997).  Option development and deployment is 
limited by current knowledge (McGrath, 1999) and the availability and cost of new information 
(Casson, 1982).  Corridor pathways are constrained by the cognitive information and information 
processing capabilities of serial entrepreneurs, limiting their ability to identify and exploit other 
perhaps superior opportunities.  However, it should be possible to escape the knowledge corridor by 
sourcing new knowledge from outside the firm (Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 2008).  In addition, 
in-depth knowledge of a specific technology should create new knowledge corridors that lead to 
radical and innovative opportunities (Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne, 2005).  Empirical evidence 
suggests that pre-existing knowledge endowments do constrain opportunity identification even in 
the presence of new information (Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson 2013; Shane, 2000) and it is 
expected that serial entrepreneurs will stay within corridors defined by prior knowledge. 
Resource Corridors  
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The sunk cost of existing assets acts like a low cost options contract that limits downside risk and is 
readily available (Bowman and Hurry, 1993).  The sunk cost of existing assets may also inhibit the 
factor's exit from a firm (Peteraf, 1993).  Resource based options are intrinsically path dependent in 
that they rely on relatively immobile, and inimitable resources (McGrath, 1996).  Options will be 
idiosyncratic in that they have high switching costs, cannot be easily sold, replaced or used 
elsewhere (Wernerfelt, 1984).  Resources of this type include the firm’s core technology and the 
product-market served (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002).  Indeed there is 
plenty of evidence from many studies of firm diversification and acquisitions, that returns from using 
organisation experience require similarity between past acquisitions and the present one (e.g. 
Greve, 2003) and narrow diversifiers should achieve higher returns (Peteraf, 1993).   
Significant physical assets and the knowledge to exploit them have a strong first order effect on 
opportunity recognition and pursuit by portfolio entrepreneurs.  From various studies of farm-based 
portfolio entrepreneurs, portfolio founders have a high number of potential opportunities and are 
better able than novice and serial founders to turn these shadow options into real options (Alsos and 
Kolvereid , 1998) for related diversifications (Alsos and Carter, 2006).  The combination of these 
various corridor effects is exhibited in the strong tendency of portfolio entrepreneurs to make 
related diversifications.  This pattern of related diversifications is so strong that the behaviour of 
small manufacturing portfolio entrepreneurs is thought better understood through the evolutionary 
resource-based theory of the firm.  Here the portfolio entrepreneur masters dependencies rather 
than seeks independence (Iacobucci and Rosa, 2004).  
The use of the evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm to explain portfolio entrepreneurship 
is reviewed further in Chapter 4, section 8.  
2.4 Section 4. Recent Developments in the Theory of Habitual Entrepreneurship 
2.4.1 Theory of Novice, Portfolio, and Serial Entrepreneurship 
Parker (2014) develops the theory of habitual entrepreneurship from a synthesis of a number of 
theoretical and empirical threads.  Parker postulates that novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs 
are distinguished by differences in entrepreneurial talent (Lucas, 1978) and preference for risk 
(Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979), which result in different opportunity recognition and exploitation 
behaviours.  Differences in ability are cognitive in nature (Brigham, De Castro and Shepherd, 2007; 
Kirzner, 1973).  Portfolio and serial entrepreneurs recognise more opportunities than novices (e.g. 
Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks, 2005).  However, portfolio entrepreneurs have superior 
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ability to exploit opportunities than both serials and novices (e.g. Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and 
Wright, 2012a; 2012b) due to the advantage in being able to make related diversifications.  
Portfolio entrepreneurs have a medium risk profile, preferring to exploit related opportunities due 
to path dependency (Gruber, 2010), the costs of searching widely for unrelated opportunities (Fiet, 
1996) and cognitive limitations.  Serial entrepreneurs have a higher preference for risk, and a lower 
exploitation ability, yet still take on progressively riskier opportunities.  Being more risk averse, 
portfolio entrepreneurs are expected to spread their risks through unrelated opportunities with 
negative covariance.  As a consequence of their comparative advantage in recognising and exploiting 
diversification opportunities, portfolio entrepreneurs enjoy greater returns than serials.  
The theory is a reflection about what is known about portfolio entrepreneurship, and Parker calls for 
further empirical investigation and theoretical contributions.  Nevertheless, there are still gaps in our 
knowledge of serial entrepreneurs, who are fundamentally different from portfolio entrepreneurs in 
exiting their ventures.  
2.4.2 Emergent Theory of Serial Entrepreneurship: Pseudo Diversification and 
Entrepreneurial Recycling  
An alternative theory of serial entrepreneurship can be synthesised from the extant research 
literature.  From this analysis it is suggested here that the economic advantage to portfolio 
entrepreneurship arising from a superior ability to find and exploit diversifying opportunities is not 
absolute.  Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle (2013) postulate that serial entrepreneurs have a form of 
pseudo diversification over their careers.  The construct of pseudo (i.e. ersatz) diversification is not 
clearly defined, requiring interpretation and further elaboration.  The process is driven by learning, 
in that entrepreneurs diversify away from factors that made them fail, while retaining the facets of 
successful ventures, and so do not start again from scratch.  This achieves the equivalent of an 
upward sloping learning curve though venture outcomes can be both positive and negative. 
The process of serial entrepreneurship with exit and re-entry will conform to many of the postulates 
of the corridor principle, real options and the evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm 
introduced and discussed in this chapter.  For serial entrepreneurs the process needs to take 
account of the exit, and the absence of a firm for a period of time.  Liquidity and other resource 
positions will vary depending on the outcome of the previous venture.  A basis for understanding the 
process of serial entrepreneurship is incubation, the process by which nascent entrepreneurs are 
incubated by employers (Cooper, 1985).  Incubation demonstrates how transfers of resources are 
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made between discrete ventures.  Furthermore, incubation predicts that the next venture is strongly 
related to the ‘host’ incubator, and hence, is highly likely to be a related diversification.  
Mason and Harrison (2006) analysed the career paths of five entrepreneurs.  Two became serial 
founders of businesses very similar in nature to their first venture.  They observed a process they call 
‘entrepreneurial recycling’ where resources recycled include: technology, former work colleagues, 
former employees, brand names, markets, local contacts and reputation in the business community.  
These recycled resources, arising from (i.e. incubated in) preceding firms support the exercise of real 
options and the evolution of the next business.  If this process is equivalent to pseudo diversification, 
then serial entrepreneurs accumulate learning that is not tied to an existing firm. This gives serial 
entrepreneurs preferential access to known (i.e. de-risked resources) whose costs are largely sunk.  
These economic advantages for the finding and exploitation of new opportunities may be equivalent 
to those of portfolio entrepreneurs.  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
There is now an emerging theory of serial, portfolio, and novice entrepreneurship.  Further synthesis 
brings related concepts and supporting evidence into a largely economic framework.  Individuals are 
selected into entrepreneurship on the basis of their attitude to risk or their entrepreneurial ability.  
Entrepreneurial ability can only be learned from participation and feedback.  There is a learned 
experience versus innate talent debate within human capital theory, likely resolved by assuming that 
both are cognitive in nature.  In selection theory, serial founders are high ability types who shut 
down low quality businesses to start again, though the cost makes the number of tries finite.  On the 
other hand, portfolio entrepreneurs can exploit the economic synergies of diversified business 
portfolios, and some evidence suggests that they seem to perform better than serials.  Evidence 
shows that serial entrepreneurs prefer to be self-funding, constraining liquidity.  This must reduce 
the size of the opportunity considered.   
Assets and liabilities theory states that measuring stocks of human capital without the detailed 
context of the newly created venture will not be correlated with venture outcomes.  This appears to 
be true, as the many performance studies expecting stocks of human capital to be matched with 
commensurate outcomes together provide inconclusive evidence.  Nevertheless, recent studies are 
consistent in showing returns to experience if start-ups are confined to the same industry corridor.  
Serial entrepreneurs are expected to develop higher order cognition as a result of experience.  
Experience of failure engenders significant transformational learning.  However, assets and liabilities 
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theory posits that any positive benefits of experience cannot be guaranteed to be relevant in 
subsequent ventures.  
Human capital and venture performance studies overlook the exit and re-entry experience of serial 
entrepreneurs, a subject of central interest to this thesis.  A number of different theories suggest 
that habitual entrepreneurship is confined to quite narrow corridors walled by prior knowledge, and 
other resource endowments, magnified by path dependencies.  This narrowness seems particularly 
true for portfolio entrepreneurs.  Researchers believe that portfolio entrepreneurship is best 
explained by the evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm, a theme amplified in recent 
developments.  An alternative view, focussed on the individual, is that serial entrepreneurs practise 
a form of effectual learning from venture to venture.  There is evidence that serials engage in a form 
of resource recycling.  Overall, the process of serial entrepreneurship has parallels with incubation, 
and serials are able to transfer knowledge and resource advantages to the next venture.  These ideas 
provide the basis for further theoretical development in this thesis.  
Chapter 2 has introduces the literature. Chapter 3 now examines the main constructs of serial 
entrepreneurship.   
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3 CHAPTER 3 
The Constructs of Serial Entrepreneurship Research 
Chapter 2 reviewed the wide range of explanatory frameworks applicable to an exploratory study of 
serial entrepreneurship.  Accordingly, because definitions and constructs should be derived from the 
consideration of the relevant theory, this chapter reviews the use of constructs in the relevant 
literature.  Following this discussion, Chapter 4 provides a detailed review and analysis of the 
empirical evidence.    
The serial founding of new enterprises sits within the broader field of habitual entrepreneurship.  
Chapter 2 discussed recent developments in the theory of entrepreneurship that make a separation 
between the main sub-types of entrepreneurship: novice portfolio and serial.  In this chapter the 
two main sub-types of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs are distinguished.  In addition, the 
theoretical and practical issues arising for conducting and positioning new research of serial 
entrepreneurs are critically evaluated.   
3.1 Section 1.  Types of Entrepreneurship: Habitual, Serial, Portfolio, Novice 
This thesis is positioned as part of efforts to unpick the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial behaviour.  
All such research need clearly defined constructs.  However, there is no generally accepted definition 
of a ‘habitual’ entrepreneur.  At the most general level, ‘habitus’ entrepreneurship is defined as an 
on-going entrepreneurial action born out of previous business ownership experience (Wright, 
Westhead, and Sohl, 1998).  Actual definitions vary from researcher to researcher.  A common 
reason is the practicalities of sampling and methods of analysis used to group the entrepreneurs 
(Westhead and Wright, 1998a).  The variety of definitions for the same or similar constructs presents 
an obstacle to a clear and consistent comparative review of the literature, the development of 
research questions and methodology, and the accurate positioning of new contributions.  
Consequently, they are discussed and evaluated here at the beginning of the thesis.  
3.1.1 Habitual Entrepreneurs: Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs  
Habitual entrepreneurs have multiple business ownership experience (Ucbasaran, Westhead, and 
Wright, 2009).  Classifications of habitual entrepreneurs typically employ two dimensions:  1) 
whether firms in a career occur serially, that is independently, one at a time, or in parallel, to form a 
portfolio; and 2) whether the entrepreneur is a founder of a new start-up, or the firm was already in 
existence and either purchased or inherited.   
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This 2 x 2 classification gives rise to 4 sub-types of habitual entrepreneurship, summarised in Table 
2.1. below.   
Number of Businesses  Existing Firms  New Firms  
One at a time(with exit 
from entrepreneurship) 
Serial Acquisition (Serial buy-
in, buy-out, outright 
purchase) Inheritance 
Serial Founding (Start-up) 
Several in parallel (without 
exit from 
entrepreneurship) 
Portfolio Acquisition  
 
Portfolio Founding  
 
Table 2.1 Categories of Habitual Entrepreneur – a development of Westhead and Wright (1998a) and 
Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright (2008).  
However, the common use of the general classification of habitual entrepreneur and its near 
substitutes can give rise to construct ambiguity when interpreting the literature. The term habitual 
entrepreneur was first coined by MacMillan (1986). Here they are individuals who enjoy the 
challenge of the start-up, rather than acquisition.  Then once the business is running smoothly it is 
‘handed over’ to professional management and the entrepreneur starts another business.  Handed 
over is ambiguous.  If it means they retain ownership and control then they are parallel founders, i.e. 
portfolio entrepreneurs.  If the business is sold in its entirety then they are serial founders.   
In the reality of real-world research, complex entrepreneurial careers often do not fall conveniently 
into the mutually exclusive categories given above.  New ventures may not be purely sequential; 
because start-ups can overlap with an initial venture (Ronstadt, 1984) and ‘intermediate’ habitual 
entrepreneurs both start and acquire businesses (Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  
Researchers needed to be prepared for such realities.  
It is hoped that in-depth qualitative case study research can conduct a more nuanced approach to 
the careers of entrepreneurs while pursuing a sharper and clearer understanding of the sub-type of 
serial founder entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, to address the challenge of heterogeneity and improve 
the understanding of habitual entrepreneurship, it is still important to distinguish between portfolio 
and serial entrepreneurs.  Many important studies (e.g. Westhead and Wright 1998a b; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, and Wright 2005a, b; Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2009; Wright, Robbie and 
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Ennew 1997a, b; Ucbasaran, Alsos, Westhead and Wright, 2008; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 
2006) make this distinction.  These and other studies provide empirical evidence that suggests that 
serial and portfolio entrepreneurs are distinct groups.  These distinctions have been important to 
recent theoretical and empirical development of the subject (e.g. Parker, 2014).  
Thesis Definition: Serial Entrepreneurship and the Importance of Exit 
The cycle of starting, exiting and re-entry to entrepreneurship using another start-up is the specific 
entrepreneurial process of central interest to this thesis.  Therefore, this study is of serial or 
‘sequential’ entrepreneurs who found multiple firms in a sequential ‘one at a time’ manner after 
exiting the previous venture (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, and Flores, 2010).  In contrast, portfolio 
entrepreneurs are multiple business owners who grow their total assets through starting several 
firms rather that growing one to its optimal limit (Rosa and Scott 1999a). To improve the clarity of 
this distinction, it is proposed that portfolio entrepreneurs are owners and managers of several firms 
in parallel and as a consequence do not exit entrepreneurship.  In contrast, serial entrepreneurs are 
often without a firm, or if overlap occurs they are in the process of disposing of one business to 
focus on the next.  
Construct Ambiguity and the Literature Review   
Having clear definitions does not remove the challenge of reviewing the literature clearly and 
consistently.  The term habitual appears to be going out of fashion.  Recent theoretical work 
(Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle, 2013) and qualitative studies (Gemmell, Boland and Kolb, 2012) label 
all multiple founders as serial entrepreneurs when more accurately they refer to habitual 
entrepreneurs.   The same ‘serial equals habitual’ convention is used in recent quantitative research 
(e.g. Eesley and Roberts, 2013; Hsu, 2007; Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 2012; Parker, 2013; Schaper, 
Mankelow, and Gibson, 2007; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014; Zhang, 2011). Consequently, it 
is difficult to both cite work accurately and report how the substantial body of empirical evidence 
relates specifically to serial or portfolio entrepreneurs.  
To further complicate matters, even the phenomenon of serial entrepreneurship as defined here 
(entry, exit and re-entry to entrepreneurship) may be labelled differently:  ‘multiple’ (Schollhammer, 
1991), ‘repeat’ (Baron and Ward, 2004), ‘revolving door’ (Hessels, Grilo, Thurik, and van der Zwan, 
2011) or ‘renascent’ (Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  All researchers need to take care when 
comparing studies and presenting their results and conclusions.  To avoid incorrect citations the 
review of the literature uses the terms used by the authors but to enhance clarity interprets the 
term to be consistent and communicate the significance and relevance of their findings.   
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3.1.2 Serial Founder Entrepreneurs  
To focus more clearly on the role of serial founders of new firms requires an appreciation of the 
constructs of entrepreneur and firm as used in the relevant literature.  
Originally, Cantillon (1755) defined the entrepreneur as a person who engages in exchanges for 
profit; and specifically who exercises business judgment in the face of uncertainty.  Casson’s (1982) 
refinement of Cantillon is someone who specializes in taking judgemental decisions about the 
coordination of scarce resources.  Both definitions are heterogeneous, entirely functional and 
remove the need to consider attributes of the personality, whether a firm is required, and their role 
such as owner/manager.  
In habitual entrepreneurship the principle focus of study is the sequence of entrepreneurial 
engagements with firms, in particular the founding of new firms.  It is unsurprising then that in the 
literature of habitual entrepreneurship the entrepreneur and the firm are very closely correlated 
constructs.  Here, the entrepreneur is most often defined using Hawley’s (1907) principles of 
ownership and control.  Ownership is required to obtain economic rents, and control to make 
decisions about the successful coordination of scarce resources.  Through ownership, entrepreneurs 
also assume the risks and returns associated with the business (Gartner and Shane, 1995).  However, 
the ownership stake may not be large enough for individuals to exhibit entrepreneurial behaviours 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008). Neither does a large stake guarantee entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Rosa, 1998).  Therefore, research and the samples that support it must focus on actual 
entrepreneurial behaviour rather than quasi-legal constructs.  Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright 
(2008) propose that habitual entrepreneurs combine three elements:  business ownership, a 
decision making role, and an ability to identify opportunities.  In other words, through active 
ownership and control they lead the entrepreneurial process of opportunity recognition and 
exploitation, assuming the risks and rewards of these activities.  
Firm Founding 
Entrepreneurship research is interested in the entrepreneurial process that includes the founding of 
new firms. Habitual entrepreneurs who found more than one firm are a natural focus of attention. 
There are strong arguments for focussing on the establishment of new firms.  Habitual 
entrepreneurs specialize in the activity of business start-up to become lifelong entrepreneurs 
(Iacobucci, 2002) with an increased ability to create novel ventures in future (Gartner and Shane, 
1995).  Whereas opportunity is the dominant concept across entrepreneurship literature (e.g. de 
Koning, 2003; Dimov, 2004; Gaglio, 1997; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman, 2003; 
42 
 
Shane, 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), entrepreneurship is also defined as the recognition 
and exploitation of opportunities that result in the creation of a firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001).  
Kirzner (1973) maintains that opportunities that are not implemented were not opportunities in the 
first place.  To many, entrepreneurship is then synonymous with founding new organisations (e.g. 
Aldrich and Reuf, 2006; Gartner, 1988; Katz and Gartner, 1988; Lazear, 2004).   
Firm Founding vs. Acquisition and Inheritance  
The focus of the study on serial founders is further justified because acquirers and inheritors of 
existing firms experience a different entrepreneurial process compared to that of founders of new 
firms.  For acquirers there is much reduced scope for the recognition and development of a novel 
opportunity.  The process of gathering resources is quite different, being centred on finding an 
acquisition target,  and raising finance from third parties and then negotiating the purchase.  In a 
Management Buy-Out (MBO) there is not even a search for a suitable acquisition as the nascent 
entrepreneur is simply employed in the right place at the right time (Ucbasaran, Wright, and 
Westhead, 2003).  For inheritors of an existing business the entrepreneurial process is non-existent 
or much reduced (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986).   
It is not surprising that very many researchers just focus on founders (e.g. Donckels, Dupont and 
Michel, 1987; Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005; MacMillan, 1986; Rosa and Scott, 1999 a b; Shane and 
Khurana, 2003; Westhead and Wright, 1998a).  Nevertheless, care still needs to be exercised in 
reviewing studies.  For example, Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright (2008; 2009) exclude inherited 
businesses, but include acquired enterprises.  Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim (2014) exclude 
businesses as duplicates if founded in the same industry and geographic location within a two-year 
period.  Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright (2009) exclude as statistical outliers seven entrepreneurs 
who had owned 10 or more businesses.   In this thesis these cases are not excluded.  Indeed, 
grounded theory relies on a variety of cases and the patterns they form to address the exploratory 
research questions.  
Firm Exit  
However, this focus on new firm founding has recently come in for criticism, as giving only a partial 
and incomplete view. This criticism lends added relevance to the study of serial entrepreneurship.   
The entrepreneurial process is more than just the creation of a new venture. It does not end with 
creation, it ends with exit (DeTienne, 2010; Wennberg, DeTienne, 2014).  Exit requires additional 
skills and behaviours in relation to the sale or liquidation of the firm.  In addition, the outcome of the 
exit may be positive or negative and the entrepreneur must deal with the consequences of exit.  For 
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this thesis, the fact and consequences of exit and the return to entrepreneurship to start-up again 
distinguishes serial entrepreneurs from other forms of habitual entrepreneurship.  
Self-Employed Founders  
There is some discussion as to whether self-employment is consistent with the entrepreneurial 
behaviours we seek to study and understand.   Self-employment is categorised as a form of serial 
entrepreneurship (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008), and recent quantitative studies by Chen 
(2013) and Parker (2013) using national income and employment statistics include the self-
employed.  However, self-employment statistics include a grey area of individuals whose experience 
is closer to that of employees, such as with independent contractors.  Some contractors are engaged 
by the company they have just left (Gartner and Shane, 1995).  In addition, there are certain trades 
and professions in which self-employment is the natural contractual form for work (Casson, 2003).  
Entrepreneurial team formation is less common in self-employment, with only 15% of firms founded 
by more than one individual (Dencker, Gruber, and Shah, 2009).  Sole proprietorships include part-
time and miniscule firms (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 2010).  For these firms exit 
may be ‘a trivial decision’ (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, Woo, 1997; Wennberg, 2005).  Therefore, self-
employment is not necessarily representative of all serial entrepreneurship and making inferences 
from such recent studies requires caution.  In this study, periods of self-employment noted in the 
careers of serial entrepreneurs were counted as employment rather than as ventures, although it is 
recognised that self-employment can be an important learning and transition phase for future serial 
entrepreneurs.  
Distributorships and Franchises 
In terms of the categorisation of the degree of important entrepreneurial behaviours, the literature 
on habitual entrepreneurs appears silent on the status of distributorships and franchises.  In the 
opinion of the researcher, distributorships and franchises are similar to joint ventures in which 
resources, costs and risks and even equity are shared.  While in the UK franchises are not classified in 
the official statistics as independent businesses, these offer entrepreneurial experience much closer 
to a fully independent start-up than self-employment and are therefore included in this study. 
3.1.3 Entrepreneurial Experience: Novice vs. Habitual Entrepreneurs 
While there are obstacles to distinguishing between the different forms of habitual 
entrepreneurship, the literature does make a clear distinction between novice and habitual 
entrepreneurs and studies regard them as mutually exclusive categories of entrepreneurs.  ‘One-
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shot’ (MacMillan, 1986) or novice entrepreneurs (Birley and Westhead, 1993) come to 
entrepreneurship with the ‘liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965) and are assumed to face a 
higher risk of mortality relative to their more experienced habitual counterparts. 
Novice business and novice entrepreneur have a particular meaning in this study as they correspond 
to the serial entrepreneur’s first venture.  Clearly, some novices become serial or portfolio 
entrepreneurs (Hall, 1995).  Therefore novice entrepreneurship is a ‘rite of passage’ for all habitual 
entrepreneurs and not mutually exclusive from the perspective of the individual.  While it is the 
norm to compare independent groups of each type (e.g. Birley and Westhead, 1993; Ucbasaran, 
Westhead and Wright, 2006), in taking a career perspective this thesis takes the opportunity to 
make a within case comparison between the experienced serial entrepreneur and their nascent pre-
entrepreneurial and initial venture novice selves.   
Nevertheless, caution needs to be exercised when associating the term novice with inexperience.  
Novices include experienced entrepreneurs whose careers are defined by the development of one 
legal entity.  Novice entrepreneurs do found and grow successful and substantial businesses.  They 
simply may not use a separate legally constituted firm when diversifying their operations, 
particularly if new products and markets are closely related to the original business.  Novices may 
develop a business for several years before progressing to their next venture.  Therefore, the 
number of start-ups is only a measure of start-up experience and not of all forms of entrepreneurial 
expertise.  
3.1.4 Habitual Entrepreneurs: Expertise and Success 
The original and abiding attraction to researchers of habitual entrepreneurs is to understand 
entrepreneurial expertise as a form of human capital.  Moreover, following the basic assumption of 
human capital theory that experience develops expertise, they will exhibit a measurable 
improvement in venture performance over their career.   While researchers recommend the study of 
successful or expert entrepreneurs (e.g. MacMillan, 1986; Starr and Bygrave, 1991), the definition of 
success varies from study to study.  Definitions include a minimum longevity for each business 
(Schollhammer, 1991), or the number of discrete spells of venture activity (Baron, 2006, Baron and 
Ensley, 2006) where repeated spells remove exceptionally lucky cases from the analysis (Baron, 
2006; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).  The implicit assumption is that persistence requires 
expertise and more than just ‘luck’, although luck is not defined and no examples of ‘lucky’ cases are 
given.  The bar has been set at a high standard; a repeatedly successful entrepreneur is someone 
who has founded three or more new ventures without a failure (Baron and Ward, 2004).  
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For this thesis, career and venture success are defined separately.  Career success is defined as 
persistence.  To be included in the study, serial entrepreneurs must be still active as well as having 
founded at least two firms, and also to have exited and returned at least once.  The sample is 
therefore subject to survivor bias (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003).  Venture success is defined 
separately at the time of exit and may be positive or negative.  Therefore, all the serial 
entrepreneurs in the study have a minimum experience of start-up and return, and have 
demonstrated a minimum level of expertise and success in remaining as entrepreneurs, even in the 
face of venture failure.  
3.2 Section 2.  Opportunities, Individuals and their Firms  
Most calls in the literature are to focus on the individual entrepreneur (e.g. Scott and Rosa, 1996).  In 
this study it is the interplay of the constructs of the opportunity, the entrepreneur, the firm and 
other resources that are considered to obtain a better understanding of the behaviour of serial 
entrepreneurs.   
3.2.1 Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Habitual Entrepreneurship  
An opportunity is simply a situation in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing 
methods can be introduced and sold at prices greater than their cost of production (Casson, 1982). 
Under the opportunity-based framework of entrepreneurship (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003) habitual 
entrepreneurship is clearly relevant to understanding how opportunities are discovered, created and 
exploited, by whom and with what consequences (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000).  The assumption is that key elements of the opportunity process are different for experienced 
compared to inexperienced entrepreneurs.  There are many studies of how novice and habitual 
entrepreneurs may vary in their capacity to recognise opportunities (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead, 
Wright, and Binks, 2003; Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, 2008) and how serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs may differ in their sources and means of exploitation of opportunities (e.g. Rosa, 
1998; Iacobucci, 2002).   
Once discovered or created, then pursued and exploited, the opportunity disappears as a separate 
construct embodied within the new venture.  The opportunity is exploited through the formation of 
a firm, and by implication shares the same fate as the firm.  However, in practice this is not true.  If 
an opportunity for profit remains underexploited then it has a distinct identity separate from the 
firm.  The opportunity can be replicated by both new start-ups and existing firms.  Even if the 
original firm fails it doesn’t automatically follow that the opportunity is economically exhausted.  As 
existing research data shows (e.g. Rosa, 1998) and this thesis also demonstrates, serial 
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entrepreneurs may re-enter entrepreneurship to reattach themselves to and exploit essentially the 
same opportunity. 
3.2.2 Individual Entrepreneurship and the Firm 
The Firm  
Ownership and control of resources to pursue and exploit opportunities is typically exercised 
through the organisational form of the firm.  In research practice firms are identified as registered 
legal entities.  Only by forming a firm can individuals learn about their actual entrepreneurial 
expertise and rent generating ability (Knight, 1921; Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982).  The firm as a 
separate legal entity from the entrepreneur is just an economic tool.  One reason it exists is because 
it is more economically efficient to use contracts than rely on market prices to organise transactions 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981).  The firm is a superior mechanism for converting creative insights 
and heterogeneous inputs into homogenous outputs (Alvarez and Barney, 2001).  The firm not only 
allows entrepreneurs to organise and contract resources that generate rents from an opportunity, 
but also enables them to appropriate some of the rents thus generated (Alvarez and Barney, 2004).  
Without the firm it is difficult to measure exit and entry, and so is essential to understanding serial 
entrepreneurship.  Exit from a previous firm is marked through a sale, closure or another legal 
outcome (Gimeno, Cooper and Woo, 1997; Westhead and Wright, 1998a).  
Institutional Effects on Firm Founding 
While the organisational form adopted by the entrepreneur may be mainly an economic decision, it 
is also contingent on the institutional and legal framework (Scott and Rosa, 1996).  There can be 
incentives (e.g. grants, tax breaks and soft loans) for the creation of new legal entities rather than 
developing a new opportunity within an existing ‘novice’ run firm.  Therefore, there must be cases 
where there is little difference from the perspective of the process of entrepreneurship between a 
portfolio entrepreneur diversifying through separate legal entities for legal or tax reasons and a 
‘novice’ entrepreneur diversifying using just one firm.  For serial entrepreneurs there may be tax 
incentives to sell a firm in the form of relief on the proceeds of sale that may incentivise 
entrepreneurs to diversify through separate firms and incentivise serial entrepreneurs to exit.  
Therefore, studies of founding and exit behaviour may need to be normalised for changes in the 
institutional and legal framework.  
Theory of Entrepreneurship vs. the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm 
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In the longstanding theory of entrepreneurship it is the individual entrepreneur who is the central 
focus (Casson, 2003).  In the relatively modern resource-based theory of the firm (Penrose, 1959), 
firm resources and products are two sides of the same coin and the resource profile for a firm 
determines the optimal product-market activities (Wernerfelt, 1984).  In other words, the range of 
actionable entrepreneurial opportunities is a function of the firm’s resources.  The entrepreneur is 
‘just’ another resource whose dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) are available to 
the firm.  
In contrast, it is argued that entrepreneurship should not be viewed as a refinement to the theory of 
the firm, because entrepreneurs exploit differences of perception about information to their own 
advantage (Casson, 2005a).  Organisational ecology theorists hold similar views.  It is the 
entrepreneur who exercises agency and creates the firm to implement her/his choice of means-ends 
combination.  New organisational forms are created by individuals trying to fashion careers (Hannan, 
1988).  Firms do not arise spontaneously from opportunities in the absence of human action, but 
through the organising efforts of individuals (Freeman,1982).  It can be added that neither do firms 
exit from economic activity without human decision and action unless there is a legal ‘firm death’.  
When arguing from the position of the theory of entrepreneurship, researchers calls for a focus on 
the individual entrepreneur and not the firm (e.g. Scott and Rosa, 1996; Westhead, Ucbasaran and 
Wright, 2005a; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008). However, this view is not universal and 
researchers of portfolio entrepreneurship (e.g. Iacobucci, 2002, Iacobucci and Rosa, 2004), while not 
denying the place of the individual, maintain that portfolio formation is best explained by the 
evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959; 
Rumelt, 1974).  
The Firm as a Temporary Coalition 
In portfolio entrepreneurship, representative careers involve a permanent engagement with more 
than one firm.  For serial entrepreneurship the clear separation of the firm and individual is 
accomplished through the act of firm exit.  Firms, especially small enterprises, can be viewed as 
‘temporary coalitions’ of individuals furthering their careers, and the legal entity is no more than a 
stylised shell obscuring social transactions and relationships (Taylor, 1999). Serial entrepreneurs can 
be expected to have skills in bringing about and disbanding these coalitions that are different from 
those of portfolio entrepreneurs.  Moreover, individual careers can succeed even if some of their 
firms fail, and careers can be expected to include both successes and failures (Sarasvathy, Menon, 
and Kuechle, 2013).    
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Lead Entrepreneur and Entrepreneurial Teams  
The call to separate the individual entrepreneur from the firm is not easy to implement.   Ownership 
and control can be shared within an entrepreneurial team, of whom one team member may be the 
lead entrepreneur (Rosa, 1998).  It may not be a straightforward matter to identify the lead 
entrepreneur.  Rosa detected non-entrepreneurial habitual founders whose success arose from 
being attached to a partner who was the true driving entrepreneur.   In practice, researchers remain 
flexible as to who is the entrepreneur.  For example, (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, 2005a) include 
the most influential members of surveyed independent businesses.  
Entrepreneur as Informant 
Gartner and Starr (1993) and Taylor (1999) argue that the whole team should be treated as the 
informant because specific patterns of interlocked behaviours among individuals influence the 
creation of an organisation.  Similarly, Reuber and Fischer (1999) and Samuelsson and Davidsson 
(2009) recommend that experience of the management team should be added to that of the 
entrepreneur, specifically to assess the total human and social capital at the venture’s disposal.  A 
limitation of this study is that, with the exception of two cases, the lead entrepreneur was the sole 
informant. 
Serial Entrepreneurs and Employment 
While serial entrepreneurship separates the individual and the firm, the literature implicitly assumes 
that exiting entrepreneurs soon return to start-up the next firm in the sequence.  It has been 
recognised that entrepreneurs intersperse paid employment with entrepreneurship (Dyer, 1994; 
Folta, Delmar, and Wennberg, 2010).  Entrepreneurial activities are intermittent and entrepreneurs 
do perform non-entrepreneurial tasks as well (Casson, 2003). The reasons for and the impact of gaps 
and pauses between ventures are not often studied.   As this study shows, these gaps include 
periods of employment.  Employment is recognised as significant to the formation of 
entrepreneurial human capital.  Many studies show how employment prior to entrepreneurship 
incubates opportunities and the assembly of resources (e.g. Cooper, 1985; Shane and Khurana, 
2003).  Therefore, the impact of periods of employment before starting out on their careers as serial 
entrepreneurs and between ventures must be considered.  
3.3 Chapter Summary  
This short chapter has reviewed the literature to position serial entrepreneurship as one of two main 
sub-types of habitual entrepreneurial behaviour.  The unit of analysis has been defined as the 
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entrepreneurial career of still active serial founder entrepreneurs.  The other key constructs of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity and the firm have also been discussed.   While the lack of consistent 
definitions of key constructs poses challenges to reviewing the relevant literature and positioning 
new findings, the assumptions of the thesis have been articulated.    
Chapter 2 and 3 have introduced the literature and discussed the main constructs.  Chapter 4 now 
develops these foundations to details the principal areas of empirical contribution.  The detailed 
literature review is used to develop the detailed exploratory research questions in Chapter 5.    
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4 CHAPTER 4  
Habitual Entrepreneurship: Theory and Evidence 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced the main theoretical approaches and constructs of habitual 
entrepreneurship.  This chapter provides further detailed analysis, particularly of the empirical 
evidence, as the basis for the development of the research questions.      
4.1 Section 1. Human Capital and Habitual Entrepreneurship: A Theoretical 
Framework  
4.1.1 Introduction 
The very large number of human capital studies in the field of habitual entrepreneurship research 
address two main research objectives: (1) to determine those characteristics of experience that are 
associated with successful performance outcomes, and (2) to distinguish between novice and 
experienced habitual entrepreneurs. Much of what is known about habitual entrepreneurs and their 
sub-types of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs has been discovered from researchers deploying a 
human capital perspective.  
Serial founders have differential knowledge of opportunity recognition, venture start-up, 
development, exit and re-entry.  Both serial and portfolio entrepreneurs should be comparatively 
more successful than novices.  Indeed, they should perform better than their younger less 
experienced selves.   
One barrier to providing unequivocal evidence of the intuitive relationship between human capital 
and economic returns to entrepreneurship is that there is no single consistently used definition of 
either entrepreneurial human capital or performance outcomes.  The literature of human capital 
encompasses a broad range of human qualities. These include prior information, knowledge, 
experience, cognitive abilities, expertise, skills, talent, dynamic capabilities and motivations.  These 
are matched with a nearly equally wide range of venture performance measures including data from 
earnings surveys.  It would appear that researchers have focussed on variables that are likely to have 
explanatory power and could be acquired from their data sets.  
4.1.2 Human Capital and Habitual Entrepreneurship: A Theoretical Framework 
The most significant contribution to our knowledge of habitual entrepreneurship comes from 
Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and their many collaborators. Both Schollhammer (1991) and 
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Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright (2006) propose a human capital based model of habitual 
entrepreneurship with three components:  1) the individual inputs 2) the entrepreneurial process 
and 3) the outcomes.   
The model and its relationship to the literature is summarised in the following diagram.  
 
Figure 4.1 Human Capital Framework for Understanding Entrepreneurship 
Based on Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright (2006) p.18 
The framework shows the paths of influence of human capital on: 
1. Ability to recognise and exploit opportunities  
2. Outcomes 
3. Feedback and experience from the process 
4. Feedback and experience from outcome e.g. exit and subsequent venture.  
The authors of the framework have made studies measuring the differential effects of the relative 
experience of portfolio, serial and novice entrepreneurs on both the process and outcomes of 
entrepreneurship.  
Arrow a. indicates that a significant number of studies have been carried out in respect of path 1. 
These and similar or complementary studies are reviewed in this chapter in section 1.  
Arrow b. represents the large number of human capital and performance studies that have been 
conducted. Most were made independently of this model with emphasis on other factors outside 
the opportunity process, measuring the association of human capital with performance directly 
using quantitative methods. These and similar or complementary studies are considered in section 2.  
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This thesis provides a better understanding of the complete cycle. It includes the starting position of 
each serial founder, the process they undertook, and how the outcome of one venture provides 
feedback into the next iteration of the process.  
Human Capital Theory  
In this framework, human capital follows Becker (1964; 1993) and Castinas and Helfat’s (1992; 2001) 
theory of managerial rents. Entrepreneurs are a type of managerial labour who possess specific 
types of human capital such as start-up experience.  These inputs affect the nature and course of 
Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) opportunity centric process of entrepreneurship.  As the 
distribution of income from employment is correlated with human capital (Becker, 1964), so 
entrepreneurs with the right quality and quantity of human capital should earn greater returns from 
entrepreneurship.   
The detailed review of the literature follows this framework in synthesising and extracting what can 
be learned about the process of habitual entrepreneurship.   
Entrepreneurial Human Capital  
Entrepreneurial human capital is knowledge and skills that assist in successfully engaging in the 
entrepreneurial process (Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch, 2011).  Therefore, returns to 
entrepreneurial human capital are realised by the recognition, pursuit and exploitation of 
opportunities.  Entrepreneurs achieve higher returns if they find or create suitable opportunities 
that match their skills.  Persons learn about their ability to generate entrepreneurial rents by starting 
a venture (Jovanovic, 1982), and in equilibrium habitual entrepreneurs match their ability to suitable 
opportunities (Lucas, 1978; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 1995).  In turn, entrepreneurial ability is the 
limiting factor for firm development (Penrose, 1959).  Overall, we should observe habitual 
entrepreneurs seeking to increase their utility by selecting opportunities that match their human 
capabilities, including, or moderated by, their personal motivations and objectives. 
Path Dependence of Human Capital  
Human capital accrues over time and spills-over from one venture to the next (MacMillan, 1986), 
and is therefore an antecedent of both present and future states (Reuber and Fischer, 1999).  
Previous experience leads to more knowledgeable decisions and actions to pursue higher potential 
opportunities and enhance firm performance (Eesley and Roberts, 2012; Shane and Delmar, 2006; 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  Human capital includes cognitive human information processing 
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capacity, which is a limiting factor as all activities are cognitively dependent. For example, the type 
of opportunity recognised is limited by knowledge corridors (Venkataraman, 1997).   
4.2 Section 2: Human Capital and the Entrepreneurial Process: Prior to Founding  
In this section of the literature review the focus shifts to research on the role of entrepreneurial 
human capital in the activities prior to venture creation, including background factors and different 
pathways for the different types of habitual entrepreneur.  Researchers are interested in 
determining if there is an association between human capital in the form of prior knowledge and 
opportunity recognition.  
4.2.1 The Start of the Journey 
Habitual entrepreneurs start accumulating entrepreneurial human capital earlier in life than novice 
founders (Birley and Westhead, 1993; Kolvereid and Bullvåg, 1993).  Serial founders are more likely 
to have worked in a small company compared with portfolio and novice entrepreneurs (Westhead 
and Wright, 1998a).  Similarly, entrepreneurs are more likely to start another venture if their first 
venture was started when younger, not married, and they funded their first company with venture 
capital (Eesley and Roberts, 2006).  Building on Schein (1978; 1985), Katz (1994) suggests that serial 
entrepreneurs are independence seeking with an autonomy career anchor, while portfolio 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be motivated by wealth creation.  
4.2.2 Human Capital and Opportunity Identification  
Human capital is formed through learning, in particular the development of templates and 
heuristics, which together form the information capture, storage and processing capabilities of 
enterprising individuals (Baron and Ensley, 2006).  Prior knowledge is often used in the literature as a 
shorthand term for human capital, and the literature positions prior knowledge as the dominant 
causal component in the determination of opportunity recognition, pursuit and exploitation (e.g. 
Shane, 2000). The term emphasises the ex-ante stock aspect of human capital, although its cognitive 
element must include a dynamic, situation specific and also a reflective capability to re-construe and 
revalue stocks of knowledge.  
Prior knowledge is shown to be strongly associated by entrepreneurs with all stages of opportunity 
discovery and decision (Tang, Kacmar and Busenitz, 2010).  Prior knowledge increases creativity 
(Amabile, 1997) and the number, quality and innovativeness of opportunities (Fiet, 2002; Shepherd 
and DeTienne, 2005). Specific technology knowledge corridors facilitate links to more radical and 
innovative concepts (Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne, 2005).  In experimental data, an 
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entrepreneur’s preference for using prior knowledge is stronger than the desire to achieve financial 
gain (Shepherd and DeTienna, 2005).   
Experience based knowledge generates additional opportunities that are ignored or not recognised 
by the novice (Gaglio, 1997).  Prior knowledge is the source of most discoveries (Shane, 2000, 
Venkataraman, 1997) because prior knowledge gives entrepreneurs an advantage in both the 
axioms of information processing; better access to information and the ability to process (construe) 
it (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  The most important determinant of the innovativeness of an 
idea is specificity of prior knowledge, where prior knowledge is likely to include specific and also 
private information directly relevant to an opportunity (Casson, 1982; Fiet, 2002).  
Shane (2000), in experimental data, shows that in every case of opportunities stimulated by a new 
technology (3D printing) the opportunity was related to prior knowledge.  In similar experiments, 
prior knowledge of markets allowed deeper thinking and the recognition of non-obvious valuable 
opportunities (Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010).  The greater their knowledge of natural and 
communal environments (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011), the more likely entrepreneurs are to 
discover sustainable development opportunities.  Other factors are also important; Gruber (2010) 
finds that the number of alternative options considered is positively related to breadth of 
experience, the founder’s level of aspiration, and to a degree their financial resources.  
Prior knowledge not only determines what opportunities are perceived, it also determines the 
entrepreneurial process through which opportunities are identified and brought to market.  Men 
and women use unique stocks of human capital and exhibit different processes of opportunity 
identification (DeTienne and Chandler, 2007).  Venkataraman and Sarasavathy (2001) proposed 
three processes: recognition, discovery and creation.  Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne (2005) 
empirically isolated three broad typologies: replication, innovation and acquisition. Both models can 
be combined to model the opportunity recognition process as follows:  
(1) Acquisition.  Acquiring an existing income stream.  Recognise and Acquire. 
(2) Replication.  Recognising and learning about market need and replicating an existing product.  
Recognise and Replicate. 
(3) Innovation.  Learning about market need and discovering or creating an innovative product to 
meet this need.  Discover and Create. 
(4) Innovation and Education.  Creating an innovative product first and then educating customers to 
its benefits or find a matching need.  Create both a new product and a new demand. 
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Prior Knowledge and Innovation 
However, for researchers interested in entrepreneurial innovation, there is a limit to the number of 
new ideas that can be created using the same set of knowledge elements.  Search is most productive 
when it uses both familiar and unfamiliar elements (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  Individuals working 
within an existing industry and technology paradigm are likely to make incremental discoveries, 
whereas truly radical changes are likely to come from outside the paradigm (Chandler, Douglas and 
DeTienne, 2005).  Prior knowledge strengthens the tendency to concentrate efforts in specific 
domains (Ronstadt, 1988), to search using known information channels (Fiet, 1996) and form 
idiosyncratic ‘knowledge corridors’ (Venkataraman, 1997).  Thus prior knowledge as a resource is 
strongly path dependent (Alvarez and Barney, 2007).  Empirical evidence shows that when distant 
(i.e. potentially path-breaking) knowledge is offered, the founder’s pre-existing technological 
abilities limits the knowledge that can be assimilated and exploited (Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 
2013).   
The literature makes specific observations about the role of prior knowledge in habitual 
entrepreneurship.  Wider and deeper prior knowledge of venturing seems to be an advantage.  
Using their prior knowledge serial entrepreneurs generate a wide ‘choice set’ of alternative market 
opportunities before deciding which one to pursue (Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2008).  
Habitual entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital identify more opportunities than novices 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Binks, 2003; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).  Habitual 
entrepreneurs identified and exploited more innovative opportunities with greater wealth creation 
potential (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  It could be that successful habitual 
entrepreneurs have accumulated liquidity in the form of financial resources that incentivise them to 
be more alert to opportunities (Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003), and also 
presumably search more, and be more open to opportunities when offered to them. 
4.2.3 Portfolio vs. Serial Entrepreneurship: Resource Endowments  
Portfolio entrepreneurs are characterised as the more successful form of entrepreneurship.  
Portfolio entrepreneurs are different from serials and novices in that they identify more 
opportunities and plan more businesses (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2005b; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, and Wright, 2009) and are more creative (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2005a).  
Recent evidence of entrepreneurs in developing countries shows that portfolio entrepreneurs are 
much more likely to engage in exporting than serial entrepreneurs and to have pursued and 
exploited innovative opportunities (Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012a; 2012b).  
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From a number of empirical studies, a potential reason for performance differences is that managing 
and owning a portfolio of ventures appears to lead to strongly path dependent or corridor specific 
decisions in respect of new opportunities that result in related diversifications.  The combination of 
prior knowledge and the presence of significant existing firm controlled resources at hand, exerts a 
strong effect on which opportunities are both recognised and implemented.  Alsos, Ljunggren and 
Pettersen (2003) found that farmer entrepreneurs in Norway were more likely to start-up ventures 
based on opportunities related to their daily activities.  Similarly, for Finnish farmers, Alsos and 
Kaikkonen (2004) show that discovered opportunities are strongly related to existing resources and 
existing social networks.  These related opportunities are much more likely to be pursued.  Prior 
knowledge does seem to be the dominant causal component of entrepreneurial human capital in 
the determination of opportunity recognition, pursuit and exploitation.  Even unrelated subjectively 
constructed opportunities that could replace the main farm business were often related to prior 
knowledge gained before entering farming (Alsos and Kaikkonen, 2004).   
4.2.4 Opportunity Discovery Processes: Alertness vs. Search 
Alsos and Kaikkonen’s (2004) study is unique in its consideration of the objective discovery vs. 
subjective construction of opportunities by habitual entrepreneurs.  Other research examines the 
competing opportunity discovery processes of alertness (Kirzner, 1973) and search (Fiet, 1996).  One 
study of habitual entrepreneurs reports spontaneity, alertness and higher levels of innovativeness 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Binks, 2003).  In another study the use of proactive (deliberate) 
and reactive (serendipitous) recognition routines are triggered by different circumstances, which 
vary from venture to venture (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2003).  
However, other studies reveal differences between serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.  Portfolio 
entrepreneurs are opportunistic and are orientated toward growth strategies (Rosa, 1998).  The 
portfolios of Scottish entrepreneurs arise naturally and serendipitously rather than through any 
artificial search process or orthodox corporate management principles (Rosa, 1998). Similarly, 
portfolio entrepreneurs are more alert and opportunistic (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, 2005b).  
In the literature, serials appear to conform to the less opportunistic customer or product orientated 
craftsperson (Woo, Cooper, Dunkelberg, 1991; Smith, 1967), such that serial entrepreneurs are more 
likely to have key strengths in a technical or functional area.  Furthermore, their business idea is 
their own and is less likely to be developed in an incubator (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and 
Binks, 2005).  Serial entrepreneurs more often say that opportunities are connected to solutions for 
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specific problems; they identify goods and services that people want by perceiving unmet customer 
needs (Westhead, Ucbasaran and  Wright, 2005b; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks, 2005).   
Opportunities and Information Search  
Opportunity discovery through information search has been the subject of a number of studies. 
Higher levels of information search intensity lead to more business opportunities (Ucbasaran, 
Westhead and Wright 2006; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008; Westhead, Ucbasaran and 
Wright, 2009).  However, there is contradictory evidence regarding novices and habitual 
entrepreneurs in terms of information search intensity.   
The inexperienced are expected to search less intensely, lacking capacity (Cooper, Folta and Woo 
1995; Woo, Folta and Cooper, 1992).  However, it was found that the less experienced 
entrepreneurs engaged in significantly greater search, especially using personal sources in domains 
that they knew.  Re-visiting this subject, only this time postulating that habitual entrepreneurs with 
their superior knowledge, contacts and cognitive abilities are expected to search less, Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright, and Binks (2005) actually found no difference in search intensity.    
The frequency of opportunity identification is associated with the use of personal sources of 
information (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  Portfolio entrepreneurs appear to avoid 
external professional information sources (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  Serial 
and portfolio entrepreneurs who use employees, consultants and financiers have an advantage in 
information sources over novices (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Busenitz, 2003).  The 
information proffered by these sources is most likely related to existing ventures and may reinforce 
any tendency to keep to existing paths and corridors and start-up closely related businesses.   
4.2.5 Initial Conditions and Entrepreneurial Career Paths 
Serial Acquirers vs. Serial Founder Entrepreneurs  
Research also finds some important differences between the sub-types of habitual entrepreneur in 
terms of the source and type of opportunities they encounter.  For serial acquirers with experience 
of Management Buy Outs (MBOs), Management Buy-ins (MBIs), acquisitions and other types of 
structured deals, prior success raises their profile.  This encourages intermediaries to present similar 
deals (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2003; Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997b). 
Serial founders are more likely to use industry specific knowledge to identify and exploit 
opportunities (Ucbasaran, Wright, and Westhead, 2003).  In contrast, serial acquirers are more likely 
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to: a) use teams to identify and exploit opportunities, b) emphasise the use of networks, c) use 
formal planning techniques, and d) come from managerial positions via MBO/MBIs to venturing 
(Ucbasaran, Wright, and Westhead, 2003).  
Serial vs. Portfolio Entrepreneurs 
The initial experience and other resource positions (i.e. real options) of individuals entering 
entrepreneurship may engender corridor and path effects that have a lasting effect on their career 
path.  Habitual founders and acquirers tend to keep to the pathway set by the experience of their 
first venture, such as, using the same mode of entry for subsequent ventures.   
Formative experiences may also have a long term impact on career trajectories.  Self-employed 
fathers are associated with entrepreneurial sons and daughters (Burke, Fitzroy and Nolan, 2008).  A 
smaller proportion of serial compared with portfolio entrepreneurs report that they had parents 
with prior business ownership experience (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  Informal 
human capital is acquired through familiarity with a parent's business (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 
1986), and there is a relationship between working in a family business and subsequent success, 
particularly for adolescent entrepreneurs (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Robinson, 2009).  Serial 
entrepreneurs may be at a disadvantage because they have less access to role models, mentoring, 
social networks and financial resources (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  
Opportunity Evaluation and Decision 
The seasoned entrepreneur with specific entrepreneurial human capital faces less uncertainty 
surrounding the value to be gained from exploiting an opportunity and the nature of the task in 
front of them (Baron and Ensley, 2006; Shane and Khurana, 2003; Starr and Bygrave, 1991).  Specific 
knowledge and experience is more important than general human capital for opportunity 
identification and opportunity pursuit (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).  Habitual 
entrepreneurs can more accurately assess the value of new opportunities (Ucbasaran, Wright, 
Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  There is evidence from cognitive studies (Baron and Ensley, 2006) 
and in particular the extensive research of portfolio entrepreneurs who own and manage clusters of 
businesses (e.g. Carter, 1998; Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005; Rosa, 1998) that shows that experienced 
entrepreneurs focus on considerations of how to exploit an opportunity during the evaluation stage.   
Overall, even strong teams of entrepreneurs will not always choose the best markets. Founding 
entrepreneurs typically choose markets they know due to their idiosyncratic path of knowledge 
experience (Eisenhardt, 2013; Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2013).  In addition, the available 
resources to hand have a strong effect on opportunities considered and subsequently pursued.  
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4.2.6 Summary 
Human capital most often expressed as prior experience has a strong causal effect on opportunity 
recognition.  Furthermore, there is also evidence that all aspects of the entrepreneurial process are 
driven by prior knowledge.  For portfolio entrepreneurs other resources on hand also strongly 
influence the entrepreneurial process, forming corridors of related ventures.  While the evidence 
shows that the prior experience of habituals makes them more innovative, their potential, 
particularly that of portfolio entrepreneurs, to move to new corridors of opportunity appears 
limited.   
Serial entrepreneurs are more solution orientated, but may lack family role models to teach them 
entrepreneurial skills and mentor them in the early phases of their careers.  Portfolio entrepreneurs 
are more likely to be opportunistic and to rely on alert serendipitous opportunity recognition.  In 
contrast to economic selection theory, portfolios are considered more economically successful than 
serials, growing their portfolios through related diversifications that leverage existing resources.  An 
alternative view offered here is that related opportunities are cognitively easier and less costly to 
discover, and therefore ‘feel’ serendipitous.   
4.3 Section 3. Human Capital and the Entrepreneurial Process: Founding and 
Exploitation  
In this section of the literature review the focus shifts to research on the role of entrepreneurial 
human capital in the activities of venture creation and development.  Researchers seek a positive 
association between human capital and venture performance, i.e. returns to entrepreneurial human 
capital.  However, as predicted by Starr and Bygrave (1991) in their assets and liabilities theory of 
habitual entrepreneurship, clear and consistent evidence has proved elusive.  
4.3.1 Start-up/Founding Experience  
Serial entrepreneurs have more experience of founding new businesses ‘from scratch’ without 
parallel businesses to aid or impede their progress.  Start-up experience is the first resource to 
express itself in new venture creation and assists in the acquisition of other types of resources in the 
crucial first stage (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Starr and Bygrave, 1992; West and Noel, 2009).  Start-
up experience provides repeat founders cost and speed advantages in founding an independent 
business.  It is easier to start a business the second time in regard to making the decision 
psychologically and in knowing what to do in launching a new firm (Lamont, 1972).  The number of 
previous start-ups is a very specific form of entrepreneurial human capital (Stuart and Abetti, 1990), 
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and cannot be acquired easily by other means (Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987). Adolescent 
experience in entrepreneurial families could be one alternative source.   
Founding Experience and Resource Organisation  
Human capital is important as it can partially compensate for a lack of financial capital which 
constrains many start-ups (Chandler and Hanks, 1998).  The more experience a habitual 
entrepreneur has in participating in entrepreneurial projects, the more skills she/he has in accessing 
resources (Reuber and Fischer, 1999).  Start-up experience helps the firm to prioritise strategic 
issues such as building supportive relationships and gaining a competitive advantage (Lerner and 
Haber, 2001).  Experienced firm founders will have previously encountered the problems associated 
with finding financial capital, developing a new product, establishing contacts with potential 
customers, and attracting and hiring employees (Aldrich and Reuf, 2006; Brüderl, Preisendörfer and 
Ziegler, 1992).  Experienced firm founders become more aware of the risks associated with new 
business creation and rates of new business success and failure (Cassar, 2014; Hayward, Shepherd 
and Griffin, 2006).  Founding experience increases the ability to judge the relevance of information 
(Cooper, Folta and Woo, 1995) and increases the predictability of key variables such as customer 
demand and the impact of technology (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002).  
Human and Social Capital in the Start-Up Phase 
Human capital and social capital combine during the start-up phase. Case study evidence from 
Brush, Greene and Hart (2001) reveals that initial human and social capital is leveraged to assemble 
other resources that enable the start-up. Strong relationships make it easier to obtain resources 
from the same party a second time around (Aldrich and Reuf, 2006; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986).  
Even weak or indirect ties become useful when the repeat entrepreneur starts another business 
(Shane and Cable, 2002). Experience and success generate a particular form of social currency - 
legitimacy.  While there is evidence that some habitual entrepreneurs become risk averse because 
they are not willing to risk their reputation (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997a), legitimacy can be 
used to convince others to reallocate resources in new ways that run counter to existing norms 
(Shane and Khurana, 2003).  Mason and Harrison’s (2006) qualitative study found a process they 
describe as ‘entrepreneurial recycling’.  By staying in the same industry and location, habitual 
entrepreneurs were able to recycle resources including opportunities, technology, work colleagues, 
employees, brands, contacts and reputation.   
Social Capital and Financial Resources in the Start-Up Phase 
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The venture capital literature informs us that many venture capitalists heavily weigh prior 
experience (Hsu, Haynie, Simmons and McKelvie, 2014).  Habitual entrepreneurs receive funding 
through direct social ties more often than less experienced entrepreneurs, increasing the likelihood  
and the amount, and reducing  the time to obtain funding (Hsu, 2007, Shane and Khurana, 2003; 
Zhang, 2011). However, this advantage may not accrue to serial entrepreneurs because serials are 
distinguished by their preference for personal savings to fund start-ups.  Two-thirds of serial 
entrepreneurs did not even use bank loans as part of their initial capital (Westhead, Ucbasaran, 
Wright and Binks, 2005) and furthermore, serial entrepreneurs are less likely to use external funding 
in subsequent ventures (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997b).  The preference for their own resources 
becomes a disadvantage and may become self-reinforcing.  Entrepreneurs with venture-backed 
founding experience tend to raise more venture capital at an early round.  In contrast, experienced 
founders whose earlier firms were not venture-backed do not show a similar advantage over novice 
entrepreneurs (Zhang, 2011).  Overall, the evidence suggests that the ventures, and by extension the 
careers, of serials are under capitalised.  Nevertheless, once established, serials can use funds 
received on successfully exiting from their last venture to fund the next (Westhead and Wright, 
1998b).  The reasons for this preference and cause and effect are not fully understood.  
Capitalisation is sub-optimal; however it could be that serial founders are drawn to opportunities 
that are easier and quicker to start.  
Start-Up Efficiency  
Experienced entrepreneurs can reuse operational routines developed in a previous venture in the 
next (Eesley and Roberts, 2013), and will execute gestation activities quickly and cost effectively 
(Newbert, 2005).  However, serial entrepreneurs are not very different from novices in the type and 
speed of start-up activity.  Parallel (portfolio) founders are more organised and more likely to 
actually start a business and not give up in the first year (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1998).  A Swedish 
study finds that human and social capital factors known to improve entrepreneurial performance are 
both significantly associated with portfolio entrepreneurship (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008).  Politis 
(2008) finds counter intuitively only marginal differences in coping with the liabilities of newness 
between novice and habitual entrepreneurs.  This suggests that larger cost and efficiency gains from 
start-up experience accrue to parallel starters, a finding compatible with the evidence of related 
diversifications.  Indeed portfolio entrepreneurs may have a type of firm-specific managerial capital 
as defined by Castanias and Helfat (2001) that arises from starting related or similar firms.  
Compared to serials, portfolio entrepreneurs alone enjoy economies of scope and also perhaps scale 
and other synergies when founding related extensions to an existing portfolio.  
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4.3.2 Business Ownership and Entrepreneurial Experience 
Prior business ownership experience (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997), though less specific 
than start-up experience is synonymous with entrepreneurship (Shepherd, and DeTienne, 2005). It is 
indicative of a significant role and high involvement in the management of entrepreneurial ventures.  
Ownership experience is associated with enhanced reputation and broader social and business 
networks (Starr and Bygrave, 1992, Shane and Khurana, 2003, Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 
2003).  Ownership experience can be leveraged to identify and pursue new business opportunities 
and to innovate new productive resource combinations (McGrath, 1996; Ronstadt, 1988; Parker, 
2006).  If previous owned ventures are viewed as intense experiential learning experiences, then the 
experience can be sobering (Arabsheibani , de Meza, Maloney and Pearson, 2000) and may temper 
an entrepreneur's tendency for over or under optimism (Hmieleski and Baron, 2009).  Also having 
owned a business prior to the start-up increases the likelihood of firm survival (Headd, 2003).  
An influential study by Stuart and Abetti (1990) found that entrepreneurial experience is the only 
factor that explains variations in venture performance.  Entrepreneurial experience is a composite 
measure of involvement in previous ventures made up of:  the number of ventures started, the 
number of successful ventures, and the role played in such ventures (Stuart and Abetti, 1990).  
However, in keeping with a very mixed picture from studies measuring the relationship between 
human capital and performance, Cressy (1996), Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, (1997) and Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992) find no significant effect of prior entrepreneurial experience on firm 
survival.  The impact of entrepreneurial experience may be affected by contextual or situational 
factors, for example Stuart and Abetti’s study was of new technical ventures clustered in the same 
region of the US.  The review of later longitudinal research shows that being in a particular industry 
and/or starting successive firms in the same industry may magnify the spill-over effects of contextual 
and task similarity (Chandler, 1996) from relevant experience.  
4.3.3 Industry Experience  
Of Castanias and Helfat’s (2001) four factors of managerial human capital, two arise from industry 
experience.  An industry is a group of firms producing products that are close substitutes or 
complementary goods (Porter, 1980).  Industry experience indicates context specific entrepreneurial 
human capital (Chandler, 1996; Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2013; Klepper, 2001).  
Many of the skills and much of the information necessary to effectively exploit an opportunity can 
only be learned through industry experience (Delmar and Shane, 2006).  Industry, environment and 
task similarities reduce the requirement for new knowledge acquisition (Chandler, 1996; Gartner 
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and Starr, 1999; Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch, 2011).  Reputation and also social ties to 
suppliers, distributors and customers are often industry specific.  When a subsequent venture is in 
the same industry, social capital ties can be more easily and quickly transferred (Aldrich and Reuf, 
2006; Delmar and Shane, 2006).  
Pre-entry knowledge of the industry provides specific and often tacit (uncodified) information 
concerning the competitive landscape. These include a host of key information elements, such as: 
profitable niches, customer preferences, supply chain issues, employment practices, and industry 
rules and norms (Brush, Greene and Hart, 2001; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Dencker, Gruber and 
Shah, 2009); market prices, resource costs, the value chain, the profitability of various market 
segments (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler 1992; Dimov, 2010; Landier and Thesmar, 2009); and 
production processes, market niches, and technological developments (Delmar and Shane, 2006).  
Specific industry experience enables entrepreneurs to know which tangible and intangible resources 
a venture will require to succeed and build strong core competencies and competitive advantage 
(Haynes, 2003).  With industry knowledge of markets, ways to serve markets and solutions to 
customer problems, the entrepreneur is equipped to better recognise and evaluate opportunities 
(Shane, 2000).  Specificity increases the effect of inherited prior knowledge.  The greater the industry 
knowledge the more sophisticated are the opportunities that are recognised (Grégoire, Barr and 
Shepherd, 2010).  Within industry innovation may not be constrained by following an industry 
corridor.  
Industry experience is likely to explain differences in behaviour between sub-types of entrepreneur.  
As habitual acquirers deal with established businesses with a track record they have less unknowns 
and are more likely to move into unrelated businesses than habitual starters (Ucbasaran, Wright and 
Westhead, 2003).  Serial starters and portfolio builders, then, by corollary, are more likely to stay in 
the same industry.   
Industry and Resource Profile 
From the perspective of the resource-based theory of the firm, firms only enter industries for which 
they have suitable resources (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002).  Furthermore, pre-entry knowledge of 
the business activity and pre-entry management experience moderate the firm’s ability to adapt to 
prevailing conditions in an industry (Dencker, Gruber, and Shah, 2009).  For example, prior industry 
experience is associated with making more accurate pre-entry forecasts particularly in high-
technology industries (Cassar, 2014).  Pre-entry industry knowledge has a positive effect on firm 
survival (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997; Delmar 
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and Shane, 2006).  From a small sample of venture capital (VC) backed ventures Sandberg and Hofer 
(1987) find that experience only impacts performance when gained in a similar industry. 
There is plenty of evidence from industry studies that show that new firms with pre-entry 
experience in related fields survive longer, such as in the digital imaging, automobile (Klepper, 2002), 
television receiver (Klepper and Simons, 2000), and ship building (Thompson, 2005) industries.  
Incubated employee spin-outs survive longer than even established diversifying entrants in disk-
drive industries (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar, 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006), and 
medical device companies perform better than other start-ups in the same industry (Chatterji, 
2005).  Spin-outs have a survival edge over other entrants because of the combination of relevant 
knowledge and entrepreneurial flexibility in the founder (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 
2004).  Indeed the general evidence that industry experience is converted into differential venture 
performance is also true for serial entrepreneurs.   
Serial Entrepreneurs and Industry Experience   
There is some qualified evidence from human capital vs. performance studies that serial 
entrepreneurs benefit from staying in the same industry.  In a German single industry survey of serial 
entrepreneurs by Kirschenhofer and Lechner (2012) there is a positive relationship between the 
number of prior ventures in the industry and performance.  The experience of US serial self-
employed and small business owners is more valuable if gained in closely related sectors (Chen, 
2013).  However, this survey is subject to the qualifications concerning the representativeness of 
self-employment data.  Swedish serial (more accurately habitual) entrepreneurs with ventures in 
knowledge intensive industries have a higher performance when there is a high level of contextual 
(industry, location and time) similarity between prior and current ventures (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg 
and Kim, 2014).  For US Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) alumni, (44% of the sample are 
habitual entrepreneurs), experience is more significant for outcomes if a venture operates in a 
familiar market or technology (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  
Other studies with lower samples of habitual entrepreneurs such as West and Noel’s (2009) study of 
high technology CEOs (20% serial founders) find no relationship between new venture performance 
and industry knowledge.  However, elsewhere the same study does find a relationship between 
performance and business relatedness (similar products, services, or overall approach).  In contrast 
to Chen’s study, Parker’s (2013) survey of US serial self-employed shows returns are largely invariant 
to being in the same industry.  However, self-employment data may not be representative of the 
behaviour of serial founders.  
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Overall, in a field of study where performance as the dependent variable is not consistently 
associated with  measures of individual human capital, the literature on specific industry experience 
shows a relatively compelling picture of the advantage to habitual entrepreneurs of making start-ups 
in the same industry.   
However, only two studies of habitual entrepreneurs measure industry specialisation: Chen (2013) 
and Schollhammer (1991).  They find that 57% and 80% of new businesses, respectively, are started 
in the same industry as a previous venture.  While Schollhammer’s early and regional specific study 
is unlikely to be representative of all habitual entrepreneurship, we would expect corridor and path 
dependent effects of prior knowledge and other resource positions to constrain an entrepreneur’s 
options to the same industry.  As recent studies point to increased returns to industry specific 
human capital, then if success does indeed breed success, then successful habitual entrepreneurs 
will be observed staying in the same industry.  If only the data presented was of sufficient granularity 
to distinguish between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs.  
Technology  
Some researchers believe that the benefit of experience may be greater when entrepreneurial 
decision making takes place in an intrinsically uncertain environment such as a venture employing 
new technology, or in high tech industries (Aldrich and Foi, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) 
where businesses are evaluated with limited information (Shane and Stuart, 2002).  High technology 
entrepreneurs view themselves as ‘insiders’ due to previous experience in the industry that creates 
barriers to entry and exit (Stuart and Abetti, 1990).  However, Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch’s 
(2011) extensive review of studies finds no consistent evidence for this.  It could be that in moderate 
levels of technological novelty prior experience is very helpful.  However, after significant 
technological change it is a disadvantage (Eesley and Roberts, 2006).  
Other Sources of Entrepreneurial Human Capital  
Other studies measure the effect of less specific forms of entrepreneurial human capital on firm 
performance.  While presenting an inconsistent empirical picture, these general forms of human 
capital, may, in fact, complement and magnify specific forms of entrepreneurial human capital.  
4.3.4 Employment Experience  
Employment experience is a precursor to becoming an entrepreneur (Bates, 1990; Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper and Woo, 1997).  Work experience in particular functions such as marketing and finance 
develops entrepreneurs’ operational knowledge (Vesper, 1980) and increases their productivity 
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(Parker, 2006).  Relevant work experience can assist in the integration and accumulation of new 
knowledge and thereby enable individuals to adapt to new situations (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  
Employment experience in the same or a related industry is a specific and potentially more valuable 
form of human capital.  Pre-founding knowledge can be easily transferred if founders have work 
experience in the same industry or domains of the new start-ups (Oe and Mitsuhashi, 2013).  
Employment in an industry provides substantial uncodified information (Delmar and Shane, 2006), 
and knowledge learned and social relationships forged in prior employment influence the strategies 
of newly founded firms (Shane and Khurana, 2003). 
General labour market experience, industry experience, and previous business experience together 
are critical in new venture start-ups (Parker and Van Praag, 2012).  However, it is work experience in 
the same industry as the start-up that increases business longevity (Cressy, 1996; Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994). Similarly, new firms 
achieve break-even faster when their founders have had work experience in the same industry (Oe 
and Mitsuhashi, 2013).  
Employment Experience and Incubation 
Nascent entrepreneurs are incubated in the organisations where they worked before starting their 
business (Cooper, 1985).  Lamont (1972) showed that future habitual entrepreneurs in Palo Alto get 
started by ‘spinning out’ and commercialising the technology transferred from previous employers. 
In addition, some entrepreneurs used their experience to change position in the value chain from 
self-employed contract engineer to producing their own product.  Two-thirds of growth orientated 
firms featured in a magazine, (75% high technology businesses), were in a similar business to their 
incubators (Cooper, 1985).  In all five case studies of Scottish technology entrepreneurs by Mason 
and Harrison (2006), the entrepreneurs started businesses in the same sector as their former 
employer.  This pattern is repeated in cross industry studies.  Start-ups (as opposed to acquisitions) 
are most similar to the incubator in terms of customers and products.  Similarity was highest where 
members of the entrepreneurial team were former employees (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986).  
Some serial entrepreneur’s initial novice ventures are likely to be incubated in employment.  The 
incubation process may provide a template for the development of subsequent start-ups.   
4.3.5 Management Experience 
Pre-entry management experience indicates that founders had worked in a managerial capacity 
before they started their new firm (Bates, 1990).  Pre-entry management experience provides a 
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variety of useful skills, greater functional knowledge and social skills in dealing with people and 
external actors.  Management experience supports the entrepreneur’s coordination role to 
effectively identify and allocate scarce resources (Chandler and Jansen, 1992).   
Managerial talent can be taken as synonymous with entrepreneurial talent (e.g. Lucas, 1978). 
Nevertheless, in practice it may be difficult to separate management experience from 
entrepreneurial experience (Stuart and Abetti, 1991).  Evans and Leighton (1989) find positive 
effects while other studies; Bates (1990), Stuart and Abetti (1991), and Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and 
Woo (1997) cannot find significant effects.  Other commentators think that overall managerial 
experience may be more valuable to serial acquirers because existing ventures typically employ 
others whereas serial start-ups do not (Parker and Van Praag, 2012; Robbie and Wright, 1996).  
4.3.6 General Human Capital  
General human capital serves as a proxy for both intellectual capacity and flexibility. General human 
capital is typically operationalised as education (Rauch and Frese, 2000).  Formal education may 
assist in the accumulation of explicit knowledge and skills useful to entrepreneurs (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994).  Entrepreneurs with university degrees have 
generally had their expectations and information processing and problem-solving skills raised 
(Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012b) and are better able to deal with complex 
problems (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).   
Entrepreneurs who start companies earlier in their careers do better than those who had sought 
further education first (Stuart and Abetti, 1990).  Educational background positively impacts 
opportunity identification (Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  It generates a wider 
range of opportunities.  However, it is not associated with pursuit (Arenius and DeClercq, 2005; 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).  Education may have no 
impact on who becomes an entrepreneur, nevertheless, the effect on performance is positive and 
significant (Van Der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg, 2008).  
In respect of habitual entrepreneurs the evidence provides a mixed picture.  Educated entrepreneurs 
are more likely to become serial entrepreneurs (Kolvereid and Bullvåg, 1993).  In contrast, in another 
study they are more likely to become portfolio entrepreneurs (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008).  
General human capital is negatively correlated with re-entry for serial entrepreneurs (Amaral, 
Baptista, and Lima, 2011; Hessels, Grilo, Thurik, and Van der Zwan, 2011); it could be that highly 
educated individuals may obtain higher returns in employment.  In contrast, serial entrepreneurs 
with specific human capital return to entrepreneurship (Amaral, Baptista and Lima, 2011).  Though 
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the evidence is not clear cut there is some support for Wiklund and Shepherd’s (2008) thesis that 
general human capital will be associated with portfolio entrepreneurship, while specific human 
capital (as with other embedded resource endowments) will be related to serial entrepreneurship. 
4.3.7 Human Capital and Business Performance Studies   
A meta-analysis of 70 pieces of quantitative research by Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch (2011) 
shows a significant but small positive relationship between human capital and performance.  They 
conclude that success is often context specific and is better predicted using task-specific measures of 
human capital.  However, contemporary longitudinal studies of serial entrepreneurs (Chen, 2013; 
Eesley and Roberts, 2013; Oe and Mitsuhashi, 2013; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014) all have 
performance outcome advantages accruing to serial entrepreneurs starting business in industries 
where they have had experience.     
Nevertheless, overall, proof of the existence of an experience curve of increasing returns to 
experience from venture to venture remains elusive.  Researchers who find curvilinear experience 
curves (Parker, 2013; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014) provide different explanations for their 
results: human capital depreciation and superstitious learning.    
Human Capital Depreciation  
Parker’s pattern of ‘reversion to the mean’ of outcomes of self-employment is attributed to the 
depreciation of human capital over time.  Other commentators also support depreciation, such as 
when networks built up in previous ventures are disbanded (Rerup, 2005), and as part of the ageing 
process (Cressy, 1996).  The value of knowledge gained from previous industry experiences erodes 
very quickly (Newbert, 2005) and investments may be required to maintain its value (Ucbasaran, 
Westhead and Wright, 2009; Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  Parker’s study 
turns the assumption of a learning curve on its head.  For the serial self-employed, economic returns 
to experience are negative not positive.  The initial stock of human capital dissipates unless perhaps 
specific prior knowledge is reused relatively quickly.  Another interpretation is that the mean return 
is a measure of their innate and fixed talent.  Again, there is the questionability of the 
representativeness of self-employment data for all forms of serial entrepreneurship.  
Faulty ‘Superstitious’ Learning  
Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim’s (2014) large study of Swedish entrepreneurs attributes its U-
shaped returns to human capital to faulty learning at low levels of experience.  With only one 
cognitive anchor (the first venture) to learn from, unless there is strong contextual similarity, 
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entrepreneurs make mistakes in their second venture.  Having learned from their mistakes their 
performance then improves.  Serial entrepreneurs will be observed making mistakes early in their 
career before the learning curve reasserts itself.  
Novice vs. Habitual Performance Studies 
The likely advantages of experience do not reveal themselves in clear performance differences 
between the ventures of habitual and novice entrepreneurs.  It may be misleading to assume that all 
habitual entrepreneurs are successful and outperform novice entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran, Westhead 
and Wright, 2006).  Several studies find no difference in the performance between habitual and 
novice entrepreneurs (Birley and Westhead, 1993; Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1993; Ucbasaran, 
Westhead and Wright, 2006; Westhead and Wright, 1998a, b).  However, the picture becomes 
clearer in studies that distinguish between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs. 
Serial vs. Portfolio Entrepreneur Performance Studies 
As already noted there is some evidence that portfolio entrepreneurs perform better than serial 
entrepreneurs.  Despite their experience serial entrepreneurs are actually more like novices than 
portfolio entrepreneurs.  Portfolio founders are more organised and more likely to actually start a 
business and not give up in the first year (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1998).  One study by Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks (2005) of 354 Scottish businesses  shows that firms run by portfolio 
entrepreneurs are larger, grow faster in terms of sales and employment, and generate significantly 
more income compared to firms run by serial and novice entrepreneurs.   
Income and Earnings vs. Venture Outcome 
Few of these studies include an absolute measure of venture outcome, i.e. exit.  This data is 
probably not available in the datasets employed. Nor is the distinction between serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs available.   The relationship between personal income and venture outcome and 
differences between the two types of habitual entrepreneur are worth exploring.  
4.3.8 Innate Talent vs. Experience and Learning 
Some researchers ascribe differential performance to an innate and fixed talent rooted in cognitive 
ability.  Entrepreneurs learn about their ability to compete in a particular industry so as to decide 
either to stay or quit (Jovanovic, 1982).  In most interpretations of this work (e.g. Storey, 2011) 
‘Jovanovic learning’ precludes learning by doing.  Recent quantitative studies of serial entrepreneurs 
identify talent as the principal explanation for superior returns to entrepreneurship, where talent is 
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assumed to be an innate and fixed superior cognitive ability (Chen, 2011; Eesley and Roberts, 2012; 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2006; 2010).  However, the research concludes that the 
combination of industry experience and talent can extract more from any entrepreneurial situation.   
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2006; 2010) conclude that serial entrepreneurs do not 
learn from success because their data shows first-time entrepreneurs have the same chance of 
succeeding as entrepreneurs who previously failed.  Eesley and Roberts (2012) conclude that less 
talented serial entrepreneurs rely on experience and chose to start ventures in familiar contexts.  
Therefore, it is possible to posit that talented serial entrepreneurs will be observed founding new 
firms in new corridors, including new industries.  
‘Success Breeds Success’ Theory of Habitual Entrepreneurship  
Very influential researchers Stuart and Abetti (1990) assume that the experience of a successful 
business is a better predictor of future success than experience of failure.  Talent theorists go further 
and postulate a ‘success breeds success’ theory of serial (habitual) entrepreneurship. Talented 
entrepreneurs are more likely to receive high average profits in their initial ventures that are then 
likely to motivate them to found new firms (Chen, 2009; 2013; Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and 
Scharfstein, 2010). Consequently, serial (habitual) entrepreneurs form a more talented pool of 
individuals than the pool of all entrepreneurs (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).   
The success breeds success theory follows the same economic principles as the division of labour 
and the matching of talented entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities (Lucas, 1978; Holmes and 
Schmitz, 1990; 1995).  Talent is assumed to be a cognitive ability beyond risk bearing that employs 
frame-breaking mental activities such as experimentation, questioning, and observation (Eesley and 
Roberts, 2012).  Talented entrepreneurs are better able to make judgements beyond prior 
knowledge such as timing of entry into new markets (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 
2010).  More research is required.  Chen’s data set includes self-employed, Gompers et al is of elite 
businesses attracting VC funding where success is defined as achieving an Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
and Eesley and Roberts restricted their sample to MIT graduates, who likely represent a social and 
intellectual elite.   Differences between the success rates of the different categories of 
entrepreneurs are quite small at 5%.  Nevertheless, Gompers et al. still conclude that failed returning 
serial entrepreneurs do not learn from failure as their IPO success rate is similar to that of novices.   
Innate talent and learning from experience are positioned as alternative theories.  However, an 
alternative view is that talent and learning from experience are not mutually exclusive.  Serial 
entrepreneurship requires cognitively intelligent, i.e. talented individuals, to transfer to the next 
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venture learning from both success and failure (Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle, 2013).  If talent is 
cognition and learning is also a cognitive ability, then there will be differential learning between 
successful and unsuccessful serial entrepreneurs and talented entrepreneurs can learn and recover 
from failure.  
4.3.9 Summary  
Prior knowledge of pursuit and exploitation confers cost and efficiency advantages to serial 
entrepreneurs on re-entry to entrepreneurship.  Previously acquired specific human capital vital for 
venture formation and development is intuitively thought significant for venture performance.  
However, the evidence presents a mixed picture.  From the review of recent studies industry 
experience appears significant to performance.  Many of the skills and much of the information 
necessary to effectively exploit an opportunity can only be learned through industry experience.  
Other types of human capital, such as employment experience, appear to be more beneficial when 
from the same industry.  Nevertheless, industry specialisation by serial entrepreneurs remains 
understudied.  Other types of research into incubation of first ventures may provide clues as to the 
process of serial entrepreneurship.    
Serial entrepreneurs benefit from start-up experience and reputation to obtain and organise 
resources. However, the advantage is not used because serial founders rely much more on their own 
resources than portfolio entrepreneurs.  Studies find that portfolio entrepreneurs are more 
successful than serial entrepreneurs.  Access to capital and the exploitation of economies of scope 
and other synergies are a source of advantage to portfolio entrepreneurs.  Serials without these 
advantages are more similar to novices in behaviour and outcomes.   
The difficulty in finding clear cut evidence for a positively sloped experience curve has led to theories 
of rapid human capital depreciation and faulty learning from early ventures.  Established theories 
based on innate (i.e. fixed) entrepreneurial talent and economic selection attract some empirical 
support.  It is argued that the less talented specialise in one industry where they can rely on their 
experience. This implies that the truly talented can start successful businesses in different industries.  
An alternative view offered here is that talent and learning from experience are both manifestations 
of cognitive ability and therefore are not mutually exclusive.  Successful serial entrepreneurs will be 
observed combining relevant industry experience with their cognitive ability.  Experience of exit, 
including the impact on income and personal wealth from both failures and successes remains 
understudied.  It does not feature as a key construct in human capital or venture performance 
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studies.  Cognitively intelligent serial entrepreneurs should be observed learning from both success 
and failure over the course of their careers.  
4.4 Section 4. Entrepreneurial Cognition 
In this section the literature on a particular type of entrepreneurial human resource, cognition, is 
reviewed in detail to ascertain its significance to serial entrepreneurship.  Everything else being 
equal cognitive talent underpins entrepreneurial judgement. Cognition has an iterative, recursive 
and dynamic quality, because cognitive ability is required to both form human capital through 
learning and also intelligently deploy it to process new information through recall and calculation.  
However, it is difficult to research the figurative ‘black box’ of cognitive processing.     
4.4.1 The Importance of Cognition  
Cognition is associated with entrepreneurial talent or business acumen and drives the economic 
matching process (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982; Lucas, 1978) of entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities.  
Similarly, cognition is central to the information centred view of entrepreneurial judgement.  The 
information view of opportunities is that opportunities arise from information asymmetries (Hayek, 
1945).  These asymmetries are especially acute because valuable information is often held privately 
(Arrow, 1974).  The exercise of entrepreneurial judgment requires a subjective cognitive synthesis of 
public and private information (Casson, 2005).  Entrepreneurs may believe that they have lower 
information costs and better theories to help them process the information (Casson and Wadeson, 
2007). The twin perspectives of access to information and information processing are present in 
Katz’s (1992) socio-cognitive model of decision making.  They use information significantly better 
than non-experts or non-entrepreneurs.  For example, people will discover and exploit specific 
opportunities (that others cannot see), when information asymmetries and history-dependent 
accumulation of experience exists (Shane, 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  Entrepreneurs 
exercise creative cognitive leadership (Witt 1998; 2007) to make and communicate business 
conceptions (i.e. opportunities), and organise ambiguous information into agendas and action plans.  
Cognitive ability distinguishes talented habitual entrepreneurs who can achieve more economic 
rents from any combination of resources (Eesley and Roberts, 2012), and is thought to drive the 
division of labour that matches serial entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities (Plehn-Dujowich, 
2010).  Entrepreneurship is a process of learning (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001) and learning is a 
cognitive ability (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes, and Hitt, 2009; Politis, 2008).  Higher order cognition is 
required to escape the path dependent nature of learning and to recognise new innovative 
opportunities (Rerup, 2005).  
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4.4.2 Entrepreneurial Cognition   
Entrepreneurs are said to have a unique mind-set (Ireland, Hitt, Sirmon 2003; McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000), orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), or dominant logic (Reuber and Fischer, 
1999).  Entrepreneurial cognition is concerned with how entrepreneurs think. In particular, it is 
concerned with the knowledge structures that people use to make the assessments, judgments, or 
decisions involving opportunity evaluation, venture creation and growth (Mitchell, Busenitz, Bird, 
Gaglio, McMullen, Morse and Smith, 2007), that transform the exchange value of resources in an 
economy (Grégoire, Corbett and McMullen, 2011).  Classified as a resource (Alvarez and Buzenitz, 
2001; Barney, 1991), cognition is the active and dynamic ingredient in the formation and 
deployment of human capital (Castanias and Helfat, 2001).  Nevertheless, despite its importance, 
cognition can be both an asset and a liability for habitual entrepreneurs (Starr and Bygrave, 1991).  
Cognition Theory 
Cognition encompasses all processes by which sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, 
stored, retrieved, and used (Neisser, 1967).  It forms beliefs and meanings that govern behaviour 
(Wiener, 1980). Cognition theories (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Gioia and Poole, 1984) explain how an 
individual's cognitive profile of schemas and action orientated event scripts determine how they 
process complex information.  Schemas can be thought of as how information is stored in an 
organised accessible way. Scripts are a form of procedural task orientated information.  Mental 
schemas and scripts link cognition to learned prior knowledge.  Schemas and scripts are models of 
how the world operates in particular domains, built on past experience with specific examples called 
templates and exemplars available to support reasoning by analogy.  As schemas and scripts become 
richer with experience, they facilitate quicker and more effective information processing (Lord and 
Maher, 1990).  
4.4.3 Bounded Rationality, Cognitive Heuristics and Biases 
Neoclassical economic decision making assumes rational analytical decision making.  Deliberate, 
systematic, rational models of cognitive processing assume information is thoroughly processed 
(Lord and Mather, 1990).  Behavioural economics stems from perceived shortcomings in the 
application of neoclassical economics to real world problems. Simon (1955; 1959) and March and 
Simon (1958) replace expected utility theory with the theory of bounded rationality, where 
economists treat the human mind as another ‘scarce resource’ (Simon, 1978).  Decision making is 
subject to heuristic short-cuts, a kind of shortened script or rule of thumb.  Heuristics yield quick and 
effective decisions to problems, but are likely to be biased (Bazerman, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 
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1974).  However, heuristic processing economises on mental resources, as it uses previously learned 
and tested mental short cuts (Lord and Mather, 1990), and is considered to be useful in complex and 
time limited decision scenarios typical of those faced by entrepreneurs (Baron, 1998; Busenitz and 
Barney, 1994). 
Prior experience based decision-making uses information clues whether recognised consciously or 
not (Simon, 1973).  Heuristics may come from repeated practice of analytical thinking; so called 
intuitive expertise (Simon, 1987).   Some research on entrepreneurial cognition indicates that 
entrepreneurs are more influenced by heuristics than managers (Busenitz and Barney, 1994; 
Busenitz and Lau, 1996), and habitual entrepreneurs are thought to rely on heuristics more than 
novices (Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  Habitual entrepreneurs are 
characterised as having a mind-set that avoids analysing ideas to death (McGrath and MacMillan, 
2000). 
Biases occur in heuristic decision making when too much reliance is placed on past experience.  Prior 
knowledge is more ‘available’ and provides a cognitive ‘anchor’ for judging new information 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  The way a habitual entrepreneur 
frames a problem and searches for solutions may become more narrow and channelled by past 
experience (Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron, 2003), and there is a danger of myopic repetition of  
successful ‘recipes’ unadjusted for new circumstances (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997a,b).  
Habitual entrepreneurs may continue to use the same information sources and social and business 
contacts that reinforce existing patterns of thinking (Starr and Bygrave, 1991), and be hindered in 
their ability to acquire new information and ideas (Gruber, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 
2012; 2013; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  Furthermore, if an experienced decision 
maker is unaware of bias in their decision making process, it can lead to other dynamic cognitive 
effects such as hubris and over confidence (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006; Ucbasaran, 
Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003). 
Experimental data gathered from students and young small businesses suggests that start-ups are 
prone to biased thinking in not perceiving risks from competition and overestimating demand 
(Simon and Houghton, 2002; Simon, Houghton, Aquino 2000).  There is also some evidence that the 
overly negative or positive framing of future prospects makes entrepreneurs more risk seeking 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 1986).  Simon, Houghton, Savelli, 
(2003) find that managers who are less satisfied with their current situation take risks, by 
introducing products into less familiar markets, even though it requires more resources.  In 
experimental data, Hsu, Wiklund and Cotton (2015) propose positive framing of future prospects to 
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explain why so many failed entrepreneurs re-enter entrepreneurship, even when failure has 
undermined their self-efficacy.  Also, they find that practising entrepreneurs tend to have high self-
efficacy that can overrule any effects of prospect framing.   
Research of entrepreneurial heuristics has mainly been conducted at the firm level.  Here, 
organisational heuristics are akin to the ‘routines’ of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary 
resource theory, and emphasise the many positive aspects of heuristics set out by Gigerenzer (1996; 
2008).  They are central to knowledge capture and learning (Bingham, Eisenhardt and Furr, 2007).  In 
particular, ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics outperform analytically complicated and information intensive 
routines, because heuristics exploit information about context (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).  
Manimala (1992) finds that innovative firms have a better developed opportunity capture heuristic, 
where the major source of new ideas is their routine contacts (customers, dealers, suppliers ,etc), 
who bring out problems with existing products and services supported by wider search activities. 
Less innovative firms replicate existing ideas and strategies until there is a crisis.  For example, 
Bingham and Haleblian (2012) show that organisations learn new heuristics following failure from 
attempts to internationalise.  Using the same case data, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) conclude 
that heuristics are ‘rational,’ especially in unpredictable markets and that the transition from novice 
to expert heuristics is an important step in developing resource capabilities.  
4.4.4 Human Capital Template Theory and Joining the Dots 
Mental schemas and scripts provide the cognitive element of idiosyncratic ‘knowledge corridors’ 
(Venkataraman, 1997) that channel or corridor entrepreneurs into familiar domains.  More formally 
from Kolb’s (1984) theory of learning, prior knowledge moderates the cognitive process of 
opportunity recognition (Corbett, 2002; 2007).  Schemas of prior knowledge are cognitively arranged 
into prototypes and exemplars that help entrepreneurs to ‘connect the dots’ of new opportunities 
(Baron, 2006).  Prototypes are general descriptions of a domain while exemplars are concrete 
examples that facilitate reasoning by analogy (Baron, 2006; Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  Bi-association is 
the cognitive mechanism that connects unrelated domains to create ideas where none existed 
before (Ko and Butler, 2003; 2006), and links ends with means (Smith and Di Gregorio, 2002).  For 
example, consistent with Venkataraman and Sarasavathy’s (2001) framework of opportunity 
discovery, opportunities may be presented as cognitive puzzles of problem-solution pairings, where 
either the problem or solution is found first, and then paired (Hsieh, Nickerson, and Zenger, 2007).   
Cognition predicts that novices can be more innovative, while experienced founders must balance an 
idea’s newness with the reality of implementation. The evidence shows that the templates of prior 
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knowledge of experienced habitual entrepreneurs emphasise factors associated with successful 
pursuit and exploitation through new ventures (e.g. cash flow, meeting customers’ needs, etc.), 
while those of novice entrepreneurs emphasise opportunity newness or novelty (Baron and Ensley, 
2006).  Entrepreneurs use prototypes to look for device plays over drugs plays in pharmaceuticals 
because of shorter lead times to market (Fiet, Clouse and Norton, 2004).  Success stimulates 
persistence and repetition in any activity (Weick, 1984), and existing information stores and 
information processing will be reinforced by success (Minniti and Bygrave (2001).  Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) use the concept of absorptive capacity to describe how the ability to acquire new 
information is recursively dependent upon existing knowledge.  A new idea that is closely matched 
against an existing prototype of an opportunity is more likely to be identified as an opportunity 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  Empirical evidence (e.g. Hills and Shrader, 1998; 
Ronstadt, 1988; Shane 2000) confirms that new opportunities are often spin-offs of other 
opportunities.  However, a well-developed mental schema acts as a ‘mental blinder’ and makes it 
difficult for individuals to notice, encode and remember information that is inconsistent with the 
existing schema (Baron, 2004).  In extreme cases, entrepreneurs may be prone to a sunk cost bias 
where courses of action with negative outcomes are maintained (Staw, 1981), because the individual 
believes that they have too much at stake to reverse their initial decisions (Hmieleski and Baron, 
2006).  There is evidence that information is both channelled into particular areas (Burmeister and 
Schade, 2007) and also sought from particular areas (Fiet, 2002), thereby reinforcing the status quo. 
Cognition and Economics 
An economic view of cognitive abilities and mental schema would regard these as assets, where the 
marginal cost of processing information is lower using these established capabilities.  Only 
information signals that relate to the entrepreneur’s particular epistemic structure are processed; 
they match signals to what is already known (Fiet, Piskounov and Patel, 2005).  Correct actions 
exhibit increasing returns to adoption such that they become repeated routines, even though they 
may be sub-optimal (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  Indeed, some cognitive concepts have clear 
similarities with the principles of economic search, for example, the confirmatory search heuristic 
(Shepherd, Haynie and McMullen, 2011) is based on the principle that entrepreneurs seek out 
information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and conjectures.  
Therefore, successful habitual entrepreneurs operating in the same industry are likely to attempt to 
replicate actions that were successful before though conditions have changed (Ucbasaran, Wright, 
Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  Even when moving to new domains they will repeat practices that 
were successful in another domain (Wright, Robbie and Ennew 1997 a, b).  Serial entrepreneurs may 
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not be able to notice significant new information clues due to their strong mental schema 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009) and find it difficult to escape a particular knowledge 
corridor (Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2013). 
4.4.5 Expert Information Processing 
Experts are people who excel primarily within their own domains.  They are able to perceive 
problems in their domain at a deeper level and spend a larger proportion of time in qualitative 
analysis and self-monitoring their effectiveness (Glaser and Chi, 1988), for example through meta-
consciousness (Flavell, 1979).  Expert performance also requires maximal adaptation to task 
constraints (the rules of the game) within the domain (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996).  Expert habitual 
entrepreneurs are expected to demonstrate similar cognitive abilities honed through practice (Baron 
and Henry, 2006, 2010; Mitchell, Busenitz, Bird, Gaglio, McMullen, Morse and Smith, 2007), that are 
a source of comparative advantage in entrepreneurial decision making.  However, advanced 
expertise may require ten years of ‘deliberate practice’ to develop (Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-
Romer, 1993) and it may only be in the middle years of a habitual entrepreneur’s career that 
expertise is in evidence.  
4.4.6 Cognition and Opportunity Recognition  
An exceptional cognitive ability ascribed to entrepreneurs is opportunity recognition. Cognitivists 
working with the inherent vagueness of Kirzner’s work provide a possible ‘how’ of alertness.  Gaglio 
(1997), Gaglio and Katz (2001) and Gaglio (2004) define alertness as expertise embedded in 
entrepreneurial mental schema and thought processes that enable the perception of new often 
innovative opportunities.  Alert entrepreneurs are able to deploy mental simulation and 
counterfactual thinking to perceive new opportunities others cannot conceive (Gaglio and Katz, 
2001; Gaglio, 2004).  Alert entrepreneurs are both more rational by not falling foul of a variety of 
biases and framing effects, and are also able to ‘think outside the box’ to perceive new opportunity 
means-ends.  Experienced entrepreneurs are able to switch between heuristic and analytical 
thinking (Baron and Ward, 2004). Habitual entrepreneurs are expected to be better able to ‘connect 
the dots’ between seemingly unrelated changes or events to detect meaningful patterns (Baron 
2006; Baron and Ensley, 2006).  Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd’s (2010) study is evidence of expert 
information processing, prior knowledge of markets allowing deeper thinking and the recognition of 
non-obvious valuable opportunities. 
Cognitively expert entrepreneurs are better equipped to resist availability and anchoring biases 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982).  Experts are able to search cognitively using both imagination 
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and experientially by interacting with the actual environment (Gavetti and Levinhal, 2000).  In an 
experimental study, expert entrepreneurs under-weighted, ignored and argued against making 
predictions and were prepared to change their initial goals and visions for a new venture (Dew, 
Read, Sarasvathy and Wiltbank, 2009).  Innovative entrepreneurs acquire and process information 
through questioning, observing, experimenting and idea networking (Dyer, Gregersen and 
Christensen, 2008).  Evidence shows that experienced entrepreneurs are able to deploy quick 
heuristic or slow rational information processing as the situation requires (Gustafsson, 2006).  Other 
evidence shows that algorithmic methods are more likely to lead to existing problem–solution 
opportunities, while new problem–solution opportunities arise from heuristic trial and error 
methods (Vaghely and Julien, 2010).   
Learned beliefs or theories (Casson, 1982) underpin the entrepreneur's cognitive structures, and 
having a strong self-sense of how to connect the dots allows entrepreneurs to direct their own 
learning (Krueger, 2000; 2007).  The degree of reflective learning or the mindfulness and 
mindlessness with which entrepreneurs use prior experience can both help and harm their ability to 
discover and exploit opportunities (Rerup, 2005).  Following  Langer (1989), mindfulness  will create 
new more nuanced and discontinuous categories out of prior experience that generate adaptive and 
alternative ways to operate, while mindlessness is like being on automatic pilot.  Habitual 
entrepreneur Stelios Haji-Ioannou’s 16 mainly start-up ventures used both mindless (simple brand 
extension) and mindful (application of a business model) approaches to generate new businesses 
(Rerup, 2005).  
Expert entrepreneurs will have better perception, memory, metacognition, and intuition (Baron and 
Henry, 2010).  Metacognition is ‘thinking about thinking’ (Flavell, 1979) to consciously understand 
the elements that make up one’s own decision process, and is valuable in dynamic, uncertain and 
novel  situations (Haynie,  Shepherd, Mosakowski  and Earley, 2010).  Through metacognition, expert 
entrepreneurs are able to deploy different types of cognitive processing, and be selective in their use 
of previous experience that is encoded in schema, templates and the like.  The ability to reflect on 
one’s decisions and the cognitive process that generated them is likely to be a facet of persistence 
and successful habitual entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  Set 
against flexible thinking is evidence for a dominant logic (Reuber and Fischer, 1999) that is difficult to 
change.  Engineers use established scripts and algorithms, while artists use mostly heuristic types of 
information processing, such as trial and error (Vaghely and Julien, 2010).  
The majority of serial entrepreneurs work with the same trusted partner in multiple start-up 
ventures (Gemmell, Boland and Cobb, 2012), and social cognitivists propose a more complex 
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opportunity recognition and development process that relies on shared cognition through social ties, 
mentors and small entrepreneurial teams.   
From an economic perspective, higher level cognitive processing is costly (Levinthal and March, 
1993), and in the presence of information symmetries and uncertainty highly imperfect.  Knowledge 
structures (i.e., schemata, scripts, frames, stereotypes, etc.) tend to be very abstract (Tang, Kacmar, 
and Busenitz, 2010).  The limited ability to research the figurative ‘black box’ of cognitive processing 
must lie at the root of the seeming lack of empirical evidence in this field.    
The nature of cognition and its relationship to the development of expertise remains a subject of 
debate in the literature of habitual entrepreneurship.  Recent quantitative studies of serial (habitual) 
entrepreneurs (Chen, 2011; Eesley and Roberts, 2012) identify talent as the principal explanation for 
superior returns to entrepreneurship.  Talent is assumed to be innate and fixed superior cognitive 
abilities that for the more gifted entrepreneurs are transferrable to different domains. Here the 
innately less talented rely on their expertise developed through experience.  The alternative 
proposed here is that learning from experience is also a cognitive ability, and talented entrepreneurs 
will learn from experience. 
4.4.7 Summary  
Human capital can be conceptualised as different categories of prior knowledge resources available 
in schema and associated with abilities embedded in ‘cognitive software’, i.e. scripts, heuristics, and 
learning processes essential for the formation of new human capital.  This synthesis is summarised in 
the following diagram. 
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Figure 4.2 Information Orientated Model of Entrepreneurial Decision Making 
The cognitive abilities of successful serial entrepreneurs are not well understood.  Behavioural 
economics, the information processing view of entrepreneurship, the division of labour and the 
talent driven theory of entrepreneurial selection all view cognition as a scarce resource.  Therefore 
cognition is essential for explaining differential entrepreneurial ability or talent of serial 
entrepreneurs.  Serial entrepreneurs are expected to demonstrate expertise in the coordination of 
scarce resources, including their own cognitive resources through higher order thinking such as 
metacognition and mindfulness.  
A potential liability of experience derived heuristics and schemas is that they may lead to 
insensitivity to noticing and absorbing new information.  This may lead to biased and myopic 
thinking.  Nevertheless, it is economically rational to reuse and further specialise costly to replace 
mental assets, whose cost of development is already sunk.  Therefore, cognitive resources may 
exhibit irreversible path dependent qualities.  It is therefore more likely that serial entrepreneurs will 
specialise in the same task and content domains, starting similar ventures in the same industry.   
However, economic selection and Schumpeter’s innovative entrepreneur require at least some 
individuals of high cognitive ability and talent.  These entrepreneurs deploy sophisticated mental 
strategies such as counterfactual thinking and mental simulation, and can resist bias and other 
mental traps.  Some cognitively talented serial entrepreneurs are expected to be able to think 
mindfully beyond prior knowledge and succeed in new domains.   
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4.5 Section 5. Entrepreneurial Learning  
In this section the review of entrepreneurial human capital and its related fields is extended from 
cognition to learning ability.  Learning is positioned here as a cognitive ability required for both 
building new stocks and to revalue existing stocks of human capital.  
4.5.1 The Importance of Learning  
Studying serial entrepreneurs without learning limits our ability to understand the entrepreneurial 
process as it unfolds over time.  The evidence for a direct causal relationship between human capital 
and returns to entrepreneurship is inconsistent, revealing that a more complex less accessible 
process is involved, an insight predicted by the assets and liabilities theory of habitual 
entrepreneurship (Starr and Bygrave, 1991).  Even though human capital is mainly acquired through 
learning, analysis of the careers of serial entrepreneurs is not expected to show an upward sloping 
experience or learning curve directly related to venture performance and personal wealth.  
However, recent postulates that advance the theory of serial entrepreneurship assume learning is 
important. It requires cognitively intelligent entrepreneurs to transfer, i.e. ‘infect’ the next venture 
with learning from both success and failure (Sarasvathy, Menon, Kuechle, 2013).  Effective firms are 
most likely to be led by entrepreneurs who not only judiciously embed their own knowledge, but 
who also have the willingness and capability to learn which becomes part of the firm’s culture (Oe 
and Mitsuhashi, 2013). 
Entrepreneurial Learning 
Learning is the achievement of new understanding and meaning (Daft and Weick, 1984).  
Entrepreneurship is an ability gradually built up over time during the careers of enterprising 
individuals (Politis, 2005, 2008), and is a dynamic learning process (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; 
Rumelt, 1987).  Without learning, human capital research is a static comparison of an entrepreneur’s 
total stock of experience at a given point of time with a given outcome (Reuber and Fischer, 1999).   
There is a need to know what, whether, and how habitual entrepreneurs learn from previous 
business ownership experiences (Westhead and Wright 1998a; Rerup, 2005).  Learning is not 
automatic in entrepreneurship (McGrath, 1999), and learning from experience may be difficult, 
particularly when task content and industry context are dissimilar (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 
2014). 
4.5.2 The Learning Curve 
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Learning is required to develop human capital and explain increases in per capita income not 
attributable to other sources (Arrow, 1962).  The learning curve postulates that expertise is 
developed through repetitive action that results in cost savings (Yelle, 1979).  Lamont (1972) noted 
that ‘practice makes perfect’ for repeat entrepreneurs, and MacMillan (1986) formally makes it a 
focus of study as the ‘experience curve’.  However, not all forms of learning are good, and passive 
(as opposed to dynamic) learning that accrues over the course of time has been shown by Thompson 
(2010) to lead to stagnation in industrial settings.  
Experience should not be equated with knowledge (Bingham, Eisenhardt, Furr, 2007), as experience 
may be a poor teacher (Levinthal and March, 1993).  Kolb’s (1984) theory of experiential learning 
makes the distinction between knowledge acquisition (experience) and transformation (learning).  It 
is entrepreneurial expertise not experience that is more likely to be correlated with performance 
(Politis, 2005; Reuber and Fischer, 1994).  Therefore, learning is not automatic, and that which is 
learned may not be correct.  Therefore, increasing returns to learning from experience should not be 
assumed every time for all serial entrepreneurs. 
4.5.3 Learning: Task and Domain Similarity 
If serial entrepreneurs start ventures in unfamiliar domains it may inhibit learning from experience. 
The cognitive process of learning is reinforced when content and context are similar (Zahra and 
George, 2002).  When formulating strategy, habitual entrepreneurs can use reasoning by analogy 
(Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005) to build links between previous and current venture 
experience.  The closer the similarity between the tasks and domain of the previous business the 
more likely is existing learning to be re-used without modification (Chandler, 1994).  It is very likely 
that serial entrepreneurs will encounter enough differences in each venture that prior knowledge 
cannot be reused without modification (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014); i.e. some new 
learning has the potential to takes place.  Individuals with greater task experience are likely to be 
more responsive to contextual changes exercising experience-based discretion (Turner and Fern, 
2012).  
4.5.4 Learning from Feedback 
Only where tasks are well defined, repeated often, and feedback is accurate and timely, does 
decision making improve (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006). Start-up experience may not 
provide sufficient feedback to enable effective learning about a particular task (Cassar, 2014).  In 
fact, all infrequent events are difficult to learn from because repetitiveness cannot compensate for 
time decay (Parker, 2013).  To overcome cognitive framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
84 
 
only when entrepreneurs have multiple reference points from several start-ups can they judge how 
to handle different start-up situations effectively (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014).  For 
example, multiple entrepreneurial experiences help the entrepreneur to detect and pursue 
opportunities with a stronger personal fit (Amaral, Baptista and Lima, 2011).  Unlearning is also 
needed in the face of difficulties and performance detracting routines (Bingham and Haleblian, 2012; 
Dencker, Gruber, and Shah, 2009; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Reuber and Fischer, 1999).  Empirical 
studies reveal that both positive success and recovery from negative experience have good potential 
for generating useful learning, but only in the presence of sufficient prior experience of the same 
type (Kim, Kim, and Miner, 2009). 
4.5.5 Learning from Critical Events  
Entrepreneurship is inherently uncertain.  Successful venturing requires developing the ability to 
respond effectively to unanticipated problems and opportunities (Reuber and Fischer, 1999), such as 
the critical incidents (Chell, 2004) that punctuate the life-cycle of a venture (Cope, 2003; 2005; 2011; 
Rae and Carswell, 2001).  Serial entrepreneurs are exposed to more critical events and 
discontinuities from multiple start-up and exit experiences over their careers.  These should further 
increase management capacity (Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 2012) because discontinuous events 
trigger ‘transformational learning’ (Cope, 2003; 2005), and play a significant role in the formation of 
expertise.  Failure can have positive learning outcomes such as becoming future-oriented and 
developing greater preparedness for further enterprising activities (Cope, 2011). 
Learning from Failure 
Failure has a longstanding place in respect of entrepreneurial learning and decision making (Cardon 
and McGrath, 1999; McGrath, 1995; McGrath, 1999; Politis and Gabrielsson, 2007).  Failure and 
underperformance can revise previously ineffective practices, highlight mistakes and augment skills 
and knowledge about the entrepreneurial process (Cope, 2011; Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 
2013).  Without the occasional failure, entrepreneurs may:  a) become prone to self-serving bias and 
over confidence (Baron, 1998); b) stick to the same formula (Sitkin, 1992); and  c) be unable to 
switch out of automatic heuristic based thinking (Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 2003).  
Because of spill-over and learning effects, it is often more useful to evaluate the collective 
contribution of entrepreneurial initiatives to wealth creation than to assess each venture on its own 
(McGrath, 1999; Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013).  Disappointing events can provide data 
crucial to assessing the actual trajectory of a venture, setting the stage for strategic redirection 
(McGrath, 1995; Cope, 2011).  Experienced entrepreneurs have developed a higher acceptance of 
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failures as a way of reducing uncertainty (McGrath, 1999; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  There is some 
evidence that this learning does occur.  Habitual entrepreneurs with prior experience of start-up and 
business failure have a more positive attitude toward failure (Politis and Gabrielsson, 2007). 
4.5.6 Learning Vicariously 
Serial entrepreneurs can do more than just learn from their own experience.  Vicarious learning 
occurs when firms attempt to understand and potentially adopt the strategies, administrative 
practices, technologies, successes and failures of other organisations (Huber, 1991; Baum and 
Ingram 1998; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Kim and Miner, 2007).  Vicarious learning is one method by 
which information asymmetries disappear (Eckhart and Shane, 2003).  Information is disseminated 
during the life-cycle stages of industry development (Low and Abrahamson, 1997) to achieve 
equilibrium, and opportunities arise from mistakes of other entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973).  Serial 
entrepreneurs who are more alert and/or employ formal search routines will benefit from 
information gained through vicarious learning.  In addition, serial entrepreneurs who pursue 
imitative ventures will deploy vicarious learning strategies. 
4.5.7 Learning and Path Dependency  
The principle of absorptive capacity maintains that the more similar new information is to prior 
knowledge the easier it is to absorb the new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002).  Learning from prior experience is particularly relevant (Argote and Ingram, 2000).  
The learning process itself may also be path dependent (Levitt and March, 1988).  Learning is heavily 
based on interpretations of the past, adapting incrementally to feedback using the logic of 
appropriateness rather than a logic of calculated choice (Cyert and March, 1964, Nelson and Winter, 
1982).  History matters (Arthur, 1989) because an entrepreneur's previous investments and 
repertoire of routines constrains his future behaviour (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  The initial 
endowment of knowledge affects the future path of the venture.  What an organization knows at 
start up determines what it searches for, what it experiences, and how it interprets what it 
encounters (Huber 1991).  The reuse of this initial endowment may lead to the formation of a 
dominant logic and information funnel/knowledge corridor (Venkataraman 1997) that reinforces the 
current path (Reuber and Fischer, 1999).   
Economic modelling of learning and feedback also predicts a narrow path-dependent learning.  
Entrepreneurs develop ‘myopic foresight’ by learning from successes as well as failures in a non-
linear stochastic feedback process that is self-reinforcing, even though what is learned may be sub-
optimal (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  Economic search in the opportunity discovery literature (e.g. 
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Fiet, 1996) also has a self-reinforcing capacity.  The same familiar information channels that yielded 
opportunities in the past are reused again and again.  
Therefore, in spite of the potential to learn from experience, some individuals may be stuck in the 
past (Ward, 2004); affected by the liability of staleness (Starr and Bygrave, 1991); or mental ruts 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  In these circumstances entrepreneurs may find themselves prey to 
‘competency traps’ and ‘superstitious learning’ (Levitt and March, 1988), or ‘hubris’ (Hayward, 
Shepherd and Griffin, 2006) or the ‘mindless’ application of prior knowledge (Rerup, 2005).  Over 
investment in current competencies exposes individuals and organisations to change in their 
environments and a mismatch between exploration and exploitation (Levinthal and March, 1993).  
Superstitions arise when the subjective experience of learning is compelling, yet the connections 
between actions and outcomes are still incorrectly aligned (Levitt and March, 1988).  The sunk cost 
fallacy, or ‘throwing good money after bad’, is an example of a perceptual trap, where the 
entrepreneur believes there to be irreversible path dependencies, or that success is just around the 
corner.  As already discussed, the available evidence (Kim, Kim, and Miner, 2009) suggests that 
accumulated experiences of the same type are needed to compare and contrast in order to 
overcome misperceptions.  This may explain data that shows negative outcomes reverse when serial 
(habitual) entrepreneurs exceed moderate levels of experience (Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 
2014).  
4.5.8 Higher Order Cognitive Learning  
An alternative to learning from experience is the possession of higher order cognitive abilities 
associated with entrepreneurial talent (Eesley and Roberts, 2012; Gompers, Kovner Lerner and 
Scharfstein, 2007).  Another aspect of higher order learning is learning about one’s self.  This type of 
learning facilitates a better fit between an entrepreneur and the opportunity (Shepherd, McMullen 
and Jennings, 2007).  Entrepreneurs with higher order cognitive abilities may have the ability to 
escape the various cognitive traps (e.g. Dyer, Gregersen and Christensen, 2008; Kahneman, Slovic, 
and Tversky, 1982).  Successful serial entrepreneurs can perform higher order learning by: a) 
mindfully reassessing their mental models and behaviours; b) abandoning ineffective routines and 
keeping effective routines; and c) implementing more appropriate strategies in the next cycle 
(Rerup, 2005).   
Synthesis of Learning 
Overall, there are then effectively four aspects of learning: 1) turning experience into knowledge in 
one context (absorption), 2) transferring it to another context (transfer), 3) applying the knowledge 
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in another context (transfer application), and 4) revaluing knowledge in relation to specific uses, 
past, present and future.  Serial entrepreneurs, in facing a larger number of unpredictable critical 
events, can be expected to practice these types of learning to stay in the game.  
4.5.9 Summary  
Like cognition, there is little direct evidence about how and what serial and portfolio entrepreneurs 
actually learn.  Learning is an entrepreneurial process that transfers experience into relevant 
knowledge.  Learning requires adequate feedback and correct interpretation.  This is more likely 
when a serial entrepreneur creates a new venture in a familiar industry.  Specialisation actually 
facilitates adaptation through increased sensitivity to changes in industry conditions.  The most 
commonly cited economic model of learning predicts that feedback has sub-optimal path dependent 
qualities reinforcing existing patterns.  Learning is likely to deepen knowledge corridors and may 
restrict the perception of real options.  Potential perceptual traps can be obviated, if the serial 
entrepreneur possesses higher order cognitive faculties.  Of further significance, serial 
entrepreneurship is prone to discontinuous critical events that trigger ‘transformational learning’, 
chief among them failure.  Failure allows serial entrepreneurs to question their previous often 
automatic application of previous recipes and thought patterns.   
An additional concept offered here is that the ability to learn can reverse previous investments in 
knowledge infrastructures and the dependencies they generate in the presence of new and more 
attractive opportunities.  By exiting their ventures serial entrepreneurs would appear to have much 
greater scope for this type of learning in pursuit of superior opportunities.  
4.6 Section 6. Teams, Social Capital and Habitual Entrepreneurship 
To this point the literature review has been true to calls to focus on the individual, examining 
individual entrepreneurial human capital and its specialist attributes of cognition and learning.  This 
section reviews research into extensions to the capabilities of the individual entrepreneur afforded 
by social capital and by teams, and their likely impact on the sequence of ventures started by serial 
entrepreneurs.  
4.6.1 Entrepreneurial Teams  
Teams are considered here as a specific form of social capital.  Some serial entrepreneurs will 
formally partner with other entrepreneurs to form small entrepreneurial teams that legally share 
ownership and control.  Partnerships persist from venture to venture.  Entrepreneurs frequently 
continue to work with partners formed in incubators (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986).  lsos and 
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Kaikkonen (2004) noted that habitual entrepreneurs carry over associates to the next ventures.  It is 
simply more economical to reuse existing partners than search for new ones (Forbes, Borchert, 
Zellmer-Bruhn, and Sapienza, 2006).  Entrepreneurs also extend the core team with functional 
specialists, such as lawyers, accountants, consultants and investors (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991), and 
presumably, some of these professional relationships are also preserved and reused in subsequent 
ventures. 
Teams are the initial resource-base of the firm and are regarded as significant for founders (e.g. 
Bates, 1990; Delmar and Shane, 2006; Lechner and Dowling, 2003; Westhead and Wright, 2011).  
Having more experience, habitual entrepreneurs should be more aware of their personal strengths 
and weaknesses (Politis, 2005), and value stronger teams (Tihula and Huovinen, 2010).  Habitual 
entrepreneurs who have already experienced the start-up process together and forged functioning 
work and social relationships should be at an advantage (Ensley and Pearce; 2001; Lechler, 2001).  
Relatively stable teams through repeated venture partnerships might also reduce dysfunctional 
team turnover due to bad relationships (Francis and Sandberg, 2000).  Team members leave mainly 
due to loss of interest or interpersonal dynamics (Chandler, Honig and Wiklund, 2005).  A larger 
initial team size provides an advantage for new organisations (Chandler, Honig and Wiklund, 2005).  
Indeed, teams with a diverse range of skills and who enjoy good inter-personal relationships are 
much more likely to launch successful growth orientated firms (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990).  
Such teams make good decisions when they use simple rules or heuristics, and, moreover, balance 
conflictual decision making with good personal relationships (Eisenhardt, 2013).  
However, the assets and liabilities thesis of habitual entrepreneurs warns that existing strong ties 
can lead to ‘staleness’ (Starr and Bygrave, 1991).  Staleness is likely when entrepreneurs frequently 
continue to work with partners formed in incubators (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986), partners from 
previous ventures, and with family members who constrain choice (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter, 2003).  
The closed group effect assures good working relationships, however, it leads to less searching for 
solutions outside the team, a phenomenon  also known as ‘group think’ (Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 
2012); and limits the knowledge that can be assimilated and exploited (Gruber, MacMillan and 
Thompson, 2013).  The advantages that teams possess on founding (such as knowledge of particular 
markets) are amplified, not dissipated, over time (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990).  Strong teams 
of entrepreneurs will not always choose the best markets.  Founding entrepreneurs typically choose 
markets they know best (Eisenhardt, 2013).  Team composition can limit innovation and restricts 
entrepreneurs to familiar corridors.  
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Larger entrepreneurial teams are associated with identifying more opportunities (Gruber, MacMillan 
and Thompson, 2008; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008).  Team experience of previous start-
ups enhances both new venture survival and new venture sales.  However, the effects are non-linear 
and decline as the venture ages (Delmar and Shane, 2006).  For serial entrepreneurs in the multi-
media industry, team diversity has a positive impact on enterprise performance while repeated 
partnerships have a negative impact (Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 2012). 
Portfolio entrepreneurs are more likely to use teams than novices or serial entrepreneurs 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2006), and acquirers are more likely to use teams than founders 
(Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  Gemmell, Boland and Cobb, (2012) found that all their 
sample of 32 technology entrepreneurs, of whom approximately half were serial (habitual) 
entrepreneurs, establish a well-seasoned team inner group or circle (de Koning, 2003).  Of this small 
group the serial entrepreneurs commonly described a single ‘trusted partner’ as their most crucial 
‘ideational’, with the great majority (65%) continuing the relationship in subsequent ventures, with 
no reports of a later ‘divorce’.  These relationships probably go beyond strong social ties as 
conventionally understood in social network theory (Granovetter 1973; 1985), effectively extending 
entrepreneurial human capital, cognition and learning available to a new venture.  Regardless of 
gender, most entrepreneurs’ strong tie networks consist of a few business associates, a few close 
friends, and one or two family members (Aldrich, Elam and Reece, 1996).   
Even if serial founders do not legally share ownership they can be expected to form stable small 
teams, perhaps supported by professionals, who are recycled and reformed for each subsequent 
venture.  Serial entrepreneurs will exhibit a team formation and management ability.  However, 
venture team stability is likely associated with a narrower corridor of ventures.   
4.6.2 Wider Forms of Social Capital 
The literature often mentions human and social capital together as essential ingredients to access 
and organise resources, including opportunities.  The corridor principal (Ronstadt, 1988) and real 
options theory (McGrath, 1996), predict that the potential future direction of serial entrepreneurs is 
strongly influenced by accumulated social capital derived from being in business.  Social capital like 
prior knowledge is another legacy, inherited or spill-over asset that provides real options for the 
development of new ventures.  It may act as an asset or liability (Starr and Bygrave, 1991).  Alike 
with other resources with path dependent qualities, social capital may ‘corridor’ serial 
entrepreneurs within familiar areas.  Alternatively, it may provide bridges to innovative 
opportunities and ventures in new areas.  
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Social Capital Theory 
In social capital theory, networks of extended relationships provide their members with collectively 
owned capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990).  Network value is a function of social resources, 
network position, and relationship strength (Lin, 1999).  Strong ties create bonds of trust that 
facilitate rapid diffusion of knowledge within the core social system; weak ties to dissimilar agents 
provide a social bridge to new knowledge and ideas (Granovetter 1973; 1985).  These networks are 
helpful in: a) finding and realising opportunities (McGrath, 1996; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000), b) 
obtaining easier access to financial resources (Hsu, 2007), c) recruiting skilled labour (Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002), and d) developing effective teams (MacMillan, 1986).   
4.6.3 Opportunities and Social Capital  
Opportunities can arise from social interaction and exchange.  Having a business grants automatic 
membership of business and social networks.  Having, (or having had) a business gives preferential 
access to opportunities arising from the position of the entrepreneur and venture in the social 
environment; providing resources that are otherwise unavailable (McGrath, 1996; Ronstadt, 1988). 
Business networks of independent firms linked by social ties, common interests, friendship and trust 
create opportunities for exchanging goods and services that do not have to rely on formal contracts 
to enforce (Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996).  Entrepreneurial networks are opportunity structures whereby 
entrepreneurs obtain instrumental social capital that helps identify and implement opportunities 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986).  Social capital is related to industry structure.  
Business communities co-evolve joined by communalistic (within market) and symbiotic (across 
market) relationships based on common technology, regulatory regime, or other forms of industry 
or market organisation (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001).  It can be inferred that strong ties reinforce 
existing patterns of behaviour, while weak outward facing ties provide links to new industry 
corridors. 
Social Capital and Entrepreneurship: Evidence 
Business contacts present new venture proposals to successful entrepreneurs in the network (Hills 
and Shrader, 1998).  Half of all firms had their business idea suggested by a business associate or 
family member (Koller, 1998).  A large social network with many weak ties is positively associated to 
idea identification and opportunity recognition (Singh, Hills, Hybels, and Lumpkin, 1999). 
Entrepreneurs who had mentors, or were members of high quality formal and informal networks, 
were most alert to new business opportunities (Ozgen and Baron, 2007).  Social capital and social 
competence together are related to financial success (Baron and Markham, 2000; 2003).  
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Geographic locations such as residential areas with their embedded social networks influence the 
perception of entrepreneurial opportunities (Arenius and DeClercq, 2005).   
The ability to extend information access and information processing are cognitive aspects of social 
capital that are perhaps understated in the literature.  Idea networking is a behaviour associated 
with generating novel ideas for innovative new businesses (Dyer, Gregersen and Christensen, 2008).  
Networks have also been shown to be important for opportunity exploitation (Davidsson and Honig 
2003).  They give access to resources significant for the gestation and start-up of new ventures 
(Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012a; Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009).  Social capital 
leverages the productivity of a venture's resource base and provides a durable source of competitive 
advantage (Florin, Lubatkin and Schulze, 2003).  An entrepreneur’s ability must include a social 
capital management dimension.  The innate limits to talent and capacity of an individual can be 
extended through the judicious use of networks. 
4.6.4 Social Capital and Habitual Entrepreneurs  
Habitual entrepreneurs have had more opportunity to develop and refine their social capital 
resource (Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1993; McKelvie and Cedere, 2001).  Habitual entrepreneurs 
exchange valuable resources including opportunities (Carter and Ram, 2003).  Habitual 
entrepreneurs have two inherited advantages in forming new networks: the social network ties of 
the founding team, and the reputation and accomplishments of their previous firms (Hallen, 2008).  
Strong signals of quality (e.g. successful executives, impressive firm accomplishments) lower the 
costs of network development and accesses to new resources (Hallen, and Eisenhardt, 2012).  New 
ventures that signal previous high-accomplishment are more likely to form ties with high-status 
partners (Hallen, 2008).  Furthermore, reputation and legitimacy can be used to convince others to 
reallocate resources in ways counter to existing norms (Shane and Khurana, 2003).  Habitual 
entrepreneurs have specific human capital accumulated from prior independent business 
ownership, such as leveraging information from business and/or governmental networks that enable 
them to discover more business opportunities than novices (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 
2005a). Habitual university-based entrepreneurs have broader social networks that bridge the gap 
between academia and business (Mosley and Wright, 2007).  Overall, successful habitual 
entrepreneurs who possess the valuable social capital of reputation can more easily attract suppliers 
of capital, labour, goods, and services if suppliers believe there is performance persistence 
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2010). 
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In recent studies, strong networks are associated with portfolio entrepreneurship, rather than serial 
entrepreneurship, especially where the network includes bridges to external support agencies 
(Robson, Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008).  However, in other 
studies, portfolio entrepreneurs avoid external professional information sources (Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005); and serial entrepreneurs emphasised making alliances with 
other organisations (Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2003).  Like teams, networks are more 
important to habitual acquirers than to habitual starters, because acquirers retain the same 
professional service providers and maintain good relationships with both business vendors and 
purchasers (Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  
Social Capital and Liquidity    
Entrepreneurs develop new ventures under liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). 
However, in respect of financial resources, serial entrepreneurs are less likely to benefit from the 
tendency for more experienced entrepreneurs to receive funding through direct social ties (Hsu, 
2007).  Entrepreneurial experience increases the likelihood of obtaining funding from higher quality 
and higher status investors, it reduces the time it takes to obtain funding, increases the amount and 
improves the terms of funding (Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012, Hsu, 2007, Shane and Stuart, 2002).  
Many venture capitalists heavily weigh prior experience (Hsu, Haynie, Simmons and McKelvie, 2014).  
However, set against this, two-thirds of serial entrepreneurs did not even use bank loans as part of 
their initial capital, and are less likely to use external funding in future ventures (Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005; Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997b).  Consequently, serial 
entrepreneurs are not expected to be observed using social capital to raise finance. The lack of 
access to financial resources may be compensated for in social forms of resource organisation.  
Serial entrepreneurs with strong tie networks of entrepreneurial families and friends who provide 
cognitive and psychological support are more persistent entrepreneurs (Stam, Audretsch and 
Meijaard, 2008). 
4.6.5 Summary  
Partnering, team formation and wider forms of social capital are positioned as extensions to 
entrepreneurial human capital, as a means of mobilising additional resources.  Team formation is 
common to all forms and entrepreneurship and habitual entrepreneurs often work with the same 
team from venture to venture.  The requirement for successful teams appears contradictory, 
needing both team diversity and stable inter-personal dynamics.  Stable teams lead to increased 
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specialisation, and a blinkered view of available options, even in the presence of new information 
and new opportunities.   
Social capital is used to mobilise resources and create real options under conditions of resource 
shortage and uncertainty.  Repeat founders with high quality networks, a reputation and legitimacy 
are at an advantage in forming ties and exercising influence.  However, ‘stale’ social networks may 
re-inforce existing patterns of behaviour for subsequent ventures. 
For serial entrepreneurs, social networks are less important for raising finance.  It is difficult to 
distinguish between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs in the use of teams and social networks as 
most evidence relates to the habitual entrepreneurs.  There is conflicting evidence on the relative 
importance of networks to portfolio and serial entrepreneurs.  They may be of more importance to 
portfolios than serials, and more important for acquirers than for starters.  Nevertheless, high ability, 
persistent serial entrepreneurs are expected to demonstrate skills in team and social capital 
formation and management.  Strong tie close personal networks may be more significant for serial 
entrepreneurs in helping overcome the negative effects of an unsuccessful venture exit.   
4.7 Section 7. Venture Exits  
Central to this study’s research question is how the sequence of starts-up by serial entrepreneurs is 
influenced by exit from the previous ventures.  Exit is very important to the innate talent versus 
learning debate, and the existence of an entrepreneurial learning curve.  If serial entrepreneurs 
return from failure to start successful enterprises, then they have most likely learned from the 
failure and augmented their entrepreneurial talent.  Selection by talent theorists points to the 
existence of an elite group of talented serial entrepreneurs for whom ‘success breeds success.’ They 
accumulate financial and reputational assets and go on, with the help of VCs to find or create even 
better opportunities.  This group may be complemented by another group who, more often rely on 
their own resources, can fail, but also learn from failure, recover and re-enter entrepreneurship.  It is 
this form of the process that is perhaps more typical of persistent serial entrepreneurship.  
4.7.1 The Importance of Exit  
Venture exit is an important entrepreneurial decision and skill set overlooked in the human capital 
literature.  The entrepreneurial process is more than just the creation of a new venture and does not 
end with creation, it ends with exit (DeTienne, 2010).  Economic selection that promotes the division 
of entrepreneurial labour and utility-maximization explains that the decision to exit is either a sign of 
entrepreneurial failure, or that the opportunity costs of  entrepreneurship compared to waged 
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labour have become unfavourable. In recent literature, exit is framed more positively as a career 
choice and the liquidation of a financial investment (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 
2010).  There is still, however, a tendency to follow established economic models and associate 
outright failure with a lack of talent and permanent exit.  The existing literature on failure is 
primarily concerned with the psychological impact of failure on habitual entrepreneurs. 
4.7.2 Venture Success or Failure?  
The accepted view is that a very small proportion of new ventures are highly successful while most, 
in contrast, fail (Baron and Henry, 2010).  In reality, success and failure may not be such contrasting 
‘black’ or ‘white’ outcomes.  There are a number of reasons for business exit: (1) voluntary exits to 
acquire a better job or venture, (2) exits due to personal circumstances, (3) exits by selling the firm 
to harvest wealth or avoid losses and (4) bankruptcy (Birley and Westhead, 1993; Politis, and 
Gabrielsson, 2007; Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 2010).  Failure is most often defined 
as financial infeasibility or unsustainability (Amaral, Baptista, and Lima 2009; Gimeno, Cooper and 
Woo, 1997; Headd, 2003).  However, research suggests that most terminations are voluntary quits 
rather than involuntary bankruptcies (Bates, 2005; Taylor, 1999), with approximately one-third of 
firms profitable at termination (Headd, 2003).  Stokes and Blackburn (2002) find that while almost 
half of closed businesses were ailing, the others were quite evenly split between thriving and simply 
not growing.  Therefore, there is evidence that many outcomes fall into a ‘gray-zone’ of near-failures 
and near-successes with different stakeholders having differing views (Rerup, 2006).  Business 
closure is not then merely reacting to financial infeasibility. 
Decision Thresholds and Entrepreneurial Persistence   
Entrepreneurs have different performance thresholds of actual performance that trigger the 
decision to terminate their businesses (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo, 1997).  Evidence shows 
that persistence is a function of many factors including: a) environmental conditions, b) personal 
investment, c) previous success and, d) other options available (Staw, 1981).  There are mistaken 
forms of persistence where entrepreneurs fall into cognitive traps.  Entrepreneurs may escalate 
commitment to a losing course of action (DeTienne, Shepherd and DeCastro, 2008).  Also, delaying a 
business failure can help balance the financial and emotional costs of business failure helping the 
entrepreneur to recover (Shepherd, Wiklund and Haynie, 2009). 
4.7.3 Successful vs. Unsuccessful Exits  
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Exits are clearly an important entrepreneurial and economic activity in the efficient allocation of 
resources.  In addition to matching entrepreneurs to opportunities, exit is required to realise 
personal wealth.  Most of the wealth created by entrepreneurs remains embedded in the firm until 
harvested (DeTienne, 2010).  Failure and success are variously and not always clearly defined in the 
literature.  Official statistics tend to exaggerate exit rates and it is a common practice to assume all 
discontinuities are failures (Levie, Don and Leleux, 2010). Failure is some legal form of firm mortality, 
its dissolution through merger, absorption, or outright failure (Gimeno, Cooper and Woo, 1997; 
Westhead and Wright, 1998a).  By implication, through outright failure due to a forced liquidation, 
the entrepreneur suffers a personal financial loss that is a measure of their innate ability and will 
cause them to leave entrepreneurship.   
Prior research has analysed sales of ventures by habitual entrepreneurs within the reference to the 
characteristics of the buyer, rather than the motivations of the seller (e.g. Birley and Westhead, 
1993).  Recently, Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon (2010) provide the seller’s perspective 
of the exit side of the equation.  Their taxonomy classifies possible exit routes for high and low 
performing businesses.  It includes differential levels of failure and success, including exit strategies 
to avoid outright failure.  A successful exit is where a high performing venture is sold as a continuing 
business, or where the firm is closed and the residual value is distributed to the owner(s).  An 
unsuccessful exit is where there is a distressed sale or liquidation of a low performing venture.  
However, the exact distinction between successful and unsuccessful can be blurred as an 
entrepreneur can harvest a business that has limited future prospects to avoid failure.  
In a large sample of Swedish new ventures in rapidly growing knowledge intensive industries, 
Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon (2010) found successful harvesting exits and unsuccessful 
distressed exits were roughly equal at 34% and 31% respectively, giving a residual continuation rate 
of 35%.  It is possible to infer from this longitudinal study that in a relatively modern and dynamic 
sector of the economy the probabilities of continuation, success and failure appear to be roughly 
equal.  
Successful Exits (Business Sales) 
The literature on the causes of seriality, (re-entry after exit), confirms the positive impact of a 
success on the likelihood of return to entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurs who received high average 
profits from their first venturing spell are disproportionately likely to become serial entrepreneurs 
(Chen, 2009).  Those who exited by selling their ventures are more likely to re-enter using their 
enhanced financial, social, and human resources and have greater confidence in their own skills 
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(Amaral, Baptisa and Lima, 2011; Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright and Westhead, 2003; Westhead and 
Wright, 1998).  
Unsuccessful Exit (Failure) 
There is both a high level of new venture creation by habitual entrepreneurs, and also high rates of 
business failure (Headd, 2003; Storey, 1994; Wiklund, Baker, and Shepherd, 2010).  Therefore, both 
portfolio and serial entrepreneurs are likely to have experience of failure.  However, serial 
entrepreneurs on average are more likely to have exited more businesses than portfolio 
entrepreneurs and have more experience of failure (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 2010; 
Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  In Germany 18% of serial founders previously 
founded a firm that went out of business (Wagner, 2003).  In a survey of 367 small business exits by 
Stokes and Blackburn (2002) 33% started another business compared to 38% who retired or 
returned to employment, leaving 29% who were probably portfolio entrepreneurs who had another 
existing business with which they could continue.   
Some entrepreneurs may have an imperative to learn, or to simply try again.  The assumption that 
entrepreneurs always have a choice between waged work and entrepreneurship is questioned.  
Many founding entrepreneurs may perceive no other career alternative than to start another 
company (Starr and Bygrave, 1992).  Habitual entrepreneurs are ‘misfits’ cast off from waged work, 
and so have no choice but to re-enter (Evans and Leighton, 1989).  Age can also prevent an easy 
return to waged work (Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  
It should also be noted that firms do not close at uniform rates.  The probability of business failure (a 
mismatch between the opportunity and the entrepreneur) decreases with the age of the business 
(Hall, 1995; Holmes and Schmitz, 1995; Nucci, 1999).  These studies show: a) closure rates are 
highest in the first few years after start-up and decline as the venture ages, b) closure rates are 
highest in smaller firms and c) some specific sectors are more prone to closures than others.  
However, Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon (2010) find that firm age is higher for 
distressed exits, between 4 and 5 years old, than for harvesting exits at between 3 and 3.2 years. 
This contradictory evidence may again be due to particular variables at play in their dataset drawn 
from high growth industries.    
4.7.4 Negative and Positive Effects of Failure  
Following the general theme of the assets and liabilities of habitual entrepreneurship, a great deal of 
the literature is devoted to assessing the negative and positive effects of failure.  
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Negative Effects  
If the costs of failure (i.e., financial, psychological, social, etc.) are too high entrepreneurs may 
choose to exit their entrepreneurial careers (Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett and Lyon, 2012). 
Returning entrepreneurs then must overcome the consequences of failure. There is evidence from 
Simmons, Wiklund and Levie (2014) that if stigma is attached to failure, then entrepreneurs are less 
likely to start new firms autonomously and are more likely to defer their entry, so as to distance 
themselves from the failure event.  While not all entrepreneurs experienced loss of self-esteem and 
felt grief (Jenkins, Wiklund, Brundin, 2014), it can still be a traumatic experience, that hinders 
learning and reduces the motivation to try again (Cope, 2011; Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy, and 
Frederickson, 2010; Shepherd, 2003).  Lost reputation reduces access to capital (Cardon, Stevens, 
and Potter, 2011).  Failure reduces the optimism of habitual entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran, Westhead, 
Wright and Flores, 2010).  If they return to entrepreneurship, habitual entrepreneurs may select less 
challenging goals and less risky and less innovative opportunities (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 
2009).  
Positive Effects  
Failure may also stimulate motivation to try again with greater effort.  Far from constraining future 
actions, failure can engender emancipatory learning outcomes (Cope, 2011).  A mixture of failures 
and successes can provide greater cognitive diversity upon which the individual can draw in 
subsequent activity (Gustafsson, 2006).  Successful serial entrepreneurs turn to their past 
accomplishments for reassurance (Cope, 2011).  Behaviours are revalued, some are abandoned, new 
knowledge is sought and new solutions developed (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  
Failure may act as a cognitive cure for a variety of mental traps, such as self-serving bias and over 
confidence (Baron, 1998).  Following attribution theory Wiener, (1985), Ucbasaran, Wright, 
Westhead and Busenitz, (2003) postulate that repetition of the entrepreneurial process is more 
likely if success and failure are attributed to factors over which they have control, or if beyond their 
control are regarded as transitory and limited in their effects.  They conclude habitual serial 
entrepreneurs are therefore more likely to be optimistic, adaptable, and resilient in adversity, while 
maintaining confidence.  Indeed Politis and Gabrielsson (2007) provide evidence that experienced 
entrepreneurs have a more positive attitude toward failure.  Confidence creates positive emotions 
that facilitate entrepreneurial resilience (Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy, and Fredrickson, 2010). 
Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, (2009) following the theory of self-definitional goals (Schultheiss 
and Brunstein, 2000), postulate that failure in a domain highly relevant to an entrepreneur's self-
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identity means that they may be highly motivated to try again.  Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) also proposes that negative framing (i.e. attribution of a loss condition) increases the 
attractiveness of pursuing a risky option of continuing (i.e. re-entry) to win back losses.  Hsu, 
Wiklund and Cotton (2015) provide evidence that negative framing may explain the re-entry 
intentions of serial entrepreneurs in the face of financial loss.   
4.7.5 Failure: Portfolio versus Serial Entrepreneurs  
There appears to be a significant difference between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs in their 
reaction to failure.  Portfolio entrepreneurs are less likely to report comparative optimism following 
failure, while serial entrepreneurs do not appear to adjust their comparative optimism following 
failure (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 2010).  A supportive store of social capital of 
families and friends increases the likelihood of re-entry (i.e. persistence) of serial entrepreneurs who 
have experienced failure (Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  
Comparative performance studies shed little light on the effects of failure.  There are no significant 
performance differences between businesses owned by entrepreneurs who have failed and those 
who have not (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, 2006).  On the other hand there is some evidence 
from Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2010) of venture capital backed ventures where 
success is measured very narrowly as making an IPO, that failed serial entrepreneurs do not learn 
from failure as much as successful entrepreneurs learn from success.  Perhaps serial entrepreneurs 
do not learn from failure, or failure is not significant in respect of future performance.  The majority 
return because they have learned enough to do so and/or they have managed to exit and preserve 
enough resources to start again (Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).   
Success, Failure and Learning by Serial Entrepreneurs 
As entrepreneurship involves trial-and-error experimentation to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity, 
then failure is likely (McGrath, 1999).  Learning from failure augments entrepreneurial talent and 
facilitates re-entry (Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  The intelligent ‘effectual’ serial 
entrepreneur learns both from their failures and successes and manages rather than avoids failure 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). Therefore, career entrepreneurs are not just passive subjects of events 
(Sarasvathy, Menon, and Kuechle, 2013).    
4.7.6 Summary  
Serial entrepreneurship requires exit and re-entry into entrepreneurship.  Serial entrepreneurs 
develop human capital in the form of the ability to exit from both successful and unsuccessful 
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ventures and return to entrepreneurship.  Serial entrepreneurs are likely to have exited more 
businesses that portfolio entrepreneurs and are more likely to have experienced failure.  A 
successful exit liquidates an existing venture at a high premium to book value and finances the re-
entry.  Nevertheless, many persistent serial entrepreneurs must also be able to recover from failure.  
Failure is seen as essential for learning as part of a wider system of economic development and 
innovation by trial and error.  The focus on failure and its negative connotations may be taking too 
narrow a view.  
It is difficult to divide exits into successful and unsuccessful.  Both the mixture of rents earned over 
the life of the business and its value on exit have to be taken into account.  An unequivocal success is 
some form of sale as a going concern.  An unsuccessful exit is a forced liquidation that results in 
economic losses.  Between these two extremes there are shades of grey, and half of all businesses 
are still financially viable when closed.  Evidence suggests that a new venture in a dynamic sector has 
an equal chance of a successful or unsuccessful exit.  Failure is more likely in the early years of a 
venture although not all the data agrees.  
Academic researchers focus on the emotional and psychological effects of failure.  By reducing 
confidence, reputation and access to capital, failure may delay return, and the returning 
entrepreneur may be less innovative and select less challenging goals. On the other hand, failure can 
cause a revaluation of prior knowledge, and depending on how the failure is attributed and framed, 
stimulate resilience, confidence, adaptability and determination to win back losses.  Serial 
entrepreneurs appear to be more optimistic in the face of failure than portfolios.   
Having failed, serials should not pursue similar opportunities, or at least not without making 
significant changes using what they have learned.  If they have succeeded before, they are likely to 
try to incorporate those elements that brought success into the next venture.  Overall, exit is a very 
important feature as it provides the principal difference between ‘cyclical’ serial and ‘permanent’ 
portfolio entrepreneurship.  
4.8 Section 8. Theory of Portfolio Entrepreneurship  
This section of the detailed literature review presents a clear divergence in the theory of habitual 
entrepreneurship between serial and portfolio entrepreneurship.  Portfolio entrepreneurship is 
regarded as better explained by the resource-based theory of the firm than the ‘classical’ theory of 
individual entrepreneurship.  This division breaks down further the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial 
behaviour into distinct forms.  Furthermore, it provides a useful platform for understanding serial 
entrepreneurship.  
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4.8.1 Theory of the Firm and Entrepreneurship  
As entrepreneurial opportunities are usually converted into a stream of rents through the start-up of 
a firm, opportunity based theories of entrepreneurship concentrate on opportunity recognition and 
the development of a business concept (e.g. Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray, 2003), and give way to the 
theories of the firm for pursuit and exploitation.  
The resource-based theory of the firm has been used to explain the ‘multi-firm-like’ behaviour of 
portfolio entrepreneurs.  Portfolio entrepreneurship assumes continuous and simultaneous 
ownership and control of more than one business firm.  Theory predicts and evidence shows their 
entrepreneurial instincts become confined to a narrow corridor of related diversified firms, owned 
and controlled in parallel.  
The general resource-based view is not exclusive to portfolio entrepreneurship.  McGrath (1996) and 
Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson (2013) use the resource-based theory of the firm harnessed to path 
dependency and evolution economics to explain Ronstadt’s (1998) opportunity and Venkataraman’s 
(1997) knowledge corridors for all types of habitual entrepreneur.  The leading researchers in the 
field, (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2001; Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead and Busenitz, 
2003), adopt Alvarez and Busenitz’s (2001) resource theory of entrepreneurship.  The resource-
based theory of the firm is deployed in a variety of different scenarios, for example by Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2008) to predict the mode of entry for firm creation used by novice and habitual 
entrepreneurs.   
Resource-Based Theory and Entrepreneurship  
In the theory the firm is a set of resources (Penrose, 1959).  Resources and products are two sides of 
the same coin (Wernerfelt, 1984), the equivalent to means and ends in the entrepreneurial 
opportunity framework.  In other words, by describing the resource profile of a firm, it is possible to 
determine the optimal product-market activities, i.e. the equivalent of actionable entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Resources that have unique capabilities increase competitive advantage and thereby 
the long term profit of the firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991). Researchers seek to 
identify the means by which new ventures can accumulate and develop resources (e.g. Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Haber and Reichel, 2007; Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001).   
The weakness in the theory of the firm is that the individual entrepreneur is absent (Baumol, 1968).  
In response, resource-based theorists simply include the entrepreneur’s specific human resources 
within the orbit of the firm.  These include coordinating knowledge, cognition, and opportunity 
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discovery (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  Entrepreneurship is a ‘dynamic capability’ (Teece, Pisano 
and Shuen, 1997). This encompasses firm founding (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and all higher-
level competences that integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external resources (Teece, 
2007), including, spotting the next big opportunity (Teece, 2012).  
In entrepreneurship theory that predates Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations, the individual 
entrepreneur not the firm is the central focus.  Entrepreneurs may begin with no more resources 
than themselves and an idea for a future opportunity.  It is the entrepreneur who profits from new 
opportunities as a reward for risk taking and exercise of judgment in the coordination of scarce 
resources (Casson, 2003).  Entrepreneurship is not a minor refinement of the theory of the firm, but 
represents a radical change, because entrepreneurs exploit differences of perception about 
information to their own advantage (Casson, 2005).  It is the entrepreneur who exercises agency and 
creates the firm to implement his or her opportunity-vision and choice of means-ends combination.   
Economic theory interposes the firm between the individual and the market and ‘must’ organise a 
firm to discover their business acumen (Jovanovic, 1982; Lucas, 1978), when in fact the firm exists 
only because it is more economically efficient to use semi-permanent contracts than rely on 
fluctuating market prices to organise transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981).  The 
transformation of an idea into an organisation requires the entrepreneur to acquire suitable 
resources (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001).  The legal entity of the firm assists the entrepreneur to 
contract resources to generate rents and also appropriate some rents for themselves (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2004).  These twin tasks of value creation and value appropriation occur under conditions of 
uncertainty because the economic value of an opportunity is not known; even probabilistically 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2005).  Opportunity exploitation will be more difficult and costly for 
entrepreneurs with fewer resource endowments (Alvarez and Barney, 2004), and as in human 
capital theory, greater capital implies higher outputs and higher returns.    
In reality, the relationship between the entrepreneur and their firm is synergistic – a partnership.  
Resources must be reconfigured by the entrepreneur in a value-added manner in order to yield a 
competitive advantage capable of generating future economic rents (Newbert, 2005).  
Entrepreneurs, especially those with prior start-up expertise, must then impose themselves and 
their visions (Witt, 1998; 2007) on the firms they create, concentrating decision making powers to 
control all resources (Alvarez and Barney, 2005).  Therefore, while dynamic capabilities are thought 
to be processes executed at the firm level, the ‘dynamic capability’ of new firm formation is a 
process executed at the individual level (Newbert, 2005).  This is because the entrepreneur retains 
ownership, control and active involvement of the firm in order to achieve her or his objectives.  
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In resource theory, firm creation and new entry is considered from the perspective of an established 
semi-permanent organisation.  The firm hires dynamic individuals to coordinate resources on the 
firm’s behalf.  It is more concerned with competition between existing firms than the creation of 
new ones.  An example of this viewpoint is Helfat and Lieberman’s (2002) influential work that 
shows that firms only enter markets if they have suitable resources; critical resource gaps are filled 
using acquisitions, joint ventures, or parent company spin-offs.  Within their organisational 
nomenclature, portfolio entrepreneurs would be viewed as practising a form of parent-company 
spin-off, and thereby, fit neatly within the resource-based view.  Clearly, start-stop-start serial 
entrepreneurs who liquidate the firm, and therefore are temporarily without a firm, perhaps return 
to employment for a while, but can still act entrepreneurially, do not fit this pattern.   
4.8.2 Theoretical Principles: Path Dependencies, Evolution, Ecology and Resources 
Path Dependency Theory 
Habitual entrepreneurship involves a sequence of ventures that form a career path or trajectory.  
Researchers using a resource-based theory of the firm perspective consider the implications of path 
dependencies arising from inherited resource endowments on a variety of entrepreneurial processes 
including: opportunity recognition (Alvarez and Barney, 2007), procedural knowledge (West and 
Noel, 2009) and organisational learning (Dencker, Gruber and Shah, 2009).  
Path dependency theory (e.g. Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985) examines self-reinforcing and non-
linear economic and technological phenomena over extended periods of time.  Resource 
endowments are a natural trajectory embedded in a firm's resource base (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993).  Those that form core competencies are a source of competitive advantage (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990).  In evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), routines, processes and other 
organised activities are also resources with the potential for path dependent effects.  Routines are 
more heavily based on interpretations of the past than on interpretations of the future.  Evolution is 
a form of learning whereby the firm gropes toward more profitable resource combinations (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982).  Path dependency does not require increasing returns to scale, only 
‘irreversibility’, i.e. a substantial cost to undo a previous resource allocation decision (David, 2007).  
In addition, though not required for path dependency, investments in durable assets where the fixed 
costs are ‘sunk’ (i.e. not recoverable) can impact future options and decisions such as inhibiting the 
factor's exit from a firm (Peteraf, 1993).  Even information as an infinitely durable asset (Arrow, 
2000) causes micro-level irreversibility which can also give rise to path dependent dynamics (David, 
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2007).  In recent explorations of firm foundation by Gruber (2010) corridors are formed and 
maintained by path dependent processes. 
Evolutionary Economics 
Evolutionary economics provides an explanation of how resource heterogeneity arises (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003).  Pre-entry knowledge not only has a direct effect on firm survival, it has an indirect 
and ongoing effect as well.  New routines are related to existing ones (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and 
products, complementary assets and routines are linked and co-evolve together (Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2000).  Evolutionary economics has clear parallels with other path orientated theories 
of entrepreneurship, including the corridor principle, real options theory, and prior knowledge 
corridors.  Of further significance, path dependencies can be found elsewhere in relevant theory.  In 
entrepreneurial learning, successful behaviour is reinforced by feedback (Minniti and Bygrave, 
2001). In cognition, absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and cognitive templates (Baron, 
2006) may also engender irreversibilities.  These cognitive path dependencies may explain why 
economic search is narrowed to familiar channels (Fiet, 1996).  While Nelson and Winter (1982) 
follow Kirzner (1973) and adopt ‘diffuse alertness’ as an evolutionary force for the discovery of new 
information, it is argued here that both search and alertness are channelled by prior experience into 
information corridors (Venkataraman, 1997). 
Organisational Ecology 
Organisational ecology theorists (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1989) also regard initial endowments 
as strongly path dependent by causing structural inertia and a lack of agility at the firm level.  Firm 
population density in particular industries and market niches increases over time and determines 
founding and failure rates.  Entrepreneurs copy existing business forms when there are strong 
evolutionary selection and retention forces (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) that have cognitive and 
socio-political legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965).  Most entrepreneurs are expected to just replicate 
and reproduce the structures, competencies, and routines of pre-existing organisations (Aldrich and 
Martinez, 2001).  Both portfolio and serial entrepreneurs will be observed ‘following the herd’, 
either replicating existing businesses or founding additional firms in closely related niches. 
Resource Bundles  
Resources should not be viewed as easily divisible fungible tangible assets.  Social capital qualifies as 
an inimitable resource in being specific to the parties involved, providing a barrier to access by 
others (McGrath, 1996).  Firms are tied to resources and resources to firms.  Resource productivity is 
attributable to the context of the firm.  Co-specialised resources (Teece, 1986) are not as productive 
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outside a particular firm; the firm and the factor are essentially a ‘team’ (Peteraf, 1993).  Resource 
mobility and resource entry barriers (Rumelt, 1984; 1987) serve to isolate groups of similar firms in 
an industry.  A location can also be an imperfectly imitable physical resource (Barney, 1991) that has 
isolating and entry prevention properties.  
From the intra-firm perspective, resource bundles change as a new venture grows (Brush, Greene 
and Hart, 2001), and entrepreneurs will concentrate on the reorganisation and reconstruction of 
‘salient’ resources critical for firm health and growth (Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001).  Resources and 
organisational capabilities follow a lifecycle of: entrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment, 
recombination and retirement (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  Changes in the lifecycle stage are 
triggered by events; these could include new opportunities, new competitors, the loss of resources, 
exit, or outright failure.  Firms may combine exit from one product-market with entry into another 
via capability redeployment or recombination, thus obtaining inter-temporal economies of scope 
(Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2002).  Replication applies to a different geographic market for the same 
product or service whereas ‘redeployment’ involves a market for a different, although still closely 
related product or service (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2002).  In one study, the gradual evolution of 
salient resources is associated with survival and growth, while discontinuous change is likely to lead 
to firm failure (Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001).   
The resource-based theory of the firm as an explanatory tool has been challenged as conceptually 
vague in specifying the mechanisms by which resources actually generate competitive advantage 
(Foss and Knudsen, 2002; Peteraf and Barney, 2003).  A sustainable competitive advantage is 
infrequently achieved in dynamic and high velocity markets (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Part of 
the problem is that resources are difficult to measure and many are intangible (Barney, Ketchen and 
Wright, 2011).  
Overall, all types of repeat venture creators constrained by resources positions can be expected to 
show gradual evolutionary change from venture to venture.  Radical departures from the current 
path are likely to be unusual and often unsuccessful.   
4.8.3 The Resource-Based View: Portfolio Entrepreneurship  
The resource-based theory of the firm is used to explain portfolio entrepreneurship.  Diversification 
or business duality (Perks and Medway, 2012) occurs when one business is developed alongside 
another.  There are two elemental forms of diversification, concentric (related) and conglomerate 
(unrelated). Concentric related diversification is close to the original business, launching related 
products or services within the same general industry.  Conglomerate diversification involves 
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completely different activities with a completely different technology, oriented towards different 
markets.  One benefit of unrelated diversification is the spreading of risk as conventionally explained 
by Samuelson (1967) for investment portfolios (Sarasvathy, Menon, and  Kuechle, 2013). 
The degree of relatedness or ‘coherence’ among a firm's products determines the nature and extent 
of the scope of the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992).  Although patterns of diversification will vary 
from industry to industry because of the differences in the possibility of transferring the firm’ s 
know-how to related activities, there will be a high degree of coherence (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and 
Teece, 1994).  Synergies, complementarities and economies of scale and scope are the most cited 
reason for why firms diversify.  Scale economies arise from lower marginal costs of producing and 
marketing one product; scope economies arise from producing and marketing a variety of products 
that can share resources and processes.  Synergies arise from a combination of activities and 
resources that magnify each other’s effects. 
Following Rumelt (1984), synergies are stressed by Porter (1980; 1985); business units that support 
and complement each other by sharing resources and transferring skills and expertise can have a 
value creating effect.  However Teece (1980; 1982) states that only if economies of scope are based 
on specialised and indivisible resources that are used recurrently, is multi-product diversification 
efficient and value creating.  In short, the more related the markets, the larger the profit potential, 
due to exploitation of economies of scope and the transfer and leveraging of resources across 
distinct businesses.  Peteraf (1993) concludes that since specialized resources also tend to be 
relatively scarce, the model would predict higher rents for narrow diversifiers.  
4.8.4 Portfolio Entrepreneurs: Resource-Based Diversifiers  
Recently, the theory of portfolio entrepreneurship has become characterised as a form of 
diversification (Parker, 2014), where portfolio entrepreneurs recognise and pursue opportunities 
that diversify their portfolios of businesses.  Parker postulates that both related and unrelated 
diversification affords portfolio entrepreneurship a clear economic advantage over serial 
entrepreneurship. This view has a solid basis in the literature.  
Scott and Rosa (1996) direct attention to the firm as a source of new firms.  Rosa (1998) and Rosa 
and Scott (1999) demonstrate that related entrepreneurial diversification from opportunities arising 
from existing ventures is routine, associated with growth and based on a corporate managerial 
strategy.  Iacobucci, (2002) and Iacobucci and Rosa, (2005) show that the growth process of 
entrepreneurial firms is primarily driven by diversification.  Their study of small regionally based 
Italian manufacturers finds that more than half of the firms set-up or acquired after the original one 
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perform similar activities; i.e. they are the result of the progressive occupation of market segments 
within the original sector of activity, using horizontal expansion rather than vertical integration.   
The portfolio entrepreneur is then an organiser who masters dependencies between ventures rather 
than someone needing independence (Iacobucci, 2002).  The study shows that they are very unlikely 
to engage in unrelated diversification using conventional corporate strategy.  They also present 
some evidence for a dynamic evolutionary process where the number of companies expands in 
phases of entrepreneurial activity and contracts to consolidate established businesses (Iacobucci and 
Rosa, 2004).  
The Diversification Strategies of Portfolio Entrepreneurs 
Their empirical research also lists the main diversification strategies pursued by portfolio 
entrepreneurs:  
a) to raise the share of existing products within the same geographic area (market penetration); 
b) to serve new, foreign markets (internationalisation);  
c) to expand in market segments within the same sector (horizontal or vertical differentiation);  
e) to enter into new sectors related to the physical and human resources of the core business 
(related diversification); 
d) to enter into new sectors  supported by government sponsored programmes (diversification); 
e) to enter new sectors as a survival mechanism (diversification). 
Interestingly, for this thesis, these studies specifically exclude the phenomenon of serial founders 
and companies that were set-up but subsequently closed or were sold, i.e. were unsuccessful during 
the life of the group.  Therefore, the theory of portfolio entrepreneurship derived from these studies 
is not representative of the behaviour of serial entrepreneurs, and only includes successful retained 
firms.   
The Drivers of Venture Relatedness for Portfolio Entrepreneurs  
A review of other studies of portfolio entrepreneurs shows that portfolio entrepreneurs make 
mainly related diversifications, be they small farm businesses (Carter, 1998) or successful ‘local hero’ 
Scottish entrepreneurs (Rosa 1998).  Potential opportunities for diversification considered by 
farmers in Finland (Alsos and Kaikkonen, 2004) and Norway (Ljunggren, Pettersen, 2003) were close 
to the existing farm business.  
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An important feature of farm businesses is the availability of physical assets in the form of farmland 
and buildings.  These resources are crucial in extending strategic growth options (Carter, 1998).  
Substantial resource transfers take place of knowledge and organisational and physical resources, 
mediated both by the resource richness of the farm and the degree of similarity in the activities of 
the farm and the new venture (Alsos and Carter, 2006).  Farm studies illustrate the ‘centrifugal force’ 
exerted by significant inherited physical resources, and the specialist industry skills required to 
operate them.  Farm assets are location specific, attached to an industry and culture of farming that 
goes back generations.  Their costs are most likely sunk, and there are considerable psychological 
and economic switching costs involved in leaving farming.  New business ventures are closely related 
to the farm business, in terms of horizontal or vertical expansion.  Similarly, Perks and Medway 
(2012) show that there is reluctance among UK farmers to go beyond incremental developments and 
a reluctance to network beyond their existing community for resources.  
Unrelated Diversification 
Kolveried and Bullvag (1993) and (Iacobucci, 2002; Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005) observe that unrelated 
diversifications are often a survivalist mechanism.  This seems to run counter to the matching 
principle of the economics of entrepreneurship.  In some studies, unrelated businesses are 
interpreted as transitioning from ‘immature’ to ‘mature’ entrepreneurship and the pursuit of better 
opportunities (Rosa 1998; Schollhammer, 1991).  The few examples of unrelated diversifications fully 
documented in the literature are attributed to government programmes encouraging farm 
diversification (Alsos and Carter, 2006). 
4.8.5 Summary 
The resource-based theory of the firm encroaches on habitual entrepreneurship from two separate 
directions; first by defining all contributions of individual entrepreneurs as resources, and second as 
the best theory of portfolio entrepreneurship.  Portfolio entrepreneurs are best placed to exploit 
related diversifications.  Portfolio entrepreneurs rarely make unrelated diversifications except as a 
survival mechanism.  Overall, studies of portfolio entrepreneurs do not suggest frame-breaking 
innovation and Schumpeter’s creative destruction of industries.  Portfolios occupy niches anchored 
by particular resource combinations.   
On the other hand, serial entrepreneurs clearly exhibit a different set of behaviours in selling, 
liquidating, and in some cases abandoning ventures and the resources they own and control, to start 
afresh.  The resource-based theory of the firm appears not to be as relevant in situations where the 
serial entrepreneur is between ventures when there is no firm. 
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4.9 Section 9. Developments in the Theory of Serial Entrepreneurship: Pseudo 
Diversification and Recycling  
The comparison between the developed theory of portfolio entrepreneurship and our knowledge of 
serial entrepreneurship illustrates theoretical and empirical gaps in our understanding of serial 
entrepreneurship, and possible future developments.  
4.9.1 Pseudo Diversification  
However, portfolio entrepreneurs may not have all the advantages of diversification to themselves.  
The careers of serial entrepreneurs may exhibit a form of pseudo (i.e. ersatz) diversification.  
Effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001) proposes that experienced entrepreneurs take a prototyping 
evolutionary approach using currently available resources, namely: who I am, what I know, and 
whom I know, to develop ventures in the face of uncertainty.  The theory’s affordable loss principle 
protects the entrepreneur from over-commitment (Staw, 1981), and allows her or him to bounce 
back from failure (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read and Wiltbank, 2009).  Small-scale entry provides a real 
option to invest heavily if early returns are promising (Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013).  
Effectuation deploys experimental and iterative learning techniques, where trial-and-error becomes 
a natural part of the new venture creation process (Politis, 2008).  Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle 
(2013) posit that serial entrepreneurs learn sequentially from experience, transferring the lessons of 
both success and failure.  This intelligent and hence cognitive process puts the individual 
entrepreneur at the centre of the action to ensure that new ventures incorporate the lessons of 
previous ventures. The learning and transfer process ‘infects’ subsequent ventures and there may be 
more failures to manage before a successful enough formula is developed.  
4.9.2 Serial Diversification: Incubation and Recycling  
How serial entrepreneurs are affected by resource and evolutionary economics is likely to be 
different, remaining in the realm of their own human and social capital, combined with a personal 
ability to recycle resources from previous ventures.   
A basis for understanding the process of serial entrepreneurship is incubation, the process by which 
nascent entrepreneurs are incubated by employers (Cooper, 1985; Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986; 
Lamont, 1972).  Incubation predicts that the next venture is strongly related to the ‘host’ incubator. 
Incubation demonstrates how transfers of real and inimitable resources are made between discrete 
ventures, including employees and future partners.   
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In all five case studies of Scottish technology entrepreneurs by Mason and Harrison (2006), the 
entrepreneurs started businesses in the same sector as their former employer.  Two became serial 
founders of businesses very similar in nature to their first venture.  They observed a process they call 
‘entrepreneurial recycling’ where a variety of resources were recycled after a previous venture was 
disbanded.  If this is the actual process of ‘pseudo’ diversification, then serial entrepreneurs 
accumulate learning that is not tied to an existing firm and gives serial entrepreneurs preferential 
access to known (i.e. de-risked resources) whose costs are largely sunk.  These economic advantages 
for the finding and exploitation of new opportunities may be equivalent to those of portfolio 
entrepreneurs.  Of additional significance, exiting serial entrepreneurs are unencumbered by the 
liberating or stifling presence of a firm.  They can create competitive advantage as an act of 
imagination embedded in a new opportunity.  
4.9.3 Theory of Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurship: A thematic framework  
The review and analysis of the literature suggests a new perspective on the theory of serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs.  Habitual entrepreneurs are subject to centripetal forces that keep them on 
a narrow path of venture development.  Portfolio entrepreneurs retain some ventures, and are 
permanently engaged in the ownership and control aspects of entrepreneurship. They are able to 
find and exploit related opportunities in a low-cost process that seems natural, bounded by the 
resource positions and real options of current ventures.   
 
Figure 4.3 Theory of Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurship: Thematic Framework 
In contrast, venture exit and re-entry is the distinguishing feature of serial entrepreneurship.  Exit 
provides a centrifugal force away from existing patterns of behaviour.  Serial entrepreneurs exiting 
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after the sale of a successful venture will have considerable financial resources on hand to find and 
exploit new opportunities.  If innovation and economic value are related, and the matching principle 
holds, they will seek high quality innovative opportunities of at least similar value to the enterprise 
just sold.  For those who exit after a negative outcome, a closure or legal bankruptcy, they may 
abandon the opportunity and re-enter via another opportunity with low exploitation (i.e. entry) 
costs.  This synthesis and postulates are depicted in Figure 4.3 above.  Overall, serial 
entrepreneurship requires the exercise of core entrepreneurial abilities to find and exploit new 
opportunities.   
4.9.4 Summary  
The advantages of the control of ‘ready to hand’ resources are not exclusive to portfolio 
entrepreneurs.  Serial entrepreneurs are also able, through recycling of both intangible and tangible 
resources, to achieve similar advantages of related diversification.  It is best to understand that the 
entrepreneur and the firm have a symbiotic relationship, and that the career of a serial entrepreneur 
is separate from the path taken by the firm.  Of further significance, new firm creation and market 
entry by returning serial entrepreneurs is different from a diversifying firm or multi-firm portfolio 
entrepreneur because it is unencumbered by the existence of a firm. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical frameworks used throughout entrepreneurial research have path 
dependencies and predict inertia and only incremental evolutionary change.  Existing ‘sunk’ 
investments in major assets including an individual’s prior knowledge and other cognitive resources 
are strong economic reasons to expect inertia in the careers of a serial entrepreneur.  What seems 
to be missing from resource centric evolutionary theory is how entrepreneurs connect with new 
innovative opportunities required to create new forms of wealth.  It is proposed here that exit 
provides an impetus for successful serial entrepreneurs to innovate and unsuccessful serial 
entrepreneurs to transfer to new opportunities.  
4.10 Chapter Summary 
While there is a wide variety of theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence pertinent to the 
study of serial entrepreneurship, much is still to be understood.  As demonstrated in chapters 2 and 
3 and detailed in this chapter the area is still developing.  The results of the literature review are 
used to generate the detailed research questions in chapter 5.  
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5 CHAPTER 5 
Research Questions, Constructs and Measurement 
This chapter explains the development of the exploratory research questions of the thesis, 
responding to calls for further research and synthesising key themes in the literature. The chapter 
defines additional key research constructs and measurement techniques required to investigate 
venture creation from an opportunity perspective.    
5.1 Section 1. Research Themes, Questions and Postulates 
A key observation from the literature on habitual entrepreneurship is that there are differences 
between portfolio and serial entrepreneurs.  The collective understanding of portfolio entrepreneurs 
is much deeper than that of serial entrepreneurs.  This imbalance provides the opportunity to 
address gaps in the literature by exploring the sequence of ventures that form the careers of serial 
creators of new firms.  The exploration is best served by qualitative research that can look behind 
the aggregate patterns presented in recent quantitative studies and can explore the causal 
processes at work.   
5.1.1 Principal Research Question: Career Trajectories and Transitions 
The focus of the research is the career path of serial entrepreneurs.  How are the ventures of serial 
starter entrepreneurs related to one another?  How are the 1st, 2nd and nth start-up ventures related?   
Since Starr and Bygrave (1992) posed this research question, many other researchers have asked for 
studies of the life-cycle of all ventures founded by habitual entrepreneurs (e.g. Carter, 1999; Carter 
and Ram, 2003; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005; Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997a; 
Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2006).  Many researchers want to understand the processual and 
contextual elements of habitual entrepreneurship (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2001; Zahra 
and Wright, 2011; Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch, 2011).     
The literature review provides four main themes that provide further exploratory research questions 
to be pursued when examining the careers of serial entrepreneurs.  
Theme 1. Serial entrepreneurship is a form of economic selection.  Serial entrepreneurs will be 
matched with opportunities that best fit their entrepreneurial human capital.  Human capital is their 
innate talent, and it is not a fixed quantity, it is supplemented by learned abilities that together form 
what we recognise as expertise.  By definition the careers of serial entrepreneurs lack continuity.  
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For them exit from and re-entry to firm ownership and control reveals the selection and matching 
process.  Failure is considered likely and serial entrepreneurs must have the ability to deal with and 
learn from both failure and success.  
Theme 2. Theory and evidences suggests serial entrepreneurs will follow a relatively narrow path of 
related ventures.  However, from what is commonly known about exit legal agreements and liquidity 
theory it is postulated that exit may make serial entrepreneurs more likely to change direction and 
follow an unrelated corridors.   
Theme 3. If serial entrepreneurs create a high proportion of new firms then what is their role in 
developing innovation?  Do they follow previous patterns, or copy existing forms or bring genuinely 
new forms of means-ends combinations into existent?  When serial entrepreneurs cross into 
unrelated corridors it may be to pursue or reuse innovations.  
Theme 4. Portfolio entrepreneurship is considered theoretically and empirically an economically 
superior form of entrepreneurship, compared to both serial and novice entrepreneurship.  However, 
we still need to know more about the economics of serial entrepreneurship.   
5.1.2 Theme 1. Selection Theory 
The start-ups of serial entrepreneurs can be expected to show the economic matching process at 
work.  Persistent serial entrepreneurs will select progressively better opportunities and exit current 
ventures and start-up new ventures to exploit them (e.g. Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982; Holmes and 
Schmitz, 1995; Plehn-Dujowich, 2010).   
Researchers want to see longitudinal qualitative studies to explore transitions from novice into serial 
or portfolio entrepreneurship (Cater and Ram, 2003; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008; 
Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  Transitions into serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurship as well as into paid employment, and the impact of the number of business 
failures would represent valuable research opportunities (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 
2010). 
In selection theory, entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards failure are a neglected area of inquiry (Politis, 
2008).  Have prior foundings and disbandings allowed them to learn and re-evaluate their strategies 
and behaviour (Aldrich and Reuf, 2006, Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005)?  Does failure reduce or impede opportunity recognition among 
experienced entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009)?  To what extent do their 
subsequent ventures resemble their failed ventures (Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett and Lyon, 2012)?  
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Recent thinking posits that business failure is common.  Success doesn’t lead to success, at least, not 
straight way.  Career success requires cognitively intelligent serial entrepreneurs to learn from both 
success and failure (Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013).  Is venture failure the ‘norm’, and how 
do persistent serial entrepreneurs still achieve personal success? To what extent does social capital 
support serial entrepreneurs when they fail, and facilitate their return to entrepreneurship? 
The economic consequences of failure on serial entrepreneurship also need further exploration.  
Liquidity constrained venture creation is a central economic theory (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  However, the impact of liquidity on the type of opportunity 
selected in the next start-up has not been studied in-depth.  Both successful exits through private 
sale, private equity investment or IPO, and unsuccessful exits involving unplanned closures, 
bankruptcy and personal debt, should have profound effects on the timing and mode of re-entry 
back into serial entrepreneurship.  Persistent serial entrepreneurs must be able to manage recovery 
from failure.  On the other hand successfully exiting serial entrepreneurs will have higher liquidity 
and different options.  
Detailed Research Questions 
1.1 How do future serial entrepreneurs become entrepreneurs?  
1.2 How do future serial entrepreneurs transition from novice (one time) entrepreneurs to serial 
entrepreneurs? 
1.3 What is the impact of failure on venture selection by serial entrepreneurs?  
1.4 What is the impact of success on venture selection by serial entrepreneurs? E.g. liquidity? 
1.5 Is venture failure, normal i.e. the ‘norm’?   
1.6 Do serial entrepreneurs learn from failure?   
1.7 Do cognitively intelligent serial entrepreneurs transfer learning of success and failure to the 
next venture?  i.e. Is there a learning curve, that unpins the development of expertise? 
5.1.3 Theme 2. The Nature of Venture Corridors  
Following Ronstadt (1986; 1988) there are many calls (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1999, Gruber, 2010; 
Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008) to explore the relationship between prior business 
ownership experience and new opportunities.  What are the origins of opportunities for serial 
entrepreneurs?  Are opportunities given to serial entrepreneurs, or are they initiated by themselves 
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(Wright Robbie, Ennew 1997a)?  Do formal networks (e.g., local enterprise agencies and trusts, 
accountants, bankers, lawyers, etc.) encourage and support serial entrepreneurs (Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005)? 
Early studies (e.g. Schollhammer, 1991; Vesper, 1980) noticed that repeat entrepreneurs were 
divided into two camps, those who started subsequent businesses in the same industry, and those 
who did not.  The industry relatedness of the start-ups of serial entrepreneurs is rarely a research 
question, and even less frequently the subject of an explicit study.  Portfolio entrepreneurs do on 
the whole stay within the same industry, making related diversifications, and the resource-based 
theory of the firm has become the explanatory theory of portfolio entrepreneurship.  The review of 
the relatively few qualitative studies also shows both portfolio and serial entrepreneurs starting 
businesses in the same or a related industry (e.g. Fiet, 2002; Rosa, 1998).   
The evolutionary resource-based theory of the firm explains the related diversifications of portfolio 
entrepreneurs through theories of the firm’s immobile and inimitable resources (e.g. Wernerfelt, 
1984; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Peteraf, 1993).  Existing resource 
positions shape the opportunity recognition and pursuit process for the next venture (Alsos, 
Kolvereid and Isaken, 2006).  There are strong theoretical grounds for expecting serial entrepreneurs 
to create related ventures.  Virtually all the main theories of entrepreneurship have either explicit or 
implicit path dependent qualities, including:  learning curves (MacMillan, 1986), the corridor 
principal (Ronstadt, 1988), knowledge corridors (Shane, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997), real options 
(McGrath, 1996), economic search (Fiet, 1996), learning through feedback (Minniti and Bygrave, 
2001), and cognitive templates (Baron and Ensley, 2006).  
Recent empirical evidence indicates that economic selection may also be affected by the division of 
labour and returns to experience in the same industry (e.g. Chen, 2013; Eesley and Roberts, 2012; 
Oe and Mitsuhashi, 2013; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014).  Therefore, most persistent serial 
entrepreneurs should start subsequent ventures in the same industry.  Alternatively, if the early 
theory of habitual entrepreneurship is correct, there is no consistent pattern, as selection occurs by 
the contingent interaction of inherited assets and liabilities with situations (e.g. Chandler and Hanks, 
1994; Reuber and Fischer, 1994; 1999; Starr and Bygrave, 1991; 1992). There will not be a 
continuous positive learning curve and returns to experience. 
Detailed Research Questions 
2.1 Do serial entrepreneurs make closely related diversifications, i.e. stay in the same industry 
corridor to reuse related prior knowledge and other resources?  
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2.2 How do exit conditions, positive or negative, affect the choice of venture corridor? 
2.3 What is the source of opportunities?   
2.4 Do they arise from intentional search or from serendipitous alertness?   
2.5 What is the role of social capital in this process?   
5.1.4 Theme 3. Innovation  
Innovation is a central theme in entrepreneurial research, yet the degree of newness has received 
scant attention in the literature (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012).  Individuals with less entrepreneurial 
ability discover and exploit imitative venture ideas (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009).  Innovative 
entrepreneurs recombine new resources to start a new cycle (Schumpeter, 1934).  Innovative 
opportunities are considered to be more valuable (Fiet, 2002; Shane, 2000).  However, the array of 
theories presented above all suggest a sequence of related enterprises.  The theory of habitual 
entrepreneurship lacks those forces that lead to radically new innovative opportunities and new 
industries as required by entrepreneurship. 
While continuous innovation is considered to be the primary competitive advantage of the 
entrepreneurial firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001), under the resource-based theory of the firm 
innovation is likely to be incremental or evolutionary (e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2010; Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Some evolutionists conclude that new forms of enterprise 
can only be accomplished by novice entrepreneurs (Aldrich and Reuf, 2006).  Are repeat 
entrepreneurs able to identify more innovative opportunities (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 
2009)? 
We have to rely on exogenous shocks to the system (Schumpeter, 1934), frame-breaking cognitive 
ability (Kirzner, 1973), systematic economic search (Fiet, 1996), and also the introduction of new 
opportunities by outside parties (Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 2013; McGrath, 1997) to generate 
innovation by established entrepreneurs.  Some researchers into habitual entrepreneurship give 
prominence to the importance of industry cycles, external contingencies that affect the supply of 
innovative or imitative opportunities (e.g. Low and Abrahamson, 1997; Low and MacMillan, 1988; 
Starr and Bygrave, 1992).  Different stages of the cycle will affect the type of opportunity selected.  
An additional postulate proposed by this thesis is that serial entrepreneurs are more likely to 
innovate and change corridors following exit.  Following selection theory (e.g. Holmes and Schmitz, 
1995; Plehn-Dujowich, 2010) serial entrepreneurs abandon poor quality opportunities, or liquidate 
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good ones to invest in even better ones, in response to changes in the business environment.  Both 
failure and success could be sufficient to overcome the centripetal tendencies to start strongly 
related ventures and start innovative business in new industries after exit.  An assumption of talent 
theory (e.g. Eesley and Roberts, 2013) is that serial entrepreneurs of high ability are expected to be 
able to found new ventures in different industries.  Do successful serial entrepreneurs confine 
themselves to markets where they operated before, or are they more successful in new markets 
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2007; Gruber, 2010)?   
Detailed Research Questions 
3.1 Are serial entrepreneurs innovative or imitative?  
3.2 Are opportunities discovered or created?   
3.3 Are higher-order cognitive abilities in evidence? 
5.1.5 Theme 4. Portfolio vs. Serial Entrepreneurship 
Evidence suggests that portfolio and serial entrepreneurship are quite different forms of 
entrepreneurship.  Portfolio entrepreneurs are more interested in wealth creation, while serials are 
more motivated by independence (Katz, 1994).  Portfolios identify more opportunities and plan 
more businesses (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, 2005b; Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2009), 
and are more alert, opportunistic and creative (Rosa, 1998; Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 
2005a).  Serials appear to fit the craftsmen typology, of specific skills and industry knowledge used to 
provide solutions for specific problems (Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  Serials have less 
access to role models, mentoring, social networks and financial resources (Westhead, Ucbasaran, 
Wright and Binks, 2005).  Serials are less likely to have strong networks (Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2008).  Serials are much less likely to use external finances, even basic bank loans (Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005; Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997b).  Overall, compared to 
founders of business clusters, serials are resource poor, likely to be undercapitalised and therefore 
select smaller start-up opportunities.  The firms of portfolio entrepreneurs are larger, grow faster 
and generate significantly more income than the firms of serial and novice entrepreneurs 
(Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks 2005).  Portfolio entrepreneurs are much more likely to 
engage in exporting than serial entrepreneurs, and to exploit innovative opportunities (Robson, 
Akuetteh, Westhead and Wright, 2012a; 2012b).   
The general superiority of portfolio entrepreneurship over serial entrepreneurship has been posited 
by Parker (2014).  His work has its antecedents in the empirical studies of diversifying farmers (e.g. 
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Alsos and Kaikkonen, 2004) and small manufacturers (e.g. Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005).  Portfolio 
entrepreneurs are more risk averse than serial entrepreneurs, and exploit synergies through related 
diversifications.  Portfolios are also expected to make unrelated diversifications to reduce the 
covariance of returns across the whole business group (Parker, 2014).  Consequently, portfolio 
founders are described as less like buccaneering entrepreneurs seeking independence, but as 
coordinators of dependencies (Iacobucci, 2002).  Growth through related diversification is routine 
for portfolios (Rosa, 1998; Rosa and Scott, 1999b).  It may be simply that by interpreting the 
evidence (e.g. Alsos and Kaikkonen, 2004; Rosa, 1998) they discover closely related low 
implementation cost opportunities very easily.   
These differences require further exploration.  For example, do serials as Parker posits take on 
increasingly risky opportunities?  Serials have some economic advantages.  Once established, 
successful serials can use funds received on exiting from their last venture to fund the next 
(Westhead and Wright, 1998b), and there are no comparative studies of the impact of funds raised 
from a successful exit on personal wealth and on the subsequent choice of opportunity and venture.   
This thesis has postulates an alternative economic theory of serial entrepreneurship, that combines 
pseudo diversification (Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013), incubation (Cooper, 1985), and 
entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and Harrison, 2006).  Together these factors may counter the 
proposed economic advantages of business groups for wealth creation.  It could be that portfolio 
entrepreneurs do not sell businesses due to their motivations or their aversion to risk (Parker, 2014).   
Alternatively, posited in this thesis, they only start related businesses, that are not on their own 
valuable enough as single ventures to attract the attention of external buyers, but still provide 
growth.   
Detailed Research Questions 
4.1 Why do entrepreneurs transition to become portfolio entrepreneurs?  
4.2 What are the economics of serial entrepreneurship?  
4.3 Do serial entrepreneurs benefit from some form of pseudo diversification, supported by 
recycling?  
4.4 Do serial entrepreneurs take on increasingly risky opportunities? 
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5.2 Section 2. Key Constructs and Measurement Techniques 
This section completes the discussion and selection of constructs introduced in Chapter 3.  Here 
additional constructs required for the methodology, including the detailed measures adopted to 
address the research questions, are explained in detail to support the study’s claims for construct 
validity.    
5.2.1 Serial Entrepreneurship, Opportunities and Firms 
This study emphasises the interplay of the opportunity, the entrepreneur, the firm and resources 
that can describe and explain the behaviour of serial entrepreneurs.  This study is firmly positioned 
within the opportunity-based framework of entrepreneurship.  Here entrepreneurship is the nexus 
of two phenomena: the presence of lucrative opportunities, and the presence of enterprising 
individuals (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003).  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this process or system orientated framework has been extended for the study of habitual 
entrepreneurship by Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright (2006) to include human capital inputs to and 
venture outcomes from the process (see figure 4.1).  The central position of opportunity requires the 
use of opportunity related theoretical concepts.  
Innovative and Imitative Opportunities 
Firms are founded by entrepreneurs to exploit recognised opportunities. The exercise of 
entrepreneurial judgment or ability requires a subjective cognitive synthesis of public and private 
information (Casson, 2005) rooted in human capital.  Here the mind is an economic resource (Simon, 
1978) where different entrepreneurs exploit their comparative advantage in information costs 
(Casson, 2003; Casson and Wadeson, 2007).  Selection theory (e.g. Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 1995) 
predicts that high human capital, high ability, serial entrepreneurs will be matched to high quality 
opportunities.  However, there are returns to specialisation in one industry corridor.  Serial 
entrepreneurs are likely to follow a narrow path and imitate past ventures or the ventures of others.  
Furthermore, innovation is likely to follow an evolutionary and narrow path.  Nevertheless, the most 
talented entrepreneurs are thought to have transferable abilities that are not dependent on 
experience derived expertise.  Therefore, some serial entrepreneurs can be expected to be observed 
moving between corridors in pursuit of higher quality opportunities. 
Innovative Entrepreneurship: Frame-breaking  
Entrepreneurship can be both disequilibrium creating through innovation, and also equilibrium 
creating through competition and straightforward mimicry of existing opportunities.  Innovative 
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serial entrepreneurs embrace uncertainty beyond available information.  Despite the power of the 
market (Hayek, 1945) it cannot include the effects of new technologies on means-ends combinations 
(Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  Even if future prices are reflected in current bids, future markets and 
the translation from future to current is highly imperfect (Arrow, 1974).  Both Schumpeter (1934; 
1942) and Kirzner (1973) emphasise frame-breaking opportunities.  The modern definition of 
opportunity includes only innovative opportunities that develop new means, new ends, or new 
ends-means relationships (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  Consequently, researchers are generally 
dismissive of incremental and imitative opportunities (e.g. Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009).  The 
novelty of new venture creation remains very important to all future entrepreneurial research 
(Zahra and Wright, 2011), though few ventures are actually entrepreneurial by this definition.  
Imitative Entrepreneurship: Cloning and Replication  
Imitation and adaptation of existing opportunities by entrepreneurs in new ventures also provides 
an important equilibrium creating economic function.  The information asymmetry that created the 
opportunity is diffused by the act of exploitation by imitative competitors who recognise an existing 
opportunity (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  The industry life-cycle is characterised by different 
entrepreneurs joining at different times.  The most innovative start ‘movements’, others join 
‘bandwagons’, or later still make ‘clones’ (Low and Abrahamson, 1997).  Imitation and replication of 
existing products and acquisition of existing income streams are typical modes of entry for 
entrepreneurs (Chandler, Douglas, and DeTienne, 2005).  It follows that opportunities have their 
own independent existence (Holcombe, 2003) and life-cycle (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  Prior 
entrepreneurial activity does not use up an entrepreneurial opportunity.  New opportunities exploit 
a previously discovered opportunity (Plummer, Haynie and Godesiabois, 2007).  Consequently, there 
are mutually supporting waves of creativity and discovery over time (Zahra, 2008).  
The Opportunity Construct 
An entrepreneurial opportunity is then more accurately defined as a feasible, profit-seeking 
potential venture that innovates a new product, improves on an existing product, or imitates or 
replicates a product in a less-than saturated market (Singh 2001).  We should expect the careers of 
serial entrepreneurs to include firm founding that exploits both imitative and innovative 
opportunities.  
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5.2.2 Sources of Opportunities: Objective Discovery vs. Subjective Construction 
Any framework that researches the origins and exploitation of opportunities in new business 
creation must recognise that the ontology of the opportunity construct is the subject of an extensive 
and long running academic debate (e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2007; McMullan and Shepherd, 2006; 
Sarason, Dean and Dillard, 2006; 2010), and through the work of Alsos, and Kaikkonen (2005) is a 
feature of habitual entrepreneurship research.  Are opportunities cognitively discovered as 
objective, exogenous objects ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, or alternatively are they 
cognitively ‘in there’ created endogenously through a form of creative subjective perception?  
Discovery is more likely to result in imitative ventures, while subjective perception will result in more 
creative and innovative opportunities. 
One option is to avoid the ontological controversy.  Samuelsson and Davidsson (2009) replace 
opportunity with the constructs of ‘venture idea‘ and ‘emerging venture‘, where ventures are either 
imitative or innovative.  The ontology of imitative opportunities is straight forward; they are 
objectively ‘out-there’ (Mole and Mole, 2010).  This pragmatic approach follows other thinkers such 
as Weick (1979) and Kirzner (1973) where only opportunities that are actually pursued and exploited 
and brought into an objective reality are therefore ‘real’.   
Another option is to have a continuum between objectively real and subjectively imagined 
opportunities.  Objective opportunities are visible (in the sense of their information) to a 
knowledgeable or attuned entrepreneur, while the subjective or socially constructed opportunity is 
inseparable from the individual (McMullen, Plummer and Arcs, 2007; McMullan and Shepherd, 
2006).  The most innovative are likely to have the highest degree of uncertainty because they lack 
objective information in the here and now to support their valuation.  Opportunities are conjectures 
similar to scientific hypotheses which are then investigated (Shepherd, Haynie and McMullen, 2011).  
Innovation arises from subjectively constructed opportunities or endogenous ‘thought experiments’ 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2008).  They are more likely to exist in emergent industries close to the firm’s 
technological base (Zahra, 2008). 
A Pragmatic View of Opportunity Ontology 
Casson and Wadeson (2007) propose resolution to the discovery versus creation question by taking 
an economic activity view of the process where a project is the unit of analysis.  A set of projects is 
objective and exogenous, i.e. they use resources and have costs.  A set of opportunities is subjective 
and endogenous because it reflects an individual entrepreneur’s perceptions.  Opportunity 
perception and development is then an evolutionary economic process that resolves differences 
121 
 
between objective information and subjective perceptions (Berglund, 2007; Renko, Rodney, Shrader 
and Simon, 2012). Serial entrepreneurs who draw on a broader set of knowledge and experience 
endowments will be in a better position to develop novel solutions (Grégoire, Barr, and Shepherd, 
2010; Gruber, 2010).   
Evolution of opportunities occurs within projects because initial perceptions of opportunities are 
basic and rudimentary, and development continues influenced by prior knowledge, resources and 
context (Sanz-Velasco, 2006; Sanz-Velasco and Magnusson, 2004).  Even a cursory look at a 
revolutionary invention such as Marconi’s wireless reveals a creative assemblage of pre-existing 
components combined and arranged in a new way.  Some entrepreneurs launch new products on a 
small scale trial basis to gather more information (McKelvie, Haynie and Gustavsson, 2011).  The 
current opportunity may need adaptation, and during the life of the firm new opportunities will also 
arise (Plummer, Haynie and Godesiabois, 2007).  As in the incubation and spin-out literature (e.g. 
Lamont, 1972), serial entrepreneurs can be expected to pick up on projects conceived in previous 
ventures.  
Pragmatic or continuum models of opportunity ontology that combine objective realism with 
subjective perception have been positioned with the multi-level ontology of critical realism by 
evolutionary realist theorists (e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2007; 2010; Alvarez, Barney and Young, 
2010).  Evolutionists (e.g. Aldrich and Kenworthy, 1999; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) emphasise trial and 
error adaptations and blind or myopic variations, where selection depends on the business 
environment.  Again, in line with the view of strong corridor effects, evolutionists predict that serial 
entrepreneurs may be too closely tied to prior industries to create new industries (Alvarez, Barney 
and Young, 2010).  However, the same article posits an alternative.  Serial entrepreneurs may repeat 
a creative and innovative process in one industry at the start of another.  
Construct Measurement  
The literature is not clear on how to define discovered or created in a way that guarantees construct 
validity.  In this qualitative study through semi-structured interviews following Berglund (2007), the 
entrepreneurs were simply asked to describe the source of their opportunities and the degree to 
which they were discovered and/or created.  
5.2.3 Sources of Opportunities: Serendipitous Alertness and Economic Search  
The opportunity-centric process of entrepreneurship requires cognitive information processing and 
decision making by the serial entrepreneur for each venture start-up decision.  In information 
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theory, opportunities are discovered either through economic search (e.g. Fiet, 1996) or alertness 
(Kirzner, 1973).  In the economic information theory of entrepreneurship, the need for information 
is driven by uncertainty (Knight, 1921).  Entrepreneurs can be radically ignorant when they are 
unaware of what they do not know (Kirzner, 1973).  Uncertainty can be reduced by economic 
investments in appropriate risk-reducing information (Arrow, 1973; Casson, 1982; Fiet, 1996; Stigler, 
1961). 
Search  
The most valuable information is information specific to an opportunity (Casson, 1982; Fiet and 
Samuelson, 2000). Non-specific general information like that associated with imitative opportunities 
is usually easily available at low cost and is unlikely to be a source of a profitable opportunity 
because it is well known (Fiet, Piskounov, and Patel, 2005).  To increase the chances of profit, 
entrepreneurs will attempt to establish monopolistic control over commercially valuable information 
related to an opportunity (Casson, 1982; Fiet, Clouse and Norton, 2004).  Entrepreneurs must 
optimise the trade-off between investing too much or too little in uncertainty reducing information 
(Fiet, 1996).  
Alertness 
Kirzner (1973, 1985, 1997) integrates previous economic theories that reject simple probabilistic 
decision making (e.g. Hayek 1945; Mises, 1949; Shackle, 1955) to propose that valuable information 
pertaining to opportunities is discovered by a serendipitous process called ‘alertness’.  Kirzner (1973) 
defines alertness as a ‘gift’ to notice previously unnoticed opportunities for profit.  Alertness is free 
to the extent that it utilises information that was not sought and is available in an inexhaustible 
quantity, as it is the basis of all human action (Kirzner, 1973).  Alertness is also used in situations 
where no information is yet available (Kirzner, 1985) and in anticipation of future innovations 
(Kirzner, 1999; 2009). 
Evidence  
There is strong evidence that entrepreneurs use a variety of information sources (e.g. Cooper, Folta, 
and Woo, 1995).  The limited evidence from just two studies that specifically research alertness vs. 
search, and other qualitative studies of entrepreneurs, suggests that entrepreneurs do not rely 
solely on alertness to make discoveries (Bailey, 1986; Bhave, 1994; Fiet, Clouse and Norton, 2004; 
Hills and Shrader, 1998; Koller, 1988; Smith, Matthews, and Schenkelet, 2009).  
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Once entrepreneurs have the object of search in mind, they go to information sources based on 
prior knowledge in ‘one’s own backyard’, searching familiar information channels even when there is 
no opportunity in sight (Fiet, Clouse and Norton, 2004).  In experimental research, systematic search 
leads to more potentially wealth generating discoveries than alertness (Fiet and Patel, 2008). 
However, search does not seem to be associated with new corridors, and searching using the same 
channels results in related opportunities. In Fiet’s (2008) cross industry sample of 12 repeatedly 
successful entrepreneurs, all but one founded all their businesses in the same industry.  Koller (1988) 
found that there was an equal split between finding opportunities through social networks and 
individually using prior knowledge. 
Opportunity Acquisition Both Search and Alertness 
The most widely referenced evidence for alertness (Kaish and Gilad, 1991) defines alertness as the 
‘search’, the broad undirected scanning of the horizon for unknown opportunities.  Kirzner (1997) 
also defines alertness as scanning.  For Kirzner (1973) search and alertness can coexist, but only 
alertness is the mechanism for discovery.  Long and McMullan (1984) found that the path to 
opportunity recognition could stem from search or serendipity.  It is difficult not to agree with 
Singh’s (2000) summation that each mode is internally consistent, only the difference between them 
remains ambiguous.  
Search Alertness and Prior Knowledge 
Alsos and Kaikkonen (2004) made an empirical study of the opportunity taxonomy of experienced 
portfolio entrepreneurs, using the constructs of alertness and search, and also of objective discovery 
vs. subjective creation.  They found that discovered opportunities were strongly related to existing 
resources and existing social networks.  More recent laboratory studies by Arentz, Sautet and Storr 
(2013) also found that alertness is influenced by prior experience in a testable way.  
It is possible to combine search and alertness as different forms of information gathering and 
learning, where both can be constrained by Shane’s (2000) types of prior knowledge (see Figure 5.1 
below). 
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Figure 5.1 Sources of New Information 
The framework assumes deliberate or serendipitous alert information gathering or the introduction 
of new information by third parties to change direction.  Information gathering in an existing or new 
corridor is assumed to be strongly affected by prior knowledge and proceeding along 
Venkataraman’s (1997) information corridors. 
Search and Alertness and Corridor Effects 
Combining information search and alertness with alternative corridors and path creation, Gruber 
(2010) suggests three possible paths for habitual entrepreneurs: 
1. Path dependence on a restricting corridor.  Restricted search and alertness. 
2. Path creation and path breaking from deliberate path search and action.  Economic search. 
3. Unintentional or random emergence of a path or path breaking.  Serendipitous alertness. 
Construct Measurement  
As the discussion of the relevant literature revealed, clearly differentiating between the constructs 
of search and alertness has its difficulties but both constructs, particularly search, appear in many 
studies of habitual entrepreneurship.  In this study, as with the question on discovery or creation, 
entrepreneurs were asked to describe the source of information for each exploited opportunity.  
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5.2.4 Corridor and Path Dependency Constructs   
Venture Similarity  
Venture similarity is a measure of conformity to a particular corridor.  Chandler’s (1996) constructs 
of context (industry) and content (task) similarity measure the extent to which accumulated human 
capital is likely to be useful. They are listed here below:  
1. Products 
2. Customers 
3. Competition 
4. Suppliers 
5. Technology  
6. Managerial skills  
7. Technical skills 
Reuse of Prior Knowledge 
The reuse of prior knowledge can also be used to measure corridor effects.  Entrepreneurs follow 
idiosyncratic information corridors (Venkataraman, 1997) such that prior knowledge and education 
is regarded by Shane (2000) as the source of all opportunities, and prior knowledge allows the 
recognition of deeper opportunities (Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan and 
Thompson, 2013).  
Shane’s model provides three types of influence stemming from prior information:  
1. Prior knowledge of markets will influence which markets to enter.   
2. Prior knowledge about how to serve markets will influence the resources (means) chosen to 
serve.  
3. Prior knowledge of customer problems (ends) will influence their discovery of products and 
services to exploit a new technology.  
In Shane’s model, knowledge of a new technology (means) is not enough on its own.  Lack of 
knowledge of a viable strategy or customer needs will lead to solutions not finding matching 
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problems.  Shane’s ‘means to serve’ is conceptually similar to the construct of a business model.  A 
business model is a firm configuration for the enactment of a specific opportunity (George and Bock, 
2011).  Opportunity viability requires a value structure that creates and captures some minimal 
value to replenish the firm’s resource base (George and Bock, 2011).  The inclusion of the means to 
serve/business model provides a direct link to opportunity enactment and firm foundation.   
Innovation  
Industry Stage 
Many researchers emphasise the importance of contingent exogenous factors such as industry stage 
(e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2001; Zahra and Wright, 2011).  The newness of the industry 
in which a serial entrepreneur choses to start-up may also be a measure of innovation or imitation.  
Within the research framework, new ventures are categorised by industry stage using a synthesis of 
constructs used by Starr and Bygrave (1992) and Low and Abrahamson (1997).  
1. Early: Pre-emergent   Addressing new often pre-venture incipient customer needs  
2. Early: Emergent  New product-customer combinations attracting new entrants 
3. Growth   Rapid growth of both demand and supply  
4. Mature   Slow growing or saturated markets 
New Product Development 
For the research framework, measures of innovation are drawn from the extant literature.  Most 
sets of constructs for innovation emphasise the degree of newness (Fiet, 2002; Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002; Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012; DeTienne and Chandler, 2004; Manimala, 1992; 
Ucbascaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009) which are condensed here into four categories.    
a) New to the world industry   Fundamentally new product  
b) New to market    New to country, similar products in existence 
c) New market segment  Modification of an existing product or new product to serve 
new customer segment in an established market 
d) Additional supply  Entry into established product market in which the firm 
does not currently participate 
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Diversification  
Individual corridor effects need to be isolated.  Whether the next venture is in the same industry and 
is a related diversification is one measure.  An industry is formed of firms producing close substitutes 
or complementary goods to meet similar customer needs (Porter, 1980).  Related diversification 
occurs in the same industry through entry into market segments that are horizontal or vertical 
expansions of the same product-customer market (Iacobucci, 2002). 
Degree of Innovation  
Venkataraman and Sarasavathy (2001) propose a model of opportunities that suggests three types 
of opportunity recognition process:  1) Recognition. Where both means and ends, already exist.  
Recognition is equivalent to imitation and cloning.  2) Discovery. Here one of either means or ends 
exists, and the other element has to be recognised.  Depending on the degree of innovation 
required, it could feasibly be a combination of recognition, discovery and creation.  3) Creation. Here 
neither means nor ends exist, and a very high level of creativity and innovation is required.  
Combined with the additional implementation element of the means to serve/business model 
derived from Shane, (2000) and George and Bock, (2011) the degree of innovation or imitation can 
be judged in respect of all three elements.  
 
Figure 5.2 Extended Opportunity Framework 
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5.3 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter we have returned to the literature of entrepreneurship to select conceptual 
frameworks, tools and constructs that are likely to assist in the exploration of the careers of serial 
entrepreneurs.  The framework is used to explore the ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘when’ of the relationship 
between the ventures of serial founder entrepreneurs.   
The next chapter details the development and application of the research methodology.  
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6 CHAPTER 6 
Research Methodology 
Chapter 5 developed the detailed research questions.  This chapter explains the methodological 
approach used to address the research questions.  The objective of this chapter is to show that the 
research employed a pragmatic and scientific approach, including an assessment of the reliability 
and validity of the study.   
6.1 Section 1. Research Paradigm  
Consideration of the research philosophy, or paradigm, is beneficial in that it enables a more 
informed decision about the research design.  Methods should be selected that are practical, 
communicable, not self-deluding and reliable (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  The correct paradigm 
enables the selection of research strategies that will work effectively and enable adaptation of the 
research design in the face of constraints that may arise (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2015).   
Social scientists continue to debate how best to conduct research, based on their assumptions about 
the nature of the social world.  This study adopts an open philosophy and a pragmatic approach 
(Cherryholmes, 1992; Patton, 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) to empirical research drawing on 
existing theory, but also deduces theory from the patterns that are perceived in the new data.  The 
method gives voice to serial entrepreneurs to reveal how they view and construct their world.   
6.1.1 Alternative Research Paradigms  
The research paradigm is the basic belief system that guides the investigation covering not only 
ontology, the nature of truth, but also epistemology, how to go about researching truth (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011).  Robson (2011) suggests that close attention to the 
research paradigm will enable the researcher to be more flexible, confident and reflective and also 
capable of reinvention and evolution of research.  
Traditionally the debate is presented as being between two fundamentally different and competing 
inquiry paradigms: (1) the logical-positivist paradigm that employs quantitative and experimental 
methods to test hypothetical generalizations using deductive reasoning, and (2) the 
phenomenological-interpretivist paradigm that prefers qualitative and naturalistic approaches using 
inductive reasoning to understand experience in context-specific settings (Patton, 2002).   
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Logical-positivists treat the social world as an objective reality, where universal laws explain and 
govern the reality being observed (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Creswell, 2013).  In contrast, 
phenomenological-interpretivists treat social reality as a subjective experience, and the object of 
research is to understand the way in which an individual creates and interprets the world (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979).  
Positivism 
Positivism derives from the philosophical stance of the natural scientists and utilises a highly 
structured methodology to analyse quantifiable data (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2015).  Positivism is underpinned by the ontological assumption of realism where reality 
exists independent of human thoughts and beliefs.  A logical-positivist approach requires research to 
be undertaken independently in a value-free way, neither affecting nor affected by the subject of 
the research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).  However, the logical-positivist paradigm is not 
value free.  Personal choices still have to be made by the researcher as to what hypotheses to 
construct, which variables to measure and how to construct and record them.  For example, an 
objective statistic such as the Consumer Price Index is made up of subjective decisions about what it 
should contain (Patton, 2002).  Nevertheless, the logical-positivist approach to research is the most 
commonly used in entrepreneurial research, as evidenced by the large number of human capital and 
venture performance studies cited in the literature review. 
Interpretism and Interaction 
However, to paraphrase Bygrave, (1989) disjointed, discontinuous, non-linear entrepreneurial 
processes cannot be studied successfully with quantitative methods developed for examining 
smooth, continuous, linear and repeatable processes.  In an interpretivist philosophy priority is given 
to the meaning entrepreneurs and other social actors attach to their situations as they go about 
their activities in conjunction with others (Prus, 1996).  To understand the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of events 
they must be examined directly through the eyes of those involved (Mintzberg, 1979).  There is a 
qualitative requirement to study things in their natural settings, also to make sense of and interpret 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  Social actors 
are affected by contingency factors that provide a context to their social behaviour (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015).  Founding and exiting firms are a social phenomenon. In interpretivist phenomenological 
research it is the participants’ perceptions, feelings and lived experiences that are paramount and 
the object of study (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012).   
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In reality, research into the process of sequential venture start-up, exit and return to start-up is 
suitable for both logical-positivist and interpretivist approaches using both qualitative and 
quantitative data.  A pragmatic starting point for the choice of methodology is calls for additional 
insights, best perceived using exploratory interpretivist methods.  
Calls for Phenomenological-Interpretivist Research   
Despite contributing a minority of studies, those taking the phenomenological-interpretivist 
paradigm have made a significant contribution to the study of habitual entrepreneurship (e.g. 
MacMillan, 1968; Starr and Bygrave, 1991; Rosa, 1968; Mason and Harrison, 2006).  Positivist 
researchers also call for more in-depth, phenomenological studies to explore the processual and 
contextual relationships of habitual behaviour, using longitudinal ethnographic case studies to 
explore and build theory (e.g. Aldrich, 1990; Chandler, 1996; Bygrave, 1989; Rosa, 1998; Rosa and 
Scott, 1999a; Starr and Bygrave 1992; Westhead and Wright, 1998; Ucbasaran, Wright and 
Westhead, 2003).   
Interpretivist methods may be better at unlocking causal relationships.  Cause and effect can be 
extracted using longitudinal research that reconstructs event histories ex-post (Rosa, 1998; 
Ucbasaran, Alsos, Westhead, Wright, 2008; Parker, 2013).  Phenomenological studies explore the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions of the relationship between the habitual entrepreneur and opportunities 
(Westhead, Ucbasaran and Wright, 2009).  Case studies provide rich contextual evidence of the 
process (Chandler, 1996), and probe more deeply into the ‘quality’ rather than the ‘quantity’ of prior 
entrepreneurial experience and learning (Reuber and Fischer, 1999; Ucbasaran, Westhead and 
Wright, 2008; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).   
6.1.2 Post-positivism, Pragmatism and Critical Realism 
In post-positivism it is possible to blend a positivist outlook on reality and recognise the subjective 
nature of perception by both the observed and the observer.  Post-positivists remain realists in the 
sense that they believe in an external reality separate from our own descriptions of it, and seek to 
provide explanations for it (Robson, 2011).  Post-positivism holds a critical realist position concerning 
reality and its perception (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011).  There also is an acceptance by post-
positivists of interaction between researcher and the researched (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
Theories, hypotheses, background knowledge and the values of the researcher can influence what is 
observed (Reichardt and Rallis, 1994). 
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In a pragmatic research paradigm, it is the research questions that determine the epistemology and 
ontology to be adopted (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).  Pragmatists pick and choose what to 
research and how to do it, and all ‘real world’ research takes place in the field, rather than in the 
laboratory (Cherryholmes, 1992).  Consequently, a pragmatic post-positivist research philosophy 
relies on multiple methods (qualitative and quantitative) as a way of capturing as much of reality as 
possible, to verify existing theories and discover new ones (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  Internal and 
external validity remain important, and qualitative procedures can lend themselves to structured 
sometimes numerical analysis.  These include frequency counts, tabulations, and low-level statistical 
analyses (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  In pragmatism, truth is what works best at the time (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).   
Critical Realism: Processes and Contextualisation 
Critical realism is appealing to pragmatists as it can accommodate a variety of methodological 
choices to develop causal explanations of complex events in specific contexts (Easton, 2010) as 
required for studies of the careers of serial entrepreneurs.  Critical realism assumes a stratified 
ontology comprised of mechanisms, structures, events, experiences and emergent powers, all 
operating within an open systems perspective (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1975).  The paradigm can 
transcend a number of inconsistencies between positivism and interpretivism (Wynn and Williams, 
2012), bridging those two extreme viewpoints (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2015), and 
thereby overcoming problems encountered in purely positivist or relativist accounts (Robson, 2011).   
Epistemology is concerned with the notion of what counts as acceptable truth by specifying the 
source, characteristics, and assessment of truth claims (Chua, 1986).  Critical realism seeks to posit 
descriptions of reality based on an analysis of the experiences observed and interpreted by the 
participants, along (pragmatically) with other types of data (Wynn and Williams, 2012).  Since a 
particular object of research may well have different characteristics, it is likely that a mixed-method 
research strategy will be necessary (Mingers, Mutch and Willcocks, 2013).  Critical realism facilitates 
a more pragmatic approach and therefore its principles are adopted in this thesis.   
Critical Realism: A Pragmatic Multi-Level Ontology 
Whereas the logical-positivist paradigm reduces reality to a conjunction of cause with effect 
(Bhaskar, 1975), critical realism stratifies reality into three nested domains.  The empirical domain is 
those events which we are able to experience via perception or measurement (Wynn and Williams, 
2012).  Lee (1991) describes the workings of such a three level framework.  The first level is the 
subjective level of the entrepreneur where common sense and everyday meanings explain 
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behaviour.  This perspective can be captured through a discursive interview process.  In the second 
level the researcher deploys a subjective interpretation similar to Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 1996), but can also draw pragmatically on other techniques.   
IPA has been used in entrepreneurship research by Berglund (2007).  Here the respondent's speech 
and actions do not mirror phenomena directly as argued by positivists, nor are they assumed to 
constitute the phenomena as argued by social constructionists.  Instead, the researcher must 
interpret the subjects' responses in order to glean their relevance for the phenomena under 
investigation (Berglund, 2007). 
In the third level the researcher uses positivist scientific theory to postulate the existence of objects 
and relationships which may or may not be directly observable in particular cognitive processes and 
social relationships of the entrepreneur.  Consequently, the socially constructed view of reality held 
by a given actor, such as an entrepreneur, may be incorrect with respect to the domain of an 
independent reality (Wynn and Williams, 2012).  Nevertheless, the research still applies the tenets of 
positivism such as falsifiability, logical consistency, relative explanatory power, and survivability (Lee, 
1991).   
In addition, critical realism also adopts a view of reality as an open system (Bhaskar, 1998; Mingers, 
2006) that is beyond our ability to control directly, and which is typical of frameworks proposed for 
entrepreneurship research that stress the temporal, open and dynamic nature of entrepreneurship 
(e.g. Bygrave, 1989; Hindle 2004; Zahra and Wright, 2011).  This thesis is a field study designed to 
capture the reality of an open system.  It captures real opportunities enacted in firms during often 
long and varied careers.    
Therefore, in following the tenets of critical realism the methodology blends the subjectivity of the 
entrepreneur and the subjectivity of the researcher from which reliable and valid postulates are 
constructed for further research. 
Critical Realism and Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship scholars who research the discovery of opportunities draw directly on this critical 
realist perspective (e.g. McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Mole and Mole, 2010) because it blends 
objective discovery and subjective creation of opportunities.  Internal thought-objects, in the mind, 
such as our beliefs, theories, and concepts about reality are ontologically real, yet distinct from the 
objects that are out-there (Wynn and Williams, 2012).  Nevertheless, the research of entrepreneurial 
opportunities remains an area of considerable debate and pragmatists need to be open to new 
perspectives.  For example, as discussed above, Alvarez and Barney (2010) assign opportunity 
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discovery theory to the critical realist ‘hegemony’.  The alternative creation perspective is positioned 
as ‘evolutionary realism’ combining subjective constructionism with evolutionary theory.  
Axiology: Values of the Researcher 
Another driver for the choice of paradigm is the personal values that guide the enquiry (Heron, 
1996).  In discovery, personal, cultural, moral, or political values cannot be eliminated.  However, 
researchers need to strive to be value-free in the presentation phase (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  
Axiology can be demonstrated by writing a personal statement of values in relation to the topic and 
articulating those values when making judgements about the research (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2015).  
Personal Statement  
This study follows a pragmatic functionalist paradigm; it is non-radical and regulatory in its values or 
axiology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).  It provides explanations 
of the status quo, social order, social integration, consensus, economic need satisfaction, and 
rational choice.  Behaviour can be understood through both exploratory research questions using 
deductive reasoning starting from established theory, and inductive theory building from new 
evidence.  The research is concerned with how the affairs of serial entrepreneurs are regulated and 
how they might be improved within the existing framework of free enterprise.  It assumes rationality 
and offers rational solutions for rational problems within the current structure.  The research is 
empathic to the individual’s view point in terms of their subjective experience of the process of 
serial entrepreneurship, but does not necessarily accept that the entrepreneur’s responses always 
reflect phenomena directly.  It is both deductive and inductive.  
The Chosen Paradigm: Pragmatism 
Consequently, this thesis takes a pragmatic view, i.e. following Weick’s (1995) pragmatic observation 
that people in everyday life couldn’t care less about ontology, and Berglund (2007) whose empirical 
study using IPA concludes that opportunities are a blend of the objective and the subjective.  It is 
also influenced by positivist realists Samuelsson and Davidsson (2009) who focus exclusively on the 
objective fact of venture creation.  Even in the fierce debates on critical realism vs. research 
structuration theory in entrepreneurial opportunity research, there are calls for qualitative and 
quantitative methods to be complementary (e.g. Mole and Mole, 2010; Sarason, Dillard and Dean, 
2010). 
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Summary 
The research paradigm employed is that of pragmatism.  This is driven by the exploratory nature of 
the research questions and the human entrepreneurs to be researched, requiring openness to new 
data and theoretical constructs, while recognising the presence of previous research.  The method 
calls for more interpretive longitudinal research into the careers of serial entrepreneurs.  The 
research uses a pragmatic approach to complement the subjective explanations of serial 
entrepreneurs with numeric data, exploring existing postulates and developing new ones.  The 
extensive debate concerning the ontology of entrepreneurial opportunities suggests both subjective 
and objective views and qualitative and quantitative forms of data are valid for the study of 
entrepreneurship. 
6.2 Section 2. Methodology: The Logic of Enquiry  
This section introduces the pragmatic combination of techniques used in the research method to 
address the research questions. The research method uses semi-structured interviews within an 
exploratory case-based framework.  The interviews form a partial 'life history' in which the serial 
entrepreneur recalls the circumstances surrounding the start-up, development and exit of 
businesses over their career.  Data analysis combines pre-coded themes reflecting extant theory 
combined with the induction of new theory.  
6.2.1 Entrepreneurial Career History Case Studies  
The principal research question is: How are the ventures of serial starter entrepreneurs related to 
one another?  This required a shortened form of life history analysis focussed on the critical 
incidents (Chell, 2004) associated with venture founding and exit.  Individual life histories, or more 
accurately career histories, are by their nature case studies par excellence (Palmer, 2010).  Case 
studies (Yin, 1981) focus on the interrelationships that constitute the contextual factors of a specific 
entity (e.g. a firm, person, organisation, event, or phenomenon) with the explicit purpose of 
generating theory or contributing to extant theory (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe, 2010).  A key 
informant approach (Kumar, Stern and Anderson, 1993) was adopted to understand an individual's 
attitudes and experiences in a given situation (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2005). In addition, 
life history case studies provide: a) insights into the social and cultural milieu, b) the sense-making 
mechanisms deployed by the key informant, and c) information about the larger group to which they 
belong (Palmer, 2010).  
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Case Study  
A case is a study of a phenomenon occurring in a bounded context (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
The phenomenon and context are intertwined (Yin, 1981).  The case study method can be used 
pragmatically because it does not imply the use of a particular type or source of evidence (Easton, 
2010).  Case study can use qualitative or quantitative evidence (Yin, 1981).  Case study is useful for 
complex phenomena, where there are many more variables than data points that require 
triangulation to detect patterns (Yin, 2014).  Both theory-building and theory-testing case studies are 
valid and both require precise and measurable constructs as the foundation of powerful theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Rigorously designed case studies produce ‘reliable’ knowledge in the form of 
analytic as opposed to statistical generalisations (Yin, 2014).  The case study provides access to 
processes not revealed through more formalised quantitative methods, such as surveys (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Indeed, case studies of entrepreneurial life histories are also more likely to be accurate than 
questionnaires (McKenzie, 2007).  
Positivism and Qualitative Case Study  
Critical realists and pragmatists have identified the case study method to explore the interaction of 
structure, events, actions, and context to identify causal mechanisms (e.g. Easton 2010; Lee 1981; 
1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Mingers, 2004).  Pragmatists must be open to ways to improve 
their research, and Lee (1989) suggests five ways that qualitative researchers can improve the 
scientific strength of their research: 1) Including other theoretical explanations for the observations 
and testing them against the evidence. 2) Utilising natural control variables, such as focussing on a 
single person in varying circumstances.  As Lee illustrates, astronomers and biologists use natural 
controls when unable to conduct laboratory experiments. 3) Remembering that strong general 
logical deductions do not require mathematics and statistics. 4) While replicability in qualitative 
studies is not feasible, the same theories can be tested across different cases with varying sets of 
initial conditions. 5) Increasing generalisability by additional experiments.  The core principles of 
generalisation that apply to scientific experiments also apply to qualitative methods (Patton, 2002; 
Shadish, 1995). 
Multiple Case Studies  
Multiple case studies, by increasing the size of the sample, strengthen the scientific or positivist 
validity of qualitative research (Lee, 1989).  In multiple case study design, while each individual case 
study is regarded as a complete study, further analysis across-cases provides convergent or 
divergent evidence regarding the facts and conclusions sought (Yin, 2014).  Each case may be similar 
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or dissimilar, as the aim is to provide either replication of results or differing results for predictable 
reasons (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2014).  Multiple case studies appeal to pragmatists because, as Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007) state, with its emphasis on constructs and testable theoretical propositions it is 
a bridge from qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research.  
Multiple cases are a powerful means to create theory, because they permit replication and 
extension among individual cases.  Replication means that individual cases are viewed as a series of 
experiments used to corroborate propositions or inferences drawn from other cases.  This helps 
researchers to perceive patterns more easily and to eliminate chance associations (Yin, 2014).  
Extension uses multiple cases to develop more elaborate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The researcher 
can also use purposeful or scientific sampling rather than random sampling to test theoretical 
similarities and differences within and between groups of cases, as an aid to the development of 
substantive theory (Yin, 2011).  Nevertheless, important or instrumental cases have explanatory 
power that throw light on phenomena, issues and processes beyond the cases themselves (Stake, 
2005) because the logic of explanation is not based on statistical generalisations, but on analytical 
generalisations about the phenomena and processes identified within a specific context (Gomm, 
Hammersley and Foster, 2000; Yin, 2014).   
This study also uses an embedded case study design, i.e., analysis at multiple levels including 
individual, group, firm and industry.  This improves the likelihood of inducting richer and more 
reliable models (Yin, 1994).  Comparative within and across-case study at multiple levels is especially 
appropriate for gaining insight into organisational phenomena over time (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Entrepreneurial life history cases have been used by entrepreneurship researchers with good effect 
in longitudinal studies.  Of particular note are Rosa’s (1998) study of the development of business 
clusters, Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead‘s (2003) study of differences between habitual 
entrepreneurs, and Mason and Harrison’s (2006) discovery of entrepreneurial recycling by habitual 
entrepreneurs.   
Other studies are listed here below in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 Qualitative Studies of Habitual Entrepreneurs 
Multiple Case Surveys  
Inductive theory-building using cases addresses ‘why’ and ‘how’, but it is not equipped to address 
‘how often’ or ‘how many’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Nevertheless, multiple-case research 
designs involving case comparison allow the pragmatic researcher to introduce positivist techniques 
such as descriptive statistics.  Case survey requires the isolation of factors worthy of further 
attention and a sufficient number of case studies to warrant cross-case tabulations (Yin, 1981).  This 
study collected and analysed the business genealogies (Rosa, 1998) of 116 ventures (112 start-ups) 
that provide a rich picture of many factors pertinent to the research questions, such as duration of 
venture, venture outcome, nature of opportunity, etc. 
The research design uses a combination of case comparison and case survey, within and across 
cases.  The thesis explores similarities and differences between serial entrepreneurs using a 
combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis that combines the entrepreneur’s 
commentary with basic counts and statistics to discern patterns.  In retrospect, the quantitative data 
about the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their ventures proved useful in:  a) expanding and 
triangulating the commentary of each informant, b) aiding the researcher’s interpretation of the 
data, c) helping establish the validity and reliability of the study, and d) positioning the study in the 
literature alongside related studies.   
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6.2.2 Data Capture and Analysis  
The pragmatic comparative within and across-case research design combines a semi-structured and 
pre-coded thematic template (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012; Flick, 2009) reflecting extant 
theory with the induction of new theory using the constant comparative method of data collection 
and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
Grounded Theory  
One feature of the qualitative tradition of research is the induction of theory from data.  Data is 
analysed through an inductive, ongoing and evolving process of identifying themes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  The technique builds a complex, holistic picture from the analysis of words 
gathered in a natural setting (Creswell, 2013).  In grounded theory, research strategy, data 
collection, analysis, and theory generation work together in close relationship to one another 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  Grounded theory uses the constant comparative method of analysis 
(Glazer and Strauss, 1967).  Here, data is coded into categories that emerge from the analysis.  Data 
collection continues and previous data is re-analysed until the categories that have emerged become 
saturated.  Researchers constantly compare theory and data and iterate toward a theory which 
closely fits the data.  Furthermore, the overlap of data generation and data collection also allows for 
pragmatic adjustment in the design strategy as themes emerge in each new case study (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Pragmatism: Extant vs. Grounded Theory  
In the pragmatic research design the research questions drive the research method (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2015).  Therefore, unlike pure forms of grounded theory, the researcher does not 
enter the field with a completely blank slate (Patton, 2002).  Codes and categories may arise from 
different sources including: research objectives, the literature review, the researcher’s values and 
prior experiences, and the researcher’s theoretical orientation (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Without a theoretical focus, it would not be possible to recognise the field being studied; qualitative 
research reflects the interplay between theory, concepts and data (Silverman, 2010).   
Theory Concept Maps and Templates   
Concept maps (Novak and Gowin, 1984) and templates (Crabtree and Miller, 1999) are devices for 
representing theoretical concepts when organising and conducting research.  These techniques have 
emerged from subjective qualitative techniques such as IPA (King and Horrocks, 2010).  King (2004) 
advocates three alternative types of template: 1) pre-define a priori codes based on the theoretical 
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position of the research, or 2) develop codes after some initial exploration of the data, or 3) take a 
pragmatic half-way position.  The latter technique takes some initial codes from the research 
questions, and then uses the interview questions and exploration of the data to refine the codes 
further.  The half way position accords with Yin (1981) who recommends that narrative accounts are 
organized around the substantive propositions, questions, or activities, with flexibility provided for 
modifying these topics as analysis progresses.   
The pragmatic approach adopted supports both deductive and inductive data analysis led by the 
research questions.  The research instrument (see Appendix I) of semi-structured questions focuses 
on the key events of start-up, exit and re-entry required of selection theory.  The life history and 
venture genealogy themes are sufficiently broad to include the investigation of a wide variety of 
existing postulates such as corridors, pseudo diversification, and innovation drawn from the 
literature review.  Additional themes drawn from theory were included explicitly in the interview 
questions.  Of most note, following Berglund (2007), the interview included questions designed to 
elicit a phenomenological response to the ontological debate on the origins of opportunities.  Only 
once the data had been collected and analysed did new themes centred on firm founding and exit 
behaviour emerge inductively.  The themes suggested new postulates for further testing.   
 
Summary  
The research method uses semi-structured interviews to gather partial 'life history' and business 
history data within an exploratory case based framework.  The multiple case study methodology 
used is inherently pragmatic and does not imply the use of a particular type of evidence.  Qualitative 
and quantitative data is collected using case survey, and used for within and across-case analysis 
using multi-stage thematic coding.  The method explores existing postulates deductively and also 
searches for new patterns to build new theory inductively. The size of the study is comparable with 
other case based studies of habitual entrepreneurship. 
6.3 Section 3. Sampling and Data Capture  
The following section discusses the actual data collection process.  The research process followed an 
accepted code of ethics throughout consisting of: a) informed consent, b) honesty and no deception, 
c) privacy and confidentiality, and d) accuracy (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  This section documents 
the reflexive nature of the research process, in particular the actions taken to avoid bias.  
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6.3.1 Sampling  
Sample Population of Interest   
The population of interest is serial founder entrepreneurs starting at least two businesses including 
the exit of at least one of those enterprises regardless of whether it was a successful (positive) or 
unsuccessful (negative) exit.  ‘Career’ is used to encapsulate not only spells as entrepreneurs, but 
also conventional forms of employment and education, before and between start-ups.  All were 
successful in the sense of being persistent, i.e. still currently engaged in their latest start-up 
irrespective of past venture outcomes.  
Sampling Strategy  
The sampling strategy follows the maxim that more cases create more robust theory, because the 
propositions are more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007).  Following Creswell (2013), a purposeful sampling strategy was used to generate a 
homogenous sample of serial founder entrepreneurs.  Purposeful or theoretical sampling occurs 
where the researcher manipulates sampling activities interactively to a much greater extent than in 
statistical sampling (Mason, 2002).  Efforts were made to select cases at an early stage in the 
research project, so as not to bias the sampling procedure to reflect prior beliefs, and to maintain 
the exploratory nature of the research.  Some commentators (e.g. Mason, 2002) recommend 
seeking out negative instances as defined by the theory with which you are working.  Others that 
extremes or ‘polar types’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) are purposely sought.  However, from the 
comparative lack of qualitative research of serial entrepreneurs, it was assumed that this group 
would be hard to engage in case study research and seeking out particular types of cases would 
consume limited research resources.   
In practice, a relatively high number of repeat entrepreneurs participated in the study, including two 
polar cases of entrepreneurs founding seven or more ventures.  The difficulty of selecting 
entrepreneurs in the population of interest from the available UK specific sample frames actually 
improved the research sample.  It led to several useful ‘negative’ cases.  Three cases of portfolio 
entrepreneurs, i.e. parallel founders, a case of a serial acquirer turned starter, and an exiting 
inheritor turned acquirer.  These cases were used for case comparison with serial founders.   
Sampling Process  
Heterogeneity and the potential for generalisability and transferability by other researchers was 
achieved by sampling from any industry (as determined by the industry of their current venture), 
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avoiding the practice of industry specific sampling often used in entrepreneurship research.  The 
sampling frames were not detailed, and the actual number, variety, and outcome of ventures started 
over their career were not known in advance of the invitation to participate.  Although the research 
has no gender specific research questions, efforts were made to find and invite entrepreneurs of 
both genders.  Of those invited, approximately 40% agreed to participate.  One entrepreneur 
cancelled on the day of the interview and withdrew from the study.  Others required several 
approaches before agreeing to participate.  This confirmed the assumption that this population is 
not easy to access for extended qualitative academic studies.  Gaining access is a common problem.  
Managers, especially those in senior positions, tend to be powerful and busy people, and are 
unlikely to allow access to a researcher unless they can see a personal or commercial advantage 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2015).  The letter of invitation (see Appendix I) appealed to their 
sense of community to provide insights relevant to nascent and novice entrepreneurs.  
Sampling Frame 
There are no readily available sampling frames for serial founder entrepreneurs likely to be willing to 
participate in case study research.  One sampling frame was built with the help of journalists and 
some press articles in the public domain.  It contained several well-known but not famous UK 
entrepreneurs.  Another frame consisted of entrepreneurs who were clients of local and regional 
enterprise consultancies, who support entrepreneurs not yet in the public eye.  It was not a 
‘snowball’ sample, because while entrepreneurs tend to know other entrepreneurs, in practice they 
are rarely serial entrepreneurs.  As a case in point, one entrepreneur referred by one of the 
participants turned out to be a serial acquirer turned founder.  
The serial entrepreneurs came from a variety of industries and market sectors and all had thriving 
current ventures, having been entrepreneurially active from 5 to 42 years.  An unexpected feature of 
the sample was the number who had not acted alone, but in partnership with at least one other 
person.  This resulted in a change to the study and questions to gather more information about the 
entrepreneurial team.  In two case studies both partners were interviewed separately to check for 
consistency.  As no significant differences were detected between data collected by the two 
interviews it was concluded that lead entrepreneurs would be reliable informants, and not to press 
for additional interviews in other case studies. 
Sample Characteristics    
All the case studies are of persistent, and in 2014 when the data was gathered, active entrepreneurs, 
i.e. there are no retirees or former entrepreneurs.  Persistent entrepreneurs are subject to survivor 
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bias (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003).  The sample can also be accused of a common bias in the 
entrepreneurship literature of only investigating successful cases after completion (Davidsson, 
2004).  However, the sample is not restricted to surviving businesses.  The study sample includes a 
significant number of cases of closed ventures (23%) and outright failures with significant losses 
(17%).  The great majority of serial entrepreneurs interviewed are males, 8% are female.  The 
average age is 51 years, the youngest is 27, and several entrepreneurs are in their 60’s, close to 
retirement age.  The average total entrepreneurial experience is 24 years with most founding their 
first venture in their early twenties. All but one entrepreneur is British born and the majority of 
ventures are British enterprises serving home markets.  
Summary  
Following Yin’s (2014) and Lee’s (1989) pragmatic approach that blends qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and techniques, the methodology resulted in 21 individual cases of the careers of serial 
entrepreneurs, each with several sub-cases of venture start-up, totalling 112 occurrences of venture 
start-up. In addition, there were 3 cases of portfolio founders, and 2 mixed cases that included 
acquisitions.  The study is comparable with other studies of habitual entrepreneurs. 
6.3.2 Data Capture: Interviewing the Entrepreneurs 
The Research Instrument  
The interview preparatory letter contained nineteen questions organised in four sections, and 
following Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), used a variety of question types including introductory, 
structuring, probing, specifying, direct, indirect and interpreting questions.  Care was taken in the 
practice and test interviews to use different wordings, to add questions, to build rapport and change 
pace (Berg and Lune, 2011).  Pre-testing of questions is normally associated with quantitative 
surveys.  Nevertheless, to ensure that the data collection method was valid and feasible, two trial 
interviews were conducted to test the complete process.  The list of prepared questions was found 
to be too long.  A shortened version was used in later interviews, and participants were asked for 
additional information by email.  The time and location of the interview was decided by the 
entrepreneur.  The test interview participants were re-interviewed toward the end of the data 
capture phase to ensure the consistency of interview quality.   
Preparation by Researcher 
Rapport between researcher and informant can make a considerable difference to the quality of 
data capture.  By its very nature a focused interview requires selection of questions by the 
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interviewer to suit the research agenda (Rosa, 1998).  The researcher must put him or herself in the 
role of respondent and not impose the world of academia and preconception upon the interviewee 
(Fontana and Frey, 1998).  Each serial entrepreneur was invited using the same standard letter to 
participate in the research by way of a confidential interview (see Appendix 1).  Neither the 
entrepreneurs nor their ventures could be easily identified.  This was especially important to those 
serial entrepreneurs who were well known.  The letter explained that the research would be used in 
aggregate for academic research and teaching purposes only.  
On acceptance and confirmation of the date and time of interview, the serial entrepreneur was sent 
a list of the topics and the specific questions to be covered if time allowed.  This demonstrated that 
the researcher was both open and professional, and the interview would be unlike a press interview.  
The subjects we told not to over prepare, but were invited to write down in advance of the interview 
to save time their ventures with dates and also some general descriptive statistics, such as number 
of employees.  In the event, most had only glanced at the questions before hand; none had prepared 
answers except for the list of ventures.   
Like the participant, the researcher did not over prepare, to ensure that the interview was not 
consciously or unconsciously the confirmation of previously held views or conclusions drawn from 
other sources.  For serial entrepreneurs who had been interviewed before by a journalist, the article 
and other information available in the public domain were reviewed for basic facts as preparatory 
work.  This basic preparation was used to build rapport and also triangulate some of the responses 
to interview questions.  None of the relatively short press articles or other information available 
addressed any of the research questions of this study.  
Semi Structured In-depth Interviews  
The chosen research method is the semi-structured qualitative interview lasting an average of one 
hour forty-five minutes.  The entrepreneurs were all interviewed in their own setting of an active 
and at that time successful venture.  In total, over 50 hours of recorded interview material was 
collected and transcribed.  Informants reflected on a series of actual opportunities they had initiated 
including the current venture.  There were no hypothetical or unrealistic situations to generate false 
data, such as ideas for opportunities that did not result in new ventures. 
Qualitative interviewing is useful for accessing individual’s attitudes and values that cannot 
necessarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire (Byrne, 2004).  Moreover, semi-
structured interviews produce a session where most of the informant’s responses cannot be 
predicted, and the interviewer has to improvise in response to what is said (Wengraf, 2001).  
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Improvisation assists in obtaining in-depth responses that explore experiences and meanings.  In-
depth interviews vary from more structured forms of qualitative interviews that focus on pre-
designed questions that test hypotheses and evaluate theory (Seidman, 2006).  Successful semi-
structured interviews require preparation, discipline and creativity during the interview, and also 
more time for analysis afterwards (Wengraf, 2001).  In this type of interview, validity and reliability 
depend not upon the repeated use of exactly the same words each time the question is used, but 
upon conveying equivalence of meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
The usefulness of essentially a shortened life history of a career elicited through semi-structured 
interviews is open to several criticisms.  Rosa’s (1998) seminal study uses entrepreneurial life history 
data as the primary means of information capture.  Rosa advises that properties of the technique are 
fully recognized by the researcher in both analysis and interpretation.  In particular, the goals of the 
entrepreneur, his or her life experiences, and the context in which the interview is given and 
conducted, can have a significant effect on what and how things are reported.  They may 
deliberately deceive or self-deceive, and their willingness to divulge sensitive information may vary 
(Rosa, 1998).  Also, and of importance for this study, the interview may provide opportunities for the 
entrepreneur to rationalize success or failure, through retrospective sense-making.  Of course, many 
of the critical events recounted occurred many years in the past.  Data gathering by interviews is 
open to the claim that the data is biased by impression management (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007).  Timmons (1999) suggests that successful entrepreneurs may take responsibility to renew and 
perpetuate the system that has treated them well.  The letter of invitation which said that 
contributions would assist new entrepreneurs was designed to be neutral and elicit both positive 
and negative advice.  Despite the potential for bias, practicing entrepreneurs are able to report 
reasonably accurate assessments of their own activities, Ozgen and Baron (2007), and key 
informants can provide reliable information about the organizational characteristics of their firms 
(DeTienne and Koberg, 2002).  In retrospect, the confidential and academic nature of the interviews 
was key to the quality of the contributions. 
6.3.3 Conduct of the Interview 
Only through rapport and careful management of the interview process could sources of bias be 
identified and where possible reduced.  Using two sample frames provided a balance of 
entrepreneurs with different experiences of being interviewed.  Clearly, the serial entrepreneurs 
who had given press interviews had experience in responding to questions about their current 
venture, their entrepreneurial philosophy and their life history.  None had previously been asked to 
reflect upon previous ventures in any depth.  Even with the promise of confidentiality some were 
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guarded in their comments until rapport and trust was established.  Most were very candid about 
problems that typically do not feature in press articles, such as mental and physical health issues, 
family issues, and the fraudulent behaviour of former partners and trusted employees  A few had 
very strong personalities and wanted to communicate their own philosophy of entrepreneurship.  
The researcher, having some relevant business experience, was able to bring the discussion back to 
the semi-structured format.  The serial entrepreneurs were not asked very detailed questions about 
the financial performance of their ventures in case they became defensive or suspicious.  If this 
information was not revealed in the natural course of the interview it was asked for later by email.  
However, not all entrepreneurs were prepared to volunteer all financial information.  The study’s 
research questions or the areas of academic debate were not revealed prior to or during the 
interview.  The researcher declared that he had an open mind and wanted to capture the subject’s 
authentic experience.  This ensured the interviewee did not debate the validity of the research 
questions nor try to answer them directly.  
Conduct of the Interview  
The main determinant of the length of the interview was the number of ventures initiated by the 
serial entrepreneur.  If the entrepreneur made statements that seemed to contradict other 
information given in the interview these responses were challenged.  It was important to show the 
participant that the researcher was listening and would not necessarily wait until later to iron out 
any inconsistencies in the interview.  Comparative questions, such as those focussed on similarities 
and differences between start-ups and exits, were used to encourage the entrepreneur to reflect 
more deeply.  One of the most interesting aspects of the interview was the responses to the 
questions on the origins of opportunities and sources of information where the entrepreneur was 
unaware of the academic debates surrounding this topic.  Overall, the researcher was struck by the 
modesty of the serial entrepreneurs, most not thinking they had done anything especially unusual or 
exceptional.  
Process Analysis vs. Critical Incidents  
Critical incident analysis of start-ups, exits and other important events was used to improve the data 
gathering method.  Critical incident analysis (Chell, 2004) investigates significant occurrences 
(events, incidents, processes or issues) identified by the respondent, the way they are managed, and 
the outcomes in terms of perceived effects from the perspective of the individual.  Chell (2015) 
considers the critical incident technique to be more powerful than the interview and can be used for 
both positivist and interpretivist research.  Venture start-ups and successful or unsuccessful exits, 
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decisions to return, and the break-up of relationships are all critical incidents.  This technique has 
been used in entrepreneurship to investigate learning (Cope, 2003; 2005), learning from failure 
(Cope, 2011) and opportunity recognition (Chell, 2015).  The use of critical incident interviewing 
allows the researcher to ask probing questions to fully examine these incidents.  The critical incident 
format of the questioning was designed to reveal the process of opportunity recognition and 
exploitation through venture initiation, development and exit.  The fact that both the founding and 
exit of ventures are ‘critical’ incidents means that subjects usually have very good recall, and if full 
and precise details are given, it can usually be assumed that this information is accurate (Chell, 
2004).  
It was anticipated that there would not be enough time to identify and discuss many specific 
elements of each venture.  Instead, a mixture of direct and indirect comparative questioning was 
used to reveal how each venture was structured and managed operationally, focussing on two 
different functions, marketing and finance.  Questions aimed at identifying the principal 
stakeholders involved and what they did, allowed both the researcher and participant to find 
similarities and differences between the ventures without resorting to direct survey-like questioning.  
To maintain rapport and engagement with the data gathering process, the researcher respected the 
subject’s time.  When the participant was showing signs of fatigue some of the more general 
questions were omitted.  This and other slight changes in the research design are reflective of the 
nature of qualitative inquiry, which is understood to be flexible and emergent (Patton, 2002).  A 
number of the serial entrepreneurs remarked in the wrap-up after the interview that they had not 
been questioned in this way before and how it had made them think about their experience in a 
different way. 
Respondent and Researcher Bias 
The challenge of interview data is best mitigated by data collection approaches that limit bias 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  The researcher reflected on the subject of respondent bias.  One 
entrepreneur wanted to emphasise his academic knowledge of entrepreneurship and exhibited 
some defensiveness in respect of the researcher’s line of enquiry.  Later the data analysis confirmed 
that this entrepreneur’s responses were consistent with the overall sample.  As Prus (1996) pointed 
out, any attempt to put pre-existing notions in suspension in order to maximise openness is still 
guided by aspects of the interviewer’s pre-conceptualisation.  Overall the researcher is confident 
that while the process is imperfect no substantial bias occurred.  Of great assistance here was the 
factual quantitative data gathered about each venture, often before the interview, that provided the 
longitudinal spine of the data gathering process, enabling entries to be matched with exits using 
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dates, generating many comparative and descriptive questions unique to each interview.  Much of 
this data could be triangulated using public sources of information.  There was no incentive to 
embellish this data, and it was only in the area of business failure that the researcher felt 
participants may have been holding back.  Not all unsuccessful ventures were reported immediately, 
some arose from discussion about the sequence of ventures. 
Summary  
The population of interest is serial founder entrepreneurs starting at least two businesses, exiting at 
least one.  Purposeful sampling strategy was used using two unrelated frames to widen the sample 
characteristics.  Critical incident analysis focussed on start-ups and exits was used to enhance the 
interview process.  The semi-structured interview was tested and modified and much care taken to 
build rapport during the process.  Confidentiality was important in obtaining engagement in the 
process and establishing rapport.  The risks of bias in the process were documented and managed 
proactively using a combination of testing, previous experience, indirect and comparative 
questioning, and triangulation.  Only in the area of business failure and financial information was 
information withheld.  
6.4 Section 5. Data Analysis 
6.4.1 Data Analysis Techniques  
Miles and Huberman (1994) define qualitative data analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows 
of activity:  a) data reduction, b) data display, and c) conclusion drawing and verification.  Data 
reduction selects, simplifies, abstracts and transforms the data that appears in interview 
transcriptions and other data sources.  Data reduction is not separate from analysis.  It occurs 
continuously even before the data is collected.  Anticipatory data reduction occurs when the 
researcher chooses the research questions, the conceptual framework, and the type of cases to 
include.  The data reduction process continues until a final report is completed (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
With qualitative research, it is impossible to provide the full evidence in a manner that is 
immediately accessible to the reader (Goulding, 2000).  Display compresses information to permit 
conclusion drawing.  In this study, across-case analysis is a major goal of the research.  Yin (1981) 
recommends that such a study might consist of brief summaries of individual cases, followed by 
across-case analysis.  Display is not separate from but part of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Drawing conclusions and verifying them requires the noting of patterns, explanations, causal flows 
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and propositions where the competent researcher holds these conclusions lightly (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  What is included is selective, but still presented in such a way as to create a 
meaningful picture.  Lists and diagrams are used to illustrate the emergence of key findings and 
theory supported by case examples at critical junctures in the development of insights (Yin, 1981). 
6.4.2 The Data Analysis Process  
As previously noted, over 50 hours of interviews were recorded with the researcher also making 
notes during the interviews.  Once transcribed, following Creswell, (2009) the interviews were read 
several times to develop a frame of reference and sense of the overall data.  The data analysis 
method was a mixture of activities using grounded theory and the constant comparative method of 
analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  The activities included:  1) gathering 
descriptive statistics concerning the entrepreneur and their ventures, 2) analysing the transcripts for 
common cross-venture elements that formed the coding scheme, 3) visualising the venture 
sequences to address the research questions, 4) categorising, tabulating, and recombining evidence 
to group and cluster ventures according to their venture creation strategies and tactics.  The data 
analysis revealed many findings not anticipated in the original research design, including patterns in 
the sequence of ventures, and the impact of breaks and interludes between start-ups.  It was not 
until later in the data display that the researcher showed the tendency described by Yin (2014) to 
build new and general explanations that fit each of the individual cases, even though the cases vary 
in their details. 
Coding  
 
This research design was led by semi-structured thematic pre-coding using the research questions, 
interview questions and assumptions in conjunction with a flexible and emergent inductive approach 
to data analysis recommended by Yin (2014).   Following Smith and McKeever (2015) the process 
was in three stages: 1) combining pre- and open-coding to find a consistent story within the 
interview fragments, 2) axial coding for comparing interviews and identifying conceptual patterns, 
and 3) triangulating by comparing sources from emerging categories.  The coding scheme soon 
deviated from the original research design and the analysis developed into a multi-stage thematic 
analysis (Flick, 2009) across and within cases.  Reliability was established through a common case 
study protocol and a case study database (Yin, 2014).  The case study information database kept all 
the voice files, transcripts and other sources of data.  The analysis used a spreadsheet to construct a 
matrix or ‘table shells’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984) to record and distil data.  These outlines ensured 
that the data collection was focused on the process of opportunity recognition, venture creation and 
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exit over each career.  The interviewees were sent a copy of the transcript and requests for 
clarification by email.  No changes were requested. 
 
Computer aided qualitative data analysis software (e.g. NVivo) was not used, as the linkages 
between businesses are not always evident in the transcripts and mix of data types used.  Following 
King (2004), the researcher immersed himself in the data so as not to miss a key part of the analysis 
and interpretive process.  Summaries and quotes from the transcripts were transferred to a 
spreadsheet for sorting and comparison.  The rows were the codes and sub-codes from the 
interview structure.  A set of columns was set aside for each case interview to facilitate across-case 
comparison.  The interviews were entered in the order that they were made.  Within the set, the 
entrepreneur’s ventures occupied the columns arranged in chronological order, earliest venture 
first.  Each passage of text was coded according to the questions and sub-questions in the interview 
schedule to compare within-case and across-case passages.  Further codes were added when 
interview data could not be coded with the existing coding structure.  When complete, each code 
was examined across all ventures in all cases to derive summary findings.  The summary findings 
were written up and then cross-checked to the coded spreadsheet and when necessary for further 
clarification to the interview transcripts.  
 
In the next stage of thematic analysis, summary information about the 26 entrepreneurs and 116 
ventures was extracted and compressed into a second set of spreadsheets for display and further 
analysis.  This analysis used the established quantitative counts and descriptive statistics about each 
venture from duration to innovativeness, providing a positivist contextual framework within which 
to place the entrepreneur’s oral history. Thus the analysis presented is a mutually supporting blend 
of qualitative and quantitative, positivist and interpretivist information.  
 
As previously explained, construct validity was established by using multiple sources of evidence 
using techniques selected from the relevant literature (e.g. Chandler, 1998; Chandler, Douglas and 
DeTienne, 2005; Shane, 2003; Venkataraman and Sarasavathy, 2001) to create a chain of evidence.  
These spreadsheets facilitated within case and across-case analysis of all first ventures, all failed 
ventures, type and stage of industry development, and the similarity of preceding with subsequent 
ventures.  Summary descriptive statistics were produced and data analysed to check the veracity of 
the postulates.  
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Modes of Venture Creation 
 
In the next stage, modes of venture creation were induced.  The individual cases were grouped into 
types (Flick, 2009), using the constructs of habitual entrepreneurship defined in the literature 
review.  The ventures were clustered and grouped independently using the origins and relatedness 
of start-ups to previous ventures.  In some ways similar to the ‘entry wedges’ of Vesper (1980) they 
were also inspired by the constructs of Low and Abrahamson (1997) and Chandler, Douglas and 
DeTienne (2005).    These included clones, replications and adaptations of other enterprises in the 
serial entrepreneur’s career.  These clusters of venture types are those made in the subjective 
judgement of the researcher.  Further contributions to knowledge were induced by plotting the 
relationship between types and previous venture exit conditions, either success or failure.  
Postulates of existing theory such as related diversification were checked deductively against the 
sequence of ventures, and also the induced venture types to generate further insights.  
 
The pieces of information were also compared to alternative propositions to determine the degree 
to which they were consistent with alternative explanations.  Outcomes due to pure chance and 
serendipitous luck have a strong tradition in the entrepreneurial literature (e.g. Baron and Ward, 
2004; Fiet, 1996; Kirzner, 1973).  Conclusions were formulated and checked using Booth, Colomb, 
and Williams’ (1995) argument formation and warranting methodology.  The analysis conveys 
patterns that are supported by the evidence and could be tested by other studies.  The process 
continued through to the writing up-phase.  The modes of venture creation are a major finding of 
this study.  Accordingly, further exposition of the data coding, cross tabulations and analysis process 
used to derive these and other findings is given at Appendix III.    
 
Summary  
Over 50 hours of interviews were recorded and the transcripts were fed back and additional data 
gathered by email.  Both cases and sub-cases of the genealogy, development and outcomes of each 
venture are used for case comparison and survey, both longitudinally and in cross-section to isolate 
critical events and data points in respect of venture initiation and exit.  The results were analysed 
using a constant comparative method once all the transcripts had been analysed.  Additional codes 
were developed through a matrix of all cases held in a spreadsheet.  There were two basic stages; 
breaking each case into different components, and then displaying all entrepreneur and venture 
sub-case analysis.  The qualitative and quantitative data were used together and were mutually 
supporting.  Constructs used were drawn from the literature, some modified and others invented 
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(induced) during the analysis process. The structuring and discussion of the results continued 
throughout the write-up stage. 
 
6.5 Section 6. Credibility: Validity and Reliability  
Validity and Reliability 
Validity is the extent to which researchers are able to use their method to study what they had 
sought to study and reliability requires repeatability in a process to obtain very similar results. 
Together validity and reliability form the overall credibility of the research.   
 
Derived from Patton (2002) the following table compares alternative sets of criteria for judging the 
credibility of research.  
 
Table 6.2 Credibility of Research Process Criteria 
6.5.1 Validity  
Validity is the extent to which researchers are able to use their method to study what they had 
sought to study rather than studying something else (Gummesson, 2000).  Validity addresses 
whether you are observing, identifying, and measuring what you intended (Mason, 2002).  Yin 
(2014) stresses the importance of internal validity of case study research in order to increase the 
rigor of the approach.  He also emphasises the importance of external validity which is especially 
relevant for multiple case studies through replication and extension.   
In Patton’s framework, external validity is replaced by transferability. Transferability is the degree to 
which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or 
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settings.  Transferability is enhanced by accurately describing the research context.  The researcher 
making the transfer of the results to a different context is then responsible for making the judgment. 
Effort was made to define valid constructs in Chapters 2 and 5 with which to conduct the research. 
Internal validity is protected by taking a longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional approach, having 
high quality interviewing skills, and immersion in the field of habitual entrepreneurship prior to data 
gathering and triangulation (Yin, 2014).  The study used proven methods and constructs.  Data was 
closely linked to findings to ensure that others could make a similar study. Reliability is supported by 
having a clear audit trail and a detailed account of the research paradigm, method, data gathering 
and analysis.   
Internal validity is also related to the credibility of the sample and the trustworthiness and 
competence of the researcher, even though they have limited time with their subjects (Patton, 
2002).  
Credibility of Sample 
The sample size of serial entrepreneurs is comparable with other published qualitative studies of 
habitual entrepreneurs.  The sample of 26 cases is the same as the largest study of this kind, which 
gathered one hour interviews compared to an average interview length for this study of 1.75 hours.  
The 112 sub-cases of start-up ventures exceed other qualitative studies of all types of habitual 
entrepreneur.  The variety of industries represented and the variety of career lengths and start-up 
experience all indicate a sound and credible sample that avoids documented issues with self-
employment data.  The sample also includes cases that have been removed as outliers or duplicates 
in quantitative research studies.  The summary statistics indicate that the ventures are in line with, 
and therefore the sample may be representative of, small sized venture creation activity in the UK.  
Skills of the Researcher 
Credibility assumes that the researcher has the skills and ability to conduct a rigorous study.  The 
researcher has conducted field research in the past, and has extensive interviewing experience.  The 
researcher has worked in senior executive teams, with angel investors and entrepreneurs, has 
started two businesses and has taught entrepreneurship to undergraduate and postgraduate 
students.  Moreover, the researcher has worked in the software industry with a number of 
entrepreneurs in the start-up and development phases of new ventures. 
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Actions Taken to Improve Validity 
To limit the threats to internal validity in this research study, the following actions were taken:  
1. The interview transcripts were sent to each of the twenty-six participants, asking for verification 
of their accuracy and for any additional comments on their opportunity recognition experiences and 
the interpretation of the information (Creswell, 2009; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
2. Preparatory and follow-up questions were sent by and replied to by email and added to the 
transcripts.   
3. All cases were analysed, including five cases outside the sampling parameters for serial 
entrepreneurs.  Therefore, disconfirming information (Mason, 2002) and negative cases (Patton, 
2002) have been included in the narrative of this study.  The five cases of other forms of habitual 
entrepreneurship were analysed to the same extent as those of serial entrepreneurs and the results 
compared to those of serial entrepreneurs.  
4. The conclusions show a number of different classifications of serial ventures.  Where there are 
exceptions to these broad categories alternative explanations are offered.  Tentative findings that 
could not be assessed from the evidence were noted, and all topics for further research are clearly 
indicated.  
5. To check for accuracy, the outcomes were compared to the published literature (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998), and rival explanations were analysed (Yin, 2014).  In general the results are explicable 
by current theoretical and empirical predictions.  However, the study adds to the habitual 
entrepreneurship literature in respect of the specific and distinct sub-group of serial entrepreneurs 
and the importance of either successful or unsuccessful exit on venture choice.  The only rival 
explanation would be that the patterns discerned are the result of another as yet unknown or 
random process.   
6. Triangulation was achieved combining multiple cases, observers, theories, methods and data 
sources, to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single methods, single observer and single 
theory studies (Patton, 2002).  
In this exploratory research a multiple theoretical and analytical approach was employed. The 
results are a mixture of qualitative and descriptive quantitative data from the same source.  The 
research relies in the main on individual ‘lead’ entrepreneurs as informants.  In approximately 25% 
of the cases alternative perspectives were obtained.  Two entrepreneurs were interviewed twice.  In 
two other cases partners were interviewed separately.   
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Five anonymised transcripts were given to entrepreneurship students to analyse and assess the 
degree to which ventures were related.  They reached similar conclusions about the data, but 
without a similar knowledge of the literature were unable to confirm the study findings.  Interviews 
were checked against other public documents, including press articles and company web-sites. A 
review of the key findings by three of the participants was held while maintaining confidentially and 
anonymity.  
7. The sample was checked for purposeful sampling issues (Patton, 2002).  
Selected entrepreneurs who did not respond to the first mailing were mailed again to ensure they 
did not want to participate.  For those who contacted the researcher but still did not participate, 
either other commitments or the estimated length of the interview at over an hour and a half were 
the reasons given.  There is no evidence that the non-participants affected the representativeness of 
the sample.  
8. The process was reviewed for research bias and reactions of the participants.  For example, 
information given to outsiders is not the whole truth (Rosa, 1998; Silverman, 2010; Timmons, 1999).  
The researcher both listened and engaged by checking subjects’ answers, revealing interpretations 
neutrally and seeking agreement and disagreement.  There is some evidence that the researcher 
established good rapport and trust as some entrepreneurs disclosed very private and personal 
information.   
9. The process was also reviewed for predispositions, selective perceptions and bias of the inquirer 
(Patton, 2002) and also the subject.  The researcher wrote up impressions of the participant 
entrepreneurs after each interview.  The combination of qualitative and quantitative information 
compensated somewhat for potential bias emanating from a single type of data.  However, the 
analysis and interpretation of the data to form conclusions remain largely that of the researcher.  
6.5.2 Reliability 
Reliability, in qualitative research, requires that two or more researchers studying the same 
phenomenon with similar purposes should reach approximately the same results (Gummesson, 
2000).  The threats to reliability in this study were addressed in the following manner: 
1. A complete and accurate account has been prepared of the study procedures and exactly how the 
researcher’s positions, assumptions, bias and values influenced the selection of the sample, the data 
generated, and data analysed (Creswell, 2009; Mason, 2002).  
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2. To substantiate the trustworthiness and rigour of the data analysis, a review of the study was 
organised for independent academics and PhD students.  A summary of the study and its results was 
presented in papers to two academic conferences in entrepreneurship in May and November 2015.   
Summary  
Together validity and reliability form the overall credibility of the research.  The study has a large 
and wide sample of serial founder entrepreneurs and new start-up ventures compared to other 
qualitative studies.  The sample contains several cases of other types of habitual entrepreneurship 
which strengthen the comparative aspects of the analysis.  The summary statistics indicate that the 
ventures may be representative of the UK small enterprise sector.  The data and findings could be 
representative of serial entrepreneurship such that the new postulates and calls for further research 
are valid and worthy of further research.  The methodology is fully documented and repeatable.  The 
analysis contains the subjective analysis of both the researcher and the researched, supported by 
descriptive statistics of the entrepreneurs and their ventures.  Other researchers are invited to 
repeat the methodology, test and extend these postulates.  
6.6 Chapter Summary  
The research paradigm and methodology reflect the literature’s calls for more qualitative 
longitudinal studies in the interpretivist tradition.  This exploratory study of serial entrepreneurs 
employs a pragmatic approach to answer the research question in the critical realist tradition.  The 
method combines qualitative and quantitative types of data and positivist and interpretivist 
techniques. Serial founder entrepreneurs were considered to be a hard to reach group that would 
necessitate a low sample size.  Against this there was determination to collect, not only the 
subjective views, but also positivist data about serial entrepreneurs and their ventures.  Accordingly, 
the method uses a pragmatic case study approach to analyse the careers of a heterogeneous sample 
of serial entrepreneurs and a small number of other cases of habitual entrepreneurs.   Data 
collection was primarily through semi-structured interviews and the data was analysed manually in 
spreadsheets using the constant comparative method. It recognises that the researcher and the 
researched interact.  The interpretive contribution is both supported and held in check by the 
quantitative data of a sizeable sample, demonstrating the benefits of mixed methods.  Overall, 
following Robson (2011), the method was prosecuted systematically, sceptically and ethically in the 
pursuit of new and useful knowledge.   
Chapter 7 provides the data analysis and research findings, and overall outcomes of the study. 
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7 CHAPTER 7  
Data Analysis and Research Findings 
This chapter presents both the analysis and findings of the exploration of 21 cases of serial 
entrepreneurship, supplemented by 3 cases of portfolio entrepreneurs and 2 additional cases of 
habitual entrepreneurs who have a mixture of repetitive entrepreneurial experience including 
acquisitions.  The research outputs are discussed, interpreted and conclusions drawn.  
The principal research question is: How are the ventures of serial starter entrepreneurs related to 
one another?  The detailed review of the literature suggests four themes and a set of more detailed 
research questions are important in addressing the larger question.   These themes and detailed 
research questions are set out in Chapter 5 and the research methodology in Chapter 6 .  These four 
themes signpost and structure the research findings.     
Theme 1. Serial entrepreneurship is a form of economic selection.  Serials are unique in their 
frequent exit from the firms they founded.  How are serial entrepreneurs matched with 
opportunities that best fit their entrepreneurial human capital?  Failure is considered likely.  Why 
does it occur and how do serial entrepreneurs deal with its consequences, learning from both failure 
and success.  
Theme 2. Theory and evidence suggests that serial entrepreneurs will follow a relatively narrow path 
of related ventures.  However, exit may make serial entrepreneurs more likely to change direction 
and follow unrelated corridors.   
Theme 3. If serial entrepreneurs create a high proportion of new firms then how, when and why do 
they found innovative ventures?  
Theme 4. Portfolio entrepreneurship is considered an economically superior form of 
entrepreneurship.   Are serials always at an economic disadvantage?  More can be learned from 
comparing examples of portfolio with serial founding.  
Chapter Structure  
Part 1 - Examines the nature of the sample and the important distinguishing feature of serial 
entrepreneurship – venture exit (Theme 1). 
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Part 2 - Answers the principal research question using constant comparison of case material (Themes 
1-4). 
Part 3 - Examines the applicability of corridor theory (Theme 2).  
Part 4 - Explores the nature of innovation (Theme 3).  
Part 5 - Debates the differences and similarities of serial and portfolio entrepreneurship (Theme 4). 
Chapter 7 concludes with the main contributions of the thesis. 
7.1 Part 1.  Section 1. Key Characteristics of the Sample 
7.1.1 Persistence, Career Success and Venture Failure 
Persistent and Currently Active 
This thesis is a study of the careers and ventures of surviving ‘persistent’ serial founder 
entrepreneurs still active and exercising ownership and control of a then current business in 2014.  
To qualify for the study all had to be currently active in entrepreneurship and have owned and 
controlled at least two businesses and experienced at least one exit.  Therefore, there are no 
retirees or former entrepreneurs who have exited permanently from entrepreneurship in the 
sample.  Consequently, the sample is subject to survivor bias (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) where 
generalisations can thus only be made about similar groups of persistent serial entrepreneurs. 
Successful  
By dint of their persistence, experience and having a current healthy business, they considered 
themselves as both successful people and to a greater or lesser extent expert.  Therefore, the study 
may also be accused of a common bias in the entrepreneurship literature of only investigating 
successful cases after completion (Davidsson, 2004).   
Venture Failure and Successful Careers  
Notwithstanding the assessment that the sample of entrepreneurs had up to the time of the study 
successfully constructed successful careers, it is essential to note that this study is not restricted only 
to surviving ventures.  It includes a significant number of closed ventures (25%) and outright failures 
(15%).  Even in the few cases where serial entrepreneurs had experienced venture closure or failure 
but not yet a successful exit (Cases 1, 3, 8, 15, 16, 18), all had achieved profitable and growing 
businesses at the time of the study.   
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Entrepreneurial Expertise: Founding Experience  
The number of start-ups is a very specific form of entrepreneurial human capital (Stuart and Abetti, 
1990).  If founding three or more businesses is an accepted standard to achieve expert status (e.g. 
Baron, 2006, Baron and Ensley, 2006), then over 80% of the entrepreneurs in this study can be 
classified as expert entrepreneurs.  Half the sample founded four or more ventures, nearly 40% six 
or more ventures (see Table 7.1).  This compares favourably to Schollhammer‘s (1991) seminal study 
in which 14% of multiple entrepreneurs founded four or more ventures.  The most experienced 
founder (Case 1) started 10 separate enterprises over 42 continuous years in entrepreneurship.   
As covered in the discussion of the literature, simply counting the number of start-ups measures just 
one aspect of entrepreneurial expertise.  In this study, the four cases of serial entrepreneurs 
founding the minimum of just two enterprises (Cases 3, 8, 14, 25) and exiting just one, possessed an 
average of 33 years experience.    
 
Table 7.1 Distribution of Founding Experience 
Being a relatively rich sample from the perspective of start-up expertise, the across-case analysis 
benefits from having a number of ventures in each stage or sequence in a career (see Table 7.2).  Of 
course the number of start-ups at each stage declines in step with the count of entrepreneurs with 
progressively higher levels of business creation experience.  
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Table 7.2 Distribution of Founded Ventures  
7.1.2 Actual vs. Planned Sample of Serial Founders   
While this thesis is principally a study of serial starter (founder) entrepreneurs, a number of other 
sub-types of habitual entrepreneurship were sampled inadvertently.  Three founders who were 
initially thought to be serial entrepreneurs were found at interview to have built and managed 
portfolios of ventures.  Furthermore, two entrepreneurs with multiple firms of which only one was 
founded are also referenced in this study.   
While not intended, the contribution of the five other cases of habitual entrepreneurship proved 
invaluable in improving the internal validity of the study.   The inclusion of portfolio entrepreneurs 
resulted in a useful addition to our knowledge and an ability to contribute empirically and 
theoretically to the discussion of the economics of serial vs. portfolio entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005; Parker, 2014). 
In aggregate then, the study sample consists of 26 separate career histories and venture genealogies 
of habitual entrepreneurs working as individuals or in small teams of full-time owner/managers.  The 
sample size exceeds most other case studies of habitual entrepreneurs.    
7.1.3 The Sample Ventures: Characteristics  
It was in the interview process that the entrepreneurs alone identified their ventures in which, as 
the interview question asked, they had “acted entrepreneurially, either alone or with other 
entrepreneurs” i.e. in small teams.  To maintain consistency in the case analysis, some relatively 
minor childhood ventures and short-term property investment businesses and periods of self-
161 
 
employment were all excluded from the analysis of their ventures.  In addition, other career 
ventures were excluded where the entrepreneur was employed as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
in a business already established and trading for over one year.  Though having a minority stake, 
these ventures were not founded by the individual and they joined after the start-up phase.  All 
senior managerial roles of this type were classified as employment for the purpose of the analysis.  
Therefore, of 125 business ventures identified by the entrepreneurs, 116 are analysed.  All the 
ventures analysed were legally formed firms with several employees.  Of these 112 were start-ups.   
The entire sample of entrepreneurs and their ventures studied is illustrated below.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Habitual Entrepreneurs and their Ventures 
In addition, for reference purposes, a thumbnail sketch of each case is given in Appendix II. 
Venture Size: Employment and Turnover   
The literature frequently cites the economic importance of habitual entrepreneurship.  In total the 
enterprises analysed created around 4000 jobs, an average of 36 employees per venture with a wide 
range from just 1 or 2 employees to over 100 employees at their peak.  Peak reported venture 
turnover averaged £7.5 million, again with a wide range.  Both averages of turnover and 
employment are in the middle range of the then current EU definition of small medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs), above micro but below medium sized enterprises.  This suggests that the case 
studies cover a range of enterprises that may be representative of small businesses in the UK.    
Venture Age and Quality 
The mean age of all ventures as measured by the length of time owned and controlled by the 
entrepreneur, including the then currently active (un-exited) ventures, is just over 7 years.  Nearly all 
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of the ventures sold as going concerns were still in existence in 2015, indicating that the ventures 
exited by sale were of high quality as predicted by Holmes and Schmitz (1990; 1995).    
Industry Sectors 
An important feature of this study is the range of industries represented in the study.  Many studies 
of habitual entrepreneurship referenced in the literature review are confined to a specific industry, 
with high growth and high technology sectors been favoured by researchers.  Using Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein’s (2010) classification, the ventures analysed operated in the industry 
sectors shown below. 
 
Table 7.3 Distribution of Founded Ventures by Industry Sector 
Nevertheless, these broad classifications do not convey the wide variety of businesses represented 
in the study.  Enterprises range from executive recruitment, software and mobile app development, 
fast food, alternative energy, music publishing and ‘big data’ IT solutions.  A wide range of business 
models are represented including: manufacturing, licensing, franchising, distribution, brokerage, 
internet intermediation and dis-intermediation, software as a service and cloud computing services. 
In accordance with the discussion of definitions and the appropriate unit of analysis in Chapter 3, 
professional services such as accountants and lawyers were excluded.  By the nature of their 
vocational training and qualifications the professions are not usually associated with the recognition 
and pursuit of new opportunities through multiple start-ups and exits.  
The ventures are 60% business to business and 40% business to consumer in market orientation, 
although a number of enterprises served both classifications of purchaser.  Interestingly, in relation 
to the corridor principal (Ronstadt,1986; 1988), the type of purchaser does not appear to have a 
strong impact on venture choice.  75% of serial entrepreneurs started ventures in both business and 
end-consumer markets, with the remaining 25% ventured exclusively in business to business 
markets throughout their entrepreneurial careers.    
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Geography 
The geographic scope of markets served is UK centric but also includes the analysis and discussion of 
new international ventures founded to serve markets in Europe, USA and Australia.  
Environmental Conditions 
Another key aspect of this study is the longitudinal nature of the case analysis so frequently called 
for by the extant literature.  From an historical perspective the aggregate genealogy of the ventures 
spans the period 1972 to 2014.  The mean and median start years are 1998 and 2000 respectively. 
The years 2000 and 2008 are the years most frequently cited for venture start-up.  The earliest exit is 
1974; the mean and median exit years are 2000 and 2002 respectively.  The years 2000 and 2008 are 
the modal years for exit.  The small positive skew in the age range of the venture reflects a tendency 
in the sample toward more recent and hence younger start-ups as is consistent with a sample of still 
active multiple entrepreneurs.   
The entrepreneurial literature emphasises the importance of exogenous contingent factors on 
entrepreneurial activity and decisions (e.g. Schumpeter, 1934; Low and Abrahamson, 1997). This 
period of economic, business and social change includes a number of exogenous trends and shocks 
recounted by the entrepreneurs in their interviews.  The mean start and mean exit years coincide 
with the height of the ‘dotcom boom’ and the soon following ‘dotcom bust’, a factor mentioned by 
many entrepreneurs even when they did not have internet related start-ups and exits.  Given below 
are the salient environmental conditions mentioned by the entrepreneurs.   
 
Table 7.4 Technical Trends 
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Table 7.5 Business and Socio-Economic Trends 
7.1.4 Sample Entrepreneurs: Demographics 
Gender, Age, Culture and Experience 
The great majority of serial entrepreneurs interviewed are males, only 8% are female.  The average 
age is 51 years old.  The youngest is 27 and several entrepreneurs are in their 60’s with only one 
contemplating retirement.  Their total entrepreneurial experience averages 24 years, including 
interludes between ventures.  The range is 5 to 42 years of experience, with the great majority 
founding their first venture in their early twenties.  All but one entrepreneur is British born, and the 
majority of ventures are British enterprises serving home markets.  In one case study the founder is 
EU born, founding a British business and several pan-European ventures.   
Family Background and Upbringing  
Researchers report that serial entrepreneurs may have less access to role models, mentoring, social 
networks and financial resources (e.g. Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright and Binks, 2005).  This study 
found no specific evidence to support this postulate.  Several serial entrepreneurs started one or 
more ventures during childhood.  Many received an early experiential education in entrepreneurship 
from entrepreneurial parents or siblings.  Three were employed in family businesses.  Others 
recounted being strongly influenced toward entrepreneurship by non-entrepreneurial parents.  Of 
this group (50% of cases), many planned their entrepreneurial career in early adulthood and most 
shared the same sentiment of one who said, “I wanted to show the family I could do it”. 
Interestingly, all with this formative exposure to entrepreneurship through family members later felt 
the need to employ formal external mentors to assist them during their careers.  Presumably they 
had learned enough or were more independent minded than other serial entrepreneurs. Further 
research is required to determine the actual reason. 
Those without an early vocation or support for entrepreneurial ambitions judged entrepreneurship 
as a superior choice to waged employment.  Two spoke of being driven by a “fear of poverty”.  
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Several possessed no particular ambition to become an entrepreneur.  These were all recruited to 
entrepreneurship as junior partners with a minority stake by the lead entrepreneur of their first 
start-up.  One such employee turned entrepreneur was approached by a supplier, “Why don’t you 
come and join me and set that up?  So that is how I got into XYZ.  And as the business grew, I ended 
up owning 10%.” 
Education  
Wiklund and Shepherd’s (2008) thesis is that general human capital will be positively associated with 
portfolio entrepreneurship, while specific human capital will be related to serial entrepreneurship.  
In this sample both the serial entrepreneurs and the much smaller number of other habitual 
entrepreneurs were on the whole well educated, with 70% having undergraduate or postgraduate 
degrees and/or professional qualifications.  Further education tended to be in areas directly relevant 
to their entrepreneurial careers: engineering, economics, mathematics, accountancy and law.  There 
is not enough evidence in the sample to support a contribution to the long running generalist vs. 
specialist human capital debate (e.g. Smith, 1967).  As is detailed in the section on entry to 
entrepreneurship, the great majority started their entrepreneurial careers utilising specific human 
capital developed in employment or through personal interests.  
7.1.5 The Use of Entrepreneurial Teams 
There is increasing recognition in the literature that entrepreneurship is not always carried out by a 
lone individual (e.g. Westhead and Wright, 2011). Both ventures formed by teams and individuals 
are represented in the sample.  There was a small majority of entrepreneurial teams over sole 
entrepreneurs.  44% of start-ups were led by individual owner managers, 56% by entrepreneurial 
teams.   
Furthermore, 35% of start-ups were led by equal or near equal partnerships, including a small 
number of husband and wife partnerships.  15% of ventures were owned and managed by three or 
more entrepreneurs and 6% by four or more partners.  Within partnerships and larger teams, roles 
were distributed among the members.   
Interestingly, the general pattern was for serial entrepreneurs to keep the same form of ownership 
and control, individual or team, throughout their sequence of starts-up.  When there were two or 
more owner managers, 70% of start-ups retained either exactly the same or a very similar team.  
This finding it consistent with Gemmell, Boland and Kolb (2012) who found that the majority of 
habitual entrepreneurs worked with the same trusted partner in multiple start-up ventures.   
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The case studies show a more nuanced view of the use of different patterns of ownership.  Some 
entrepreneurs started with a partner and then bought out their share, maintaining the new pattern 
of sole ownership and control throughout their ensuing career (Cases, 2, 8, 15, 22).  A technology 
entrepreneur was continually unsuccessful, but remained committed to the same equal partner.  
After realising his partner’s shortcomings, commenting “I had an epiphany, I suddenly realised he 
wasn’t offering anything,” he dissolved the partnership, later finding success with a new partner.   
Partnerships stem from a variety of antecedents.  They could be siblings in a family business, friends 
who met when young at school or in the early stages of their career, through a mutual hobby, 
sharing accommodation, or other accidental social ties.  The cases suggest that the strength of the 
partnership is founded on mutual dependence, each possessing complementary but different 
knowledge and other resources.  In the most typical partnerships, two individuals would specialise in 
either the product development (the means) or in business development through marketing and 
sales (the ends).  Sole entrepreneurs acting without equity partners had with one exception 
specialist knowledge of both means and ends.  In the exception to this pattern (Case 11) the serial 
entrepreneur struggled to achieve success. 
From the small sample of portfolio builders (Cases 9, 13, 24) repeated patterns of behaviour are 
again in evidence. One starter of parallel ventures always formed a collective composed of small 
groups of equal partners.  Each venture had a different team composition but with some members 
in common. Whether intentional or not, in this way he built a complex web of shared interests that 
helped tie the portfolio of strongly related ventures together.  Teams do not suit all serial 
entrepreneurs; in one exceptional case (Case 1) the entrepreneur left or changed teams in nearly 
every venture, until finally starting out on his own.  In addition, if the founder had to work alongside 
managers put in place by VCs, or managers of the acquiring company, these arrangements also often 
had limited life spans (Cases 4, 7, 17). 
7.1.6 Summary and Key Findings  
1) The majority (80%) are expert entrepreneurs starting-up three or more businesses.   
2) The sample of 26 case studies is multi-industry, longitudinal and broadly representative of UK 
small business serial entrepreneurship for the period 1972-2014.    
3) There is not enough evidence in the sample to contribute to the generalist vs. specialist human 
capital debate.  The sample entrepreneurs were in general well educated and all made use of 
specific education. 
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4) The comparative numbers of ventures formed by individuals, compared with partnerships/small 
teams are similar.   
5) The stability of partnerships between ventures is consistent with the findings of Gemmell, Boland 
and Kolb (2012).   
7.2 Part 1.  Section 2.  Serial Entrepreneurship: Venture Exit and Outcome 
In this section, we look further into the entire sample using the lens of venture exit. The large 
sample of data is analysed using a pragmatic blend of positivist case study and interpretivist 
grounded theory.  Serial entrepreneurship is fundamentally different from novice and portfolio 
entrepreneurship due to its repeating pattern of entry, exit and re-entry to firm ownership and 
leadership.   
In this section analysis also contributes findings relevant to Theme 1. The entrepreneurial process 
does not end with start-up; it ends in exit (DeTienne, 2010).  Following Holmes and Schmitz (1990; 
1995), high ability entrepreneurs are expected to be observed starting high quality ventures that are 
likely to be innovative and acquired for high prices.  In addition, low quality firms will be shut down 
to pursue superior opportunities (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010).  The effects of outright failure are 
ambiguously treated in established economic theory, and following Jovanovic (1982), permanent 
exit from entrepreneurship is a very likely outcome. 
7.2.1 Serial Entrepreneurship: Exit and Re-entry - Unsuccessful Exits 
Research question 1.2 asks: How do future serial entrepreneurs transition from novice to serial 
entrepreneurs?  The serial founder entrepreneurs, at least in this study, did not plan to become 
serial entrepreneurs at the outset of their careers.  Serial entrepreneurship is an unplanned 
consequence of exiting the first novice venture.  
Of course, none foresaw at start-up the outcome as an unsuccessful exit – a closure or an outright 
failure with significant economic loss.  Nevertheless, a striking feature of this study is that overall the 
number of unsuccessful exits outweighs the number of successful exits by a ratio of 2:1 (Table 7.7). 
Even for successful careers failure of some form is a common experience.   
Research question 1.5 asks: Is venture failure normal, i.e. the ‘norm’?  On the basis of this evidence it 
is.  Furthermore, the general assumption that outright failure results in permanent exit is 
questioned.  In this study, serial entrepreneurs can experience several negative exits in a successful 
career.  
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As can be seen from Table 7.6 below only a minority of founders have escaped some form of 
unsuccessful exit in their careers so far.  The majority (80%) experienced some form of unsuccessful 
exit.  Close to half (46%) experienced more than one unsuccessful firm.   
 
Table 7.6 Frequency of Unsuccessful Exit Experience 
Research question 1.6 asks: Do serial entrepreneurs learn from failure? The answer must be yes.  
Because these careers also have successes, we can go further and also say yes in answer to question 
1.7; it is correct that cognitively intelligent serial entrepreneurs transfer learning of success and 
failure to the next venture.  
There is then prima facie evidence for a learning curve underpinning the development of the specific 
expertise of serial entrepreneurs.  The process of recovery and learning from failure is an 
underappreciated entrepreneurial talent by the standards of (Lucas, 1978) and (Jovanovic, 1982). 
This finding runs directly counter to the ‘success breeds success’ conceptualisation of serial 
entrepreneurship, and its static view of innate talent (e.g. Chen, 2013; Eesley and Roberts, 2012; 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2010).  It provides compelling evidence for theories of 
entrepreneurial learning, especially learning from failure (e.g. Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1995; 1999; 
Sarasvathy and Menon and Kuechle, 2013; Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).   
The aggregate view of the sample of the serial entrepreneurs’ ventures and their status or outcome 
at the time of the study is given in Table 7.7 below.  
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Table 7.7 Sample Start-Up Venture Outcomes 
Learning from Unsuccessful Ventures 
Table 7.7 shows that the majority, just over half (56%) of first ventures were unsuccessful.  Early 
ventures, particularly the first novice venture are most problematic for future serial entrepreneurs 
‘to be’.  This is to be expected as venture experience is least.  In second ventures while failure rates 
are the same as novice firms, more second businesses survive to continue as current going concerns, 
whose ultimate fate is yet to be decided.  There is then ceteris paribus evidence of learning from the 
first novice business.   
This raises the important supplementary qualitative question as to what serial entrepreneurs 
actually learn from unsuccessful and successful ventures.  This chapter provides a very detailed 
response to this question.   
In aggregate, third businesses are similar to second businesses in their outcomes with a third being 
unsuccessful.  This could be construed as indicating that learning flattens out.  However, when the 
career of each entrepreneur is inspected, the frequency of outright failure tends to reduce as a 
career unfolds, while the level of ambition is at least constant.  Qualitative patterns like this did not 
lend themselves to a clear statistical correlation (see Figure 7.3).  Career paths are very idiosyncratic, 
and the sample is of different careers at different stages with a low number of data points for longer 
careers.   Overall the evidence of a learning curve is not surprising.  It is entirely consistent with the 
characteristics of a sample of persistent, surviving and still active entrepreneurs.   
Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, (2014) find a declining then rising U shaped relationship between 
the venture sequence and venture performance, and postulate a lack of learning between the first 
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and second ventures.  Here, in this study, it is the first novice venture that is most likely to have an 
unsuccessful exit.  A possible reason is that the researchers decided to exclude similar businesses. 
They have been captured in this study as venture creation by internal replication, also labelled 
‘clones’ or ‘reboots’.  
Unsuccessful Exit Classification: Outright Failure vs. Managed Closure  
While 40% of start-up ventures ended in some form of unsuccessful exit, 25% of all start-ups were 
closed down in a managed way with either a manageable loss or at break-even.   This latter category 
could be equated to Saravathy’s (2001) construct of affordable loss.  15% were outright failures 
involving receivership (Cases 1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26), and for some personal 
bankruptcy.  Businesses closed down in a managed way lasted on average 3.6 years.  Failed 
businesses failed relatively quickly, on average 2.5 years from start-up.  These statistics are 
consistent with Holmes and Schmitz’s (1995) findings on failure and business age.  
Under-Reporting of Failed Business 
The number of failed businesses reported in the case studies may be less than the actual number in 
reality.  Failed ventures were often not mentioned until the end of the interview when rapport had 
been established (Cases 1, 4, 18, 19, 23).  International diversifications and new product related 
start-ups that ended in considerable losses were not reported initially as separate ventures.  In some 
cases the ventures had been scaled down and put on a “back burner” but not yet formally closed.  
Reasons for Unsuccessful Ventures  
A small number of failed ventures (2%) were abandoned by one serial entrepreneur (Case 1) giving 
up his shares to the remaining partners following several personal disputes.  This individual had 
small minority stakes compared to the other founding team members.  From the conversations 
about disputes and team members quitting, it is in the first or second ventures that serial 
entrepreneurs are on a steep learning curve about the dynamics of partnerships and teams.  Of all 
failed firms, a significant minority (32%) were caused by some form of fraudulent or dishonest 
behaviour by another partner or trusted employee (Cases 1, 4, 6).  It should be noted that exit due 
to fraud had a more negative effect on entrepreneurs than other more normal causes of failure.  
Entrepreneurs expressed a great deal of remorse at exposing themselves and their employees to this 
type of event.  One lamented, “It all closed down, ended up with a bloody mess.  I was technically 
the owner of the business at the time, but this didn’t do any good.”  
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As the detailed analysis reveals, closure or outright failure is associated with unrelated 
diversifications where the entrepreneur was disadvantaged, lacking prior knowledge and other 
relevant resources at start-up.  In 67% of failed and 60% of closed enterprises, the entrepreneur was 
missing at least one of Shane’s (2000) types of prior knowledge: markets, means to serve and 
customer solutions (see Table 7.9).  In other cases, the original opportunity or method of 
exploitation is fundamentally flawed.  Due to a lack of information and business acumen, for one 
serial entrepreneur (Case, 15) several separate start-ups were required before these flaws became 
apparent to the entrepreneur. 
International ventures were very prone to failure (Cases 18, 23).  One of the three portfolio 
entrepreneurs in the study (Case 13) was especially prone to starting unrelated ventures, 
encouraged or led by external third parties pursuing their own objectives.  This finding reflects prior 
research by Alsos and Carter (2006) and Iacobucci and Rosa (2004) where unrelated diversifications 
are attributed to government programmes.   
Other research suggests that most terminations are voluntary quits rather than involuntary 
bankruptcies with many firms still profitable at termination (e.g. Bates, 2005; Headd, 2003; Levie, 
Don and Leleux; 2010; Taylor, 1999).  However, in this sample of serial entrepreneurs, exits due to 
failure or closure were clear cut cases of financial infeasibility with little evidence for Rerup’s (2005) 
‘gray’ zone, except for business sold on to employees at book value when a new and superior 
opportunity was recognised.  Serial entrepreneurs are more clear-cut in their decisions to exit.   
Response to Failure  
All the entrepreneurs affected said that outright failure is always extremely stressful and damaging 
to self-confidence, often terminal to many social and business relationships and damaging to their 
reputation.  Two serial entrepreneurs disclosed that they had suffered severe mental health 
problems following failure.  Financial losses had a very negative impact on their standard of living, 
self-esteem and personal relationships, and were a financial barrier to starting again.  For example, 
“Most of the mates from the past, once they realised things weren’t going very well, they 
disappeared” (Case 1).  Nevertheless, all responded by simply starting another venture, often on 
shoestring budgets.   The study captured two cases of serial entrepreneurs who exited from 
entrepreneurship and returned to employment for a while to recover emotionally, socially and 
financially before returning again to found another venture (Cases 15, 16).  Failure can have positive 
aspects.  A lack of liquidity following failure can stimulate entrepreneurial instincts.  For example, “I 
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didn’t have the capital to go and buy vehicles, but at least if we did leasing, the leasing company paid 
the dealer, and then I would have a commission from the finance company” (Case 1). 
The effects of an outright failure are always serious. “It was personally and financially devastating”. 
“My first venture 15 years ago lost 90% of our start-up capital” (Case 20).  Despite complex factors 
surrounding a failure most took personal responsibility for the failure as the decision maker.  “There 
were clear external circumstances but I held myself responsible.  I knew it could have been a success 
if different decisions had been taken” (Case 3). 
Research question 1.6 asks: Do serial entrepreneurs learn from failure?  Serial entrepreneurs were 
unanimous about learning from failure.  In some cases very successful relationships between 
business partners were forged when an initial venture failed.  “We used it as a means to reduce the 
size of our founding team and to focus on a better, wider opportunity” (Case 20).  “It taught my co-
founder and I a lot about timing” (Case 26).  “When starting again I was determined to learn from 
the previous mistakes, and I did” (Case 3).  Many were able to reflect deeply upon it even several 
years after.  “I think acceptance is a good word that supports failure, and as I would say in my case 
that the causes of failure are generally a mixture of responsibilities, external, internal and not 
managing risks“ (Case 16).  “Certainly the more time that passes since the event the easier it is to 
see a business failure in its right context” (Case 26).  In one case external factors were critical; the 
government reversed policy and withdrew support to a fledgling renewable energy industry, a 
consequence of “Having too many eggs in the renewables basket” (Case 24).  This vital lesson 
learned would not be repeated in future.  
Learning from the critical event (Chell, 2004), especially outright failure appears not to be merely 
evolutionary or marginal, but causes transformational learning (e.g. Cope, 2011), a fundamental 
revision and revaluation of previously held information about practices, assumptions and theories.   
Response to Multiple Failures 
Cases of multiple failure of successive business are rarely found in the literature.  A contribution of 
this study is to explore the consequences of these sequences of ventures.   From this study, two 
consecutive closures or failures are likely to cause serial entrepreneurs to exit entrepreneurship 
temporarily for an extended period of at least one year to recover (Cases 15, 16).   
In one case study (15), a serial entrepreneur launched a third similar venture with some adaptations, 
only to fail yet again.  Severely affected, this individual exited entrepreneurship to complete a long 
postponed undergraduate degree.  Through retrospective analysis he realised that he and his 
partner lacked the necessary entrepreneurial ability/business acumen.  Each of the three iterations 
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was an attempt to find a market, replicating and adapting various components from venture to 
venture.   
Ultimately, the serial entrepreneur with a new partner capitalised on his hard won knowledge and 
technical skills in his fifth venture to start a highly successful international internet business in the 
same industry domain as the unsuccessful start-ups.  His experience would doubtless ‘knock-out’ 
many other individuals.  His passion for his chosen technology and his low need for income lowered 
his exit threshold (Gimeno, Cooper and Woo, 1997).  Therefore, some serial entrepreneurs e.g. 
technophiles, with a low need for financial returns and a high level of persistence can eventually 
learn business acumen.  
Implications for Entrepreneurial Learning   
A significant finding is that persistent career serial entrepreneurs learn from failure, and recover 
from the serious consequences of failure.   This study supports and adds to existing theory and 
evidence that failure is an important learning experience (e.g. Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1995; 1999; 
Sarasvathy and Menon and Kuechle, 2013; Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008).  All the persistent 
serial entrepreneurs in this study learned from closure and failure.   
Implications for Selection Theory: Recovering from Failure 
This study’s detection and examination of cases of multiple failures provides evidence for Plehn-
Dujowich’s (2010) extension to economic selection theory where serial entrepreneurs can return 
after an unsuccessful exit.  Theoretically, orderly shut-downs of unsuccessful ventures allow serial 
entrepreneurs to return practically immediately to entrepreneurship.  Therefore, in existing 
effectual theory, those serial entrepreneurs sustaining an ‘affordable’ loss (Sarasvathy, 2001) can 
return immediately.  However, this study shows that outright failure is not an orderly shutting down 
but often a disorderly, damaging and high cost process that is unaffordable.  In some instances 
(Cases 15,26) a return after one failure was facilitated by the finance providers (banks and angel 
investors) writing-off previous commitments including ‘unaffordable’ charges on the family home 
and providing further finance to pursue the same opportunity.  Furthermore, this study shows that it 
is possible to recover economically from repeated failures and closures by taking employment in a 
related area.  During this period serial entrepreneurs reflect upon the reasons for repeated failure 
and undergo transformational learning.  To return, they must use this period to overcome a 
comparative disadvantage in start-up costs and access to start-up capital arising from an 
unsuccessful exit.  
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The extension to selection and matching theory to include the process of recovery from failure and 
the phenomenon of ‘recoverable failure’ is illustrated below.  
 
Figure 7.2 Extension to Selection Theory: Recovery from Failure 
Unsuccessful Exit and the Re-entry Decision 
By definition, for a persistent serial founder entrepreneur, closure or failure is not an obstacle to 
starting again.  Over half (54%) of the entrepreneurs experienced at least one outright failure.  In 
two cases they failed in their first two businesses, yet still went on to start and develop high quality 
enterprises (Cases 1, 15).  It was postulated in the literature review that following the matching 
principal a closure or failure results from an economic mis-match between the entrepreneur and the 
opportunity.  Unsuitable opportunities should be abandoned as the entrepreneur seeks new 
ventures fitting her or his business acumen.  The analysis of re-entry decisions reveals a significant 
finding that after a negative exit a serial founder is more likely simply to try again with the same or a 
closely related opportunity.  This phenomenon is explained in much greater detail in the section on 
venture creation.   
7.2.2 Serial Entrepreneurship: Exit and Re-entry - Successful Exits 
Referring again to Table 7.7 and the 2:1 ratio of unsuccessful to successful, just 23% of all start-up 
ventures assessed were classified as successful exits.  Nevertheless, the great majority of the 
entrepreneurs studied were judged to be successful in earning a living much greater than in waged 
employment.   In addition, some serial founders had achieved great personal wealth (Cases 2, 4, 7, 
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11, 14, 17, 21, 23) principally by selling one or more innovative ventures.  Two start-ups grew to 
achieve listings on the main UK Stock Exchange (Cases 17, 21).  While the total proceeds from 
venture sales are not available, disclosed values sum to £165 million.  In the most financially 
successful case study of a start-up (Case 17), several years after the founding the serial entrepreneur 
had sold their remaining shares to VCs, the enterprise was listed at a total value of £1.5bn. 
As can be seen from Table 7.8, two-thirds of the sample of persistent multiple founders have 
achieved a successful exit.  In three cases (7, 21, 24) entrepreneurs achieved three or more 
successful exits.  From Table 7.7, despite the prevalence of failed novice ventures, 40% of first 
ventures are still exited successfully.  This outcome is maintained for second ventures when there 
are many more founded ventures that are still current.  Again, this supports the earlier conclusion 
that serial entrepreneurs learn from experience, both positive and negative.  
 
Table 7.8 Frequency of Successful Exit Experience 
The serial founder entrepreneurs in this study did not plan at start-up to ‘harvest’ and exit their 
venture by sale.  Positive exits occurred only when they were either approached by a buyer, or when 
they came across a superior opportunity and wanted to sell-on their current business.   
All those who achieved considerable personal wealth by selling their first novice business as going 
concerns, selling shares to attract investment or achieving an IPO, returned to create another 
business from scratch.  When reflecting on the ‘habitus’ of habitual entrepreneurship (Wright, 
Westhead, and Sohl, 1998) it appears that the challenge and stimulus of starting and developing a 
new enterprise persists even after achieving more than enough wealth with which to retire.  In one 
case (Case 4) both partners gave up the proceeds of a sale controlled through earn-out clauses to re-
start again as serial entrepreneurs.  Therefore, while the resource-based theory of the firm includes 
dynamic resource capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) they are difficult to secure from 
independent minded entrepreneurs.   
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Successful Exit Classification: Sale at Premium vs. Sale at Book Value 
Successful exits can be classified into two sub-categories a) sales of all or part of a high quality 
business at a clear premium to book value at a high multiple of earnings.  Such sales generate  
personal wealth and liquidity, and b) sales of a going concern at close to book value.  There are four 
instances of selling on a business at close to book value (Cases 16, 19, 24, 25).  Here established 
enterprises were sold to former employees, when the serial entrepreneur found a new more 
profitable opportunity.   
It should be notes that successful exits in this study did not conform strictly to Wennberg, Wiklund, 
DeTienne and Cardon’s (2010) taxonomy.  There was no sense of an intention to ‘harvest’ 
investments as approaches were made by third parties, and ‘liquidation’ was not used by high 
performing firms in the sample.  Selling a business on at book value to exploit a new opportunity is 
not a sign of distress. In addition, there are other cases that do not fit this taxonomy.  Raising VC 
funds is a type of sale where the entrepreneur stands to gain even more in the future.  Exiting 
entrepreneurs may not realise the true value of their firm.  The founding entrepreneur is gradually 
‘edged-out’ of a high quality business when VCs put in their own managers, and earn-out 
agreements breakdown for similar reasons (Cases 4, 7, 11, 17).  
Reasons for Successful Exits  
Successful high premium exits were not only in high growth often high technology sectors, such as IT 
and internet related, but also in fast food and professional services in new growth areas.  Whether 
serial entrepreneurs start innovative ventures or imitative ventures that jump on bandwagons or 
copy previous businesses is the subject of a separate theme and discussed in much more detail in 
this chapter.  
Learning from Success 
A key focus of this study is the repeated pattern of entry and exit that makes serial entrepreneurs 
unique.  Their particular learning from experience is a constant theme throughout the case analysis. 
In aggregate the thesis has already reported that success doesn’t always lead to success due to the 
prevalence of unsuccessful firms.  Like a business closure or outright failure a successful exit is also a 
critical event and is a source of transformational learning that is under-reported in the literature.   As 
will be demonstrated, successful serial entrepreneurs do learn from prior success by replicating and 
transferring previous behaviours to new start-ups.  They also learn about the process of successful 
exit and what it means for their careers.  
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The Exit Decision   
While not planning to sell, serial entrepreneurs appeared to rationalise the sale ex-post as a reward 
and vindication of their decision to start-up.  “I sold as I thought it was a good time to crystallise the 
company's value.  I wanted to take my winnings and leave the game, so to speak” (Case 26).    It (the 
exit) helps to crystallise your success.  “Most entrepreneurs are not driven by money, but the value 
that you create in a business is ultimately a measure of success and hence reputation” (Case 20).  An 
interpretation of this rationalisation is that while a sale is not planned or sought, the experience may 
encourage some serial entrepreneurs to start again but this time being open to the possibility of a 
sale.  
Some recognise that the decision to exit is not always the optimal financial decision and selling is a 
specialist and learned skill.  “The sensible entrepreneur is not too greedy.  If you wait for the mega-
bucks you may never sell” (Case 24).  “I would not wish to exit again unless it is a much bigger 
amount.  My counterparts who stayed on with the business post-acquisition made a great deal more 
money than I did” (Case 16).  “In my case selling my first business was a fluke and I needed to do it a 
second time to prove myself to myself” (Case 11).  We like the challenge.  We love the competition 
of beating the competition. We like the thrill of the exit” (Case 23). For some it’s the money but for 
most it’s a game” (Case 23). “After a period of R&R (rest and relaxation), I needed new projects/new 
stimulation.  So I did what I had experience of.”  “When you sell your business a huge hole opens up 
in your life, you have all this time and have no idea what to do with it.”  “We get bored and as 
entrepreneurs we are always looking for that new opportunity” (Case 11). 
Making a successful exit is something that is learned, and serial entrepreneurs can become more 
skilful when negotiating from a position of strength. “Selling a business is very complex and has its 
own terminology and rules that aren't obvious.  It is easier to sell a business second time because 
the process is familiar.  After your first exit it becomes less critical and less significant to get the deal 
over the line, so as a vendor you are inevitably more relaxed” (Case 23). 
Successful Exit and the Re-entry Decision  
Broadly consistent with the literature (e.g. Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008), for this sample of 
persistent entrepreneurs all successful exits were followed by re-entry to entrepreneurship, in most 
cases with interludes varying in length and the activities undertaken, where the enhanced liquidity 
from the exit provides a flexible resource to support the next cycle of entrepreneurial activity.  As 
postulated in the literature, successfully exiting entrepreneurs are subject to centrifugal legal and 
economic forces that require them to find new opportunities.  Contracts of sale were accompanied 
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by non-competition clauses and/or it didn’t make business sense to start a copy-cat venture in an 
effort to replicate a previous success (Cases 4, 11, 14 17, 22, 23).  
7.2.3 Evidence of a Learning Curve for Serial Founders 
The average age of successfully exited ventures is 10.5 years, reflecting their relative maturity and 
quality at the time of sale.  Once ventures have survived their initial years, the so-called ‘valley of 
death’, where the liabilities of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965) they have an increasing 
chance of surviving, gaining the potential for outright sale or further equity investment through a 
partial sale.  Overall the evidence is consistent with economic selection theory and the matching 
principle (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 1995; Plehn-Dujowich, 2010), that serial entrepreneurs will exit 
to seek better opportunities until one is found, and mature high quality ventures fetch the highest 
sales prices.   
Venture Outcome:  Venture Maturity and Start-Up Experience 
In an effort to reveal a learning effect for successful exits, the relationship between the outcome of 
each venture and the experience of the entrepreneur was plotted.  The quality of the enterprise was 
rated 1 to 10, where 1 is failure, 2 closure, 3 low employment and revenues, up to 10 which is an exit 
by sale at a significant premium over book value.  Experience is measured by adding the age of the 
business in years to the start-up experience of the entrepreneur.  This gives a scatterplot of business 
quality vs. maturity of the venture plus the experience of the serial entrepreneur given in Figure 7.3 
below.  Overall the combined age of the business and the serial entrepreneur’s previous experience 
of start-up had a positive correlation with successful outcomes. 
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Figure 7.3 Venture Quality vs. Age of Venture and Experience 
The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient statistic is 0.43386 giving a low positive 
correlation between the two variables.  It is indicative of a learning curve.  There are three clusters 
of interest.  Cluster a) shows that failed, closed and quitted ventures are short-lived and occur when 
entrepreneurs have less start-up experience.  Cluster b) is of middle ranking quality ventures 
associated with medium levels of combined age and experience.  Cluster c) is of the most successful 
exits, where these occur after a minimum period of time to grow. There is a sub-cluster of successful 
exits with medium level combinations of venture longevity and start-up experience.  This cluster 
suggests that the actual quality of the opportunity is also important.  In other words, a good quality 
opportunity, i.e. an innovative opportunity in a growth industry sector such as  CAD/CAM software 
(Case 16), on-line advertising rewards (Case 21), and internet retailing (Case 17) is more important 
than experience,  
7.2.4 Overall Career Ratio of Successes to Failures     
It is important to remember that despite the longitudinal nature of the study it is still a snapshot of 
career trajectories still in motion. Over a third (37%) of the ventures studied were continuing and 
their final status is not yet known.  Therefore, the overall ratio of negative and positive outcomes 
once a career has been completed may well be different from the 2:1 ratio for the sample.  To 
determine the total career ratio of positive ‘hits’ to negatives ‘misses’ the careers of these serial 
entrepreneurs would need to be followed to their retirement.   
Notwithstanding that the sample is a snapshot, it can be argued that while we do not know the 
aggregate career ratio of positive and negative outcomes, negative outcomes occur more frequently 
earlier in careers. The most long lived current venture was 36 years old.  The group of current 
ventures is just above the average age of all ventures with 12 ventures in this group older than the 
average age of a successful exit.  Furthermore, the data from this study is consistent with selection 
and matching theory (Holmes and Schmitz (1990; 1995) that predicts that once a venture reaches 
maturity it is unlikely to close down and even more unlikely to fail with financial losses.  Therefore, if 
the pattern in the study has some general validity, in two to three years’ time a number of these 
currently active enterprises will have transformed into successful exits improving the overall success 
ratio for serial founder entrepreneurs.  If all of the 37% of the currently active enterprises become 
successful exits the ratio is transformed into 2:3 in favour of successful firms.   
From the work of Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon (2010), it was inferred that in a 
relatively modern and dynamic sector of the economy the probability of continuation, success and 
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failure are all about equal.  The Swedish study is of a high growth sector that was neither in 
recession nor boom.  This study spans a number of industries and several economic cycles in the UK, 
including the dotcom boom and bust, and the financial crisis with its after effects.  Therefore, with 
further follow-up research of this sample it could provide an answer to questions concerning the 
overall success rate of serial entrepreneurs.  Of course, an appropriate method will need to be 
devised, as a number of ventures may be passed on to family members and escape a market test of 
their value.  This could prove a superior method or complement those used in other performance 
studies (e.g. Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014). If there is a learning curve for persistent and 
ultimately successful serial entrepreneurs we would expect economic returns to outweigh losses 
with most  (though not all) failures occurring early in careers.   
7.2.5 Summary and Key Findings 
1.  No entrepreneur in this study said that they set out to become a serial entrepreneur by planning 
to sell their first venture and start-up again.   
2.  Unsuccessful ventures with a negative exit are endemic to serial entrepreneurship.  80% of the 
entrepreneurs experienced some form of unsuccessful exit.  As 80% also meet the 'expert' criteria, it 
could be said that a serial entrepreneur starting three or more ventures is very likely to experience 
at least one business closure or outright failure with losses.  Nevertheless, persistent serial 
entrepreneurs are able to recover from a negative venture experience.   
3. Negative exits occur most frequently in the first novice venture.  This can be expected as 
experience is lacking.  After the first venture the reduced frequency of negative outcomes is 
evidence for learning, though the pattern remains idiosyncratic.   
4. Unsuccessful exits were clear cut, not ‘gray’ (Rerup, 2006) or marginal decisions.  The 
entrepreneurs described these as negative experiences.  Outright failures are not ‘affordable’ 
(Sarasvathy, 2001).  Two successive negative exits in this study are followed by a break from 
entrepreneurship and a period to recover.  
5. The serious consequences of losses lead to valuable transformational learning (e.g. Cope, 2011).   
6. Exits (successful and unsuccessful) should be added to measures of entrepreneurial human capital 
and also of venture performance to improve research techniques.  Managing an exit is a form of 
entrepreneurial capital that is learned.  
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7. Evidence supports and tempers aspects of an emerging theory of serial entrepreneurship. Failures 
do outweigh successes for serial entrepreneurs, but in the early phase of a career.  The postulate of 
the transfer/spill-over of learning of both success and failure to subsequent ventures is confirmed.   
8. However, this learning and transfer is highly idiosyncratic because it is contingent on the 
judgement and decisions of the individual entrepreneur in relation to opportunity selection and 
implementation.    
9. The evidence supports the current theory of the economic selection and matching process.  
However, the theory of selection requires an extension to include a period of recovery where 
persistent serial entrepreneurs recover from the negative effects of several negative exits occurring 
in sequence.   
10. The process of recovery and learning from is failure runs directly counter to the ‘success breeds 
success’ conceptualisation of serial entrepreneurship, and its static view of innate talent.  
11. One negative exit is recoverable especially if financiers facilitate an immediate return through 
debt relief and fresh finance.   
12. There is no support for other evidence that second ventures are more problematic, though it 
should be noted that this thesis is not strictly comparable with quantitative venture performance 
research.   
13. The age of a venture is indicative of its quality and age combined with start-up experience is 
positively associated with venture outcome.  
14. Post-sale it is difficult for some successful serial entrepreneurs to see out earn-out clauses.  They 
prefer to start another venture than stay as an employee, even if it means forgoing proceeds of the 
sale.   The resource-based theory of the firm with dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997) should not assume that they can be acquired by purchase of an entrepreneurial firm.   
7.3 Part 2.  Section 1. Serial Entrepreneurship: Venture Creation  
Having examined the whole sample from the perspective of exits, the analysis now focusses on 
venture creation.  In part 2, the principal research question is addressed directly using constant 
comparison of cases (entrepreneurs) and sub-cases (founded ventures).  Ventures are classified into 
common modes or means of founding.   A  longitudinal perspective is taken starting with the origins 
of the first novice venture, then the second venture, third, fourth, fifth etc.  The findings contribute 
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to all four of the principal exploratory research themes of this study.  The modes of founding provide 
insights in the what, how, when and why of serial entrepreneurship. 
7.3.1 Origins of First Venture Start-Up   
Research Question 1.1 asks:  How do future serial entrepreneurs become entrepreneurs?  The 
qualitative analysis of the relationships between a serial entrepreneur’s first and nth venture begins 
with an examination of the origins of the first (novice) business.   
7.3.2 Modes of Founding: Transition to Novice Entrepreneurship 
A mode of founding is a new construct induced from the analysis.  It is inspired by the work on 
typologies by Low and Abrahamson (1997) and Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne (2005).  
The majority of the alternative modes of venture creation and entry into entrepreneurship for 
novices who later go on to create careers as serial entrepreneurs are strongly related to prior 
employment.  Novice ventures are incubated by employers or have their origins in other relevant 
prior experience.  Alternatively, employees are recruited into entrepreneurship by other lead 
entrepreneurs.  Other first ventures are replications of existing incumbent businesses or are 
innovations.  Interestingly, innovative first ventures may or may not draw upon prior experience, 
providing some support for Aldrich and Reuf’s (2006) emphasis on novices as the primary source of 
innovative enterprises.   
Figure 7.4 provides a summary listing of each novice mode of new venture founding.  The nature and 
origins of each mode are explained in detail. 
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Figure 7.4 Modes of Founding: Transition to Novice Entrepreneurship 
7.3.3 1. Incubation of Entrepreneurs in Employment  
A clear majority of serial entrepreneurs founding firms did so following a career in salaried 
employment.  Employers and employment incubate (Cooper, 1985) first ventures.  Of those 
employed, most (70%) started a first business that was related to their employment experience.  
None of the first start-ups in this study were direct transfers or ‘spin outs’ of technology from an 
employer.  They were conscious copies of the employer’s business or replications of key aspects of 
their employer’s enterprise.  Employers unwittingly incubate future serial entrepreneurs.  Nascent 
entrepreneurs deliberately used employment to learn how to start a similar if not identical venture.   
In all these cases the nascent entrepreneur, very often with a clear plan, learned how to move up 
the value chain from waged employment to founding their own business by learning from an 
incumbent ‘host’. 
Incubation as Employees  
- Replicate Employer’s Business 
Of those motivated to become entrepreneurs from an early age, four made a clear plan to learn 
about starting their own business through employment (Cases 6, 8, 11, 18, 26).  They all make very 
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similar statements about learning and the benefits of “making mistakes on someone else’s payroll”.  
They used employment to learn about their own strengths and weaknesses.  One talked about 
developing the confidence to go it alone because, “In small business you get to learn most of the 
functions in the business” Case 11).  They learned which products and services could be sold 
profitably and how to organise resources through an effective business model.  Most developed 
lasting social capital including ties to future customers and suppliers, taking one or two of their 
employer’s customers, suppliers and employees with them, despite the contract of employment 
having specific clauses designed to stop these resource transfers.  It is clear that this is replication 
(e.g. Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne, 2005) but from the inside.  It is a conscious, mindful, step by 
step process of active learning by doing.  Replication as a construct is similar to Low and 
Abrahamson’s (1997) cloning.  However, as will be shown in other cases true cloning should be 
restricted to another type or mode of start-up strategy that occurs in second ventures. 
Incubation as Employees 
- Replicate Own Job as Self-Employment  
A common form of incubation is to move from employed to self-employed contractor status as a 
transition stage to founding a new firm.  The case studies detail a number of instances of transitional 
periods of self-employment in roles virtually identical to those held before in waged employment 
(Cases 6, 11, 19). Redundancy pushed one unwilling and unprepared individual into self-employment 
and then starting his own company.  He said “I got made redundant from XYZ industry. I went back 
to the MD of a previous company and rather than being employed I went back as a self-employed 
contractor.  That kind of really sparked in my mind at that point, when my back was against the wall 
because I had no other options, and so I first thought about starting my own company“ (Case 19).  
Other future serial entrepreneurs knowingly took the interim step of self-employment before 
launching a new enterprise.  One possessed highly valued skills developed in the public sector that 
were the basis of self-employment in the private sector.  Some planned transitions involved small 
trial businesses.  Though sometimes tangential to the first significant start-up, e.g. selling spare parts 
or second hand computers, they provide relatively safe and low risk learning opportunities to build 
new skills and accumulate funds.  One individual was an IT contractor while searching for the right 
opportunity, “I worked in a wide range of big, medium sized and small companies, learning different 
things each time” (Case 11). Self-employment positioned individuals closer to their source of start-
up opportunity, facilitated the accumulation of financial resources and gave time for searching, 
planning and developing the maiden start-up enterprise.   
185 
 
Incubation as Employees 
- Transfer Unique Skills  
In some cases, the link between the new entrepreneur’s start-up and previous employment appears 
tenuous.  On closer examination, very unique skills are being incubated in employment that are used 
to recognise and realise opportunities in other industries.  One serial entrepreneur (Case 14) 
occupied a unique position to acquire private and specific information on opportunities to integrate 
disparate technologies.  He related “I was the first person to get a word processor, the first to get a 
desktop computer, probably in the whole of the UK.  We were the first to do on-line insurance 
broking but using telex machines, the first to connect radios in vans to mainframes computers, a 
kind of early form of mobile computer.  So we did a lot of leading edge stuff.”  His subject knowledge 
was supported by extensive experience of large scale system integration.  The relevant prior 
knowledge could only have been acquired in employment in that particular time and place, and the 
new firm exploited an opportunity in a new industry that few, if any, had the knowledge to both 
recognise and exploit.  
Incubation as Employees 
- Transfer Specialist Skills 
In one of the case study exceptions (Case 12), the serial acquirer and founder entrepreneur, an 
accountant with specialist knowledge and experience in company bankruptcy and receivership, 
developed a conceptual model and a set of criteria (cognitive template) to search for suitable 
acquisition targets.  The model was an amalgam of knowledge learned in professional education and 
from learning from doing.  The accountant also utilised social capital in the form of strong ties to 
deploy leveraged finance expertise to overcome liquidity constraints to the purchase his ideal 
business.   
This case of a career involving both acquisitions and start-ups reveals that acquirers and venture 
founders are attracted to different types of opportunity.  The acquisition of an existing revenue 
stream was made on the basis of the degree of fit between available firms and prior knowledge. 
Prior learned knowledge was condensed into a theory (Casson, 1982), and used a cognitive heuristic 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and exemplar template (Baron, 2006) to facilitate reasoning by 
analogy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  The entrepreneur described how to filter target firms to find those 
who could be swiftly reorganised to generate more profit.   The serial acquirer said “It didn’t really 
matter what the product was, but what was behind the business”.  This is in contrast to novice 
(future serial founder) entrepreneurs who most often founded businesses similar in products, 
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customers, industries etc., to those they already knew.  This shows that a more nuanced fine grained 
approach to the study of habitual entrepreneurship can distinguish more clearly between different 
types of behaviour.  
Incubation as Employees 
- Indirect Transfer via Recruitment to Entrepreneurship (Specialist Skills)  
In several cases (1, 4, 16) future serial entrepreneurs were recruited into their first start-up team for 
their specialist skills by a lead entrepreneur.  For example, “I was the only person that he knew that 
knew anything about computers at all.”  These ‘apprentice’ entrepreneurs later took on the role of 
lead entrepreneur in subsequent serial careers.  Being part of the lead entrepreneur’s social network 
meant that private and detailed information about their experience was available at relatively low 
cost.  Future serial entrepreneurs recruited to the start-up team invariably fulfilled an important role 
in marketing and sales or operational management.  In return they were rewarded with a minority 
share in the new enterprise.  
Rosa (1998) detected non-entrepreneurial habitual founders, whose success arose from being 
attached to a partner who was the true driving entrepreneur.  It is very difficult to judge 
retrospectively if these individuals already had innate entrepreneurial talents or only subsequently 
learned them from actual experience of start-up; and this could be the subject for further research.  
For example, in some cases, it wasn’t always clear who discovered the opportunity and who was 
responsible for developing it.  Most recruits who became serial entrepreneurs in their own right had 
senior sales backgrounds and therefore had proven talent in identifying and exploiting revenue 
streams.  Others recruited for operational roles also transitioned to lead entrepreneur.  All had 
relevant industry and management experience.  A serial entrepreneur described the recruitment 
process. “A (the lead entrepreneur) had just won a large account and they wanted to launch a sales 
force in the UK.  Why don’t you come and join me and set that up?  A asked me.  So that is how I got 
into ABC business.” “And as the business grew, I ended up owning 10% of it, B ended up owning 25% 
of it, and A ended up owning the rest (Case 4).  One serial entrepreneur said, “I don’t really know 
how I got involved, but I hated accountancy.” “This person was a friend of a friend, so it was just a 
pure coincidence“ (Case 1). 
Not all individuals recruited in this way do go on to become lead entrepreneurs.  Partners who filled 
very specialist technical roles used to develop new products invariably stayed as partners to the lead 
entrepreneur in subsequent ventures (Case 2, 20).  This suggests that human capital studies should 
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include specific task and context functional roles in their analyses recommended by some 
researchers (e.g. Unger, Rauch, Frese and Rosenbusch, 2011). 
Incubation as Supplier  
- Replicate Customer’s Business  
Contractors as suppliers of labour services are very similar to employees, but have a more arms-
length relationship.  Suppliers of other goods and services can also learn to start a very similar 
business to those of their customers and move up the industry value chain.  
Two brothers employed in small firms supplying specialist services to the same industry started their 
own company simply by replicating their customer’s business (Case 7).  They realised that it was 
completely undifferentiated, commenting that “It would not raise money on Dragon’s Den.”  
However, starting up moved them from waged employment to business owners in the industry they 
knew very well.   
Similarly, a semi-skilled building labourer employed on a short-term day wage basis launched a first 
venture two steps up the value chain by buying and renovating residential property (Case 10).  In the 
process he acquired specialist knowledge in mortgage backed bank finance to leverage his start-up.  
This knowledge and skill proved vital to the development of subsequent related ventures.    
In another case, a father brought home an imported machine tool he had difficulty selling that 
stimulated a new innovative opportunity (Case 13).  His son, with no knowledge of engineering, 
combined his father’s knowledge with experience gained from starting several small businesses in 
his youth, to reengineer the machine tool and target new customer needs.  He recounted, “One mad 
weekend in my final year at university I mocked up a tool to sell for £100 each.  I went to (one of my 
father’s customers) and came away with an order for 500.”  With further help from his father to 
secure successful trials of the prototype, the son started his own machine tool business supplying 
the exact same customers as his father’s employer.    
Incubation as Customers  
- Replicate Supplier’s Business  
Two employees responsible for sales in a completely new industry noticed that there was a gap in 
the market (Case 2).  The new industry was not being provided with specialist advertising and other 
marketing services.  As the serial entrepreneur recounted, “My entry into entrepreneurship started 
with a friend and I.  I was 25 years old.  We wanted to set up our own business basically doing 
188 
 
advertising for technology companies.  It was our vision.  We both came from a technology 
background; we worked in the same company, which was a quite entrepreneurial organisation.”  
Despite being informed consumers of such services (ends) they still needed to acquire (replicate) 
knowledge of the means.  Completing this side of the equation was achieved by making a joint 
venture with an established advertising agency.  The joint venture served as an accelerated form of 
incubation, providing the missing knowledge, skills and experience.  The novice entrepreneurs 
rapidly acquired specific entrepreneurial capital and when a dispute occurred they dissolved the 
joint venture and formed their own firm.  In a two-step process they moved up the value chain from 
informed consumers to sole suppliers to a completely new market segment.      
7.3.4 2. External Incubation/Replication   
- Incubate Unique or Specialist Skills (Vocational and Personal Interests) 
Similar to employees who gain access to privileged information from their employers, novice 
entrepreneurs can follow their deep knowledge and passion for a particular subject, such as dance, 
photography and music pursued by entrepreneurs in this study (Cases 9, 15, 25).  While other 
individuals pursue vocational or other special interests by seeking employment, these started their 
own businesses. One such entrepreneur said, “I set up a dance school in a church hall.  That was the 
beginnings of me having a business.  I didn’t have enough money to start a business.  I didn’t have 
any financial support, except from my mother.  Right from the beginning I could only do what I could 
afford to do.  So wanting to be able to sleep at night I was very resistant to borrowing money” (Case 
25). 
These novice entrepreneurs were not motivated by monetary rewards, but by a desire to serve a 
distinct community of similarly passionate consumers.  In their first start-up they also replicated 
familiar existing business forms, such as specialist publications, education classes, and community 
events.  They all later founded substantial and profitable ventures and often innovative ventures 
that retained the original social dimension to their first ventures. 
- External Replication of an Existing Business  
Existing organisations can spawn new ventures by being copied from the outside, externally, 
because the nascent entrepreneur does not enjoy the advantage of being an employee or possess 
other inside knowledge.  These individuals had a clear plan to become entrepreneurs and searched 
for a suitable opportunity in the shape of an existing business (Cases 3, 23).  For example, one serial 
entrepreneur said, “My aim is to become the next McDonald’s, with thousands of stores.  That was 
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the intention. So I looked around surveying London for suitable ideas.”  From another case, “ I was 
analysing the market, seeing what I could do, and we were being bombarded by mail order 
advertising catalogues from A and B who were new start-ups at that time.”   
The entrepreneurs picked attractive sectors and researched selected incumbents to provide a 
business template of means, ends, means to serve/business model, and then designed their own 
competing version.  In one case, in order to gain access to specific information, the entrepreneur’s 
friend took employment with an incumbent to learn the details of its business operation.  An 
incumbent’s business model is more likely to be copied if it is semi-transparent and information is in 
the public domain or can be systematically researched at low cost.  Nevertheless, external 
replication can often be an unsuccessful mode of entry strategy for a start-up, should the novice gain 
only a partial knowledge of the detailed procedures needed to operate and manage the business 
successfully.  Unlike incubated employees who replicated their employer’s venture, these were 
replications with some differences or adaptations.  Here novice entrepreneurs did not want to 
compete head-on, so they target a closely related market segment.  Therefore, the start-up is 
effectively a diversification of an existing business form, made by copying the underlying business 
model.  These entrepreneurs sought to bring something different to the sector, though always 
derived from existing possibilities.  They were much more prepared than some incubated start-ups 
to modify their approach and abandon less viable ideas.  They also brought innovations to the 
industry in the form of new products and operational forms, stimulated by the lack of resources and 
the need to ‘bootstrap’ the start-up and growth phases.  
Replication as an Entry Mode 
All serial entrepreneurs who replicated existing businesses defended their strategy on the basis of 
risk and return.  They said they knew before launch that there was customer demand for their new 
offer.  Prices were available and costs could be estimated.  Relevant commercial information was 
available at low cost through the industry ‘ecosystem’ of trade shows, business press, industry 
awards and the like.  “At the time you couldn’t look on-line.  There was no such thing, but we 
discovered that there were such things as trade shows, and so we went to trade shows.  We looked 
in the Yellow Pages, we did what you would call classic old fashioned market research” (Case 3).  
They found it reassuring that their competitors’ suppliers also supplied them. Suppliers encouraged 
new entrants and shared commercial information.  While very confident of their own abilities these 
‘diversifying replicators’ could rely on continued learning from other sector participants.  
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7.3.5 3. Innovate New Business 
- Innovate New Supply 
- Innovate New Demand  
- Innovate New Demand and Supply 
A significant proportion (27%) of first ventures founded by this sample of serial entrepreneurs could 
be described as highly creative, inventive, innovative or even frame-breaking when at the start or 
early stages of new industries (Table 7.12).  One of these first ventures started a family of internet 
enterprises to whom companies such as Uber and Airbnb can trace their parentage (Case 17).  
There is some evidence that first time novice entrepreneurs are more likely to conceive frame-
breaking opportunities (Kirzner, 1985) if their idea for a business was not incubated directly from 
employment (Cases 1, 17, 20, 21).  Incubation is associated with replication.  Most often the novice 
entrepreneur discovered a new customer problem and their innovation arose from designing a new 
solution.  In one case the nascent entrepreneurs realised from their own experience as a customer 
the difficulty of ordering fast food (Case 17).  Opportunities arose from within the general domain of 
the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge in response to price signals, a phenomenon described by other 
serial entrepreneurs as alertness in their peripheral vision.  For example, a novice venture was a 
response to the rising cost of office space in the financial district of the City of London in the 1970s, 
addressed by new means of moving document and later computer tape storage to the then largely 
derelict London Docklands area (Case 1).    
This finding provides a weak corroboration of the view of some evolutionists (e.g. Aldrich and Ruef, 
2006) that novice entrepreneurs are more likely to introduce innovative opportunities.   The finding 
is weak because overall innovative ventures occur at a roughly constant rate of approximately half 
(47%) of all start-ups researched.  Moreover, if anything it is contracted by the ratio of genuinely 
innovative start-ups increasing with experience (Table 7.12). 
7.3.6 Summary and Key Findings 
1. The novice modes of business start-up can be summarised in three super-types: Incubation in 
Employment, External Incubation, External Replication, Innovate New Business.    
2. Most novice start-ups are imitative in nature.  Many are incubated unknowingly by employers. 
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3. Imitative ventures are an economical low risk means to change status from employed to 
employer.   
4. Novices also found very innovative businesses especially those not related to employment.  
5. Some future serial entrepreneurs are recruited into their first venture as minority partners.   
6. Novice founders can be distinguished from novice acquirers.  Acquirers can use pre-learned 
theories, that employ cognitive heuristics and exemplar templates find target firms.   
7.4 Part 2. Section 2. The Next Venture – Transition to Serial Entrepreneurship   
The transition paths and ‘rites of passage’ from novice to habitual entrepreneurship are of interest 
to researchers (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright and Flores, 2010).  Exiting the first venture and 
creating the second venture is the first iteration of the exit and re-entry cycle of serial 
entrepreneurship.  The post-conditions of exit are likely to determine to a large extent the pre-
conditions for the next venture.  However, in this study this is not an entirely contiguous or 
continuous cycle.  Some serial entrepreneurs pause after exiting their first venture and what they do 
in the interlude has a bearing on the why, when and how of the next venture.  
Research question 1.2 asks: How do future serial entrepreneurs transition from novice (one time) 
entrepreneurs to serial entrepreneurs?  While research questions 1.3 and 1.4 ask:  What is the 
impact of failure and success on venture selection respectively.  In other words, how the outcome of 
one business affects the how, why and when of the next venture.  
7.4.1 Modes of Founding: Transition to Serial Entrepreneurship 
The alternative modes of second venture creation that transition novices to serial entrepreneurship 
are listed in Figure 7.5 below.  The evidence for each mode is set out in detail.  
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Figure 7.5 Modes of Founding: Transition to Serial Entrepreneurship 
7.4.2 1. Internal Replication  
- Cloning 
Clones of the first (novice) venture were a small but significant proportion (15%) of all second start-
ups.  Many novice entrepreneurs become serial entrepreneurs, usually unexpectedly by making an 
emergency copy or ‘clone’ using the blueprint/exemplar template (Baron, 2006) and many of the 
resources of their first business (Cases 1, 2, 4, 19)  This process was described by one serial 
entrepreneur as “rebooting”.  The first business can fail outright and is insolvent.  In most cases 
there were disputes and unethical behaviour and legally the firm was wound-up.  However, the 
opportunity and the combination of resources in the previous firm used to exploit it were not 
exhausted.   
In these cases, the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team, occasionally with the assistance of key 
employees, use their prior specific and largely private knowledge to replicate the previous business.  
With cloning, the entrepreneur already possesses the detailed exemplar template and access to 
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most of the necessary resources.  The entrepreneurs in this study aimed to recreate the previous 
business from the blueprint as soon as practicable in order to keep going in business.  “Yeah, we 
carried on with the same old formula of very strong branding, lots of adverts, the 50% of turnover 
spent on advertising and marketing, big ads in the trade press, etc.” (Case 4).  
Cloning of the first venture occurs most frequently when the previous business came to an 
unplanned, unexpected and often abrupt end.  Most commonly there was an unresolvable dispute 
within the original entrepreneurial team, and one of them suddenly leaves, often taking resources 
with them precipitating a lengthy legal dispute.  The denuded team has to reorganise to save the 
rent generating capacity of the venture.  The newly serial entrepreneur acts entrepreneurially to 
replace those elements provided by the former partner(s).  These cases could be classified as closing 
for technical reasons (Stokes and Blackburn, 2002) or closing voluntarily (Levie, Don, and Leleux 
(2010). Nevertheless, the entrepreneurs described these as negative experiences and faced the costs 
of starting again, sometimes alone (Case 1).   
One related the background circumstances at the time, “Costs were high and the recession was 
beginning to bite. X folded the business, and took all the cash to Australia because X was able to 
empty the company bank account.  X was struck off as a director in the UK but that didn’t help us” 
(Case 4).  
Similarly, cloning also occurs when there is a break-down of a joint venture.  It can be due to a 
difference in goals, for example, “They weren’t willing to give us any more equity in the larger group 
so I said to my partner come on let’s go on our own.  He didn’t want to.  They tried to divide and 
conquer and eventually he said ‘right let’s do it, let’s leave’. We walked out and set up across the 
road and took one client with us” (Case 2). 
It can be due to a break-down in trust and other personal disputes.   Another then soon to be serial 
entrepreneur in response to a question on what happened to a successful venture replied, “I fell out 
with the people who put the money up.  I left and set-up on my own” (Case 1).  A similar situation 
occurred in another start-up. “He just couldn’t tell you the truth all the time.  In fact, he never told 
the truth, he was a bloody nightmare” (Case 1).   
Legally the business is closed (an unsuccessful exit) and the assets cannot be liquidated in a way that 
reflects their true value.  Nevertheless, the business was economically viable, the opportunity 
remains to be fully exploited and the detailed method for exploitation is known tacitly by the new 
lead entrepreneur.  The new lead entrepreneur re-starts the previous venture to continue in 
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business. Clones were very often a springboard for previously more junior members of the 
entrepreneurial team to take on more responsibility and learn new skills.    
Cloning activities include:  setting up a new legal entity, contacting customers to maintain continuity 
of the business relationship when legal contracts are in a kind of legal limbo, moving to a new 
premises very often nearby, rehiring staff, setting up new bank accounts and lines of credit, and 
replacing the skills of the ex-partners and other employees and service suppliers whose loyalties lie 
with the other individual or joint venture firm.  The case studies illustrate how disputes may spawn 
direct and aggressive competitors.   
The process of cloning is time consuming, expensive and often imperfect, negating some of the 
efficiency and effectiveness gains of lessons learned from experience.  The imperfections in the 
cloning process can lead to both favourable and unfavourable adaptations.  These include 
economising and moving to low-cost but also more effective premises.  In one example (Case 4) the 
second version of an enterprise moved to a large rent free building in a prominent location where a 
huge advertising banner for the new business could be displayed at very low cost, demonstrating 
creative thinking.  In another (Case 1), the relatively inexperienced entrepreneur set up a clone in a 
slightly different location that was too far from his previous customers and labour force.  This newly 
serial entrepreneur was unable to replicate the strengths of the sales force in the previous business 
or the level of initial capitalisation, and consequently the venture quickly failed.  
Cloning at this early or ‘immature’ novice phase in the career of a serial entrepreneur appears to be 
a side effect of partnering, where the novice entrepreneur may have been recruited into 
entrepreneurship and have a smaller stake and less influence.  New teams may be more prone to 
dysfunctional turnover due to bad relationships and loss of interest (e.g. Chandler, Honig and 
Wiklund, 2005; Francis and Sandberg, 2000).  Nevertheless, becoming a serial entrepreneur 
unexpectedly through cloning teaches the entrepreneur resilience and how to start a business very 
quickly in difficult, complex and uncertain circumstances.  Failure has a longstanding place in respect 
of entrepreneurial learning and decision making (e.g. McGrath, 1999; Politis and Gabrielsson, 2007).  
The unexpected failure is a critical event (Chell, 2004), a discontinuity that triggers ‘transformational 
learning’ (Cope, 2003; 2005; 2011) and plays a significant role in the formation of entrepreneurial 
capital or expertise.  Cloning in this context provides structured learning by doing following a proven 
exemplar template in the practicalities of starting a business using a known business model to 
address a known opportunity.  
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- Adaptation  
An unsuccessful first venture can be followed by replication and a thoughtful (mindful) and 
considered adaptation of the first start-up (Cases 6, 8, 26).  The first step in the adaptation is dealing 
with failure, even if it was due to circumstances beyond their control.  As Case 6 relates:  
“Yes, but I personally blame myself because you look at yourself in a mirror, and say what could I 
have done to avoid that.  As an entrepreneur you get smacked in the face and you spend a few days 
or weeks feeling sorry for yourself, but there is only one way to go in life and that is upwards.  And it 
was during that time that I invented the business model and that is where I am with the second 
business.” 
Here, unlike cloning, the firm did not close unexpectedly for non-business reasons, but analogous to 
cloning, the opportunity is also not exhausted.  The outright failure or closure of the first venture has 
exposed flaws in the business model (George and Bock, 2011) that can be addressed by an overhaul 
and modification of the means to serve (Shane, 2000), or a more fundamental change to the 
business model that arises directly as a result of learning from failure.  Having demonstrated 
learning in the first iteration, they are able to obtain support for the next version.  As one 
entrepreneur related, “In Britain, failure is a dirty word.  But actually, quite a lot of people are 
beyond that now, and they saw me as quite an attractive proposition because they believed in the 
(new) business model, and they thought that I was a sensible chap.  And therefore they did not look 
negatively at my first experience, that I was cavalier or out of control as a lot of entrepreneurs are, 
they actually saw it as an opportunity” (Case 26). 
Having founded essentially the same business before, entrepreneurs are able to repeat the start-up 
process but adapted with the benefit of hindsight.  In general, having to ‘bootstrap’ from a low 
resource base following failure encourages new ways of combining resources efficiently, but learning 
also generates very specific fixes.  For example, the lack of information needed to make critical 
decisions concerning profit margins that contributed to the failure was addressed by using new 
decision support software in the adapted start-up.  “We didn’t really know what margin we needed, 
we didn’t know about margin then.  We thought if we made a few quid on the sale of something that 
was great, but pretty quickly you learn that you need to make a 50% margin or a 60% margin if you 
are going to have a sustainable business” (Case 3).  A failed novice entrepreneur recognised that 
while customer needs and products had not changed, changing conditions in the industry had 
precipitated the failure.  He noticed the contradiction not in the means-ends but means to serve, 
“Therefore you fight on one hand to deliver the most exceptional product and price proposition but 
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you were fighting in a channel that was dying.”  Posting product catalogues had become expensive, 
ineffective and therefore wasteful.  Reflecting on the failure, this entrepreneur demonstrated 
alertness to the development of ecommerce and on-line retailing.  Not first to use the internet, the 
entrepreneur was able to take advantage of new low cost software tools to ‘bootstrap’ a new on-line 
retailing web site.  The use of low cost software was an entrepreneurial skill learned in the first 
venture to design and print catalogues on a meagre budget.  The failed novice also noticed that the 
first generation of on-line entrepreneurs did not have the relevant retail experience to succeed 
where he had failed.  He capitalised on the learning from these experiments by internet pioneers by 
combining it with prior knowledge he said “He had learned the hard way”.  The second venture 
became the industry first mover to entirely replace paper catalogues with web pages and 
ecommerce.  
Most of the previous business model was revisited and adapted inclusive of the supply chain.  One of 
the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic search routines was to trace the suppliers of similar products.  
Noticing that the US was supplied by Chinese textile manufacturers, he saw the opportunity to 
significantly improve his margins the second time around.  Being one of the first UK retailers to 
import directly from Chinese manufacturers, the long established oligopolistic market organisation 
of UK manufacturers and distributors was circumvented.  This case study demonstrates 
unequivocally a clear process of adapting and building upon deep prior knowledge, so as to undo the 
mistakes of the past and forge new sources of competitive advantage.  It is one example of how a 
series of evolutionary changes, many stimulated by business failure, coalesce into a revolutionary 
change.   Learning from failure or success does ‘infect’ the next venture (Sarasvathy and Menon and 
Kuechle, 2013,) revising previously ineffective practices, highlighting mistakes and augmenting skills 
and knowledge about the entrepreneurial process (Cope, 2011).  Moreover, replication and 
adaptation invoke another structured learning opportunity through a repeat of the start-up process 
using prior knowledge to focus on key entrepreneurial qualities such as alertness and search.  
From reflecting on failing the first time, one entrepreneur realised that in his first incarnation he had 
replicated the aggressive culture toward staff and clients of his previous employer.  This culture had 
worked against them during a sharp economic downturn.  In the adapted version they cultivated a 
novel co-operative culture that was so successful that it became an exemplar template (Baron, 2006) 
for subsequent start-ups.  The entrepreneur recounted that when he was asked, “What was the big 
difference between your successful business and an apparently similar, but less successful rival?” he 
replied, “There wasn’t one big difference, but hundreds of small differences.”  The case is another 
197 
 
example of where failure can stimulate deep introspection that results in major adaptations and 
modifications that generated greater variety among superficially similar businesses.  
In another similar case of recovering from failure by starting again using replication and adaptation, 
this novice entrepreneur left the first business with just a fraction of its actual value due to complex 
legal proceedings instigated by the more experienced joint venture partner.  With legal restrictions 
and without a critical mass and financial resources, the entrepreneur was not in a position to clone 
the previous business and simply fill the resource gaps left by the former joint venture partner.  
Effectively barred from his favoured market of large clients, the newly serial entrepreneur had to 
refocus the business on smaller customers.  Drawing upon relevant prior experience and learning by 
trial and error, a new business model based on much smaller transaction oriented services was 
developed.  He learned to team-up with other smaller suppliers working with them on a reciprocal 
basis.  The entrepreneur steadily grew the second incarnation of the business until he could return 
to large systems integration projects.  The second venture eventually grew to three times the size of 
his first joint venture business.  In summarising the experience the entrepreneur related, “The deal 
was that X would concentrate on sales and Y on delivery and that just didn’t happen”.  They were 
supposed to take away stress from me but they just added more stress.  However, I did learn a heck 
of a lot over three years” (Case 8). 
In another example of failure (Case 26) the finance for the first failed venture had been secured on 
the entrepreneurs’ homes. “We had no money and the banks had the keys to our houses.”  “And it 
would be gnawing away at me and my business partner.  We would be talking about it, what we 
were going to do; never-ending.”  While terrified of the consequences of failing for himself and his 
family, the bank’s confidence in the plan for the remodelled version of essentially the same business 
was sufficient for them to write-off the previous secured loan and finances the second smaller 
venture.  The novice entrepreneur was able to try again because he was able to convince finance 
providers that he had learned from failure.  It should be noted that there were other instances in the 
study of serial entrepreneurs benefiting from ‘relationship banking’ that cushioned the effects and 
considerably reduced the costs of failure and bankruptcy  (Cases 15, 16).  
An entrepreneurial opportunity can be separated from the venture (Plummer, Haynie and 
Godesiabois, 2007) and also the entrepreneur.  When a business fails it is not always because it was 
a substandard opportunity that should be abandoned.  The next venture, if cloned or replicated and 
adapted can appear identical if measured using purely categorical quantitative variables, but is 
nevertheless qualitatively fundamentally different.  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, some 
quantitative studies remove this type of venture from their samples as they are regarded as 
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essentially the same business.  These quantitative studies may miss out the venture that transitions 
a novice to serial entrepreneurship, and other transformative situations where significant learning 
takes place as they bounce back to try again to exploit the same opportunity.  Trying again with the 
same opportunity was not predicted from the literature review.  It was thought that failed 
entrepreneurs would try elsewhere.  There are in fact strong centripetal forces to trying again with 
exactly the same opportunity as their first venture.  Unsuccessful ventures do not seem to diminish 
the ambition of serial entrepreneurs.  Experiential learning seems to counter balance negative 
influences such as on self-confidence.  
7.4.3 2. Internal Diversification   
- Spin-Outs (Unrelated Diversification) 
Another type of second venture is a new enterprise coming from within, incubated by the first 
venture.  Spin-out is a familiar category from the early habitual entrepreneurship literature (e.g. 
Lamont, 1972).  The current business develops a product or source of expertise that forms the basis 
of a new standalone spin-out business.  This either leads to the next venture in the series when the 
parent is exited or is the transition to a diversified portfolio of ventures. 
Internal replication by spin-out is different from replication by adaptation.  A spin-out company can 
be defined as a new, small company formed to exploit newly formed IP developed as a by-product of 
the originating firm’s operations.  It is spun-out because it is largely unrelated to the existing firm’s 
operations and/or has the potential to become a new stand-alone firm.  Clearly, as these ventures 
are incubated in the original firm they are related and benefit from the transfer of prior knowledge 
and other hard won resources.  Spin-outs in the case studies are distinguished by the development 
of a new distinct unrelated opportunity that begins a new branch or venture corridor. 
In one case study (Case 15), the entrepreneurs and their small group of angel investor backers saw 
an opportunity to recover from an unsuccessful service based novice business by making a 
technology only spin-out.  The idea came from a review of the existing business by a famous UK 
‘dragon’ entrepreneur turned VC.  As the struggling entrepreneur related, “He (the famous dragon 
investor) absolutely tore us to sheds with our angel investors in the meeting and it was brilliant, it 
was really good, really useful.  He introduced the idea of the minimum viable product (a lean start-
up technique).”  The struggling but still operating original business was split into two ventures, with 
the new lean software venture receiving a fresh injection of capital.  Nevertheless, both the 
reformed and spun-out new start-up subsequently failed.  This case demonstrates that it is still 
possible to replicate fundamental flaws in the original opportunity and the business model designed 
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to exploit it.  Also, moreover, without relevant experience and ability to introduce new ideas and 
modifications, they may prove to be misjudgements.  The technology spin-out was in effect an 
unrelated diversification despite the technology being the same.  
In this study, all (100%) of spin-outs that are more distant and unrelated to the original business 
failed (Cases 11, 13, 19, 22).  More conventional diversifications, closely related to adjacent 
customer segment-product combinations, were less prone to closure or failure.  However, relative 
success is difficult to judge as in this study none of the sub-cases of related diversifications were 
sold.   Related diversification is the main route by which some serial entrepreneurs transition to 
portfolio entrepreneurship.  
- Expansion in the Same Industry (Related Diversification)   
How novice and serial entrepreneurs transition into portfolio entrepreneurship is an area of great 
interest to researchers (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008; Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright 
and Binks, 2005) and extends our knowledge of selection theory.  This study includes a small number 
of founders who formed portfolios.  From this limited sample of three case studies (Cases 9, 13, 24)  
the usual pre-condition for building a portfolio of starts-ups appears to be retaining a surviving first 
venture that is not exited and continues to meet the entrepreneur’s minimum threshold (Gimeno, 
Cooper and Woo, 1997) for continuation.  
So called ‘parallel’ starters who build portfolios find or search for growth by horizontal diversification 
(Iacobucci, 2002), with the same or similar products aimed at the same broad market or occupying 
adjacent market segments.  Both horizontal and vertical diversification exploits similarities, 
synergies, economies of scope and potential of scale.  Related diversifications can be said to lie in 
product or customer knowledge corridors (Venkataraman, 1997).  In this way, the current venture 
facilitates the recognition of related opportunities and avenues to exercise options (McGrath, 1996) 
and reuse current resources.  This thesis suggests that the reason why researchers find portfolio 
entrepreneurs to be more alert and opportunistic (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, 2005b), and 
portfolios arise naturally and serendipitously (Rosa, 1998), is because related diversifications are 
relatively easy and low cost to recognise.  
An example of expansion in the same industry include a portfolio founder focussed on serving the 
vibrant and creative UK music industry (Case 9).  His start-ups pursued new horizontal and vertically 
diversified music related product-customer opportunities, “Filling in obvious gaps in the product 
portfolio on a trial and error basis.”  An portfolio entrepreneur was looking to diversify away from 
renewable energy  and was open to new ideas “Basically, it is a question, of keeping your eyes and 
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your ears open, and being open to opportunities. You have to be open to whatever opportunity 
comes along” (Case 24). 
7.4.4 3. Internal Replication and Transfer  
- Transfer Innovative Business Model to Different Industry (Opportunity Abandonment due to 
Success)   
In this study the transfer of innovations to other industries by the original entrepreneur is carefully 
planned following a very remunerative successful exit from an innovative first venture (Cases 7, 11, 
14, 17, 23).  The original high quality opportunity has to be abandoned, because the first venture has 
been sold and direct competition by cloning is not possible due to legal reasons or because the 
opportunity cannot support an identical direct competitor.  The entrepreneurial logic is to replicate 
the business model in a different industry and achieve a similar breakthrough in value creation.   
The returning, now serial entrepreneur redeploys and repeats the recipe or essential elements of 
the first successful venture, the means to serve (Shane, 2000) or business model (George and Bock, 
2011).  From a cognitive perspective, what is transferred amounts to the underlying business model 
template (Baron, 2006) where the means and ends combination is not necessarily specific to 
particular customers or suppliers.  This is not the same as related diversifications by portfolio 
entrepreneurs documented by researchers (e.g. Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005) that follow related 
variants in products or customer segments.  In this study, for example, it occurs in new ventures that 
are applications of a proven model of internet intermediation between buyers and sellers.  Here the 
serial entrepreneur is confident of having found a highly successful formula that by reasoning by 
analogy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) is applicable in new and unfamiliar contexts.  
The newly successful entrepreneur may not need to search for new opportunities.  Publicity 
surrounding the first business and the entrepreneur’s reputation for innovation stimulates third 
parties (also reasoning by analogy) to bring new opportunities with a good fit.  In effect, having a 
breakthrough business model generates a large number of real options (McGrath, 1996).  In these 
circumstances, a more mature serial entrepreneur may change role to become a minority angel 
investor and mentor, parcelling out their business model expertise into a wider portfolio of smaller 
investments, retaining a stake in the dispersion and diversification of their innovation (Case 17), or 
as shown elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 2006) they may set up their own VC 
firm.  It is conceivable that they could transition from novice or serial to portfolio entrepreneur, 
using the business model, although there were no cases of this.  A transferable business model is 
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applicable to completely new industries and the continued presence of the first high quality or ‘host’ 
venture is not relevant as it is in related portfolio diversifications.  
There appears to be a positive association between the size of the success in the first business and 
the scale of ambition for the next, a ratchet effect on the future goals of successful serial 
entrepreneurs.   However, and a constant in this study, this type of second venture tends not to 
succeed if the context and content (Chandler, 1996) are too distant from the original business.  One 
entrepreneur had a huge success and pursued opportunities in many disparate sectors using the 
same approach (Case 17).  While his career trajectory shows that he had transferred industry 
corridors, in reality the ventures remain related through the replication of the means to serve.  After 
experiencing some less successful ventures, he has returned to the original opportunity, this time as 
a direct competitor, making a ‘mature’ clone of his original business.   
- Transfer Specialist Business Model     
This category of second start-up is similar to the transfer of an innovative business model and its 
theoretical basis is similar.  The difference is the lack of innovation behind the new business model. 
Here they use a set of business principles, proven or known theory (Casson, 1982) or formula for 
profitable venturing, such as franchising or supply chain operations.  For the next business they also 
search using reasoning by analogy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) for opportunities that had a good fit to 
this type of exemplar template (Baron, 2006), only this time combining heuristic cognitive processing 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and systematic search (Fiet, 1996).  A second successful experience 
reinforces (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001) this pattern of behaviour.  Confidence, ambition and 
creativity increase in a ratchet-like fashion as they research and devise more subtle and 
sophisticated business models that combine experience and research of new opportunities.   
Two of this study’s entrepreneurs follow this pattern (Case 12, 23).  One serial entrepreneur with no 
relevant prior experience for his first business made an external replication of an existing fast food 
business which subsequently failed.  However, along the way one of his employees discovered the 
equivalent of a related diversification of the then failing business.  The new business contained a 
successful formula of a means to serve/business model.  The first venture was shut down with 
substantial losses. The second start-up was sold to an acquirer.  Realising it was the business model 
that was the key to his success, he searched for other existing opportunities in other industries that 
fitted the formula or ‘discovery template’.   
The serial entrepreneur described the approach deployed, “I went looking for any business that 
fulfils several criteria. One is recurring revenue, or contract revenue that your customers have to buy 
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from you. Two it has to be ideally niche but scalable, so as not to compete in a mature market. Third, 
it had to be somehow sexy, not dealing with the sewage system, you know.  And it had to be global 
and understandable” (Case 23). 
Once a suitable match was found the entrepreneur made a copy (external replication) of the 
incumbent.  After achieving another successful exit, again he searched for his third opportunity using 
exactly the same approach.  
Serial Acquirer Business Model 
For one of the case study exceptions (Case 12) it appears that acquirers also use a specialist business 
model to search for and filter existing firms to purchase.  Acquirers are more likely to emphasise the 
use of networks and use formal planning techniques (Ucbasaran, Wright and Westhead, 2003).  The 
one case of a serial acquirer studied appears to support this prior research.  Like his serial founder 
counterpart he also used a simple exemplar business model template, described in his own words 
as, “The idea was to put more volume through the system. The costs were already there (fixed 
costs), and build the profitability by increasing the transaction density“ (Case 12).  As in other cases, 
the ‘discovery template’ was suitable for many different industries, enabling the entrepreneur to 
enter a wide range of industries unrestricted by a need for specific prior industry knowledge, social 
capital and other industry specific assets.  Entrepreneurial replication and adaptation of recycled 
knowledge such as mental short-cuts is not then confined to serial founders.  Serial acquirers also 
extract additional rents by copying and transferring sources of business advantage from one venture 
to the next.  
- Transfer Specialist Business Model – Adapt Mode of Entry   
This same entrepreneur (Case 12) also used a formulaic heuristic approach when searching for a 
start-up opportunity.  Search on this occasion was conducted to find suitable existing products 
rather than businesses.  The mode of entry is ‘replicate’ rather than ‘acquire’ (Chandler, Douglas and 
DeTienne (2005) because the aim was to make a modest, but differentiating innovation in an 
established market reusing the specialist value creating elements learned from the two acquisitions.  
This demonstrates that it is better to build rather than buy when planning to introduce a significant 
innovation to an existing sector.  In this case the innovation was to replace the established business 
model of selling unbranded goods and using conventional retail sales and distribution as the means 
to serve.  These career steps can appear to be very opportunistic, but on closer inspection the 
acquired and founded ventures were discovered through search using a powerful and clear vision 
reusing heuristically selected specific knowledge to generate and filter a range of opportunities.  As 
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the acquirer turned founder said, “People say to me, how do you go from (…industry X) to 
(…industry Y).  I say well of course it is not the product, but it is what goes behind the product, it is 
the warehousing…etc., etc.” 
- Transfer Business Model to Different Industry (Opportunity Abandonment)   
This type of replication and transfer occurs for negative reasons (Case 18).  It may also be rare as it 
requires a third party to introduce an opportunity to a struggling entrepreneur unaware of its 
existence.  One of the unmistakable signs of an economic recession is a lack of viable opportunities 
and unemployed resources.  In this case study, during the crash that followed the 9/11 attacks in 
New York, the manager of a serviced office business experiencing a lack of demand for temporary 
offices noticed that one of his client businesses was also going through hard times.  The manager 
suggested that his struggling client employ their sales skills to find him new customers.  They were 
using an approach to business to business sales previously replicated from a prior employer.  When 
transferred and reused in pursuit of managed offices in an established industry, it turned out both 
workable and serendipitously a unique source of competitive advantage.  The partners said, “We 
realized that property was, well as far as commercial property goes it is a professional game where 
there are lots of big words and grey suits and lots of people like to talk a lot of fluff.  Whereas we are 
quite direct.”  As this case illustrates, both the opportunity and the market innovation may occur 
serendipitously.  What was essential to the transfer occurring was the fact of keeping the business 
going.  Had the third party not intervened the business would have most likely closed or failed 
outright.   
Some persistent serial entrepreneurs are able to recognise when industry conditions have changed, 
and the underlying business model must change with them.  In Case 4, an entrepreneur skilled at 
direct negotiation with the customer’s principal decision maker abandoned that market when his 
preferred means to serve customers was no longer possible.  Recognition of change is neither a 
universal skill nor a lasting ability.  In Case 16, the advent of a new if very similar product sold in a 
previous venture but at a lower price triggered the instinct to clone a previous firm, but conditions 
were now very different and the venture failed.  Another serial entrepreneur (Case 1) responsible for 
introducing mini-computers to the UK, failed to grasp the opportunity to introduce the next 
generation of networked micro-computers in Europe.  He said, “I failed entirely to see how these 
tiny micro-computers connected in a network could replace a mini-computer and its terminals”.  It 
could be that some opportunities that lie in essentially the same corridor for related diversifications, 
and the transfer of relevant knowledge and other assets like this are difficult to see and ‘connect the 
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dots’ (Baron, 2006), especially when they compete directly with a current venture that is performing 
well. 
Relationships between Discrete Ventures in Different Industries 
The principal research question is concerned with how separate ventures founded by the same serial 
entrepreneur are related.  Aggregate quantitative studies would detect a habitual entrepreneur 
changing industries but not ‘how’ and ‘why’.  A finding in this study is that successful serial 
entrepreneurs can change industries but only when ventures are still closely connected by 
transferrable, i.e. recycled prior knowledge.  In the study this also occurred in one of the non-serial 
founder entrepreneur case study exceptions.  An inheritor grew the turnover of the family firm from 
“£2million up to about £75million”, and exited after an acquisition of a bankrupt firm in a distant but 
still related industry (Case 5).  This entrepreneur discovered his second venture accidentally when a 
famous UK brand went into receivership.  His then current firm had licensed a design owned by the 
now bankrupt company.  He related the circumstances, “I got a text on my Blackberry saying ‘PQR 
company are in difficulty’, and I got another text saying about an hour later ‘They’ve gone bust’, so I 
reply saying ‘Right, let’s go there and see the administrator tonight’, so I picked up my licencing 
director at the time. “   
His initial objective was to buy the design IP (Intellectual Property) from the liquidator, thereby 
removing all future IP licencing costs.  Unexpectedly he managed to purchase the complete design 
and tooling IP at low cost, and was able re-launch the brand in the UK.  He was able to replicate, 
transfer and apply nearly all sources of competitive advantage from his first business to the new 
unintended purchase.  This included product and packaging design, low cost manufacture in Asia and 
UK retail distribution.  However, he couldn’t transfer his existing business model, as he had to move 
up the value chain.  Nevertheless, having spent many years competing against strong retail brands, 
he knew the strengths and weaknesses of brands, and also undertook further professional training in 
brand development.  He exited his first venture to dissolve an unsatisfactory partnership and pursue 
the new opportunity.  As this case example of acquisition is an exception to the core study more 
research is required.  It could well be that acquisitions of existing firms are more or less efficient for 
the replication and adaptation of key aspects of the ‘donor’ enterprise. 
7.4.5 4. External Replication of an Existing Business  
As already discussed, serial entrepreneurs enter attractive industry sectors by initiating start-ups 
that by and large copy incumbent firms. 
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- Entry into an Emerging New Sector 
Pull Factors 
Following a successful exit, some serial starter entrepreneurs choose not to pursue the same or 
similar opportunities, but confidently start new firms in growing sectors using the proceeds of the 
exit.  Low and Abrahamson (1997) call this part of an industry lifecycle ‘joining bandwagons’.  The 
attraction of high growth sectors such as the internet during the dotcom boom, set against the lack 
of detailed specific information available about necessary resource requirements and viable business 
models, results in entrepreneurs entering sectors where both their prior knowledge and absorptive 
capacity to learn (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) or acquire information (Fiet, 
1996) is insufficient.  The study contains examples of serial entrepreneurs who gathered insufficient 
experience in their first venture (Cases 10, 16, 19).  They replicated the entrepreneurial team ‘recipe’ 
unadjusted for new circumstances (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997a,b) 
learned in the first venture, but lacked the quality of social capital and the recruitment skills 
necessary to find suitable team members.  This type of unsuccessful new venture creation process 
may underlie Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim’s (2014) postulate that entrepreneurs may not learn 
enough from the first venture. 
Push Factors 
In a similar finding to previous research (Alsos and Carter, 2006; Iacobucci and Rosa, 2004), this 
study found instances of government enterprise agencies encouraging entrepreneurs into new 
emergent or pre-emergent sectors.  Agencies bring new innovative opportunities to established or 
well-known entrepreneurs to ‘start a movement’ as termed by Low and Abrahamson (1997) in the 
earliest phase of an industry lifecycle.  The opportunities are supported by official market research 
and incentivised with grants and social capital in the form of access to senior politicians and other 
establishment decision makers.  For example, UK government agencies supported the development 
of new IT solutions to facilitate home working, and blended work place learning (Case 13) .  This 
genre of second venture invariably failed, as opportunities were in incipient/pre-emergent sectors 
too far from the entrepreneurs’ relevant experience.  Some entrepreneurs learned the lessons from 
this negative experience (Case 16), other entrepreneurs repeated the mistake (Cases 13, 24).  Both 
those who repeated the experience had a more varied entrepreneurial career, and with slow 
growing current ventures were motivated to seek unrelated diversification opportunities to form a 
portfolio of parallel ventures.  They were less risk averse and wanted to find the next ‘big thing’.  The 
strategy may be sound, but tactically the opportunities proved beyond their capabilities.  In one 
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case, the experienced serial entrepreneur said, “I was far too early to market with a solution to an 
opportunity that was not well understood” (Case 13).  They were swayed by the subsidies and 
opportunity to develop social capital.  They may have been flattered by the attention from the 
government as spokespersons for the entrepreneurial community and felt that they had to 
reciprocate or justify their social standing.   
This finding shows that start-up experience is not sufficient, that relevant prior knowledge is 
required.  It helps explain other research that finds mixed results for the effect of prior 
entrepreneurial experience on firm survival (e.g. Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler 1992; Stuart and 
Abetti, 1990) and supports the conclusion that  experience is strongly affected by contextual or 
situational factors noted in previous research (e.g. Chandler, 1996; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 
2014).  Further research is required as to why unrelated opportunities in pre-emergent industries 
are pursued by both serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.  
- Entry into a Growth Sector  
Mimicking and emulating existing firms by replication to enter growing sectors can also be 
accompanied by innovation.  In one case (Case 10), having had negative experiences in a previous 
venture because of poor quality manual work, a serial entrepreneur purchased and installed the first 
Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) manufacturing capability in his industry in the UK, taking 
great risks to finance and learn the new technology.  Another serial entrepreneur (Case 25) entered 
the mature and declining UK clothing manufacturing sector, but to serve a high growth consumer 
market she knew intimately from her first venture, just as the innovative Lycra fabric from Du Pont 
became available for the first time.  “Another innovator (Debbie Moore) in the same sector 
persuaded Du Pont to make a Cotton-Lycra, and the new (niche) market took off”. 
7.4.6 5. Recruitment to Entrepreneurship (Specialist or Unique Skills) 
Some entrepreneurs are recruited by other lead entrepreneurs to become partners for both their 
first and second ventures (Cases 1, 21).  They possess particular or rare skills developed in 
employment, e.g. for the then emergent computer industry, and/or have considerable social ties 
that connect them to new opportunities.  
7.4.7 Sources of Innovation in Second Ventures 
Second venture innovations are much more related to prior knowledge and specific entrepreneurial 
experience developed in previous ventures.  Transfers of business models to other industries by 
serial entrepreneurs, spin-offs and related diversifications to start portfolios can all be innovative.  
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Experienced entrepreneurs use their existing business knowledge to search for gaps or apply new 
ideas to develop new means or ends.  In this study, knowledge corridors can also be innovation 
corridors, as revealed in other research on the effects of prior knowledge (e.g. Grégoire, Barr and 
Shepherd, 2010; Shane, 2000).  Progressively deeper knowledge in familiar areas may explain an 
ability to notice new opportunities that may explain the consistent rate of innovation in both first 
and second ventures.  
The literature (e.g. Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 2013) finds that the prior knowledge of the 
entrepreneurial team restricts their ability to recognise new opportunities.  However, entrepreneurs 
can be persuaded to take on unrelated innovative opportunities with government sponsorship and 
support.  We can add that prior knowledge restricts the entrepreneur’s ability to recognise feasible 
new opportunities.  
More natural internally or externally fostered forms of innovative opportunities arise from three 
sources:  a) those related to new information endogenously generated by an existing business, b) 
the application of new technology exogenous to the current business and c) opportunities 
introduced by potential collaborators. 
Information Production in Prior Ventures   
Specific unique private information created by one business is often the basis of another innovative 
opportunity and new firm.  Several cases (1, 6, 22) illustrate the information origins of related but 
innovative start-ups.  One venture in car leasing generated unique and inimitable insights into the 
driving habits of a difficult to serve niche market segment that went against the long standing 
assumptions held in the industry (Case 1).  The new facts noticed by the entrepreneur resulted in a 
highly innovative rearrangement of the standard industry business model.  The serial entrepreneur 
remarked, “This business has been one of the most successful of all I have been involved in.”  In 
another case study venture a private investigator noticed that legal papers for court hearings 
needed storage and also rapid retrieval.  He devised the first computerised document management 
service for legal practices in the UK (Case 22).   
Implementing Emerging New Technologies  
An internet entrepreneur already very familiar with the sector formed a venture to provide a new 
type of on-line reward for the advertising industry (Case 21).  A novice entrepreneur’s first start-up 
replicated typical incumbents in the mature industry of advertising printing; then a seasoned CEO of 
a much larger firm mentored the novice entrepreneur to introduce emerging digital print technology 
(Case 7). The entrepreneur’s second business under the mentor’s guidance began the digitisation of 
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the UK print industry.  In other cases already cited (3, 25) emerging ecommerce technology 
facilitated re-entry after a previous failure to exploit the same opportunity, and by researching the 
supply chain of a new high-tech fabric, the entrepreneur was able to supply new products to the 
community of hundreds of businesses of which she had been a member with her first start-up. 
Opportunities Introduced by Potential Collaborators 
As the corridor principle (Ronstadt, 1998) predicts, the study shows that a business is a natural 
source of new opportunities and collaboration occurs as industries co-evolve (Aldrich and Martinez, 
2001).  Collaborators can bring both new information and new technology.  Owning a business 
positions the entrepreneur as a potential collaborator or joint venture partner for new starts-ups or 
existing firms.    These are discussed further in the section on the origins of opportunities for 
established entrepreneurs later in this chapter.  
7.4.8 Summary and Key Findings  
1. Four main modes of founding transition novices to serial entrepreneurs: Internal Replication,  
Internal Diversification, Internal Replication and Transfer,  and External Replication.  The majority of 
modes reflect the reuse of prior knowledge and resources in creating a second enterprise.   
2. The exit conditions of the first business appear to determine the mode of founding for the second 
venture.  (i) Entrepreneurs making highly remunerative exits of innovative businesses re-enter 
entrepreneurship with similarly ambitious ventures often in new industries.  (ii) Failed entrepreneurs 
return to the same opportunity and try again with an adapted approach their ambition 
undiminished.  (iii) If there is no exit then entrepreneurs start closely related or unrelated 
diversifications and commence a transition to portfolio entrepreneurship. Unrelated ventures fail. 
3. Many second ventures are clones of businesses that closed unexpectedly for non-business reasons  
including disputes and fraud.  Clones provide structured transformational learning for the more 
inexperienced entrepreneurs who then go on to start a number of ventures as ‘lead’ entrepreneur.  
4. Therefore, an entrepreneurial opportunity can be separated from the venture (Plummer, Haynie 
and Godesiabois, 2007) and also the entrepreneur.  When a business fails it is not always because it 
was a substandard opportunity that should be abandoned. 
5. A very successful sale is associated with at least the same level of ambition and risk taking in the 
next cycle.  There is a kind of ratchet effect.  An unsuccessful exit is not associated with a reduction 
in ambition, just more caution through the exercise of new learning.  
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6. Ventures are successful when related to prior knowledge and other resources reused and recycled 
from a previous successful venture.  Connectivity and similarities between two discrete ventures 
may not be obvious to quantitative studies focussed measures such as the industry classification.   
7. Innovative opportunities are strongly related to previous business experience.  Knowledge 
corridors are also innovation corridors.  
8. Successful serial entrepreneurs can develop cognitive theories and heuristics to search for cross 
industry opportunities to fit a proven template business model.   
9. Innovation occurs ‘naturally’ in existing enterprises. They produce new opportunity specific 
information, attract third party collaborators, and provide test beds for new ideas and new 
technologies.   
10. Innovative opportunities should be given to entrepreneurs with relevant prior knowledge.  
Having entrepreneurial experience of start-up is not a predictor of success for unrelated ventures.   
11. It is economic to exploit the same, similar or related opportunities where proven and de-risked 
knowledge and other resources can be reused, even if it requires the transfer of business models to 
different industries.   
7.5 Part 2. Section 3.  Breaks from Founding: Career Interludes and Pauses 
This picture of a constant cycle of exit and re-entry doesn’t convey the complete process.  This 
study’s objective is a more nuanced understanding of serial entrepreneurship.  After exiting a first or 
subsequent business, some serial entrepreneurs take a break from entrepreneurship.  These 
interludes are understudied and have bearing on the re-entry conditions and decision of serial 
entrepreneurs.  
Research questions 1.3 and 1.4 ask: What is the impact of failure and success on venture selection 
by serial entrepreneurs?  
The study finds that one of the effects of exit is that serial entrepreneurs take breaks between start-
ups.   These interludes and pauses are important for understanding how they manage their career 
and the relationship between their ventures.  These interludes and pauses are significant for the 
incubation of new opportunities.  In this study there was a marked tendency for the venture started 
on return to be influenced by the latest spell of non-entrepreneurial activity.  Failing entrepreneurs 
take prolonged breaks from entrepreneurship ostensibly to recover from the negative effects of 
failure. 
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7.5.1 Interludes after Success 
Some entrepreneurs, after a successful first (novice) venture, take a break from entrepreneurship 
(Cases 4, 11, 14, 17, 23).  The sale of a business sells the rights to exploit a known opportunity to a 
third party.  As previously discussed, having sold on the rights, they must usually find a new 
opportunity with which to re-enter entrepreneurship.  Post successful exit, the pattern is for serial 
entrepreneurs still using prior knowledge to recognise and exploit a related opportunity even if it 
was in a different industry.  
A very successful novice dotcom entrepreneur (Case 14) retired and went sailing for a few years.  
When engaged in a completely different activity of building a new home, he discovered his second 
opportunity to start a new venture by applying a variant of the unique innovative business model 
that was so effective in achieving his first successful exit at the height of the dotcom boom.  After 
another year researching the opportunity he returned to the UK to start his second venture.  
Another successful entrepreneur (Case 11) undertook extensive research about issues facing the 
industry in which he had launched his first successful venture.  Even though both had amassed a 
personal fortune with which to retire they returned to what some serial entrepreneurs referred to as 
the “game” of entrepreneurship.   
In common with other studies (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 2006) this study also found that 
successfully exiting entrepreneurs use an interlude to become successful angel investors.  They 
usually returned to entrepreneurship with new ideas less related to their first venture and much 
more related to their investing experience.  In one case (Case 11) an entrepreneur invested in a 
series of dotcom start-ups, one of which was highly successful.  On return he made his own dotcom 
start-up which lost £100k.  This suggests that entrepreneurs learn continuously and there is perhaps 
a cognitive availability bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) toward recently acquired information.  
Therefore, what happens in the breaks to the entrepreneur’s stock of knowledge, social capital and 
other assets is significant for the incubation of new opportunities.  However, unrelated ventures 
inspired by new information were very likely to end in failure.   
7.5.2 Pauses after Failure for Recovery 
After an outright business failure, some entrepreneurs returned to employment or education or 
took a complete break (Cases 15, 16, 19). “I went AWOL” as one entrepreneur put it.  Interestingly, 
business closures with small or no overall financial losses, while still a negative experience, were not 
followed by taking a break from entrepreneurship.  In this study, overall frequency of outright failure 
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reduces as careers progress, these ‘retreats from failure’ occurred in the early phases of their 
careers after one, two and in one case three venture failures.   
The evidence suggests that serial entrepreneurs can re-enter immediately after one unsuccessful 
exit, but more than one failure in sequence is much more likely to result in a complete break from 
entrepreneurship.  Therefore, those serial entrepreneurs sustaining an affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 
2001) do not exit for long.  In some cases this return after one failure was facilitated by the finance 
providers (banks and angel investors) writing-off previous commitments including ‘unaffordable’ 
charges on the family home and providing further finance.  Therefore, the study provides evidence 
for Plehn-Dujowich’s (2010) extension to selection theory, where orderly shut-downs of unsuccessful 
ventures allow serial entrepreneurs to return practically immediately to entrepreneurship. Further 
research can explore if there is a general threshold in respect of the number and type of 
unsuccessful exits related to the speed of return to entrepreneurship. 
The length of the break is likely related to the required recovery period which in turn is related to 
the size of the failure.  Extended breaks of over a year followed two successive outright failures or 
closures, suggesting that there is a threshold number of unsuccessful exits.  The breaks proved to be 
temporary pauses as they allowed recovery from the negative effects of failure, restoring self-
esteem, family ties, reputation and finances.  Breaks appear to generate fresh thinking as the 
negative effects fade.  Breaks, intentional or unintentional, weaken social ties and dissipate 
obligations towards previous stakeholders, such as former business partners.  Renewal involves the 
revaluing and redevelopment of prior knowledge and social capital.  For example, serial 
entrepreneurs with a preference for team-based entrepreneurship used interludes in employment 
to form new teams of like-minded individuals with complementary skills.   
As already reported, many first ventures are incubated in employment.  If the first successful 
venture was incubated in employment those who left entrepreneurship after an unsuccessful 
enterprise took employment in the same field as the first successful business.  These serial 
entrepreneurs went through a ‘re-incubation’ process, only this time they each knew with increased 
certainty what they were looking for in an entrepreneurial opportunity.  As one (Case 16) put it, 
“Having lived the VAR (value added reseller) nightmare for 5 or 6 years, having your own IP was 
always my objective.” Taking a break after failure and recuperating while continuing to develop 
related knowledge increases the probability of future success.  In all instances returnees started 
successful enterprises in a sector they knew well.  Employment strengthened and refreshed their 
core knowledge, developed new social capital and restored confidence and financial liquidity.  
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It appears that while mental simulation is associated with opportunity recognition (Gaglio, 2004), 
going over past events and deciding which were the critical events and decisions that led to venture 
failure does seem to help failed entrepreneurs who later return and find success.  Researchers 
believe that higher-order cognition is required to escape previous patterns and recognise new 
innovative opportunities (e.g. Rerup, 2005) and transformational learning is triggered by failure (eg. 
Cope, 2011).  
7.5.3 Summary and Key Findings 
1. Persistent serial entrepreneurs experiencing two or more venture closures or outright failures 
used employment or education to recover psychologically, economically and socially while reflecting,   
assessing and learning from experience.   
2. Successful exits were also followed by breaks and then searching more widely for new 
opportunities, funded by greater liquid resources.   
3.  Breaks are significant as returning entrepreneurs were heavily influenced by the most recent 
activity undertaken, providing evidence for a kind of information availability bias.       
7.6 Part 2. Section 4. Expert Modes of Founding: Third, Fourth, Fifth, … Businesses 
The comparative analysis of the remaining ventures is presented in this section.  At this stage the 
serial entrepreneurs reach expert status as defined by Baron (2006) and Baron and Ensley (2006). 
The origins of third, fourth, fifth, sixth, etc. ventures see a repeat of the modes of founding already 
interpreted for second ventures.  The established modes are confirmed by saturation by more sub-
cases (ventures).  For example,  a now very experienced entrepreneur (Case 1) exited a mini-
computer business for personal reasons to start a new venture supplying terminals to this new 
rapidly expanding sector,  clearly a case of an ‘internal diversification’ to make an related 
diversification in the same broad industry.  In third ventures, closure and failure with losses are 
associated with attempts to start-up again in the same or a related area if the opportunity is not 
exhausted (Case 6, 15).  Serial entrepreneurs continue to use an opportunity recognition heuristic to 
search for opportunities that meet their template (Cases 6, 17, 19, 23).  By now established portfolio 
founders try unrelated diversifications that fail (Case 13), and related ones that take root (Cases 9, 
24).   
Unsurprisingly, at this stage in their career, no serial entrepreneurs are recruited into their third 
venture by other lead entrepreneurs.  It is their preferred means of earning their living and 
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accumulating wealth.  They demonstrate increasing expertise from previous learning for both 
success and failure evidenced by the reduced frequency of outright failure as their career trajectory 
continues on an upward path.     
Nevertheless, the analysis and interpretation reveals additional modes of re-entry that reflect the 
increased maturity, reputation and social capital of an established serial entrepreneur.  It also 
reveals that even experienced entrepreneurs can make mistakes and still have much to learn from 
experience.   Certain scenarios are prevalent, in particular: a) returning to previously successful 
opportunities, b) attempting international ventures, c) facing further decisions to diversify into 
portfolio (parallel) founding.  Conditions vary as does entrepreneurial experience and competence in 
making judgement in these scenarios.  
7.6.1 Modes of Founding: Experienced Founders 
Additional modes of venture creation through internal replication (copying existing forms that are 
cognitively familiar to experienced founders) and diversifying from the existing venture are 
illustrated in Figure 7.6 and explained thereafter.  
 
Figure 7.6 Modes of Founding: Experienced Founders 
7.6.2 1. Internal Replication  
- Mature Cloning 
Immature vs. Mature Cloning 
A mature form of cloning occurs in later phases of a serial entrepreneur’s career, when an identical 
or very similar opportunity to an earlier venture presents itself (Cases 15, 16, 22).  Mature cloning is 
very different to early ‘immature’ cloning of a first venture, following unexpected failure for non-
business reasons.  Firstly, a mature clone is of a successful venture, and secondly there is a 
considerable time gap between the original success and the subsequent clone.   
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Conditions are likely to have changed in the intervening period and the serial entrepreneur has at 
least one other start-up under their belt.  While a replicate and adapt approach may be a more 
suitable strategy, in this study the instinct to ‘clone’ and reuse prior knowledge unmodified, 
returning to past glories is strong.  Entrepreneurs who have just experienced an unsuccessful exit 
may be prone to reuse old recipes unadjusted for new circumstances (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 
1997a,b), in an unthinking, mindless manner (Rerup, 2005).  This faulty process is named here 
‘cloning by projection’ when the present is cognitively projected onto the past, using reasoning by 
analogy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) but using superstitious learning (Levitt and March, 1988). 
A serial entrepreneur whose second venture had just failed saw an opportunity that he perceived to 
be identical to his first very successful venture.  However, as the entrepreneur (Case 16) related, 
“The market price of the equivalent product had fallen by two thirds, but sales costs were nearly as 
high.”  The unmodified reuse of the same business model as before led to margins that were too 
small to sustain the venture and it was shut down.  From the case analysis, in his first successful 
venture margin control was not his area of responsibility and he had insufficient learning to assess 
the new opportunity competently.  With two unsuccessful start-ups in a row, cumulative losses and 
family pressures, the serial entrepreneur had to exit entrepreneurship to resume paid employment.  
After a couple of years recovering he returned stronger and wiser to start-up a successful fourth 
venture in the same industry.  
Another form of mature cloning also occurs when some time after a previous successful exit by sale, 
it becomes apparent that the new owners have changed the original business formula (Case 22).  
The business may have been sold again causing further adaptations to a once successful business.  
Social ties with previous customers, now customers of the new owners, provided specific ‘inside’ 
information and encouragement to the original entrepreneur.   
In the words of the serial entrepreneur, “They (former customers) would pick up the phone and 
speak to me.  The new American owners (not the firm he had originally sold the business to) decided 
that they wanted to change things and put in the business model that they used to operate in the 
States into being over here, and of course, it doesn't work.  The idea of storage in the States, it is a 
bloody huge warehouse in the middle of nowhere, rammed to the top with boxes and putting 
someone in there to find a box and send it the next day.  And of course that was opposite to how I 
sold the business here” (Case 22).  
To take advantage of a mature clone opportunity, the serial entrepreneur must be either now free of 
any legal covenants attached to the exit, or is not challenged by the new owners when the clone is 
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started.  In this study, the serial entrepreneur was able to pick up, recycle and reuse previous assets 
including customers, employees, premises and software systems relatively cheaply and quickly, in 
the same locality using the same network of social ties.  Former customers who encouraged the 
entrepreneur to reincarnate by cloning the old business were clearly obligated to support the new 
venture.  
The extant literature (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 2006) documents instances of sellers buying back 
(rather than re-starting) into previous ventures and the circumstances and logic are likely to be 
similar.  Other cases of mature cloning were also captured by this study.  Overall, the evidence 
indicates that the majority of mature cloning of earlier ventures in third and subsequent businesses 
is likely to be restricted to certain industry sectors and forms of enterprise.  These are likely to be in 
mature industries not undergoing rapid change, and/or having stable, clear and well understood 
business models; e.g. professional services such as recruitment, franchisees or distribution 
opportunities.  
- International Cloning (International Ventures) 
Another form of cloning is international venturing, where a largely unmodified version of the home 
business is established in another country (Cases 9, 17, 18, 23).  The initial start-up is based on a 
clone, even though modification inevitably occurs because of differences in context and content 
between the home and the new market.  In this study, the majority of these start-ups fail due to lack 
of experience.  The entrepreneur falls into similar cognitive traps mentioned above and fails to 
realise in the opportunity recognition and assessment phase that there are material differences 
between the home and foreign markets.  International ventures can transition a serial entrepreneur 
into portfolio entrepreneurship, but in this study nearly always only on a temporary basis before the 
foreign enterprise failed, closed or shrank to an insignificant size. 
The extant literature on habitual entrepreneurship indicates that international ventures are not 
always successful (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 2006).  International ventures may be a symbol of 
success and reputation in the home venture.  International opportunities were in every case not 
recognised by the entrepreneur but rather brought to the entrepreneur by third parties such as 
foreign nationals, or via social ties to employees who emigrate or who have family members living in 
other countries.  A typical comment from one case is, “We received a CV from a guy in the US who 
had been in the industry who was looking for a job, and we said, right, we want to go to the States, 
let’s fly him over.”  Success and high rates of growth in the home market seem to blind all parties to 
the risks of international ventures.  In line with the current literature, only difficulties, i.e. critical 
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incidents (Chell, 2004) and retrospective assessment post-closure stimulate transformational 
learning (e.g. Cope 2011).  
In contrast, and perhaps more by luck than design, a successful international serial entrepreneur 
(Case 17) tested the viability of international operations in Europe through a franchise agreement.  
The franchise was opened in a small geographically isolated European country culturally and 
economically similar to the home country.   
“Before I moved to the UK we actually franchised out Country A, it was a coincidence these two 
students who were students in my country and so knew the business said they wanted to do it in 
Country A where they came from. I said ‘fair enough’.  I wanted to test if we could do it technically” 
(Case 17). 
Most of the risk was displaced to the franchisee, and the entrepreneur would have been able to 
distance himself from the experiment had it failed.  This limited and controlled experiment, as in the 
development and exercise of real options (McGrath, 1996) managed uncertainty while 
simultaneously facilitating entrepreneurial learning in an effectual (Sarasvathy, 2001) process.  
7.6.3 2. Internal Diversification  
- Spin-Outs (Unrelated Diversification)  
New opportunities are a common occurrence throughout the career of seral entrepreneurs.   A 
related diversification may lead to the development of a portfolio when the current firm is not 
exited.   As is the common theme throughout the study, unrelated ventures fail or are shut down.  
While they are still operating the serial entrepreneur enjoys a form of temporary portfolio status.   
In a case study (Case 18) one new innovative venture used ecommerce as a new means to serve 
customers, leading to the parallel development of unique expertise in ecommerce, spun-out as a 
new venture.  In this case the entrepreneur called it “Ill-conceived and not well executed “.  The 
entrepreneurs were very competent, but the new venture was too far from their prior knowledge 
and expertise in an emerging sector where there was insufficient information to make anything 
other than a risky entry.  Interestingly, a number of entrepreneurs, when asked what new ventures 
they were working on, would describe this type of unrelated spin-out venture.  It could be that 
pursuit of unrelated venture opportunities and the risks that they embody is not uncommon, as they 
are attractive to potential portfolio founders seeking new growth opportunities.  However, because 
few succeed, the life histories of portfolio entrepreneurs, such as those researched by others (e.g. 
Iacobucci, 2002) are likely to show only related ventures at aggregate levels of assessment.    
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A mature and experienced entrepreneur developed a culture and systems for handling spin-off and 
related diversification opportunities (Case 26).  If it is internally generated, then the employee must 
convince the owners that they have the necessary entrepreneurial qualities to lead the project.  For 
mature established entrepreneurs some spins-offs and diversification opportunities are generated 
by ‘walk-in’ ‘would be’ entrepreneurs (Cases 9, 17, 20, 26).  The recruitment services entrepreneur 
(Case 26) who had experience of using a systematic approach to new opportunities acted on a ‘walk-
in opportunity’ from a younger less experienced ‘would be’ real estate entrepreneur.  When 
questioned by the researcher about the apparent unrelated nature of this venture the experienced 
entrepreneur, on his fourth venture replied, “In fact the new opportunity had lots of similarities; 
both are ‘people’ businesses, both match buyers to sellers, and both have transaction and recurring 
revenue streams”.   
The venture in this case suggests that some very experienced entrepreneurs can develop a higher 
order cognitive ability to see meta-connections between the business models of ostensibly unrelated 
opportunities in different industries.  This is similar to other cases discussed in the context of second 
ventures where a serial entrepreneur discovered or developed a successful business model template 
that was applied to new opportunities in other industries.  
Nevertheless, there has to be a good fit derived from prior experiences.  Missing elements such as a 
means to serve that works for the customer can be the downfall of a promising venture.  In another 
‘walk-in’ opportunity, a location database entrepreneur was approached by a programmer who 
wanted to produce a solution to the travelling salesman problem (TSP) (Case 9).  It was related to his 
existing business because “It was using existing data sets that we had”.  “We have been shoot from 
the hip merchants … I looked into the business opportunity and again I thought this is a market that 
we could really disrupt.”  Despite a prototype solution being devised the customers didn’t want a 
solution as there were unanticipated problems for which they didn’t have the relevant experience 
and skills.  “Actually what transpired was we were selling to a different group of people.  The guys 
we were selling to would be making a decision tantamount to turkey’s voting for Christmas.” “These 
were the kind of issues you really only discover once you kind of jumped in.” 
7.6.4 Sources of Innovation in Third and Subsequent Ventures  
Fourth, fifth and later start-ups were also innovative in roughly the same proportion as in earlier 
career phases.  In the third venture there is a fall in the proportion of innovative ventures, although 
there is no discernible pattern in the career trajectories to account for this aggregate statistic.  In 
these later phases there are mature clones of earlier ventures and some serial entrepreneurs enter 
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established industries by external replication.  Just as with second ventures, innovations were 
related to prior knowledge and specific entrepreneurial experience.  As in second ventures they arise 
from a) new information endogenously generated by an existing business, b) the application of 
exogenous technology and c) by potential collaborators.  Again even closely related diversifications 
can be innovative. These could be externally brought in opportunities from collaborators in related 
industries, or less successfully from Government agencies sponsoring ‘blue sky’ ideas.  Serial 
entrepreneurship and innovation is discussed at more length later in this chapter.  
7.6.5 Summary and Key Findings 
1. Third and later ventures in the careers of now expert serial entrepreneurs conform to most of the 
patterns found in second ventures.  In addition, experienced serial entrepreneurs clone previous 
successful businesses when the same opportunity becomes available again.   
2. Serial entrepreneurs may transition to become established portfolio founders.    
3. Despite their expert status, if insufficient learning has taken place in a previous venture they may 
make cognitive mistakes in assessing similar opportunities and apply ‘old recipes’ (cognitive 
templates, etc.) when conditions have changed.   
4. For example, success in the home market seems to blind all parties to the risks of international 
ventures.  Recovering from the failure of an unrelated venture can also generate a false-positive 
assessment of new opportunities.  
5. Some very experienced/talented entrepreneurs are able to see meta-connections between 
current ventures and seemingly unrelated opportunities in other industries.  
6. Limited controlled experiments are superior for managing uncertainty and supporting learning.  
Collaborative opportunities with other firms and individuals become possible as more businesses 
reach maturity and become well-known in their sector.  
7.7 Part 2.  Section 5.  Synthesis: Model of Career Trajectories of Multiple 
Founders  
From results of the comparative analysis a new model and theory of the career trajectories of serial 
entrepreneurs is synthesised.  The first element of the theory is a summative list of all the serial 
modes of venture creation already reported.  They are listed here below in Figure 7.7.   
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Figure 7.7 Modes of Founding  
So far as the sample has allowed it also includes portfolio founders.   In summary there are four  
modes or super-types of new venture start-up that occur after the first novice business: 
1. Internal Replication – cloning a previous venture that failed for non-business reasons or adapting 
on the basis of learning in reaction to a venture failure.  This often results in a successful business 
eventually.  
2. Internal Diversification – making a related or unrelated diversification in response to a low quality 
current venture.  Related ventures lead to transitioning to portfolio entrepreneurship or liquidating a 
lower quality enterprise if a serial entrepreneur.  Unrelated ventures of all types are very likely to be 
unsuccessful.  
3. Internal Replication and Transfer – starting-up in a new industry by transferring essential 
components of a previous venture.  Can be very successful if the transfer is applicable.  
4. External Replication – forming a start-up by copying an incumbent, typically in a growth sector, 
and making adaptations to compete more effectively.  Progressively better opportunities are 
substituted over a career.  The lack of innovation is likely to constrain exit values.  
The second element partially anticipated from the literature review and its synthesis of centrifugal 
and centripetal economic forces, is that the alternative post-conditions of a venture:  (i) successful 
exit, or (ii) unsuccessful exit, or (iii) no exit leads to different choices for the next venture.  In other 
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words, for serial entrepreneurs the post-conditions at exit of one venture become the pre-conditions 
for the next venture creation process and these conditions can be used to predict the founder 
entrepreneurs decision i.e. it has both explanatory and causal power.   
Successful Exits 
After a successful exit it is more likely that serial entrepreneurs will start-up in a different industry 
and/or increase the degree of innovation without reducing the size of ambition.  The higher liquidity 
and opportunity abandonment resulting from the sale of a business as a going concern provides the 
stimulus and resources (time and money) to find new innovative opportunities and move to 
different industry corridors.  Nevertheless, these are not completely unrelated new ventures and a 
connection to prior knowledge remains.  Should an unrelated venture be attempted, the lack of a 
substantive connection between ventures results in failure or closure.  It appears that no amount of 
social or financial capital can compensate for a lack of reusable relevant entrepreneurial experience. 
Unsuccessful Exits 
After an unsuccessful exit it is more likely for the serial entrepreneur to return to the same 
opportunity.  This may happen immediately if the business closed for non-economic reasons, or after 
a period of recovery and a new adapted business model if the reasons for failure are understood, 
new learning occurs and changed conditions are recognised and exploited.  In contrast, more 
experienced entrepreneurs with an established business are tempted to try unrelated 
diversifications, and establish a portfolio.  There is no exit from entrepreneurship and these failures 
are not revisited.  
No Exit  
When there is no exit, conditions of the current venture (s) become the pre-conditions for the next 
cycle of venture creation.  Here conditions for portfolio entrepreneurship arise.  Highly related 
diversifications are more likely to succeed, though seemingly attractive unrelated opportunities 
occur regularly.  In addition, it is manifest from the analysis that a start-up can end in closure or 
outright failure when an opportunity is a ‘false positive’, having all the hallmarks of a mature clone, 
when in fact industry conditions have changed or the international market is different from the 
home market.  
The potential alternative pathways induced from the case analysis for exiting serial founders and 
non-exiting portfolio builders are summarised here.  
Serial Entrepreneur Unsuccessful Exit: 
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1. Same opportunity.  Clone and ‘reboot’ previous venture when unexpected failure.  Success is likely 
if learning has been accomplished and business conditions have not changed.  
2. Same opportunity.  Replicate previous venture but adapt and try again using a different approach. 
Success if sufficient transferable learning has taken place including adaptations to new conditions. 
3. New opportunity.  Replicate critical elements of previous venture, e.g. means to serve and adapt 
to a new industry.  Success is likely.  Rare as it needs a third party in the new industry to introduce 
the opportunity. 
4. Abandon opportunity and recover.  The usual response to failure by serial entrepreneurs is to try 
again with a clone, spin-out or adapted venture.  Two or more negative exits in succession result in 
opportunity abandonment and a return to previous employment or education.  Re-entry to 
entrepreneurship is again to an area of previous experience making adaptations or making a mature 
clone of a previously successful opportunity.  
Serial Entrepreneur Successful Exit:  
5. Same opportunity.  Mature clone of previous venture, when opportunity becomes available again.   
Success is likely when industry conditions have not changed, i.e. no direct competition and sufficient 
learning has taken place.  Key resources are available for recycling and reassembly of the clone. 
6. New opportunity.  Stay within the same industry, finding new opportunity, using the same general 
means such as software development.  
7. New opportunity.  Transfer to a new industry corridor.  Replicate critical elements of a previous 
venture in a heuristically applied template e.g. means to serve, and then adapt to a new industry.  
Success is likely.  
8. New Opportunity.  Copy an existing business in another industry.  Failure or closure more likely as 
unrelated and insufficient relevant learning. 
Transition from Serial to Portfolio Entrepreneurship Maintaining Current Venture 
9. New Opportunity.  Make a related diversification, i.e. a new but related opportunity in the same 
industry, and transition from serial to portfolio entrepreneurship.  
10. New Opportunity.  Make an unrelated diversification.  This is a radical departure from the 
current business to a different industry.  The transition to portfolio entrepreneurship is likely to be 
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temporary as failure or closure is likely as there is insufficient relevant learning and transferable 
resources. 
11. Same Opportunity (In fact different).  Make a clone in another country.  Following false 
perception, it is managed as the same opportunity, but likely fail as it lacks similarity in critical areas.  
Smaller scale international ventures e.g. a franchise is more likely to succeed. 
The pathways or corridors derived from this study are summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 7.9 Outcome and Next Venture Creation Process 
Breaks: Interludes and Pauses for Recovery  
This new theory is extended to include the effect of prolonged breaks between ventures, which 
affect the simple and direct translation of exit post-conditions to re-entry pre-conditions.   As has 
been discussed, after a successful high value exit an entrepreneur may indulge in other not directly 
related activities that revise their knowledge and bring them into contact with other unrelated 
opportunities that may deflect their trajectory.  Of course, the alternative is also possible and they 
engage in related activities that reinforce their path.  Also as previously discussed, breaks are used to 
recover from a series of unsuccessful exits.  Persistent serial entrepreneurs use the pauses to reflect 
and learn from the past, dissolve unfruitful relationships and focus on how to return to a related 
area with a new venture.   
Heterogeneous Behaviour  
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The new theory helps address the observation by researchers as to the wide variety of behaviours 
that must be encapsulated to form a comprehensive theory of entrepreneurship.   Existing theories 
of habitual entrepreneurship such as ‘success breeds success’ are positioned within this new 
framework.  It corresponds to pathways 5, 6 and 7.  It should be well noted that no claim is made 
here that the new theory is complete and comprehensive.  There are sure to be additional pathways 
to be discovered in follow-on research.  Furthermore, heterogeneity will always be a feature of this 
model because entrepreneurship is still an open system.  The founding, exit and re-entry decisions of 
serial founders will be moderated or mediated by other circumstances that require entrepreneurial 
judgement.  This study that aside from economic conditions there are also the actions of other 
actors that affect the attainment of purely economic outcomes.  These include:  mentors, acquiring 
firms, and VCs.  There are also socio-economic factors such as personal disputes, unethical 
behaviour and the complex web of social ties that impinge upon decisions.  
7.7.1 Repeated Patterns of Founding Behaviour  
Nevertheless, there is further evidence for homogenous patterns of behaviour.  Some founders can 
repeat these modes of founding.  In other words, they continue to practice what they have learned 
from previous foundings as their preferred strategic approach to venture creation.  Repetitive firm 
founding has centripetal path-dependent qualities.  Entrepreneurs pay attention to positive 
feedback as part of learning (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001) and it is costly to unlearn cognitively deeply 
rooted theories, heuristics blueprints/templates used in the exercise of entrepreneurial judgement.   
These learned and repeated pathways or corridors, evidenced in the data, and partly inspired by the 
work of Gruber (2010) are illustrated in the following diagram.  
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Figure 7.8 Repeated Modes of Serial Founding  
Pathway A is a very restricted type where the serial entrepreneurs keep to a relatively narrow 
knowledge, limiting search and alertness. 
Pathway B is followed by a diversifying serial entrepreneur.  Related opportunities are discovered 
and implemented at low cost.  Unrelated diversifications that are potentially path breaking are most 
likely to fail.  The pattern repeats because they are ‘stuck in the middle’ with a business of moderate 
quality and are without an exit.  
Pathway C is path breaking.  The first venture is innovative and a high value venture.  Nevertheless, 
the path is not completely open because discovery and exploitation of opportunities are still related.  
Pathway D is traversed by serial founders who sell a low or moderate quality imitative business to 
pursue a better imitative opportunity but in an emerging or growth industry.  
While as reported, chance may bring a related venture that provides an escape from an industry in 
decline or in severe recession (Case 18), and collaborators may present opportunities that were 
neither sought nor noticed, unlike Gruber (2010), unintentional or a random emergence of a path or 
path breaking is very unlikely to succeed.  For a better opportunity to be exploited prior resources 
must be relevant and available for reuse.   
7.7.2 Summary and Key Findings 
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1.  A new model and theory of serial founding is presented.  The model also includes what has been 
captured about portfolio entrepreneurs.  
2.  This new theory is extended to include the effect of prolonged breaks between ventures, which 
affect the translation of exit post-conditions to re-entry pre-conditions and deflect a career 
trajectory.   
3.  Modes of business creation may be self-reinforcing such that experienced serial founders repeat 
the same approach.  This is a new type of entrepreneurial learning.   
3. Further research using the constructs and measures arising from this study (exit conditions, 
relatedness, innovation, etc.) is required to determine if these modes and career paths hold for 
other and larger samples of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.   
7.8 Part 3. Section 1. The Nature of Venture Corridors  
In this section, analysis also contributes findings relevant to Theme 2. Theory and evidences suggests 
that serial entrepreneurs will follow a relatively narrow corridor (Ronstadt, 1986; 1988) of related 
ventures constrained by prior knowledge, social and physical resources, cognition, and learning.  
Research question 2.1 asks: Do serial entrepreneurs make closely related diversifications, i.e. stay in 
the same industry corridor to reuse related prior knowledge and other resources?  2.2 asks: How do 
exit conditions, positive or negative, affect the choice of venture corridor?   
The analysis and findings presented so far have already addressed these questions in part.  Serial 
entrepreneurs do change industries especially after a successful exit.  Both serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs are faced with decisions as to whether to pursue related or unrelated opportunities.  
The inherent difficulties of exploiting unrelated opportunities bring entrepreneurs back to a corridor 
of ventures linked by prior knowledge and other resources.  This section presents further evidence 
and discussion.  
7.8.1 Venture Similarity, Prior Knowledge, Innovation   
The study used three qualitative methods derived from the literature to triangulate the degree of 
venture similarity (see Chapter 5).  Antecedents arising from prior employment and other 
experiences over the serial entrepreneur’s career are also included in the analysis.  The summary 
statistics of the whole sample are given here below.  
226 
 
 
Table 7.10 Venture Relatedness and Innovation 
In aggregate the similarity of a venture to the previous venture (or employment) is high (69%) as 
might be expected.  The use of prior knowledge is also high (75%) as would be predicted.  It is only in 
the first novice business when entrepreneurs transition from employment that similarity is less, 
again as might be anticipated. What is interesting is that despite the high degree of similarity the 
ventures  are approximately equally divided between imitative and innovative, with the exception of 
the third venture, where imitative ventures were more frequent.  Serial entrepreneurs found 
ventures that are similar in terms of customers, products, technology etc., reuse prior information 
about means, means to serve and ends and still innovate in half the instances of business creation.  
In terms of how and why this occurs, the detailed analysis of the modes of founding has shown how 
new forms of business arise even as serial entrepreneurs work to preserve and reuse prior 
knowledge and other resources.   
Industry Corridors 
As the economic matching principle predicts, exiting serial entrepreneurs will seek progressively 
better opportunities until they find one that matches their abilities. We might expect the higher than 
expected degree of innovation to be related to changes in industry corridors.  
Chen (2013) found in data of US serial self-employed and small business owners that 57% started 
businesses in an industry where they had founded one before.  Schollhammer’s (1991) early study 
found that 80% of all second venture initiatives are in the same or a closely related industry.  In this 
study the equivalent summary statistic is 58%.  In addition, taking a slightly different view across all 
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ventures the proportion of serial entrepreneurs who maintain their entire career in the same 
industry is 53%.  
However, these summary statistics do not paint a complete picture of the underlying process.  
Sustaining a new start-up business in a different industry is more difficult.  While 28% of all ventures 
in the study were founded in different industries from the preceding enterprise, only half survive as 
current ventures, and only one has been sold on as a going concern.  All the surviving ventures are 
still related in some way to previous ventures with just one exception, that of an entrepreneur (Case 
1) who switched industries after a disastrous failure, starting again from “rock bottom”.  
Knowledge corridors can connect serial entrepreneurs to new industry corridors, a finding that 
supports propositions about the connectedness of corridors (e.g. Chandler, Douglas and DeTienne, 
2005).  Transferrable knowledge of means, ends and business models allows the recognition and 
exploitation of opportunities in other industries.  Without these connections the venture is too far 
from the entrepreneur’s experience and resources and closes or fails outright.  To underline the 
importance of prior knowledge, a lack of prior knowledge is associated with unsuccessful outcomes.  
In 67% of failed and 60% of closed enterprises, the entrepreneur was completely without one of 
either prior knowledge of markets, means to serve or customer solutions on start up.  As previously 
noted in this chapter, it appears that a talent or experience of founding is in isolation insufficient for 
successful venturing in new areas.   
Therefore, if half of all ventures are innovative then some are the result of the transfer (infection) of 
other industries by related knowledge and resources, but the majority of innovation is intra-industry.   
In one example of a successful transfer to a new industry, the serial entrepreneur (Case 2) changed 
to a new industry (mobile phone app development) with a completely new product but he still 
served former clients and their customers by re-using prior knowledge of technology, marketing and 
sales.  He remarked, “Other new skills had to be learned the hard way”, in an emerging sector which 
had little information available and few established firms to replicate.    
Case 20 shows how changing industries can arise from a combination of specific prior knowledge, 
alertness and a preparedness to act.  Here failure caused the opportunity to be abandoned and the 
two partners searched for a new opportunity.  One positive outcome from the failure of a property 
services venture was their strong partnership forged in the heat of very difficult circumstances.  As 
they searched for a new opportunity, an insignificant part of their first venture allowed them to 
notice a significant change in the licencing model for a national database that all established industry 
participants had overlooked.  As they related, “We were starting with a real green field, two 
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incredibly green people who had no experience of start-ups particularly, having failed one already, 
no contacts or industry knowledge of the technology space.  It was a massive massive risk.” 
A change in industry can also occur through the experience of being a customer.  The serial 
entrepreneur’s existing small franchised business developed a competitive advantage from close 
customer-relationships and an outstanding quality of service (Case 25).  The very negative 
experience of being an early customer of a new product in an emerging sector led her to realise that 
she had the appropriate transferrable skills to serve customers better than the incumbent.  She was 
also able to reuse the knowledge gained as a franchisee to move up the value chain to become a 
distributor.  
Cognitive Expertise and Connections between Industry Corridors  
Several cases have been presented in this chapter where serial entrepreneurs successfully changed 
industries, and there were connections of reused prior knowledge and other resources (Cases 1, 2, 5, 
7, 14, 23, 26, 25).  Under Theme 3.  Research question 3.3 asks: Are higher-order cognitive abilities in 
evidence?  In the sections above some detailed examples have been given of experienced serial 
entrepreneurs discovering or developing an industry transferrable business model template with a 
cognitive opportunity discovery and exploitation heuristic to employ it; they occur in Cases 5, 7, 12, 
23 and 26.  These cases support Manimala’s (1992) finding of an organisational opportunity capture 
heuristic and Bingham and Eisenhardt’s (2011) conclusion that heuristics are ‘rational,’ and the 
transition from novice to expert heuristics is an important step in developing resource capabilities.  
Some experienced entrepreneurs are able through mindful (Rerup, 2005) high order thinking (Lord 
and Mather, 1990) to make meta- connections using reasoning by analogy (Baron, 2006; Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005) and mental simulation (Gaglio, 2004) between 
business models in apparently different industries.  Others are able to use small information clues 
(Simon, 1973) to think counterfactually and conceive of opportunities that go against conventional 
wisdom.  These serial entrepreneurs demonstrate a particular and expert level talent.  In addition, it 
will be argued later in this chapter that successful within industry diversifying portfolio 
entrepreneurs employ their own form of this opportunity heuristic.  
The new evidence presented adds to established theory and evidence.  Other studies (e.g. Grégoire, 
Barr and Shepherd, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 2013) show that prior knowledge acts as a 
knowledge corridor, with Venkataraman (1997) arguing that knowledge exhibits path dependent 
qualities.  However, this simple first order comparison of venture similarity cloaks second order 
effects that lead to intra-industry innovations.  Progressively deeper knowledge in familiar areas 
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confers an ability to notice new non-obvious opportunities (e.g. Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010).  
Herein is a likely reason for the higher number of innovative opportunities found in this study than 
might be expected from a review of the literature.  Prior knowledge acts as a cognitive blueprint or 
template (Baron, 2006).  The template and the additional economic costs of acquiring new 
information constrain the development of new knowledge to deeper knowledge of a similar type 
which aids innovation.  Furthermore, we have shown that closure and outright failure triggers 
transformational learning and new but substantial modified efforts to try again in the same industry.  
Furthermore, Shane (2000) maintains that all opportunities are related to prior knowledge.  While 
this is true at the aggregate level for most of the ventures, for some unrelated diversifications the 
link is tenuous, e.g. opportunities introduced and incentivised by government agencies.  This type 
serendipitous alertness of information (given but not sought) (Kirzner, 1973) can be dangerous.  
A much more detailed discussion of the nature of innovation by serial entrepreneurs is provided 
later in this chapter. 
7.8.2 Multiple-Corridor Careers   
Serial entrepreneurs can have careers that traverse more than one industry corridor, though several 
complete changes of corridor are probably rare.  The most experienced serial entrepreneur in the 
study (Case 1) operated in three separate and distinct corridors with apparently little to connect 
them.  The first two corridors (business to business services and computer equipment and software) 
arose from recruitment into entrepreneurship to access his proven managerial ability and technical 
expertise.   The third corridor arose from a serious business failure that resulted in a bankruptcy that 
exhausted both social and financial capital.  When asked why his extensive social and business 
network did not provide another opportunity as earlier in his career, the entrepreneur remarked, 
“Nobody wants to know you when you are bankrupt.  I had hit rock bottom”.  While in other careers 
this may have prompted a permanent exit from entrepreneurship, this resource poor situation and 
lack of alternatives stimulated his entrepreneurial instincts.  When buying a second-hand car at 
auction for his wife he was alert to a completely new opportunity that he had just enough resources 
to address.  He relates how the opportunity developed. “I then bought a couple of second hand cars, 
bought them and sold them and then realised that there are a lot of nearly new cars being sold 
through the auction.  So I set up a business called Phoenix ‘out of the ashes’ of me having lost 
everything, buying used nearly-new cars on behalf of companies”.  This path had no obvious 
connection to previous corridors except for the reuse of his entrepreneurial skills.  In all other 
respects he resembled an undercapitalised novice pursuing his or her first opportunity. 
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7.8.3 Summary and Key Findings 
1.  The aggregate view shows ventures are strongly related to each other.  They form corridors, such 
that one business leads to or is a stepping stone to the next.  However the 50:50 ratio of innovative 
and imitative ventures is strong evidence for both intra and inter-industry innovation across 
successive ventures    
2.  Corridors have adjoining doors.  Over a career a serial entrepreneur may traverse quite distinct 
corridors in different industries, but they are most likely related by transferrable resources.  
3. When a serial entrepreneur through failure “hits rock bottom” and exhausts practically all 
financial and social capital their entrepreneurial instincts will take them in different directions to find 
a low cost means of re-entry.   
7.9 Part 3. Section 2. The Origins of Opportunities  
Research question 2.3 asks:  What is the source of opportunities?  In the opportunity-centric process 
of entrepreneurship the opportunity construct is central and the investigation of start-up experience 
requires the investigation of the source of opportunities.    As the corridor principle (Ronstadt, 1986; 
1988) predicts, having an existing business leads to opportunities not available to nascent 
entrepreneurs, and that these may appear serendipitously, and that social capital (McGrath, 1996) is 
key to explaining the development of real options.  This study confirms the corridor principle that 
existing entrepreneurs have several more avenues to generate new opportunities than nascent 
entrepreneurs who, as has been reported rely on other means to start-up.     
Opportunities from Existing Customers and Employees  
Existing Customers 
All of the founder entrepreneurs described how solving problems for current or potential customers 
was an enormous driver for the genesis and development of their ventures.   Alertness or sensitivity 
to customer problems and then finding solutions is a hallmark of the origins of very often innovative 
solutions in the study.  There are many examples.   An experienced serial entrepreneur started a 
new venture in a new but related industry (from digital print advertising to digital marketing) by 
realising that many of his former large customers were struggling to coordinate a plethora of new 
advertising channels (Case 7).  However, there are no cases in this study of current customers 
initiating solutions that led to new products that became the genesis of start-ups.   A new market 
segment arose when care homes started used industrial lighting systems to assist their elderly 
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residents to keep reading as their vision faded (Case, 13).  As the experienced entrepreneur related, 
“We went into domestic markets. What took us there was an enquiry from ABC homes, they ended 
up buying a lamp for every resident.”    
Existing Employees  
While it is likely that employees are also a source of unique ideas, only suggestions for starting a 
foreign subsidiary were detected in this study.  One suspects that it is possible that many employees’ 
ideas are subsumed within those originating from the entrepreneurial team.  
Mentors 
Approximately half of the serial entrepreneurs had external mentors, in particular those who did not 
have an entrepreneurial family background.  Mentors remained with serial entrepreneurs for several 
businesses and were actively involved in originating or shaping opportunities.  The mentors were all 
entrepreneurs in their own right.  In one venture (Case 7) the experienced mentor provided the 
mentee with an innovative opportunity that they no longer have enough time left in their careers to 
see through.  However, most mentors did not provide opportunities per se, but saw the new start-up 
as an opportunity to take a stake in the enterprise in return for advice or specialist services supplied 
by their firm, such as advertising (Case 10), or to nurture a business with a view to taking a sales 
agent’s commission after a successful exit (Case 11).   
7.9.1 Opportunity from Collaborators    
Collaboration occurs as industries co-evolve (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001).  There is a clear corridor 
effect from existing entrepreneurs finding new opportunities from interaction (information 
exchange) and later collaboration with third parties.  Proactive entrepreneurial third parties bring 
information and new ideas that increase the number of options, opportunities and pathways 
available to entrepreneurs with current businesses or a reputation for successful entrepreneurship.  
Information is exchanged to develop projects of mutual interest.  Active businesses are often well 
known in their industry, their community of customers, suppliers, distributors, competitors and 
government agencies.  Firms encourage interaction and trade through advertising, attending trade 
shows, press coverage and the like that communicate their interests and capabilities.  These 
activities build tangible social capital through actual contacts and intangible links through knowledge 
being spread throughout the marketplace.  Other entrepreneurial owner/managers or employees 
with responsibility for business development actively search to form new opportunities.  They do 
this knowing that they hold options or part solutions that are just part of the picture of potential 
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new opportunities.  Perhaps an extreme version of social ties generating new opportunities is that of 
Case 18.  Here it was the intervention of a third party property services company that probably 
saved an experienced entrepreneur by suggesting that they transfer their business model from 
recruitment to the property services industry.  
Complete Opportunities from Larger Firms 
Larger firms offer serial entrepreneurs distribution and franchise opportunities in the conventional 
way (Cases 16, 17, 24).  In addition, other types of collaborative arrangements are offered to existing 
entrepreneurs when the larger business was unable to pursue an opportunity for legal or 
organisational reasons (Cases 1, 16).  These ‘outsourced’ opportunities were outside the larger firm’s 
normal capabilities, often experimental and carried both financial and reputational risk.  Other 
opportunities arose from legal disputes with other large firms.  From Case 16, “Z (large software 
company) approached us.  They were just about to sign a deal with an Indian company who they 
found was ‘cooking the books’.  They found us through a friend of mine who was very well 
connected with the senior Z company people.  We flew to (the HQ) to meet the senior vice president 
of the business unit and signed on the dotted line all within 10 weeks.” 
Collaborative arrangements can occur serendipitously.  A large company acquired an office 
physically adjacent to the entrepreneur’s site.  “I got involved with ABC Company who was one of 
the funders of the business.  In fact it’s that building right there (pointing to the office building next 
door)” (Case 1).   The resulting start-ups were complementary related diversifications making related 
products and/or serving adjacent customer segments.  These complementary arrangements were 
very profitable because the small business captures the large firm as its distribution channel.  Of 
course, this type of opportunity is most likely to lead to portfolio entrepreneurship as it relies on the 
existing capabilities of the established entrepreneurial firm.   
Partially Complete Opportunities from Small Entrepreneurial Firms or Individuals 
Business to business (B2B) contacts are initiated to develop new opportunities to increase the 
number of real options available to each party.  Entrepreneurial firms approached other established 
similarly sized small firms as potential customers or suppliers.  In one venture from Case 1, a high 
tech company with customers in the haulage, heavy transport industry approached an experienced 
entrepreneur creating value by using new solutions to lower the cost of domestic vehicle insurance. 
An entrepreneur struggling to manufacture a new product shared the problem with an experienced 
serial software entrepreneur with shared social interests (Case 15).  The conversation resulted in a 
successful new start-up that extended the functionality of the physical product using a mobile app.   
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As previously exampled (Cases 9, 26) in the section on modes of founding of experienced serial 
entrepreneurs, some spins-offs and diversification opportunities are generated by ‘walk-in’ ‘would 
be’ entrepreneurs (Cases 9, 17, 20, 26).  As in all diversifications the entrepreneur must be 
experienced and able enough to make the meta-cognitive connection between experience and the 
new opportunity with all elements of prior knowledge (markets, means to serve and solution) if the 
new venture is to be a success.  
Incomplete Opportunities from Consultancies and Industry Bodies 
Incomplete opportunities come from advisory and consultative bodies seeking potential solutions on 
behalf of their clients.  Industries and professions provide both formal and informal forums to 
discuss problems and potential solutions.  For example, the genesis of one of the ventures of Case 1 
arose from a problem retaining trainee accountants.  The experienced serial entrepreneur heard of 
the problem through membership of his professional body.  The collaboration resulted in an 
innovative service that defied conventional wisdom.  A successful serial entrepreneur who had 
specialised his venture to serve a particular industry was commissioned to consult to that industry 
on a long standing problem (Case 11).  The serial entrepreneur related, “From the research I knew 
this problem would not solve itself, it would get worse.  No one was looking at it seriously, but I 
knew a way to stop an industry wide problem.  It was a combination of looking for a problem that 
needed solving and having the domain knowledge about the suppliers, so I knew from the supplier 
side what was happening.”  This access to specialist and specific information about the problem and 
solution, combined with the expertise and liquidity after a successful exit to create a new and 
innovative venture, placed the entrepreneur in a unique and advantageous position.  
The case studies suggest that collaboratively developed opportunities between roughly equal parties 
coming from different perspectives can generate highly innovative if still strongly related 
opportunities.  On the negative side it has already been shown from the case analysis that 
government supported bodies do approach established entrepreneurs with unrelated  ‘blue sky’ 
opportunities that are inherently risky and too distant from the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge.  
Even experienced entrepreneurs are well advised only to start new ventures with a high degree of fit 
with the essential elements of prior experience needed for both recognition and execution.  Perhaps 
novices entrepreneur are more innovative because their cognitive recognition ability outweighs their 
implication ability and a few ‘get lucky’.  Looking at the ‘body count’ of unsuccessful first ventures, it 
is novice entrepreneurs rather than serial entrepreneurs who take more risks.  
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7.9.2 Summary and Key Findings 
1.  The corridor principal that existing entrepreneurs have many more avenues to generate potential 
opportunities than nascent entrepreneurs is confirmed.  
2.  Being brought or developing opportunities in collaboration with third parties generates new 
opportunities for both serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.  
3. The pooling of common goals, complementary resources and knowledge with collaborators of all 
types is a source of innovation.   
4. However, there are pitfalls, such as cognitive and social traps to avoid when outside parties such 
as government agencies and foreign nationals introduce unrelated diversifications.   
7.10 Part 3. Section 3.  Finding Opportunities: Search, Alertness, Social Capital 
Research question 2.4 asks:  Do opportunities arise from intentional search or from serendipitous 
alertness?   Research question 3.3 asks: Are higher-order cognitive abilities in evidence?  In the 
opportunity centric theory of entrepreneurship, there is a very substantial body of theory and some 
evidence of opportunity discovery that relies on either economic search (Fiet, 1996) or alertness 
(Kirzner, 1973).     
These are alternative means of information acquisition and processing and provide insights into the 
cognitive processes of entrepreneurs.  Following Berglund (2007) it was decided to directly ask the 
entrepreneurs about the informational origins of their opportunities.   
7.10.1 Entrepreneur’s Experience of Information Discovery 
The entrepreneurs were more likely to mention discovery without systematic search (alertness) 
(50%) (Cases 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 26) than searching (31%) (Cases 3, 7, 9, 14, 16, 
17, 21, 23) to discover opportunities.  However, 15% (Cases 5, 6, 20, 25) said that it was a 
combination of both alertness and search.  In a re-examination of the cases in terms of the actions 
taken to discover opportunities there is some evidence that half of all cases used both.   
When asked if opportunities for new ventures arose from search or alertness responses included:  
“Serendipity, I notice stuff, I am aware, I see an opportunity” (Case 1).  “It was serendipity, not 
conscious effort.  It is just about having ears and eyes open to what is happening” Case 2).  “It can be 
one sentence said down the pub, that’s how I found the idea to make X” (Case 10).  
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Alternatively, others commented on the value of search.  “I am doing research every day of the 
week; it is the opposite of serendipity” (Case 14).  “It is searching to find missing things.  Serendipity, 
no that was definitely not the case” (Case 7).  “I research software in great detail.  It is a constant, 
when you build a service.”    
References to search occurred in three types of structured activity:  
1) Looking for imitative opportunities to replicate or adapt by novice entrepreneurs after the 
decision to become an entrepreneur has been made (Cases 3, 8, 12, 14, 18, 23); 
2) Researching areas of potential innovation where means and ends are only vaguely known;  (Cases 
6, 11, 14, 16, 19, 21, 25) and  
3) Using search to develop an existing opportunity to keep in step with changes in competition, 
customer needs, technology and the like (Cases 1, 7, 10, 13, 17, 24).   
In addition, the analysis of the modes of venture creation revealed that search is used by 
entrepreneurs when using a template or heuristic to find and filter potential opportunities (Cases 12, 
23, 26).   
Formal Search Mechanisms   
As a test for the use of economic systematic search, each entrepreneur was asked if they had paid 
for research, had commissioned research, or had asked employees to search for opportunities.  With 
one exception (Case 26) that had set up internal procedures for assessing new opportunities, all 
answered in the negative.   It was much easier to do it themselves.  “Only you really know what you 
are looking for” (Case 23). “The nuances and sensitivities of what is in your mind are very difficult to 
explain to a paid researcher” (Case 20). One entrepreneur (Case 14) spent a year using the internet 
and talking to local universities researching an opportunity that he had noticed.  Like other 
entrepreneurs in the study, the idea came to him from the vantage point of being the customer, 
from noticing what is missing.  He had “retired” after selling a venture and wanted to buy a product 
for his new house.  He had a ‘hunch’ that a product was there, not missing.  Only when he searched 
for it did he discover it was unavailable.  After further research, he realised that he had exactly the 
appropriate prior knowledge from the previous venture to develop a solution.   
Some entrepreneurs confirmed existing research (e.g. Bhave, 1984; Koller, 1998) in that they 
searched for suitable opportunities only after they had decided to become entrepreneurs.  As 
already described, some took waged employment as a form of search to acquire information to start 
their own copy of the business.  They were not exactly sure what kind of opportunity they were 
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seeking, but they wanted to have their own business.  The exact opportunity was a secondary 
consideration.  As one related (Case 3), “Owning a firm, doing your own thing is the opportunity”.  
One entrepreneur (case 23) set out to be an imitator, “The second McDonalds” and confined his 
search for an opportunity to the fast food sector, researching future competitors, taking notes on 
prices, products, customer footfall and other planning information.   
Many talked about serendipitous discovery or presentation of information not sought, but they also 
emphasised all the hard research work that put them in the position to be gifted this insight. 
Interestingly, two unconnected technology serial entrepreneurs (Cases 6, 20) responded by saying 
that they used a synthesis of both alertness and search methods of information gathering.  Both 
referred to the importance of peripheral vision.  One explained how a synthesis of both approaches 
worked in practice.  “Search is looking where you choose to focus, alertness is to information you 
have in your peripheral vision.”  It is possible that they may have been subconsciously thinking about 
the quote by futuristic writer J.G Ballard who wrote “the periphery is where the future reveals 
itself.”  Nevertheless, it provides an insight into the cognitive information acquisition and processing 
mechanism used by some entrepreneurs.  It is consistent with a process of innovation occurring 
within an information corridor.  This insight is also consistent with Thomas Edison’s adage of 
combining perspiration and inspiration to discover innovation.   
7.10.2 Social Capital, Networks, and Locality  
Research question 2.5 asks:  What is the role of social capital in this process?  
Social Capital: Close Networks 
Many serial entrepreneurs remarked that they consciously avoided developing a network of general 
contacts.  They wanted to keep their activities secret and saw no value in joining entrepreneurs’ 
clubs or organisations such as the UK’s Federation of Small Business (FSB).  Confirming existing 
research (e.g. de Koning, 2003; Gemmell, Boland and Kolb, 2012) on ‘inner circles’, they nearly all 
used the term “close network” to describe a small decision making group consisting of venture 
partners and family members.  Typically, lead entrepreneurs would describe how they themselves 
maintain tight control of the finances and legal aspects of the business.  Consequently, very few had 
professionals, such as lawyers or accountants as part of their close network.  Those professionals 
who were in the close networks contributed very specialist skills.  For example, in Case 9 the team 
was augmented by lawyers experienced in international tax law.  As previously mentioned, mentors 
played a role in roughly half the cases, the other group could usually rely on entrepreneurial family 
members.   
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The less experienced entrepreneurs could be prone to taking inappropriate advice from consultants. 
This occurred in (Case 3) where the entrepreneur commented, “By that stage, years three, four, five 
we were taking advice from consultants and all sorts of different people.  “Their advice was, you’ve 
got to grow as fast as possible to get some critical mass whereby it then becomes a self-fulfilling 
growth curve.  It proved to be very dangerous.” 
Serial entrepreneurs could be very negative about the value of outside professional help from 
accountants.  A representative reply to questions in this area was, “They might tell you the options 
but you had to get the facts and make the decision” (Case 10).  Another without prompting 
described his external accountants as “pretty bloody pathetic” (Case 1) and another said they had 
contemplated suing their external accountant (Case 24).  On the other hand several made 
complimentary remarks about the support they had received from their banks (Cases 10, 15, 24, 26) 
which as already noted could be instrumental in recovering from a failure (Case 26). 
Purposeful Networks  
The analysis found examples of a second type of network, called here a ‘purposeful network’.  
Purposeful networks are instruments to carry out structured economic search for information not 
readily available, and were mentioned by those serial entrepreneurs who said that they used search 
to discover and develop opportunities.  A purposeful network can be a sales network built from 
contacts gathered at trade shows (Case 20).  One entrepreneur described spending most of his time 
travelling to meet organisations that were essential to getting his venture accepted by the industry.  
He repeated this strategy in both his ventures (Case 14).  A purposeful network also provides 
opportunities for serendipitous discovery.  One entrepreneur (Case 6) said that “Networking puts me 
in a place where I am much more likely to discover information that is useful even though I may not 
be looking specifically.”  
Geography 
The study evidence shows that the discovery of new information is often constrained by geographic 
location.  Geography determines proximity to customers which in some sectors is a limiting factor.  
However, embedding in a particular locality is a significant dimension to information networks and 
gives access to opportunities not easily available to others.  In one case, a serial entrepreneur 
remarked on how one venture brought him to Clerkenwell in London, also known as ‘silicon 
roundabout’ (Case 6).  This move allowed a later software venture to reach a global market due to 
its proximity to high speed low cost server capacity in the neighbourhood.  As previously mentioned 
from Case 1, a series of related ventures began when a neighbouring business was acquired by a 
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large international company.  The ensuing reorganisation generated a number of new opportunities  
for the experienced serial entrepreneur located next door.  Being in close proximity fosters social 
ties and flows of specific private information.  Another serial entrepreneur (Case 11) made a 
breakthrough in his business fortunes by contacting a neighbour, Trevor Bayliss, the inventor of 
clockwork radio. “Trevor introduced us to his manufacturer and they introduced us to QVC, a TV 
shopping channel.”   
Nevertheless, serial entrepreneurs can develop sophisticated information capture and analysis 
systems through networking and collaboration.  A frame-breaking innovative new venture needed to 
create new information about likely future prices and price elasticity.  This was achieved by 
supplying customer demand data from pilot installations to researchers in a leading UK university, in 
exchange for the results of quantitative modelling and access to other research and expert opinion.  
In return the university uses the data to produce academic papers and bid for research funding (Case 
14).  
Formal systematic search is employed during the detailing phase of opportunity recognition as 
opportunities move from ideas to concrete systems to exploit the idea.  Search is used to find 
instances of existing components, such as an insurance underwriter willing to underwrite a new type 
of insurance policy (Case 1).  In this case the insurance policy component was introduced by a 
collaborator.  As has been discussed and illustrated above, parties with partial solutions with missing 
or unsatisfactory opportunity components approach another party and share their information.    
The other party may not know exactly what they are looking for but recognise it when they find it.  
Both parties may not be actively searching but a serendipitous information exchange between two 
cognitively alert persons can bring the pieces of the puzzle together.  
Information Capture by Serial Entrepreneurs  
The serial entrepreneurs in the study select and build information channels (Fiet, 1996) to obtain 
relevant information signals pertinent to their research objective.  Along the way they notice or are 
alert (Kirzner, 1973) to other things in their peripheral vision. This confirms the view taken in the 
development of the theoretical framework, that cognitively both search and alertness are 
constrained by knowledge corridors.    
Experience and search expands prior knowledge also increasing peripheral alertness.  Established, 
experienced entrepreneurs are also given specific valuable information related to a new opportunity 
(Casson, 1982) called here an ‘opportunity lead’ within or outside of their immediate area of 
interest.  To be given leads entrepreneurs are actively searching, or third parties know or guess the 
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business interests of established entrepreneurs and pass leads and/or collaborate to form new 
opportunities, pooling and expanding their real options (McGrath, 1997) using an effectual , 
experimental, evolutionary process.  Most often the problem is recognised before the solution is 
conceived.  The solution is then searched for.  The process appears not to be instantaneous but 
closer to a start-stop process that continues after start-up and is intrinsic to the development of the 
new firm.   This mixed response to the search vs. alertness question reflects, perhaps, the overall 
information cost of an opportunity, low cost if serendipitous, expensive if by search. 
Serial entrepreneurs have the option to ignore signals from outside their area of interest, investigate 
further, or process the information and thereby revalue their information portfolio.  Information 
portfolios are similar to any other asset class in having a value that varies according to content and 
context.  Constant assessment, synthesis and economic revaluation of information generates the 
alert entrepreneur’s ‘hunch’ (Kirzner, 1973), triggering further information gathering and processing.  
7.10.3 Summary and Key Findings  
1. Both search and alertness are bounded by knowledge corridors.  
2.  Some serial entrepreneurs describe a complementary and simultaneous cognitive process that 
combines both.  
3.  Search is used by entrepreneurs to replicate incumbent businesses after they had decided to 
become entrepreneurs, to filter potential opportunities using a template, to research innovations,  
and to develop an existing opportunity.  
4. No entrepreneur delegated or paid for search. This reveals that search is idiosyncratic and 
subjective and more akin to its alertness counterpart than is usually considered.   
5. Consistent with existing research, many serial entrepreneurs avoided making general contacts and 
used a ‘close network’ consisting of other venture partners, family members or mentors to support 
decision making.   
6. Many were very negative about the value of professionals.   
7. Some used purposeful networks to carry out structured economic search for information not 
readily available. 
8. Overall, binary mutually exclusive definitions of search and alertness are not always useful; the 
actual process is often more complex.   
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7.11 Part 4. Section 1. Innovative vs. Imitative Opportunities 
This section contributes findings and analysis relevant to Theme 3.  Serial entrepreneurs create a 
significant proportion of firms but their role in creating innovative new firms is under researched.  
Do they copy existing forms or create new means-ends combinations?   
Degree of innovation is considered to be a marker of entrepreneurial ability.  Innovative firms are 
assumed to implement high quality, high value opportunities (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 
2009).  High ability entrepreneurs will be selected and matched to innovative opportunities and 
ventures.  Individuals with less entrepreneurial ability discover and exploit imitative venture ideas 
(Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009).   
Evolutionists inspired by Schumpeter emphasise the importance of novice entrepreneurs to create 
frame-breaking opportunities (Aldrich and Reuf, 2006) because habitual entrepreneurs are too 
bound by their industry experience (Alvarez, Barney and Young, 2010; Delmar and Shane, 2006).  An 
alternative evolutionary view is that serial entrepreneurs repeat a creative and innovative process 
used in one industry at the start of another (Alvarez, Barney and Young, 2010).  However, being 
bound by industry experience is not necessary a bad thing in respect of finding new innovations (e.g. 
Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010).   
So far in this thesis, evidence has been presented that supports both evolutionary views: intra and 
inter-industry evolution.   There are good economic and cognitive reasons for all types of multiple 
founder entrepreneurs to reuse existing knowledge and resources within an industry corridor.  
Existing theory and evidence shows that non-exiting portfolio entrepreneurs are most likely to start 
closely related ventures.  The study data shows that approximately half of serial entrepreneurs 
maintain their entire careers within the same industry.  Furthermore, there is a high degree of 
similarity to previous ventures (see Table 7.9).   However, despite this 50% of ventures are 
innovative.  Therefore, as concluded above, this table suggests that there is both inter and intra-
industry innovation.   
The case studies show that experienced entrepreneurs find or are given new opportunities that may 
be related or unrelated to the current firm.  Only those that are related in a clear and fundamental 
way to previous ventures are likely to survive.  Unsuccessful entrepreneurs often try again with the 
same or an adapted approach.  In contrast, successful exits empower serial entrepreneurs to use 
their liquidity to overcome legal and competitive restrictions that prevent replicative/imitative 
venture creation so they start-up again often in a distinctly different industry or sector.   
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We already have evidence that serial entrepreneurs and portfolio entrepreneurs play a significant 
role in the creation of innovative new enterprises.  Additional evidence and analysis of the topic of 
innovation is presented here.  
7.11.1 Start-Ups and Industry Stage  
Research question 3.1 asks: Are serial entrepreneurs innovative or imitative?  We know from 
previous analysis that the broad aggregate pattern is 50:50 innovative vs. imitative start-ups.  Serial 
founders are just as likely to found new businesses at the start of new industries; in pre-emergent 
and emergent industries as to start-up in established growth or mature industries.    
17% of start-ups were in pre-emergent and 33% in emergent sectors.  Examples were found in  
executive recruitment (early 1970s) (Case 2), keep-fit  (early 1970s) (Case 25), secure document 
storage (Cases 1, 22), digital printing (Case 9), on-line retailing (Case 3), mobile telephony (Cases 2, 
14), e-commerce (Cases 17, 21), on-line mental health services (Case 17), and other technology 
centric ventures (Cases 1, 6, 11, 16, 18, 19).  For the other half, 24% of start-ups were in growth 
sectors where demand exceeded supply including fast food (Case 23), computer equipment (Case 1), 
recruitment (Cases 2, 26), and IT systems integration (Case 8).  A further 26% of start-ups were in 
mature sectors such as building supplies (Case 10) and print-based advertising (Case 9).  
 
Table 7.11 Venture by Industry Stage 
Examining individual careers there are no new obvious correlations or patterns.  A Serial 
entrepreneur could enter a young industry and continue making innovations e.g. (Cases 6, 13, 15, 
16, 19, 21), enter a mature industry and then in a subsequent start-up introduce an innovation that 
would completely change it (Case 9), or start a venture that revisits past successes at the mature 
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phase of the industry (Cases 16, 22, 26).  The reasons and drivers behind these choices are 
idiosyncratic, but as has been shown they rest on decisions concerning the opportunities that arise 
in the course of a career, in particular the cognitively mindful (or mindless) reuse of prior knowledge, 
and the exit conditions of the previous venture.  
7.11.2 Degree and Type of Innovation  
In the aggregate, it has been shown that nearly half (47%) of all start-ups created new products or 
services.  In the pursuit of other patterns of innovation the type of innovation is presented in Table 
7.12.   
 
Table 7.12 Venture Start-up Innovation vs. Imitation 
Following on from the analysis of venture by industry stage, it is entirely consistent to find that the 
serial entrepreneurs focus their activities on new markets rather than diversifying into new market 
segments serving similar customers or producing related products.   
With emphasis on pre-emergent and emergent markets it is again consistent to find that 27% of 
ventures exploited products or services assessed here as genuinely innovative and hence ‘new to the 
world’.   
Though so far a third of the new to world classification of venture had closed down or failed 
outright, e.g. an internet domain business (Case 11), home working via the internet (Case 13), 
interactive photo tours (Case 15), work based learning (Case 13), licenced premises management 
(Case 20), this type of venture is the most valuable as measured by the proceeds from the sale on 
exit.  Many are still current enterprises with good prospects for continued growth.  This group 
243 
 
includes: LED lighting, software to handle mobile telephone calls, mobile apps for a variety of 
existing tasks, on-line advertising monetisation, integration of mobile phone data platforms and the 
automation of digital marketing.  This finding supports the assumption (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead 
and Wright, 2009) that innovative opportunities are of higher quality and have greater wealth 
creating potential.    
New to market included introducing products and services to the UK for the first time from the US 
and other countries, such as CAD/CAM solutions (Case 16) multi-media and digital printing (Case 7), 
and secure storage (Case 1).  Failure and closed frequency is still significant (38%), but again 
substantial personal wealth was earned by exiting serial founders selling to trade buyers and venture 
equity firms.  
Start-ups that created new market segments could arise from entrepreneurs now diversifying to 
build a portfolio of related enterprises (Cases 9, 16, 24), or by serial entrepreneurs founding a new 
business by copying an existing venture (external replication), but adapting it for an alternative 
segment so as not to compete head-on with the incumbent (Cases 9, 19, 23).  Most of these 
ventures remain current, still owned and managed by the founder.  
The imitative class of venture, of course, corresponds to start-ups that add to the existing supply of 
already available products and services.  Though classified as imitative, many involved substantial 
entrepreneurial risk taking as they were start-ups in emergent markets with few participants, such 
as in multi-media applications (Case 5), biomass renewable energy systems (Case 24), ecommerce 
(Case 21) and mobile app development (Case 2).  Ventures in this category involved substantial 
innovation in areas such as in the supply chain for children’s toys and garden equipment, often using 
techniques and resources learned and acquired in previous ventures (Cases 10, 16, 26) .  Risk as 
measured by unsuccessful exits is higher than might be expected at 40%, but the frequency of 
making a successful and remunerative exit is still (21%) with the remainder still current ventures.   
Innovation and Venture Sequence 
The study has already reported that there is some evidence that novice entrepreneurs who did not 
incubate their first opportunities in employment are more likely to introduce innovative 
opportunities.  This could be construed as confirming the view of some evolutionists (e.g. Aldrich 
and Ruef, 2006) that novice entrepreneurs are more likely to introduce innovative opportunities.  
However, on the contrary, overall innovative ventures are founded in a constant proportion. 
Moreover, there appears to be (see Table 7.12) an experience effect in the evident increasing 
frequency of genuinely innovative new to the world start-ups.   
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A way to reconcile these findings is straightforwardly to note that most serial entrepreneurs 
innovate, and some are highly innovative throughout their careers, including those very innovative 
novices (Cases 1, 17, 20, 21).  These novices would be considered by ‘success breeds success’ 
thinkers as innately innovative.  From an entrepreneurial learning perspective, spill-over effects from 
experience are also in their favour, helping them to maintain their frequency of innovation.  Other 
serial entrepreneurs clearly learn to be innovative or discover this quality in later ventures (Cases 3, 
6, 7, 16, 25, 26).  A conclusion is that researchers should include some measure of innovativeness as 
a type of entrepreneurial human capital and as a measure of venture quality.  Innovation is also a 
potential measure of risk as the data indicates that innovation is not strongly associated with 
successful exits.  
Second, third, fourth, fifth and later start-up venture innovations are much more related to prior 
knowledge and specific entrepreneurial experience developed in previous ventures.   As reported,  
innovative opportunities arise from three sources:  a) those related to new information 
endogenously generated by an existing business, b) the application of new technology exogenous to 
the current business and c) opportunities introduced by potential collaborators.   
Innovation in Opportunity Components   
The nature of innovation is further analysed from a number of perspectives using a synthesis of 
existing opportunity frameworks (e.g. George and Bock, 2011; Shane, 2000; Venkataraman and 
Sarasvathy, 2001) in Table 7.13 below.  It has already been reported that serial entrepreneurs create 
innovative new products and also business models/means to serve that they transfer to other 
industries.     
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Table 7.13 Opportunity Creativity: Means, Ends, Business Model 
16% of innovative start-ups contained the creation of new means, in the form of new solutions but 
used conventional business models to address existing customer needs.  These include mobile 
phone data transfer, digital printing, route optimisation for satellite navigation, on-line photo 
montage services, and ecommerce for professional services.   
15% of opportunities involved a new business model to deliver either new means or ends.  For 
example, a serial entrepreneur wrote a completely new software solution for the global market of 
bee keepers, and delivered it using a subscription business model based on the number of hives 
(Case 15).  Similarly, electronic document storage (Case 22) required a new business model not 
based on the use of conventional warehouse space, deposit, retrieval and collection.  
The small number (5%) of means-ends innovations corresponds to new software solutions that meet 
new needs but delivered through a conventional software licencing business model (Cases 11, 14, 
15, 16). 
10% of opportunities exploited by serial entrepreneurs are classified as highly creative, involving 
both new solutions (means) and new applications (ends) as well as new forms of business 
organisation (business model).  As might be anticipated these are all new to the world products and 
services of which several examples have been given.  In the world of services an experienced 
entrepreneur devised a means to allow employees who were not entitled to a company car to 
receive employee benefits that by creative use of the tax system would achieve the equivalent.  
Thereby he created the means, ends and means to serve/business model (Case 1).  
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As would likely be seen in any study of innovation, the determining factors that frame the 
entrepreneurs’ creativity are:  the nature of the industry, the technology and customer needs.  
These determine, to quote an entrepreneur “What was missing” and therefore had to be created to 
provide all three elements of viable opportunity.  As Plato said “Necessity is the mother of 
invention”. 
In this sample study, there also appears to be no association between innovation and the binary 
measure of venture outcome: successful or unsuccessful exit.  However, those innovative 
opportunities that did result in business sales were larger and generated more wealth for the serial 
entrepreneur.  Nevertheless, as already discussed, the outcome of a previous venture has a 
significant impact on innovation.  These are:  a) to try again after failure with an adapted means, 
ends or business model, or b) to replicate and transfer successful elements in another context.  This 
latter group contains innovative and creative entrepreneurs who found several equally innovative 
enterprises.  As previously noted they reuse specialist knowledge such as in the application of new 
technologies from venture to venture often in different industries.  This group would be recognised 
by other researchers (e.g. Eesley and Roberts, 2012) as part of an elite group where ‘success breeds 
success’.  The former group is where ‘failure breeds success’, through a process of entrepreneurial 
learning.    
7.11.3 Summary and Key Findings 
1.  Serial entrepreneurs do play a prominent role in innovation.  They provide both intra and inter-
industry innovation, a finding that supports both evolutionary views of serial entrepreneurs  posited 
by Alvarez, Barney and Young, (2010).    
2.  Most serial entrepreneurs innovate at some point in their careers and some are highly innovative 
throughout their careers, some from their first novice venture.  
3. They operate at the beginning of pre-emergent and emergent industries but also bring 
innovations to established sectors.   
4.  The increasing frequency of genuinely innovative new to the world start-ups in the overall sample 
suggests that innovation can be learned.   
5. The evidence supports the assumption (e.g. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009) that 
innovative opportunities are of higher quality and wealth creating potential.    
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6. Innovative opportunities are related to corridor effects arising from:  a) new information 
endogenously generated by an existing business, b) the application of new technology and c) 
opportunities from collaborators.   
7. Serial entrepreneurs create new solutions (means), new applications (ends), and also and 
importantly for inter-industry innovation new forms of business organisation (business 
model/means to serve). 
7.12 Part 4.  Section 2. Objective Discovery vs. Subjective Construction  
Research question 3.2 asks: Are opportunities discovered or created?   3.3 asks:  Are higher-order 
cognitive abilities in evidence?  
The opportunity-centric theory of entrepreneurship wrestles with how information, however 
acquired, determines the extent to which opportunities already exist and are objectively real and  
‘out there’ waiting to be recognised, or alternatively are subjective ‘in there’ and only come into 
existence through creative thoughts put into action.  In this study, following Berglund (2007) the 
entrepreneurs were asked directly about the origins of their opportunities in the expectation that 
they would think reflectively and meta-cognitively (Flavell, 1979) about their entrepreneurial 
process.  
As already reported, founded ventures are divided roughly 50:50 between innovative and imitative 
ventures.   Half of all start-ups were to exploit opportunities where demand, supply and a business 
model already existed.  Many were described by entrepreneurs as conscious and planned 
replications of an employer’s business or cloned “reboots” of their own ventures.  These 
opportunities are objectively ‘out-there’ (Mole and Mole, 2010), not requiring as much imagination 
to construct.  Nevertheless, even clones are not exact copies as circumstances are not identical and 
entrepreneurs introduce changes to implement what they had learned.  
7.12.1 Entrepreneur’s Experience of Opportunity Discovery or Creation 
Discovery 
A clear majority (65%) felt that they had discovered their opportunity.  Responses  include, “It was 
discovery, most probably; I’ve not created any new markets.  I go where there is an identified 
opportunity and de-risk it for ourselves and our customers.  I am not a creative entrepreneur” (Case 
7).  “I would say discovery, I’ve not invented a new piece of software.”  “I’ve always wanted to do my 
own thing and it was a question of finding a business with which to achieve this aim” (Case 11).  
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Creativity 
Only a few entrepreneurs (13%) maintained that they had created the opportunity.  They had all 
developed ‘new to the world’ opportunities so there was some support for their self-analysis.  They 
had either been the first to notice the problem and had invented a new way to solve it, or they were 
aware of a completely new technology and applied it to an industry they knew intimately.  “I saw 
how it (a new technology) would eventually wipe out three separate industries” (Case 7).  His 
current venture is also born of this same cognitive ‘creation by projection’  or reasoning by analogy, 
that the industry conditions prevailing at the time of an extremely innovative venture are very 
similar to those prevailing in another industry, and that he is uniquely placed in that ‘corridor’ to 
recognise and act upon it.   He said, “Generally speaking, it (my career) has been doing things in a 
different way that nobody else is doing. “   
Cognitively talented serial entrepreneurs are expected to be able to think beyond prior knowledge 
and succeed in new domains (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  From experiential learning by doing, serial 
founders can develop cross-industry template business models (Baron, 2006) and heuristics (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) to search for and screen suitable opportunities and make bi-
associations (Ko and Butler, 2003; 2006) to create ideas where none existed before.  Some serial 
entrepreneurs are able to extrapolate trends into the future to create new opportunities using 
mental simulation (Gaglio, 2004).  Others see meta-connections between opportunities in seemingly 
unrelated industries by reasoning by analogy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). 
Another entrepreneur (Case 14) used a similar technique, “I always make 5 year plans for myself.  I 
did this when in employment and update the plan every year”.  “I am very lucky in that I can see 
forward 10 years in terms of where technology is going, and can identify opportunities that are likely 
to emerge.  It is creation.  The idea of X just didn’t exist.”  Again this entrepreneur used the same 
cognitive process to devise his latest venture, commenting, “What we are doing just didn’t exist 
before.  There are people who are now doing parts of what we do, but the core of what we do is 
unique based on a vision.”  This suggests that some serial entrepreneurs reuse the same mental 
processes or heuristic for opportunity recognition that yielded successful opportunities in the past.  
In addition, with a track-record and reputation they are able, as Shane and Khurana (2003) noted, to 
convince others to reallocate resources in new ways that run counter to existing norms. 
Entrepreneurs Self-Assessment of Creativity 
Not all serial entrepreneurs are able to recognise their achievement as a creative process of 
subjective opportunity construction.  This seems to be particularly true for software entrepreneurs, 
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who may create new means but do not make claims to have created new ends or a business model.  
The process appears to be ‘out there’ not ‘in there’ and/or they are perhaps constrained by the 
social conventions of humility.  “If I hadn’t created the software package someone else would have 
eventually” (Case 11).  In this case, even if they had introduced both means and ends they did not 
think that they had created the actual opportunity.  It was out there waiting to be discovered. They 
had just got there first.  The problem was out there, as were the means or tools in software 
development, even if the actual solution was not.  Another entrepreneur (Case 21) said, “It was the 
logical next step.  There were only three ways of solving the on-line rewards problem and mine was 
one of these”.  Pinning down creativity in software development may be difficult, because software 
ventures tend to replace existing ends: human, paper or semi-automated processes with software 
that either a) mimics existing processes or b) facilitates the transfer and integration of data between 
existing technologies.   
Portfolio founders of related ventures may not be sensitive to their own creatively.  In a portfolio of 
related businesses in the music sector (Case 9), the entrepreneur hit upon the idea of retailing music 
as MP3 files via the internet. While he was adamant that they were really the first in the world to do 
this, he didn’t put any emphasis on creativity.  He said, “They were already using the internet and 
had been distributing music on CD”.  He described using the MP3 innovation as “Merely filling an 
obvious gap in our range of music products and services”.   
Discovery and Creation Combined: Packaging 
A significant minority (22%) said that it was a “bit of both”, some discovery, some imagination and 
creativity.  “A combination, some I invented myself or with other people” (Case 17).  “I suppose it’s 
the gap, the thing which isn’t there.  That is another way of thinking about an opportunity, 
something missing” (Case 1).  Here the problem and the solution were intertwined and both could 
be objectively researched and simultaneously subjectively contemplated.  When asked to explain the 
nature of their creativity, some emphasised the assembly of different components that already 
existed but were packaged in a different way.  A serial entrepreneur (Case 6) used the business 
analogy of the Lotus sports car being assembled from standard (mainly Ford produced) components.  
“We use pre-existing everything.  Steve Jobs didn’t invent anything.  It is a bit like Lotus.  He took 
Cortina rear axle components from other cars but the sum of the parts was a Lotus 7.  But what we 
do with the bits we do get in, is we create a unique proposition.”  The same metaphor of 
rearrangement and repackaging occurred in several interviews such as, “Looking for and assembling 
the pieces of a jigsaw” (Case 21).  It is interesting that these same two entrepreneurs said that they 
combined search and alertness as focus but sensitive to new information in their peripheral vision.  
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As the analysis of innovation of the different components of an opportunity shows, creativity and 
discovery can be combined.  One or more elements: means, business model, ends are discovered, 
others are created.  Other components are ‘ready-made’ from a previous venture.   
The software industry creates intellectual property and then licenses it, “Make once, sell many 
times” (Case 6).  This entrepreneur realised (discovered) that software distribution is more effective 
via the internet and ‘the cloud’ than by physical CD ROMs.  The newly discovered, exogenous ‘out 
there’ method of distribution added value by extending the reach of his created software solution to 
service international clients with global operations.   In a venture from Case 1, the new business 
model was created endogenously.  The entrepreneur demonstrated an ability to use small 
information clues (Simon, 1973) and think counterfactually (Gaglio, 2004). Without changing the 
means or ends, he added value by realising through an act of counterfactual  higher order thinking, 
that the best way to manage the peaks and troughs of demand and supply for courier services was 
to reverse the standard industry practice of allocating orders first to full time couriers and then to 
contract staff.  He would have mentally simulated (Gaglio, 2004) the new solution before deploying 
it.  
Very experienced entrepreneurs referred to “Rearranging parts, some borrowed from other 
businesses and previous experience “  (Case 1).  The creative element was “seeing what is missing” 
and making a new combination, the “packaging” (Cases 1, 5) of existing components.   The 
‘packaging’ and ‘pieces of the jigsaw’ metaphors appear to combine pure discovery (of existing 
components) and creativity (how the components are combined).  The use of the verb “seeing” does 
not mean just discovery.  Framed as a cognitive process it can mean both objective discovery and 
subjective construction.  
Another very experienced entrepreneur described an evolutionary process, “We were not the 
Beatles, we were evolutionary not revolutionary” (Case 5).  One serial entrepreneur associated the 
construct of creativity with invention.  “We didn’t invent anything.  We simply took existing 
technologies and found a way to implement them for customers” (Case 7).   Experienced serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs are very likely to have more knowledge formed into ‘ready to go’ 
templates/blueprints that generate more options and combinations of options.  Further research is 
required. 
Case 1 contains more than one example of packaging.  From this entrepreneur’s intimate knowledge 
of the industry, he noticed how the very high price of insurance encouraged rational consumer 
behaviour that maintained the high price.  Familiar with all the other elements of how customer 
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value was created, he went through several iterations of negotiations with different suppliers, 
resulting in a lower cost insurance policy as part of an overall package.  When asked if this process is 
better described as creation or discovery he answered, “It was both.  It was the packaging that was 
new.  It was the packaging of the pieces rather than the creation of them that was key.  We worked 
out what was missing and then put a package together.”  Looking back over his career from the 
venture cited it was apparent packaging was a cognitive skill learned in previous ventures.  It is likely 
‘packaging’ involved a number of discrete cognitive processes already cited to develop bi-
associations (Ko and Butler, 2003; 2006) between unrelated domains to create ideas where none 
existed before. 
In addition, it is interesting to note that these responses align quite closely the metaphors for the 
opportunity formation process favoured by theorists, such as ‘sewing a patchwork quilt’ (Sarasvathy, 
2001), ‘assembling pieces of meccano’, ‘finding the last piece of the jigsaw’, (Casson, 1982), and 
‘joining the dots’ (Baron, 2006).   
Being customer focussed is essential to the combined discovery, creation and packaging process.  In 
many cases including those cited in this section, close relationships with key customers allowed an 
informed and feedback driven effectual experimentation process where both customer and 
entrepreneur were near equal stakeholders.  
In other innovative ventures it is the packaging, the assembly, and some modification of existing 
components, means, ends and business model that is at the heart of the new venture.  It is 
concluded that unless a clearly new product or something equally tangible is created for the first 
time, as in a scientific invention or patent, entrepreneurial creativity may be indistinguishable from 
discovery.  The discovery process may obscure the creativity that occurs in the assembly of 
components that connect means and ends.  A research focus on only means and ends may obscure 
genuine innovation in the business model.  Overall, if experienced founders have accurately 
described the reality of the opportunity recognition process, then the evidence appears to support 
the theories of evolutionary realists (e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2007; 2010). Furthermore, as has been 
demonstrated, several evolutionary effects add up to significant value creation and can make truly 
frame-breaking opportunities.  Strangely, the terms evolutionary and discontinuous innovation are 
not at odds.  
Corridor Effects: The Advantage of a Current Business  
The findings from the examination of opportunity discovery vs. creation also shed light on the 
concept of venture corridors.   It has already been reported how existing businesses search for or are 
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found by potential collaborators and how this in an important facet to the career trajectory of serial 
entrepreneurs.  It is clear that the process of innovation continues after start-up.  Existing 
opportunities evolve from within the venture, through creative packaging of existing, newly 
discovered or created components.  New options and new opportunities grow ‘naturally’, 
endogenously from existing operations and exogenously from change in the environment.  
Overall, having or having had recently one or more businesses confers several advantages/corridor 
effects given in Table 7.14 below.  
 
Table 7.14 Advantages in Opportunity Formation from a Current Firm 
It can be concluded that compared to individual entrepreneurs, firms have a kind of information 
production function harnessed to the means to turn information into actionable options and real 
opportunities.  Because portfolio entrepreneurs have several parallel businesses they may be better 
placed to benefit from this arrangement of resources.    
Characteristics and Behaviours of Innovative Serial Founder Entrepreneurs 
The thesis posed the question as to the apparent absence of Schumpeter’s innovative entrepreneur.  
In this study, serial founders do contribute innovative new firms and many then proceed to spread 
their innovations and opportunity capture and exploitation heuristics to other industries in a 
connected evolutionary process.  The new ventures can introduce discontinuous (frame-breaking) 
innovation in one or more components of a viable opportunity.  Innovative serial entrepreneurs 
exhibited one or more of the following salient characteristics that are listed in Table 7.15 below.   
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Table 7.15 Characteristics of Innovative Serial Entrepreneurs 
Many of these characteristics and behaviours can be emulated and learned by other entrepreneurs 
seeking innovative opportunities.  
7.12.2 Summary and Key Findings  
1. A majority described their own opportunity process as discovery.    
2. Only a few entrepreneurs thought that they had created the opportunity.  These developed ‘new 
to the world’ opportunities. They used similar cognitive techniques to project into the future.  
3. A significant minority thought it was a “bit of both”.  Of these two described alertness cognitively 
as “peripheral vision”. 
 4.  Other ways of describing the process included:  looking for what is missing, packaging existing 
components in new ways, looking for and assembling pieces of the jigsaw.  These are similar to 
metaphors favoured by theorists.  Combining and packaging existing components in new and 
creative ways is form of creativity so far undocumented.   
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5.  As with alertness and search, the two binary and opposing constructs of discovery or creation are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
6.   Therefore whether this process is optimisation within the existing framework or alternatively 
frame-breaking is a matter of debate.   
7. The corridor effect creates conditions for innovation in several ways including: generating new 
information from a prior business, gaining private information from customers, suppliers and other 
collaborators, having employees and the close network capture and process new information, and 
having willing customers with whom to conduct experiments.    
8. Cognitively talented serial entrepreneurs use information to think beyond prior knowledge and 
succeed in new domains (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  There is evidence of high order thinking (Lord 
and Mather, 1990) by serial entrepreneurs, including: mindful thinking (Rerup, 2005), the use of 
small information clues (Simon, 1973), counterfactual thinking (Gaglio, 2004), and others already 
reported.  Binary categorisations of processes and outcomes as either innovative or imitative, 
discovered or created, are not always useful in understanding the behaviour of experienced 
entrepreneurs.   
9.  Overall, the process is evolutionary, with re-combinations of existing components an essential 
part of a creative process.  However, just a few marginal evolutionary innovations can result in a 
discontinuous/frame-breaking market innovation.   
10. Further research into the origins of opportunities using evolutionary realist constructs (Alvarez 
and Barney, 2007; 2010) has the potential to shed further light on the process.   
7.13 Part 5.  Section 1.  Comparison of Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurship  
This section contributes findings and analysis relevant to Theme 4.  The general consensus from 
literature is that portfolio entrepreneurship is intrinsically more economically efficient.  The firms of 
portfolio entrepreneurs are larger, grow faster and generate significantly more income than the 
firms of serial and novice entrepreneurs.  In contrast serials are resource poor and have less access 
to role models, mentoring, social networks and financial resources (Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright 
and Binks 2005).  The view explained in this study is that serial entrepreneurship also has some 
advantages and requires its own theory from the work of (Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle, 2013), 
(Mason and Harrison, 2006) (Cooper, 1985).   
7.13.1 Portfolio Entrepreneurship – Case Analysis  
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The three cases of portfolio entrepreneurship are consistent with the existing empirical evidence 
(e.g. Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005). Entrepreneurs start parallel businesses to exploit horizontal 
synergies.  Horizontal diversifications occur because adjacent customer segments in the same 
corridor are more easily discovered at low cost through alertness or search, because they have 
similar information characteristics and can share resources that generate complementarities, 
economies of scale and scope.  Therefore, the costs of finding and implementing unrelated 
opportunities are higher.  This economic explanation is supported by empirical evidence that 
diversifications for portfolio entrepreneurs appear serendipitously and naturally without search or 
strategic planning (e.g. Alsos and Kaikkonen, 2004; Rosa, 1998), and that a complete change of 
direction was rare for portfolio entrepreneurs (Rosa, 1998).  The entrepreneur must make a 
judgement of comparative additional costs (including opportunity costs) of assessing and exploiting 
an unrelated opportunity against its potential for profit.  If a misjudgement is made they will pursue 
an unrelated opportunity and fail, returning to singleton status or worse.  For a serial entrepreneur 
to exceed the efficiency of a portfolio entrepreneur they must sell at the highest premium (a form of 
profit) and also find a related opportunity with low implementation costs.  Successfully exiting 
entrepreneurs may be disadvantaged due to the terms of sale in exploiting a related opportunity, 
but they have the cushion of better liquidity and use of their own time.  
For portfolios, related diversification widens the corridor, as each venture opens new possibilities 
and real options for further diversification as the portfolio grows.  Portfolio building momentum 
develops as the marginal cost of recognising, pursuing and exploiting related opportunities declines.  
The case evidence also supports a view of portfolio building as a dynamic effectual process of 
experimentation, exploiting options derived from the current cluster of firms.  These experiments 
can be reversed if unsuccessful.  Another clear advantage to a portfolio entrepreneur is that an 
outright failure with economic losses can be isolated and does not result in an exit from 
entrepreneurship.   Portfolio entrepreneurs can ‘shelter’ the development of new ventures (Case 
24).  In building a portfolio of a number of horizontally related firms in renewable energy, she 
commented “What we’ve got now is getting B off the ground within the safe confines of A.”  This is 
part of an incubation and spin-out process that is only open to owners of existing enterprises. 
 In the study, a portfolio founder focussed on serving the vibrant and creative UK music industry 
(Case 9).  Horizontal diversification included live music concerts and selling recorded music.  Vertical 
diversification included band management, band marketing, music recording, production and 
distribution.  The entrepreneur described the diversification process as, “Filling in obvious gaps in 
the product portfolio on a trial and error basis”.  Information about potential opportunities could be 
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found easily in one of their businesses - a music newspaper.  Some start-ups failed, were closed or 
put on a “back burner” waiting for better business conditions.  Highly innovative, the entrepreneur 
was the first to sell MP3 music downloads, again as a related diversification.  Another frame-
breaking opportunity occurred when a completely new, related but unmet need arose.  This high 
growth addition to the portfolio soon became the principal focus.  The portfolio is now effectively a 
single venture with a few satellite and comparatively small legacy businesses.  This raises the 
question, to what extent is a portfolio a cluster of equals or just one or perhaps two main ventures.   
In another case, the portfolio entrepreneur diversified along two dimensions of related markets and 
related products (Case 13).  The first start-up provided a business to business product in the 
industrial machine tool market.  The second venture a different product to the same industrial 
market.  The third venture provided a version of the first industrial product to the consumer market 
under a new brand name.  At the time of the research this portfolio founder plans to reorganise 
around two firms, one for the domestic and one for the industrial market.  Through this process, 
portfolios of start-ups have a concertina-like quality of expansion, reorganisation and contraction 
over time as would a small conglomerate.   
In many ways portfolio founders are the same as serial founders.  The serial entrepreneurs and the 
small sample of three portfolio founders in this study have much in common.  They came to 
entrepreneurship through similar routes, prefer to start small ventures using their own resources, 
eschewing external finance beyond conventional bank loans.  Like serials, portfolio founders all show 
evidence of a learning curve, and of innovation including the development of new to the world 
products and services.   The trend in each portfolio career (like their serial counterpart) is that each 
retained venture shows increasing sophistication of the products and operations, and also increasing 
size and profitability, even if earlier ventures are sometimes closed. This demonstrates portfolio 
entrepreneurs also learn from experience. 
7.13.2 Transition to Portfolio Entrepreneurship – The Absence of Exit   
Research question 4.1 asks:  Why do entrepreneurs transition to become portfolio entrepreneurs?  
In the discussion of the constructs of habitual entrepreneurship, serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurship are clearly separated by exit from entrepreneurship.  Therefore, economic 
selection doesn’t operate in the same way.  Novice and serial entrepreneurs are both ‘singletons’ 
with one current venture.  Portfolio building begins when there is a new opportunity but an exit 
doesn’t occur.  Exits can be positive or negative.  A lack of exit indicates a business of medium 
quality, not failing but not of sufficient quality to attract a buyer.  They are ‘stuck in the middle’ with 
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ventures too lucrative to abandon but not advantageous enough to attract an acquirer.  The reasons 
that alone or in combination propel singleton novices or serials to transition to portfolio 
entrepreneurship, might include:  
a) The existing business is not of high quality and doesn’t attract a buyer. 
b) Synergies and cost economies reduce the marginal cost of another related business.  
c) The preceding business directly funds and ‘shelters’ a new venture over the start-up phase.  
d) If a preceding business was sold or closed the synergies would disappear making the next venture 
unsustainable,  
e) An unrelated venture is launched and fails, increasing dependence on the other businesses which 
provide a form of insurance for further risk taking.  
f) Portfolio entrepreneurs prefer the utility, including the enjoyment and social status of owning and 
managing a portfolio of businesses.  
Portfolio founding is defined as founding at least three new ventures and not exiting 
entrepreneurship.  Many ‘singleton’ entrepreneurs must at some point have the option to transition 
to become a portfolio entrepreneur.  Over a third of the serial entrepreneurs had another parallel 
venture at some point, most often as an unsuccessful diversification.  Lower quality ventures are 
also held as temporary insurance before sale as they transitioned to the new higher quality new 
venture (Cases 6, 24).   
7.13.3 Economics of Serial and Portfolio Economics  
Research question 4.2 asks:  What are the economics of serial entrepreneurship?  A great deal of 
serial entrepreneurship is born of failure.  Here the entrepreneur has no choice but to bear the costs 
of recovery and re-entry.  Positive exits require another type of judgement.  Selling a business is an 
entrepreneurial ability requiring a particular type of acumen.  Economically it is a means of 
extracting future profits, to reinvest in another start-up.  As has been noted in the analysis, it is 
subject to learning effects from experience, so serial entrepreneurs get better at extracting value.   
Portfolio entrepreneurs learn to extract synergies from related businesses.   Serial entrepreneurs 
may have a superior cognitive ability to detect and calculate capacity limits, diseconomies and 
negative synergies arising from retaining a low quality firm in the presence of a superior opportunity.  
Serial entrepreneurs may judge that they do not have a very large cost disadvantage in business 
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start-up, especially if it is related.  They are prepared to give up any potential synergies in return for 
enhanced liquidity and the high personal wealth and freedom this entails.   
Diversification Advantage  
Parker (2014) is drawn to the idea that portfolio entrepreneurs can pursue a less risky strategy by 
adding unrelated businesses as do equity investors intelligently managing a portfolio of shares.  
Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle (2013) make a similar observation.  The literature and this study 
provide no evidence of successful diversification motivated to reduce the co-variance of returns.  
The evidence supports the conclusion that portfolios entrepreneurs are looking for new growth 
opportunities.  
Serial Diversification  
To close the economic gap between portfolio and serial entrepreneurship, serials should have access 
to synergies between their successive enterprises.  As 4.3 asks: Do serial entrepreneurs benefit from 
some form of pseudo diversification, supported by recycling?  Despite the apparent loss of potential 
portfolio synergies by pursuing a serial career path, Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle (2013) postulate 
that serial entrepreneurs benefit from pseudo-diversification across their discrete sequential 
ventures.  In addition, serials have been shown to practise resource recycling (Mason and Harrison, 
2006).  These resource combinations are developed through a process of incubation (Cooper, 1985).  
Pseudo is assumed to mean ‘artificial’ or ‘ersatz’.  As reported, the case studies clearly show that 
serial starters do make related start-ups and therefore benefit from diversifications that generate 
real options and therefore are real rather pseudo.  Internal replication or cloning is an obvious 
example.   Accordingly, they are renamed here as ‘serial diversifications’.  There are many examples 
of serial diversification cited in the analysis.  In another example (Case 23) a first fast food retail 
business ended in failure.  However, while operating this struggling business, the entrepreneur 
discovered a new commercial market segment that was far more profitable.  He simply shut down 
and exited the retail business and switched to supplying the new market.  This reorientation is 
clearly a related serial diversification.  Similarly, in another instance of this phenomenon the serial 
entrepreneur left one business selling mini-computers to start another selling the terminals needed 
for mini-computers (Case 1).  Other serial ventures may not have such obvious connections, such as 
when there is a switch to a different industry.  Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates 
unequivocally that they are almost always related by critical components of prior knowledge and 
other recycled resources if they are to be successful.  Serial entrepreneurs obtain returns to 
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specialisation (i.e. the division of labour) in more subtle ways than portfolio entrepreneurs.  Porter 
(1985) refers to tangible and intangible horizontal synergies often between separate value chains.  
Serial entrepreneurs transfer tangible resources, reemploy former key employees, suppliers, social 
networks, and serve the same customers.  He or she obtains more output to a resource whose 
performance and risks in use are known, the costs of which are largely sunk, paid for in a previous 
firm.  Intangible resources are know-how about the same type of business component.  These are 
equivalent to the cognitive heuristics and templates already cited as important.  Serial entrepreneurs 
benefit from this ‘shadow portfolio’ of previous ventures and their recyclable resource positions. 
This study finds a continuum of prosperous ventures from clones to ventures related by common 
components.  
For example, a serial entrepreneur (Case 1) employed the same systems programmer, a salient 
resource (Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001), in most of his many and varied businesses.  Together they 
developed an employee benefits system for a venture sponsored by a large corporate.  Several 
ventures later, a version of this system was used to launch an entirely new product nationwide.  This 
long standing inimitable resource combination of entrepreneur and key employee, the persistence 
of their prior knowledge, enhanced and kept fresh by constant reuse, allowed the small company to 
punch above its weight.   
If for Iacobucci (2002), a portfolio entrepreneur is a master of dependencies, a serial entrepreneur is 
also a master of the assembly and re-assembly of resources across discrete firms.  
Exit, Personal Wealth and Serial Entrepreneurship  
Finally, the economic effects of exit have to be accounted for.  Both serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs can fail and suffer economic losses and opportunity costs.  However, if personal liquid 
disposable wealth is taken into account, then the few portfolio entrepreneurs in this study are 
unlikely to be economically more successful than very many of the individual serial entrepreneurs.  
From the reported proceeds of business sales, the exiting serial entrepreneurs in this study had 
much more personal wealth.  Taking the data at face value, in order to maximise personal wealth, an 
entrepreneur would be well advised to start a single new innovative venture in an emerging high 
growth industry and use successive rounds of private equity to extract personal wealth while using 
the funding to grow the business to achieve an initial public offering.  On exit the entrepreneur 
should retain a substantial minority stake while starting again to repeat this wealth creating process.  
However, this path is likely to be more risky than holding on to a medium quality venture and adding 
related enterprises.  
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Research question 4.4 asks:  Do serial entrepreneurs take on increasingly risky opportunities?  A 
complete change of direction is rare for portfolio entrepreneurs (Rosa, 1998).  Parker (2014) argues 
that serial entrepreneurs take increasing risks.  However, portfolio starters in the study were more 
prolific founders than most serial founders.  On the other hand they were also more prone to 
venture closure and failure from unrelated diversifications (Case 13).  They could be taking on more 
risky ventures to pursue growth, insured and supported by the portfolio.  It is likely that the 
unsuccessful ventures of portfolio founders are under reported.  Aggregate studies of portfolio 
founders that do not record exits, especially failures are likely to report only related diversifications.   
Holmes and Schmitz (1990: 1995) attribute portfolio entrepreneurship to a lack of ability.  Both types 
of entrepreneurship are innovative and try to move up the value chain with each start-up, 
maintaining or increasing their ambition with each new venture.  This question will require further 
research and the development of appropriate constructs of entrepreneurial risk to resolve.   
The discussion throws doubt on Parker‘s (2014) synthesis of theory and evidence that maintains that 
portfolio entrepreneurship is always more economically efficient than serial entrepreneurship. 
Theory of the Firm Resources vs. Theory of Entrepreneurship  
Iacobucci and Rosa (2004; 2005) cite the evolutionary theory of the firm as the best fit with the 
evidence for portfolio building.  Here the individual and the firm(s) are tightly bound together acting 
as a mini-conglomerate.   It has been argued in this thesis that the emerging theory of serial 
entrepreneurship separates the success of the firm and its resources, the individual entrepreneur 
and his or her resources, and the opportunity.   This perspective rebalances the importance of the 
resource-based theory of the firm versus that of entrepreneurship.  If a serial starter’s experience, 
knowledge, social capital and other resources are directly transferrable, and costs are sunk, then 
they can achieve economies of scale and scope from their own human and social capital.   
Some economists (e.g. Arrow, 1962) actually predict decreasing margin returns to experience.  
Parker (2013) posits that the human capital of the self-employed depreciates relatively quickly and 
returns to entrepreneurship return to the mean.  This study has evidence of recycling and reuse, that 
options or combinations of resources developed in earlier businesses are long lasting, improve with 
learning through repeated use, and may lie dormant only to be reused at an appropriate juncture.   
A failed serial entrepreneur returned after failure to found a second successful venture re-using 
experience gathered in employment (Case 3) “I spent five years being involved very closely with 
strategic international trade, so I spent time understanding how moving a container from China to 
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the UK added value.  I could very quickly understand how to gain a margin advantage over our 
competitors because I had a complete understanding of how international trade worked.”   
In another case the entrepreneur had learned from prior employment in the VC industry how to 
position “technology plays” to investors to achieve high pre and post-investment valuations.  After a 
series of technology start-ups, his latest venture is to create this type of technology play in the 
emerging ‘big data’ sector (Case 20).  The case studies are consistent with Alsos and Kaikkonen’s 
(2004) finding that apparently unrelated opportunities are in fact derived from information learned 
prior to their current occupation.   
7.13.4 Summary and Key Findings 
1. The cases document examples of mainly horizontal diversification as found in the literature (e.g.; 
Iacobucci, and Rosa, 2005; Rosa, 1998), but also finds new evidence of vertical diversifications.  
2. Portfolio founders appear to be similar to serial founders in terms of:  innovation, learning, failure 
and ambition.  The chief difference is the absence of exit from the ownership and active 
management of several firms.  
3. As an alternative theory to a lack of risk taking (Parker, 2014), portfolio entrepreneurs instead 
have a lack of ability (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990: 1995).   Portfolio entrepreneurs develop a medium 
quality business that is not attractive to a buyer.   
4. Portfolio founders grow by building an interlocking mutually supporting set of ventures linked by 
synergies.  There was no evidence to show that they sought unrelated diversifications to balance risk 
as proposed by conventional portfolio theory (e.g. Parker, 2014).  Instead, they sought them to 
achieve growth.  
5. Some serial entrepreneurs enjoy substantial personal wealth earned through the sale of their 
venture. This route to economic success is more fruitful, though likely to be more risky than portfolio 
building.  
6. There is clear evidence that serial entrepreneurs also enjoy the benefits of diversification as 
proposed by Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle (2013).  This is achieved by entrepreneurial recycling 
(Mason and Harrison, 2006) of knowledge and resources accumulated and paid for in previous 
ventures.  They also have liquid financial resources from selling a venture, influence (Shane and 
Khurana, 2003), and freedom to select superior opportunities unencumbered by an existing firm.  
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7. If for Iacobucci (2002) a portfolio entrepreneur is a master of dependencies, then a serial 
entrepreneur is also a master of the assembly and re-assembly of resources across discrete firms. 
7.14  Concluding Remarks  
7.14.1 Serials vs. Novices – Evidence for an Experience Curve  
Lessons for Quantitative Studies of Venture Performance 
There is a shortfall in knowledge of how the performance of one venture is related to the next 
(Parker, 2013).  Persistent serial entrepreneurs return from failure, transfer to new industries, 
discover or create innovative opportunities, maintain ambition and improve their success rate.  
While there is an accumulation of entrepreneurial human capital, its rate of growth is non-linear, 
varying according to what is learned that can be reused or built upon.  There is then a difference 
between measurable experience and the more qualitative and subjective transferable learning.  This 
point is at the heart of the assets and liabilities theory of habitual entrepreneurship (Starr and 
Bygrave, 1991; 1992) and its derivatives (e.g. Reuber and Fischer, 1994; 1999), works that inspired 
this thesis.   
Venture performance is also non-linear, because especially in the early phases of a career failure of 
some form is likely.  There is not a direct positive correlation between experience and outcomes of 
serial founders because both the individual learning curves and performance curves are punctuated 
with critical events, especially that of exit.  Aggregate performance studies do not take into account 
exit conditions, nor pauses between ventures where learning also takes place.  To illustrate this 
point, Figure 7.9 illustrates a theoretical accumulation of human capital.  It is the area under the 
curve of the upper most diagram.  Following conventional economic theory it shows declining 
marginal returns to experience.  Unconventionally, but still based on empirical evidence from this 
study and others (e.g. Cope, 2011, McGrath, 1999), it is the analogue of outcomes or performance, 
i.e. more is learned from difficulties than from success.    
This may explain some of the difficulties in finding a consistent positive association between stocks 
of human capital and venture performance, simply because exit experience is not counted as a 
measure of human capital nor as a measure of outcome or performance.  Recent studies in this area 
rely on comparisons of experiential human capital such as the number of ventures founded with 
earnings from income surveys (Chen, 2013; Parker, 2013) and log transformations of earnings from 
business or firm revenues (Eesley and Roberts, 2012; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014).  Few 
researchers look at venture outcome.  Exit conditions as found in this study are very likely to be a 
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powerful explanatory variable to be used with earnings.  The other constructs used in this research 
such as for innovation are also offered for the benefit of future research.  
The diagram illustrates the overall successful career of a serial founder who experiences a mix of 
both unsuccessful and successful enterprises.   
 
Figure 7.9 Accumulated Experience and Venture Performance 
7.14.2 Synthesis: New Model of Entrepreneurship 
The final finding is a revised model of entrepreneurship.  The model is a summary of what has been 
learned and can be induced from this study.  It builds on the model of habitual entrepreneurship 
proposed by Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright (2006) (see Figure 4. 1).  The development is 
compatible with other models of entrepreneurship such as Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray (2003) that 
emphasise prior knowledge and social capital.   
The new model of entrepreneurship illustrated in Figure 7.10 also following Casson (1982; 2003) 
gives prominence to the entrepreneur’s role in economic decision making in the allocation of scarce 
resources.  In the section labelled dynamic cognitive entrepreneurial capabilities following thinkers 
such as Shane and Venkataraman (2000) and Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), the role is defined to 
include specific information gathering and processing tasks.  These include the valuation and 
revaluation of all resources in response to information signals, the appropriation of new resources 
and the development of the skills/abilities required to address changes in the environment.  
Entrepreneurial learning is a cognitive ability that includes information acquisition by both search 
and alertness.  
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The new model includes the recursive nature of serial entrepreneurship.  Information signals 
generated by significant events, such as the recognition of a new opportunity and venture 
performance, trigger the resource co-ordination and decision process.  This leads to changes in 
resource positions, even if it is just a change in current knowledge.  New opportunities can arise 
from within a current venture.  All ventures can be considered experiments to discover new 
information and thereby generate and select new options.   
An important innovation is that the model includes venture exit explicitly.  Exit is a measure of 
venture performance.  Moreover, the potential for exit is also included as a new type of opportunity 
to realise future profits or cut losses and start another venture.  Exit is classified as an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, if a special type.  Opportunity liquidation is included in the model as a 
key ability and as part of the opportunity-centric process. 
In the model, resource positions or combinations of abilities, knowledge, and tangible resources 
have multi-dimensional, dynamic and recursive features.  For example, knowledge of markets will 
exist in various forms, controlled by different people at different times.  Opportunity recognition 
may be solidified into an organisational heuristic.  Changes in resource positions impact opportunity 
recognition, exploitation and liquidation abilities.  
It is the entrepreneur who manages the combination of personal, team and firm resources.  This 
study has shown that even in teams that share ownership and control, there is a lead individual 
entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur, the team and the firm come together at different phases of the 
opportunity process, to be disbanded on exit, and recycled for the next venture.  Leadership and 
decisions to combine resources are a dynamic entrepreneurial capability.  
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Figure 7.10 New Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship 
7.15 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has presented the analysis and findings to answer the principal research question of 
how the ventures of serial founder entrepreneurs are related to one another.  This question has 
been pursued by examining how, when and why serial entrepreneurs come to select and exploit 
opportunities, analysing the connections between ventures, and comparing their careers with those 
of portfolio entrepreneurs and other types of multiple entrepreneurship. 
7.15.1 New Theory of Serial Entrepreneurship 
Overall the chapter presents a new theory of serial entrepreneurship.  Built upon new empirical 
evidence the new theory has explanatory and predictive power.  The new theory also updates our 
understanding of entrepreneurship.  
The first element of the new theory of serial entrepreneurship is an extension to the theory of 
economic selection.  In equilibrium entrepreneurs are matched to opportunities and firms 
concomitant with their abilities.  Selection theory is extended to a more dynamic and realistic 
process where negative outcomes of closure and failure are common and some serial entrepreneurs 
take extended breaks from entrepreneurship to recover (see Figure 7.2).  Furthermore, the new 
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version of selection theory must now embrace entrepreneurial learning.  Negative outcomes are 
most common in first novice ventures, while the frequency of successes increases over a career (see 
Table 7.7), clear evidence of an experiential learning curve, but one punctuated by fundamentally 
different types of experience, success and failure (see Figures 7.3, 7.9).  Here entrepreneurial ability 
is not fixed.  If talent is rooted in cognitive ability then learning is also a vital talent required to build 
entrepreneurial human capital.   
The second element of the new theory shows that successful careers arise from founding a series of 
related ventures.  The process is called ‘serial diversification’.  It is clear that success only 
consistently follows success for a small minority of serial entrepreneurs (see Table 7.6).  However, 
the study has pinpointed how, when and why success is most likely to be achieved.  A significant 
finding is that when ventures are related through reused and recycled knowledge and other 
resources there is a higher probability of founding a high quality venture.  If they are unrelated or 
insufficient learning has taken place to build relevant experience then a negative outcome is very 
likely.  There is clear economic logic for starting related ventures that reuse knowledge and 
resources whose performance is known (de-risked) and whose costs have been largely sunk in 
previous ventures and employment.  Therefore, start-up experience alone is not enough to 
guarantee success.   
The third new element is the modelling of the four modes of venture creation practised by 
experienced multiple founders (see Figure 7.7).     
1. Internal Replication  
2. Internal Diversification  
3. Internal Replication and Transfer   
4. External Replication 
1. Internal Replication – cloning a previous venture or adapting it on the basis of learning in reaction 
to a venture failure.  
2. Internal Diversification – making a related or unrelated diversification.  Serial entrepreneurs sell or 
leave lower quality enterprises to found a new firm.  However, if the business is retained then the 
entrepreneur transitions to portfolio entrepreneurship.  Should the outcome be negative proto-
portfolio entrepreneurs return to single business status.   
3. Internal Replication and Transfer – starting-up in a new industry by transferring the inside 
knowledge and essential components of a previous venture.  
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4. External Replication – forming a start-up by copying an incumbent from the outside typically in a 
growth sector and making adaptations to compete more effectively.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that serial entrepreneurs, having learned a successful mode of 
entry, will repeat it several times over a career (see Figure 7.8). 
These modes of founding are a completely new addition to our knowledge of expert 
entrepreneurship.  They contrast with the entry modes of novice entrepreneurs (see Figure 7.4).  
Future serial entrepreneurs mainly rely on employers and existing forms of business to copy when 
planning their own start-up.  However, novices alone innovate completely new businesses. 
A summary comparison of novice and expert modes is given below in Figure 7.11. 
 
Figure 7.11 Novice and Expert Modes of Venture Creation 
The fourth element of the new theory of serial entrepreneurship is the insight that the outcome of 
the previous venture is significant for the choice of opportunity and mode of creation for the next 
venture in the series.  The exit conditions are:  1) a high cost negative exit, 2) an affordable low cost 
exit, 3) a high value successful exit, 4) a low or moderate value exit, or 5) no exit.  These conditions 
will determine the process of recognition and exploitation for the next opportunity.  In addition, the 
new model can be used to predict the outcome of a venture from the combination of: a) The 
outcome of the previous venture, b) the type of opportunity, c) the industry and d) the mode of 
founding (see Table 7.9).  The choice of next venture is also affected by activities in the breaks and 
interludes between ventures which can deflect a career trajectory.   
The fifth element of the new theory of serial entrepreneurship is how serial founders provide intra-
industry innovation derived from deeper knowledge and inter-industry innovation by transferring 
key opportunity components such as business models/mean to serve to new opportunities. Serial 
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entrepreneurs can create new to the world products and start-up at the beginning of new industries 
throughout their careers (See Tables 7.11, 7.12). 
Venture outcomes/exit conditions also play a very important part in understanding how innovation 
occurs and is spread from industry to industry.  High quality ventures are synonymous with 
innovation and growing markets and attract high prices.  Armed with the experience of success and 
significant liquidity, but restricted by non-competition clauses these serial entrepreneurs enter new 
industries and spread their innovations.  Novice entrepreneurs react to failure not by pursuing new 
opportunities but return to try again with either a clone if the venture closed for non-business 
reasons or an adapted version that encapsulates what was learned from the failure.  Successful or 
unsuccessful exits are not associated with a reduction in ambition, or ‘playing it safe’ in the next 
venture.  There is evidence of a ratchet effect.  Additional experience and learning facilitates the 
growth of ambition. 
Even imitative replications of existing firms or previous ventures can be innovative because they 
result in imperfect copies and include considered adaptations to enhance competitiveness.  While 
centripetal forces keep half of all serial entrepreneurs within the same industry corridor, 
opportunities arise to take new pathways.  They are profitable diversions if they are supported by 
relevant transferable knowledge and other resources.  
The new theory of serial entrepreneurship upholds the basic tenants of entrepreneurial theory.  An 
entrepreneur is someone who specializes in taking judgemental decisions about the coordination of 
scarce resources Casson (1982), such that the competence of the entrepreneur in identifying 
business opportunities and gathering resources is directly related to the performance of the start-up 
firm (Chandler and Hanks, 1998).  However, it is clear from this intensive study that serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs often get this judgement wrong and career paths remain idiosyncratic.  For 
example, for novices the quality of an opportunity can outweigh a lack of relevant experience.   The 
study reveals that there is an important juncture in an entrepreneur’s career when without an exit 
they make decisions to start new firms in parallel that may transition them to portfolio 
entrepreneurship.   
The study provides new insights into the cognitive thinking patterns and decision making of serial 
entrepreneurs that underpins the theory of serial entrepreneurship.  It shows how they develop 
cognitive exemplar templates and heuristics for detecting and exploiting new opportunities, such as 
by reusing business models that are largely industry independent.   For corridors to be followed and 
knowledge recycled there must be a cognitive process akin to reasoning by analogy whereby new 
269 
 
opportunities are mapped to existing knowledge templates and the dots are joined between these 
mental representations.  There are new insights into the formation of new opportunities by 
experienced entrepreneurs (see Table 7.13) including the benefits for information capture and 
processing that arise from having an existing firm (see Table 7.14).  Some predict the future by 
extrapolating trends, others look for what is missing in today’s offerings, some combine and package 
existing components in new and creative ways (see Table 7.15), a new form of creativity so far 
undocumented.  The traditional hard distinctions of alertness vs. search and discovery vs. creation 
do not always match the entrepreneurial experience of opportunity formation.   
The thesis concludes that entrepreneurial learning is an important driver for the accumulation of 
entrepreneurial human capital by serial entrepreneurs.  The study provides fresh insights into why, 
what, and when serial entrepreneurs actually learn.  Employment is a common means of learning 
about how to start a similar firm, learning vicariously from others and copying incumbent firms.   
Cloning and ‘rebooting’ also provided structured learning opportunities for the relatively 
inexperienced.  Learning from failure is transformational and serial entrepreneurs also learn to time 
their exit and sell their company.  Serial entrepreneurs learn to innovate, using controlled 
experiments and learning with and from collaborators.  Successful modes of creation are learned 
and then repeated during careers (see Figure 7.8).  
These theoretical advances to serial entrepreneurship are set alongside an analysis of three portfolio 
entrepreneurs.  Portfolio founders appear to be similar to serial founders in terms of:  innovation, 
learning, failure and level of ambition.  The chief difference is the absence of exit from firm 
ownership and management.  The fact that successful exits provide considerable personal wealth to 
serial entrepreneurs provides an argument against the economic superiority of portfolio 
entrepreneurship.  As postulated serial founders despite exiting can benefit like portfolio 
entrepreneurs from related diversification though across discrete ventures.  Serial diversification, 
like special and unique expertise in exit and re-entry is a type of human ability peculiar to serial 
entrepreneurs.   
In addition to inducing new theory another role of qualitative case study analysis is to complement 
larger scale quantitative studies.  This thesis finds that entry experience (mode of venture creation) 
and exit experience (positive or negative) are powerful explanatory variables.  They measure both 
entrepreneurial human capital that cannot be easily learned elsewhere and also venture 
performance.  
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Finally, the new theory of serial entrepreneurship has stimulated new thinking about the nature of 
entrepreneurship.  The thesis presents a new model of entrepreneurship that includes the recursive 
and dynamic nature of serial entrepreneurship driven by: information, learning and resource 
accumulation (see Figure 7. 10).  
The next chapter summarises and concludes the thesis.   
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8 CHAPTER 8 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter draws together the threads of the preceding chapters to conclude with the distinctive 
contributions of the thesis to theoretical and empirical knowledge and its position within the 
literature.  The chapter identifies the practical implications for policy makers, practitioners and 
educators, and sets out an agenda for future research.  
8.1 Section 1. Overview of Study Outcomes 
8.1.1 Research Sample and Methodology 
The sample of 26 case studies, 116 ventures and over 50 hours of interviews is likely to be one of the 
largest qualitative studies of its kind.  21 cases were of serial founders, 3 portfolio founders and 2 
other case of habitual entrepreneurship.  The study sample is almost exclusively of British small 
business serial entrepreneurs with an average of 24 years’ experience, 80% of whom founded 3 or 
more businesses and so would be considered experts by researchers (e.g. Baron and Ward, 2004).  
All are still active and none had retired at the time of the study in 2014. The 112 start-ups span a 
range of different industries over a time period of considerable environmental change.  The 
methodology used is a pragmatic combination of positive case study and interpretation using 
grounded theory.   
8.1.2 Research Question  
How are the ventures of serial starter entrepreneurs related to one another?  How are the 1st, 2nd 
and nth start-up ventures related?  The question was first posed by the authors of the assets and 
liabilities theory of habitual entrepreneurship (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; 1992).  This theory 
questioned the idea of an upward sloping experiential learning curve posited by MacMillan (1986) 
from a single anonymous case study.  This has been an unanswered question for some time, and has 
been supplemented by many other calls for more nuanced qualitative longitudinal studies of the 
processual and contextual aspects of the careers of habitual entrepreneurs.  While many studies do 
not distinguish between the types of habitual entrepreneurship, the literature shows that there are 
real differences in behaviour and economic outcome.  Consequently, this thesis purposely throws a 
spotlight on serial founder entrepreneurs.   
The relevance and timeliness of the study is enhanced by the recent development of a 
comprehensive theory of the major sub-types of entrepreneurship (novice, portfolio and serial) by 
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Parker (2014).  However, these developments are based largely on a comparatively deeper 
understanding of portfolio entrepreneurship (e.g. Alsos, Ljunggren and Pettersen, 2003; Iacobucci 
and Rosa, 2005; Rosa, 1998). It has been argued that this one sided development has been to the 
detriment of the established theory of entrepreneurship.  It is claimed by Iacobucci and Rosa (2004; 
2005) that multi-firm portfolio entrepreneurs behave like conglomerates whose behaviour is best 
explained by the evolutionary resource-theory of the firm.  Moreover, portfolio entrepreneurship is 
considered to be economically superior to serial entrepreneurship (e.g. Parker, 2014; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright, 2005b).  
Human capital theory has been a major driver of research into habitual entrepreneurship.  It has 
been the expectation of most academics that repeat experience of founding increases venture 
performance.  However, consistent evidence for this intuitive proposition has been elusive.  
Following Reuber and Fischer (1994; 1999) Cope (2003; 2005; 2011), this suggests a much more 
complex process where critical events (Chell, 2004) such as entry and exit, not easily summated in 
aggregate quantitative studies, may be susceptible to examination using an exploratory qualitative 
research approach.   DeTienne, (2010) maintains that entrepreneurship does not begin and end at 
start-up; exit is a neglected part of the process.  Serial entrepreneurs are clearly differentiated from 
portfolio builders because they exit one venture before focussing on the next.  To unpick the 
relationship between successive ventures the thesis has studied careers with additional emphasis on 
exit and entry.   
Detailed research questions were grouped under four themes synthesised from the literature review 
presented in Chapter 5.  These themes are used to summarise the findings already presented in 
Chapter 7.   
Overall, this thesis provides several new empirical and theoretical insights.   
8.1.3 Theme 1. Selection Theory 
Selection theory places repeated entry and exit as part of an economic selection process that 
matches entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities.  High ability entrepreneurs will be observed 
starting high quality ventures (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 1995; Jovanovic, 1982; Lucas 1978; Plehn-
Dujowich, 2010) and enjoying the advantages of increased liquidity (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). 
Most versions of selection theory place entrepreneurship as a talent discovery process, fix a level of 
natural ability and exclude both learning and a return after failure.   
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Detailed Research Questions 
1.1 How do future serial entrepreneurs become entrepreneurs?  
1.2 How do future serial entrepreneurs transition from novice (one time) entrepreneurs to serial 
entrepreneurs? 
1.3         What is the impact of failure on venture selection by serial entrepreneurs?  
1.4  What is the impact of success on venture selection by serial entrepreneurs? E.g. liquidity? 
1.5 Is venture failure normal i.e. the ‘norm’?   
1.6  Do serial entrepreneurs learn from failure?   
1.7  Do cognitively intelligent serial entrepreneurs transfer learning of success and failure to the 
next venture?  i.e. Is there a learning curve that unpins the development of expertise? 
As is common to theoretical approximations of complex socio-economic behaviour, economic 
selection theory is a simplification of reality.  This thesis reveals how, why and when serial 
entrepreneurs become owner managers of particular ventures.  A key contribution of the study is to 
show how serial entrepreneurs learned their trade.  Though none foresaw nor planned to become a 
serial entrepreneur, most set out early executing their plans to become entrepreneurs, influenced 
by family backgrounds and formative experiences.  Most of their novice start-ups were incubated in 
employment, using and replicating what they had learned to move up the value chain from 
employed to employers. These are direct examples of learning from experience (Minniti and 
Bygrave, 2001; Politis, 2005; 2008).  Some novices, despite their inexperience, founded highly 
innovative ventures achieving high sales prices at exit.  While providing some evidence for Aldrich 
and Ruef’s (2006) belief that novices and not serial entrepreneurs are the main source of innovation, 
innovation was found to occur throughout careers.  
A small minority were recruited as ‘apprentice’ entrepreneurs by the lead entrepreneur of the team.  
A few, lacking the required resources, entered alliances with incumbent firms to learn about the 
missing pieces of the jigsaw.  These less experienced novices invariably experienced the break-up of 
these teams and alliances for non-business reasons.  While this could be construed as supportive of 
suggestions by Levie, Don and Wiklund (2010) that the number of business failures is overstated, 
these are in fact genuine failures where firms ceased trading, wound-up and restarted, incurring 
high start-up costs.  Re-starts after closures for non-business reasons use a ‘rebooting’ process, 
cloning the now defunct venture. 
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The transition to serial status is unplanned.  No case said they set out to start and sell several 
ventures.  The novice business is exited due to an unplanned negative outcome or an unplanned 
acquisition by a third party attracted to a high quality venture.  Without an exit an entrepreneur may 
stay a singleton or transition to portfolio status.   
Economic selection has relatively little to say about negative exits, especially those that are 
especially costly, and this thesis contributes an extension to existing theory (see Figure 7.2).  What is 
interesting is that these unsuccessful ventures provided a structured learning process that 
transforms the skills of the novice entrepreneur, improving the odds that the clone grows to become 
a high quality venture.  Negative outcomes for business reasons generate a period of deep reflection 
and transformational learning (e.g. Cope, 2011) and a return to the same novice opportunity to try 
again.  Closures and failure of all types provide a crucible of learning.  Losses are not always 
‘affordable’ as postulated in effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001).  It is important that they do not 
prevent a return to entrepreneurship or a deterrent to further episodes of founding.  Banks, angel 
investors and close social networks can reduce the costs of failure and can help serial entrepreneurs 
recover and return to entrepreneurship. Recovery from the economic, social and psychological 
effects of an unsuccessful failure is part and parcel of the selection process and also a driver of 
innovation.    
The evidence from failed novice entrepreneurs and experienced serial entrepreneurs returning to 
the same opportunity supports the conclusion that an entrepreneurial opportunity can then be 
separated from the venture (Plummer, Haynie and Godesiabois, 2007) and also from the 
entrepreneur.  When a business fails it is not always because it was a substandard opportunity that 
should be abandoned, but because the entrepreneur had not yet learned the correct skills and 
business model to exploit the opportunity successfully. 
The evidence from successful exits in this study supports established economic selection and 
liquidity theory.  The study also confirms that the strongest predictor of venture outcome is business 
age as a measure of innate quality.  Additional support for the theory is that all successfully exiting 
serials returned to entrepreneurship to pursue an opportunity of higher or similar quality, suggesting 
a ratchet effect on their ambition and risk taking propensity.  A new insight from this thesis is that 
successful entrepreneurs start-up in new sectors or new industries.  They are much more likely to be 
successful if they adhere to Helfat and Lieberman’s (2002) requirement that firms only enter 
markets if they have suitable resources.  
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From both successful and unsuccessful exits, the economy obtains innovations, modifications, 
adaptations, adjustments to the environment, and also financial liquidity recycled into the hands of 
able entrepreneurs.  In addition, other resources are recycled (Mason and Harrison, 2006) that have 
been de-risked and whose costs have been sunk in previous ventures.   
There is an experiential upward sloping learning curve first proposed by MacMillan (1986), though as 
in many other studies statistical proof is weak.  The presence of failure and other idiosyncratic 
events and decisions breaks the assumed smooth link from human capital to venture performance.  
For researchers, investors and agencies looking for a successful formula for entrepreneurship then 
start-up experience is not enough to guarantee success.   Successful successive ventures are linked 
by the reuse of tangible and intangible resources (Porter, 1985).  This insight provides a more subtle 
but more economically sound version of the assets and liabilities and success breeds success 
theories of habitual entrepreneurship akin to real options theory (McGrath, 1996).  Serial 
entrepreneurs who find and pursue opportunities with a good fit to current resources enjoy a cost 
and risk advantage that reduces information costs from learning, and experimentation. Here closed 
or failed ventures are costly experiments. 
While this thesis is clear that, Sarasvathy, Menon and Kuechle (2013) are correct that cognitively 
intelligent serial entrepreneurs do transfer learning of success and failure to the next venture, it is 
the ability and capacity to husband and recycle related resources of all types, including cognitive 
elements such as templates (Baron, 2006; Baron and Ensley, 2006) and heuristics (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) that are a mark of entrepreneurial expertise (Manimala, 1992; Bingham and 
Eisenhardt, 2011).  Progressive economic selection of entrepreneurs to suitable opportunities 
requires there is a relevant and valuable connection between start-ups, even if it is in a new 
industry.   
8.1.4 Theme 2. The Nature of Venture Corridors 
There is a large body of theory and evidence (e.g. Chen, 2013; Oe and Mitsuhashi, 2013; Toft, Kehler, 
Wennberg and Kim, 2014), that strongly suggests that both serial and portfolio entrepreneurs should 
follow narrow corridors (Ronstadt, 1986; 1988) or paths of related ventures, constrained by prior 
knowledge, social and physical resources, cognition, and learning.  Each venture is not an end in 
itself.  It creates real options (McGrath, 1996) and preferential access to future opportunities 
(Bowman and Hurry (1993).    
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Detailed Research Questions 
2.1 Do serial entrepreneurs make closely related diversifications, i.e. stay in the same industry 
corridor to reuse related prior knowledge and other resources?  
2.2 How do exit conditions, positive or negative, affect the choice of venture corridor? 
2.3 What is the source of opportunities?   
2.4  Do they arise from intentional search or from serendipitous alertness?   
2.5 What is the role of social capital in this process?   
Around half of serial entrepreneurs stay in the same industry corridor; the others follow related and 
unrelated opportunities into new industries, of which only the related enterprises survive to 
maturity.  An exception is failed entrepreneurs with so few resources left that they must select an 
immediately available low-cost small-scale opportunity in another industry.    
For experienced founders there is evidence that ability to exploit an opportunity is a very important 
part of the opportunity selection process.   As already explained, start-up experience is not enough 
to guarantee success.  The recognition of high quality opportunities that can actually be pursued is 
the key to the next successful venture because completely unrelated ventures are invariably 
unsuccessful.  Some entrepreneurs fall into the cognitive trap (e.g. Dyer, Gregersen and Christensen, 
2008) of thinking that they have the ability to change corridors.  
As serial entrepreneurs use the same cognitive templates and heuristics to find new opportunities 
again and again, often in different industries, this has ramifications for researchers of corridor 
effects (e.g. Gruber, 2010; Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson, 2012; 2013) who view many 
entrepreneurs as passive receivers of new information and unable to form new paths easily.  
Nevertheless, there are economic returns to specialisation in one industry.  The thesis confirms that 
new opportunities arise from deep knowledge of a particular sector (Grégoire, Barr and Shepherd, 
2010).  Innovation occurs ‘naturally’ in existing enterprises. They incubate and produce new 
opportunity specific information, attract third party collaborators (sometimes from different 
industries) as industries co-evolve (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001), and provide test beds for new ideas 
and new technologies.   
As postulated in the literature review, both search (Fiet, 1996) and alertness (Kirzner, 1973) are 
channelled by information corridors (Venkataraman, 1997) of prior knowledge (Shane, 2000).  
Alertness is not a completely independent variable in the entrepreneurial process, and information 
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corridors are also innovation corridors.  Most serial entrepreneurs mentioned alertness in relation to 
opportunity discovery rather than systematic economic search.  Some serial entrepreneurs describe 
a complementary and simultaneous cognitive process that combines both.  Systematic search is used 
to replicate incumbent businesses, find and filter potential opportunities using a template, and to 
develop an existing opportunity.  
The great majority of serial entrepreneurs remarked that they consciously avoided developing a 
network of general contacts.  As predicted in the literature they relied on ‘inner circles’ (e.g. de 
Koning, 2003; Gemmell, Boland and Kolb, 2012) of partners with complimentary skills, mentors and 
family members.  An insight is that some developed a sophisticated ‘purposeful network’ to carry 
out structured economic search for information not readily available. Overall, binary mutually 
exclusive definitions of search and alertness are not always useful; the actual process is often more 
complex.   
8.1.5 Theme 3. Innovation 
This topic is concerned with the extent to which the expected narrow path of related start-ups is 
compatible with the role of entrepreneurs as innovators (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942) required for 
economic growth.  Narrow corridors suggest mainly imitative ventures or marginal innovation as a 
result of industry specialisation (e. g. Aldrich and Reuf, 2006; Gruber, MacMillan, Thompson, 2012; 
2013).  
Detailed Research Questions 
3.1 Are serial entrepreneurs innovative or imitative?  
3.2 Are opportunities discovered or created?   
3.3  Are higher-order cognitive abilities in evidence? 
Serial entrepreneurs are innovative both within and across industry corridors, with broadly equal 
numbers of innovative and imitative opportunities.  The careers of serial entrepreneurs reflect 
changes in the business environment, particularly technological change and economic cycles.   Serial 
entrepreneurs are attracted to high quality opportunities and are more likely to found businesses of 
either type in high potential and growth sectors rather than in mature sectors.  Many create ‘new to 
the world’ products.  The evidence from business sales and IPOs supports the assumption (e.g. 
Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009) that innovative opportunities are of higher quality and 
wealth creating potential.    
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Consistent with the findings on search and alertness, the majority of serial entrepreneurs described 
discovering rather than creating their opportunities.  A significant minority thought it was a “bit of 
both”.  Creativity is aligned with painstaking research and the cognitive ability to project emerging 
trends into the future and form new patterns of private subjective information (Casson, 2005).  
Serial entrepreneurs who created ‘new to the world’ products or services were able to recognise 
meta-cognitively (Flavell, 1979) their own creativity.  Others, particularly software entrepreneurs, 
struggled to recognise their own creativity.  Other ways of describing the process included:  looking 
for what is missing, assembling pieces of the jigsaw, combining and packaging existing components 
in new and creative ways.   As with alertness and search, the two binary and opposing constructs of 
discovery or creation are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Overall, the process is consistent with evolutionary theory that emphasises path dependencies, and 
allows both intra and inter-industry innovation.  Here re-combinations of existing components is an 
essential part of a creative process.  However, just a few marginal evolutionary innovations can 
result in a discontinuous/frame-breaking market innovation.   
Further research into the origins of opportunities using evolutionary realist constructs (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007; 2010) has the potential to shed further light on the process.   
Cognitively talented serial entrepreneurs use information to think beyond prior knowledge and 
succeed in new domains (Eesley and Roberts, 2012).  Some of the evidence for high-level cognition 
has already been mentioned such as transformational learning (e.g. Cope, 2011) triggered by 
venture closures or failures.  Serial founders develop cross-industry templates and heuristics to 
search for and screen suitable opportunities.  Very experienced entrepreneurs see meta- 
connections between opportunities in seemingly unrelated industries using reasoning by analogy 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005).  There is likely to be a similar cognitive 
process whereby new opportunities are mapped to existing knowledge and the dots are joined 
(Baron, 2006) between these mental representations. There is evidence of high order thinking (Lord 
and Mather, 1990) including: mindful thinking (Rerup, 2005), the use of small information clues 
(Simon, 1973), counterfactual thinking and mental simulation (Gaglio, 2004), to make bi-associations 
to create new ideas (Ko and Butler, 2003; 2006).  Nevertheless, the prevalence of negative outcomes 
reveals that serial entrepreneurs also make mistakes, from superstitious learning (Levitt and March, 
1988), and by not learning enough from previous ventures and falling into cognitive traps (e.g. Dyer, 
Gregersen and Christensen, 2008).  Accumulated experiences of the same type are needed to 
overcome misperceptions. (Kim, Kim, and Miner, 2009).  The data is similar to Toft-Kehler, 
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Wennberg and Kim (2014) in finding faulty learning at low levels of experience.  However, this can 
also occur later in a career when encountering new situations.   
8.1.6 Theme 4. Portfolio vs. Serial Entrepreneurship 
This theme is in response to recent theoretical developments by Parker (2014) and Sarasvathy 
Menon and Kuechle (2013). The literature suggests that serial entrepreneurs are able to use 
resource recycling (Mason and Harrison, 2006) and incubation (Cooper, 1985) to achieve similar 
economic advantages in venture formation as portfolio entrepreneurs.   
Detailed Research Questions 
4.1  Why do entrepreneurs transition to become portfolio entrepreneurs?  
4.2  What are the economics of serial entrepreneurship?  
4.3  Do serial entrepreneurs benefit from some form of pseudo diversification, supported by 
recycling?  
4.4  Do serial entrepreneurs take on increasingly risky opportunities? 
The small sample of three portfolio founders appear to be similar to serial founders in terms of 
innovation, learning, failure and ambition.  They came to entrepreneurship through similar routes 
and prefer to start small ventures using their own resources, eschewing external finance beyond 
conventional bank loans.  The chief difference is the absence of exit and the growth of a permanent 
group of firms.  Portfolio entrepreneurs develop a medium quality business that is not attractive to a 
buyer.  Rather than being risk averse (Parker, 2014) they lack ability (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990: 
1995).  Portfolio founders grow by building an interlocking mutually supporting set of ventures 
linked by horizontal (e.g. Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005; Rosa, 1998) and also, as found in this study, 
vertical synergies. They make use of their permanent base of firm controlled resources to generate 
options (McGrath, 1996) and make controlled experiments, which do not threaten their 
continuation as entrepreneurs.  However, in this study they do make risky unrelated diversifications 
and spin-outs that fail.  There is no evidence to support the assertion (e.g. Parker, 2014) of unrelated 
ventures being founded to balance overall portfolio risk. 
Serial entrepreneurs also benefit from their own form of diversification (Sarasvathy, Menon and 
Kuechle, 2013), renamed in this thesis as ‘serial diversification’.  The formation of real options 
(McGrath, 1996) and resource recycling (Mason and Harrison, 2006) and reuse in a related 
opportunity reduces cost and mitigates risk.  From an economic perspective, the wealthiest 
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entrepreneurs in the survey are serial entrepreneurs who sell their high quality ventures to a trade 
buyer or to venture capitalists. To build and maintain a career serial entrepreneurs must master the 
assembly and re-assembly of resources across discrete firms. 
8.2 Section 2. Implications for Entrepreneurship Researchers, Policy-Makers, 
Practitioners and Educators 
8.2.1 Implications for Entrepreneurship Researchers  
The thesis helps close the relative gap in our understanding of serial entrepreneurship compared to 
portfolio entrepreneurship.    The thesis makes a number of major and minor contributions of 
interest to academics.   
Major Contributions  
1. It provides a more complete theory of serial entrepreneurship, building on the postulates and 
empirical work of others and also providing unique insights.  The theory has five main elements 
whose postulates can be tested in follow-on research.   
A. Extensions to economic selection theory to include negative venture outcomes and the 
recovery from such critical set-backs, and following from this it must now include 
entrepreneurial learning where human capital is not fixed and ability increases with 
experience. 
B.  Successful serial entrepreneurs practice ‘serial diversification’. To achieve a successful 
series of ventures, and therefore a successful career, new ventures must be related to 
previous enterprises.  These connections may not be obvious, e.g. when a business model is 
transferred to a different industry.  
C. There are four modes of venture creation practiced by experienced multiple founders that 
are different from those practiced by novices. Three of the four modes involve an explicit 
forms of replication of previous ventures or existing business forms.  When a mode of 
founding achieves a positive outcome it is likely to be repeated over a career.  
D.  The outcome of the previous venture is significant for the choice of opportunity and 
mode of creation for the next venture in the series.  The exit conditions are:  1) a high cost 
negative exit, 2) an affordable low cost exit, 3) a high value successful exit, 4) a low or 
moderate value exit, or 5) no exit.  No exit is a condition for the potential transition to 
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portfolio entrepreneurship.  Successful or unsuccessful exits are not associated with a 
reduction in ambition.  
E. Despite the apparently imitative nature of their mode of venture creation, serial 
entrepreneur founders provide both intra-industry innovation derived from deeper 
knowledge and inter-industry innovation by transferring knowledge and other resources to 
new opportunities.  
2. Serial entrepreneurs can be similarly efficient as portfolio entrepreneurs through serial 
diversification.  They also can be more economically successful than portfolio entrepreneurs through 
the sale of high quality innovative firms.  
3. The thesis reveals more about the process of serial entrepreneurship including the types of 
decision, learning and cognitive processes employed.  Traditional processes of information search, 
alertness, discovery and creation are often combined.  Experienced founders see creativity in the 
assembly and packaging of existing resources in new ways and can detect important information 
clues in their peripheral vision when searching. 
4.  A new general model of entrepreneurship is offered that includes the recursive and dynamic 
nature of serial entrepreneurship driven by information processing and resource accumulation.   
Minor Contributions 
1. The term habitual entrepreneur should be replaced with the specific sub-types of serial and 
portfolio entrepreneur further sub-divided into founders, acquirers and inheritors.  This thesis 
recommends a portfolio founder entrepreneur is defined as someone creating at least three firms 
owned and managed in parallel.  
2. Serial entrepreneurship is distinguished from portfolio entrepreneurship by its cycle of exit and re-
entry into entrepreneurship.  The constructs of entry/re-entry and exit experience have been shown 
to have explanatory power and should be added to the nomenclature of entrepreneurial human 
capital. These constructs answer longstanding calls (e.g. Reuber and Fischer, 1994; 1999) for the 
inclusion of iterative, flow and transformational elements in entrepreneurial human capital.  
For example, recent longitudinal studies of venture performance and returns to entrepreneurship 
rely on firm or personal earnings (e.g. Chen, 2013; Toft, Kehler, Wennberg and Kim, 2014).  Further 
studies should include binary conditions of successful or unsuccessful exit.  This will bring further 
clarity to the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and outcomes. 
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3. The current exit typology of harvests and liquidations (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 
2010) is modified.  Exits should be classified according to economic consequences.  Successful exits 
are business sales of varying value, with a premium or surplus over book asset value.  Unsuccessful 
exits are closures that are economically ‘affordable’, while failures are not.   
4. As serial entrepreneurship often includes pauses and interludes that are material to their career 
trajectory these periods and activities should be included for further studies.  
5. As most serial entrepreneurs walked away from the earn-out clauses agreed at the time of sale, 
the findings cast doubt on the resource-based theory of the firm’s assumption of entrepreneurial 
dynamic capabilities being within the control of the firm.  
6. Portfolio and serial founders have more in common than is reflected in the literature, such as 
background and a preference for using their own resources.  The study reveals that portfolio 
entrepreneurs engage in vertical as well as horizontal diversifications.  Furthermore, portfolio 
entrepreneurs do not diversify to reduce overall risk in a portfolio as proposed by Parker (2014). 
7. The need to separate the career of the individual from the fortunes of the firm is upheld in this 
study.  Furthermore, the study also shows that it is useful to treat opportunities as also having a 
distinct identity and lifecycle (e.g. Plummer, Haynie and Godesiabois, 2007).  Serial entrepreneurs 
replicate incumbent firms and re-enter entrepreneurship to re-exploit essentially the same 
opportunity.  
8. While the relatedness of successive ventures is assumed by some researchers (e.g. Delmar and 
Shan, 2006), the literature review provides a new view of relevant theory as an array of corridor 
narrowing (centripetal) and widening (centrifugal) forces.  
9. To assist in understanding the source and nature of opportunities, the thesis recommends an 
extension to the means-ends opportunity framework (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003) to include the 
business model (George and Bock, 2011) and/or the similar construct of the means to serve (Shane, 
2000).  This will emphasise the entrepreneur’s role in the coordination of scarce resources (Casson, 
1982) and as found in this study, new forms of coordination are a source of innovation.  
10. Serial founder entrepreneurs describe using both opportunity discovery and creation, sometimes 
separately, sometimes together, in a cognitive process called ‘packaging’ that uses a number of 
other discrete cognitive processes.  Similarly, opportunity search and alertness are also described by 
some entrepreneurs as joint and complementary processes.  This suggests that rival ontologies are 
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best combined in future studies. For example, the evolutionary realist approach (e.g. Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007; 2010) given empirical support in this thesis may prove useful. 
11. Alertness (Kirzner, 1973) and search (Fiet, 1996) are constrained by prior knowledge.  Also 
alertness without search does not usually lead to frame-breaking opportunities.   
8.2.2 Implications for Policy-Makers, Practitioners and Entrepreneurship Educators 
The thesis concludes with a number of recommendations for other stakeholders in 
entrepreneurship.  
Policy Makers 
1. Target support to inexperienced novice entrepreneurs, as it is here that a negative exit is most 
likely to occur.  Position programmes that introduce entrepreneurship as a learning experience.  
2. Reposition the role of small business groups such as the UK’s FSB from networking to mentoring.  
3. Serial entrepreneurs who ‘bounce back’ go on to make successful careers.  The costs of failure and 
the barriers to re-entry should be lowered.  This includes familiar proposals for less strict bankruptcy 
laws.  In addition there should be tax incentives for banks to write-off loans and for venture 
capitalists to write-off losses quickly.  Refinancing returning entrepreneurs could also be 
incentivised.   
4. Provide support for unsuccessful entrepreneurs in the form of grants or vouchers for higher 
education to encourage a period of reflection and learning. 
5. Remodel government backed schemes that encourage experienced entrepreneurs to pursue new 
‘blue sky’ opportunities unrelated to current ventures.  As the study shows, start-up experience is 
not enough and new opportunities must be related.  New opportunities should be channelled to 
entrepreneurs with relevant experience using a check-list developed from the constructs used in this 
thesis. 
6. Liquidity and adequate capitalisation of start-ups is important.  The finance industry could learn 
from the mortgage industry in respect of the rapid turnaround of loan applications.  
Practitioners (Entrepreneurs) 
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1. Avoid copying existing businesses in emerging or growing sectors as a method to enter 
entrepreneurship.  For the first novice venture it is much safer to internally replicate a business and 
incubate a start-up from within, i.e. in employment.   
2. Exercise caution towards opportunities for unrelated diversification.  Be particularly cautious 
about international diversifications and subsidised official programmes.  
3. Embrace and consider opportunities to innovate provided that the conditions of recycling and 
reuse of proven components and relatedness hold true.  Develop cognitive models and templates of 
the business model/means to serve.  Serial entrepreneurs can be well placed to exploit emergent 
industries where they have relevant experience.  Start-up experience alone is insufficient. 
4. Avoid business exits that have earn-out clauses or similar forms of agreement that turn the 
entrepreneur into an employee.  Retaining a share and a seat on the Board of Directors is more likely 
to benefit both parties. 
5. Understand that an unsuccessful business is not necessarily the end of an entrepreneurial career. 
Even bankruptcy can be avoided by negotiation and by giving evidence of learning from mistakes.  
Educators  
1. Rebalance the current emphasis on ‘success stories’ towards the use of theory and evidence of 
the factors that makes a business successful or unsuccessful.   
2. Position employment and entrepreneurship as complementary not mutually exclusive pathways.  
This is already true for the professions such as accountancy, legal services etc. whose practitioners 
go on to start new firms to capitalise on their experience. 
3. Provide short-courses and consultancy to entrepreneurs contemplating new opportunities or 
seeking growth through diversification to avoid inappropriate new ventures.  
4. Provide short-courses and consultancy to entrepreneurs in difficulties or in recovery from failure. 
8.2.3 Limitations of the Research   
There are some limitations to the reliability and validity of the thesis.  Generalisability of the findings 
cannot be claimed for qualitative research.  Patton (2002) and other researchers must judge the 
transferability to other research situations.  The sample is subject to survivor bias (Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2003).  All 26 case studies are of surviving ‘persistent’ entrepreneurs who were still active 
at the time of the study in 2014.  The ‘life histories’ captured are not complete and further research 
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is required to determine the overall outcome for all of the start-ups analysed.  The smaller number 
of portfolio entrepreneurs reduces the strength of findings in this area.  In addition, the research 
(with two exceptions) relies on individual entrepreneurs as informants.   
Finally, the results rely on a pragmatic blend of interpretivist inductive analysis triangulated by a 
positivist analysis of ventures singly and in aggregate.  Nevertheless the analysis and interpretation 
are open to researcher bias.  Serial entrepreneurs willing to be interviewed are hard to sample in 
significant numbers, and it was not possible at reasonable cost to purposefully seek out additional 
cases that might contradict the findings.  On the other hand, the sample size compares favourably to 
other studies employing similar methods and could be one of the largest so far conducted.  
8.2.4 Requirements for Further Research  
1.  The postulates of the new theory of serial entrepreneurship should be tested for their veracity on 
larger samples and other samples of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.   
Other specific topics for further research include:   
2. Determination of the ratio of successful to unsuccessful ventures in the careers of serial 
entrepreneurs.  It is postulated that the ratio of 2:1 in favour of unsuccessful exits in this study’s 
sample would improve over time.   
3. Establish if there is a general rule regarding the number and type of negative exit that results in 
either a temporary or permanent exit from entrepreneurship.   
4. Determine if more is learned of relevance to a successful career from failure than from success.  
5. The study supports the importance of liquidity in determining the size and quality of the 
opportunity exploited.  Founders in this study have a strong preference for using their own financial 
resources.  Further research is required to understand the trade-off between starting small and fast 
and starting with more substantial liquidity in the form of loans or equity investment.   
6. The transition to portfolio entrepreneurship requires further research to examine the premise 
that the pre-condition for portfolio entrepreneurship is a lack of exit potential, e.g. a lower quality 
venture with limited growth prospects, not attractive to outside buyers, but not unattractive enough 
to dispose of.   
7. Parker (2014) suggests that serial entrepreneurs are different from portfolio entrepreneurs in 
having a high preference for risk.  In this study, risk preference assessed by the ambition of their 
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ventures at least remains constant. The absence of exit suggests that portfolio entrepreneurs have 
lower ability.  Further research is required using suitable risk and ability constructs to determine if 
there are material differences between different types of experienced entrepreneurs.   
8.  The findings relating to how the opportunity centric process of entrepreneurship occurs in serial 
and portfolio founding suggests that binary categorisations of the process, (discovered or created) 
and outcome (innovative or imitative), are not always useful.  This study suggests that evolutionary 
constructs (e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2007; 2010) as described by the entrepreneurs’ in their own 
words as ‘packaging’ and ‘peripheral vision’ have the potential to shed further light on the process. 
9. McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) two-step opportunity decision process separates the recognition 
process from the assessment to exploit decision.  For experienced founders prior knowledge and 
other resource positions influence both steps, but implementation considerations are the primary 
consideration.  Further research could clarify the actual decision process.   
10. Serial and portfolio entrepreneurs can make unrelated diversifications.  Further research is 
required to understand how these opportunities arise and the cognitive and economic decision 
process that often leads to a negative outcome.  
11. Additional research is also needed to determine if the process of innovation may be different for 
serial compared to portfolio entrepreneurs. 
8.3 Section 3. Conclusion 
Serial founder entrepreneurs, by dint of their exits from and subsequent return to venture creation 
are worthy of separate study.  This thesis offers a new evidence based theory of venture creation by 
serial entrepreneurs, connecting venture outcomes to modes of venture creation and setting out the 
economic forces and cognitive processes at work in a successful career.    
Furthermore, relatedness and other corridor effects are not inconsistent with innovation, either 
evolutionary or frame-breaking.  While novice entrepreneurs may bring fresh insights unconstrained 
by the experience of venture management, serial entrepreneurs replicate successful practices into 
new ventures and new industries, or return from failure with an improved formula to exploit a still 
viable opportunity.   
In bringing more clarity to serial entrepreneurship, we also reveal similarities and differences 
between other types of entrepreneurial behaviour.  Our overall knowledge increases and further 
specific research questions are generated.  Serial entrepreneurs focus on finding and developing one 
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opportunity at a time rather than on managing the dependencies of a portfolio of firms.  As serial 
entrepreneurship often includes pauses and interludes it is important to include all of the activities 
that contribute to the career trajectory of a serial entrepreneur.  
In conclusion, the study has contributed further theoretical and empirical progress, advancing our 
knowledge of serial founder entrepreneurs, their behaviours and the outcomes of their start-ups by 
answering the principal research question: How are the ventures of serial starter entrepreneurs 
related to one another?  An agenda for further research has been detailed to develop our knowledge 
of this important group of entrepreneurs.     
  
288 
 
Appendix I Interview Briefing Letter and Research Instrument 
 
    Stephen O’Regan 
Senior Lecturer 
University of Roehampton  
Business School 
London SW15 5SL 
 
Date          +44 20 8392 3523 
+44 79 1900 8342 
 
s.oregan@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Re: Entrepreneurship Research – Interview Briefing  
Dear ………,                          
Thank-you very much for agreeing to be interviewed as part of my research.  
In order to use your valuable time effectively I am sending you this briefing that includes the 
format of the interview I will be using.  It is a semi-structured interview. It establishes some 
basic facts across all the interviews, but also allows for deeper conversation.   
My aim is not to write a personal profile or an entrepreneurial life history. I am researching a 
very specific and detailed aspect of the entrepreneurial process, with the aim of helping new 
entrepreneurs.  
I do not have a particular theory I am trying to prove or disprove I am simply interested in 
facts. Your anonymity and that of your ventures are guaranteed, so you are able to respond 
freely.  I use a voice recorder to capture our conversation.  
If you have any questions please simply drop me an email to s.oregan@roehampton.ac.uk 
Yours sincerely,  
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Stephen O’Regan  
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Structure 
Part 1 Background Information  
1. List the enterprises or ventures in which you acted as the entrepreneur, either alone or 
with other entrepreneurs. (Provide basic data on dates, peak turnover, peak no of 
employees, if profitable etc.) This data should be prepared in advance.  
2. For each enterprise where you acted entrepreneurially with others, can you recall their 
names and their role(s) in the enterprise?  
3. Within the context of these enterprises were there occasions when you acted 
entrepreneurially? When for example a new enterprise was not formed but instead the 
organisation was transformed in such a way that it was effectively a new venture?  
Part 2 The Ventures 
Thinking and reflecting on your ventures in turn from beginning, to decision to develop, and 
through development.  
4. What things did you bring to the table that were put to use within your new venture?  
These things or elements can be information, knowledge (know-how), resources, or any 
asset you had at that time. It could be very specific e.g. information about some potential 
customers or employees, or specific knowledge of a technique. It could also be very general 
e.g. an area of customer need not covered by others, but not yet quantified.  
5. When you think about the other persons who were entrepreneurial with you, what things, 
or elements of the venture did they bring to the table?  
290 
 
6. Did you use other sources of information, knowledge, resources and assets? They may 
have been professionals, agencies, mentors, key customers, suppliers, family members, 
friends, competitors, previous employers or other sources.   
7. What did they bring to the table? 
Part 3 The Entrepreneurial Process  
Again reflecting on each venture, from beginning, to decision to develop, and through 
development. 
8. Were any elements you brought from previous experience and your ventures used again 
‘as is’ i.e. without change? 
9. Were elements used again, but with some modification for a new venture?  
10. Were any elements developed from scratch?  
11. Did you ever realise you were missing something?  
12. Did you actively search for missing elements using your own time or having someone 
else do it, perhaps as a paid professional? 
13. To what extent did information, knowledge, resources and other assets come to your 
venture accidentally - without conscious effort? 
Part 4 Looking Back and Looking Forward  
14. What is an opportunity? (What isn’t an opportunity?) 
15. What is the essential difference from ventures that have been developed to other 
projects you have not pursued or were shelved? 
16. What kinds of new opportunities or ventures are you considering now?  
17. In what ways are these new ventures related to or unrelated to your previous ventures?   
18. How did you come across your new venture, was it ‘out there’? 
19. What did you create that was not already ‘out there’ for your new venture? 
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Appendix II Case Summaries 
Given here are short summaries of each case given in order of interview.  Due to strict confidentiality 
promised in advance of the interviews, and also the express promise only to report findings at a 
higher aggregate level, only highlights can be provided.  Further information about each case is 
embedded and cited in Chapter 7.  Interested readers can find this information by following the case 
citations and construct a more detailed picture of each entrepreneur. 
Case 1.  The most prolific serial entrepreneur in the study, making 10 venture start-ups in multiple 
industry corridors over a 42 year career. Now considering retirement.  He changed industries several 
times though only once due to a venture failure.  This resulted in the abandonment of special 
knowledge and the learning of new skills in mainly emergent sectors.  The entrepreneurs relied on 
social capital and reputation in employment to be recruited into entrepreneurship on two separate 
occasions.  This case illustrates that trying to clone an existing business is not always successful.  Also 
that complete failure can lead to a new direction when the entrepreneur has minimum resources 
with which to restart.  The entrepreneur was highly creative, thinking counter intuitively and looking 
for what was missing.  Reused key resources such as technical staff and knowledge learned in 
business such as software development.  
Case 2. 3 start-ups in two related industries.  22 year career as an entrepreneur.  He and his partner 
kept to the same broad industry of the UK high-tech sector.  With insufficient knowledge of how to 
serve the new market niche of high-tech companies spotted as a customer, he and a partner formed 
a joint venture with an incumbent firm.  When the JV broke down they started a clone in the same 
location.  He used the proceeds of a £5million business sale to a large industry player looking to 
diversify, to enter another new industry of software app development.  The venture is moving up the 
value chain to become a software producer to his former customers and similar high-tech 
companies.  
Case 3. 2 start-ups of different versions of the same opportunity over 15 years with a two-year break 
between to recover.  Essentially an imitator but the imperfect copy of an existing business and a lack 
of relevant skills led to failure.  He returned after failure to restart a much improved and innovative 
version taking advantage of new supply and demand conditions caused by globalisation and the 
internet.  The case illustrated that copies from the outside of a high growth company are imperfect 
and adaptations after failure can be innovative.  
Case 4. 5 start-ups during a 33 year career. Stayed in the same professional services industry 
throughout after recruitment into the initial start-up.  Cloned first business and sold the copy for 
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over £3m to a large industry player.  Walked out of an earn-out deal and then lost heavily in an 
unrelated property business.  He returned to professional services bootstrapping a minimally 
resourced start-up reusing skills and contacts developed in the previous venture.   
Case 5. 2 ventures and 35 years as an entrepreneur.  One of the case exceptions who was not a serial 
founder.  He inherited a small family business and grew it to the largest distributor and licensor in 
the UK.  Then changed industries and moved up the value chain through an unusual opportunity to 
acquire a former supplier.  The case illustrates differences in acquirer’s motives and also the transfer 
and reuse of special and relevant competencies such as foreign manufacturing, branding and retail 
management that were successful in developing the first family business to revitalise an ailing 
business in another industry.  
Case 6. 6 start-ups over 24 years.  He started young before going to University.  Changed industries 
from car repair (selling the business) to software development in emerging sectors using new skills 
acquired at university.  Used university resources to start-up as he had done while at school.  
Continued to adapt the central solution and business model from venture to venture moving up the 
value chain through several ventures to eventually find a successful niche in UK retail.  The 
entrepreneur made a number of innovations from working very closely with customers.  Exceptional 
social skills used to develop his ventures.  Mentor helped, providing advice related to transferring to 
the new industry.  Highly creative individual who views the process as a combination of alertness, 
search, discovery and creation. 
Case 7. 4 start-ups over 24 years. Same print based industry through progressively larger ventures 
exploiting a single technical trend.  Started copy of existing type of business and then with the help 
of a mentor changed to new sector within the same industry to pursue a new technical trend.  There 
was VC involvement from mid-career that had a significant impact on career trajectory and personal 
wealth.  He is using the same approach to find future opportunities and method of VC finance to 
grow new ventures.  Though he is creative he doesn’t recognise it.  Describes it as the simplification 
of technologies and customer problems. 
Case 8. 2 venture start-ups. 14 year career.  In employment learned to found his first venture by 
copying his employer’s business.  Used a joint venture to fill gaps in first venture.  Following the 
dissolution of the joint venture and a legal case re-entered the same IT services industry, adapting 
the business model to a small scale due to resource constraints following failure.  Gradually growing 
to address the original size of opportunity the joint venture was set-up to exploit.  Is now focussed 
on philanthropic not for profit ventures. 
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Case 9. 6 start-ups to form a portfolio over 28 years starting straight from university.  All started in 
the same industry of popular music gradually changing in scale and scope from local to national. Two 
highly innovative businesses implementing new technologies that he described as filling in the 
obvious gaps in product offerings.  Now learning how to deal with national competitors after 
formative years operating in a narrow local niche.   
Case 10. 4 start-ups in the building industry. 33 year career.  Moved up the value chain from 
labouring to renovations to manufacturing sophisticated types of building extensions.  He simply 
replicated other businesses and tried to do a better job using his creative talent for design and 
quality high production methods.  He is gradually increasing the size and sophistication of the 
business taking enormous risks with the assistance of expert mentors and supportive financiers.  
Case 11. 4 starts-ups.  29 year career.  Learned the relevant skills in employment with the aim of 
starting his own company once he had learned enough.  He operated in the same broad industry 
related to telephony services but moving from B2B to much larger B2C markets by reusing particular 
and relevant competencies.  Interim period as an investor led to attempts to found unrelated 
ventures that failed.  Again highly innovative, but again did not recognise his own creativity. Had to 
learn new skills when changed industries.  Tempted by international venture in the Americas but 
wisely declined the opportunity and remained focussed on the UK.  
Case 12. Case exception of acquirer and founder, with a 19 year history of multiple 
entrepreneurship.  2 acquisitions and 1 start-up in different industries but still related by the reuse 
of common competences in warehousing and distribution.  Uses a sophisticated acquisition model 
learned as a chartered accountant.  He used a similar heuristic/template approach to search for new 
opportunities when starting-up an innovative venture from scratch.  Recycled and reused important 
social capital and recruited former employee as business partner for the new start-up.  
Case 13. 7 start-ups.  35 year career as an entrepreneur.  Started young, both before and while at 
university.  Same broad industry of industrial production tools with related diversifications to form a 
portfolio.  Several unsuccessful unrelated diversifications introduced by Government agencies.  The 
case illustrates that portfolio entrepreneurs can be tempted by high risk unrelated opportunities and 
that start-up experience is not enough on its own to ensure success.  
Case 14. 2 start-ups. Different industries over 23 year career.  First venture uses unique skills and 
knowledge only available in a very small number of large high-tech firms.  Ventures are related 
through a similar approach to searching for completely new high-tech opportunities.  Fundamental 
customer problems are solved through the development of common industry standards and 
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technologies where none existed before.  Career is built on technical knowledge, but also 
sophisticated networking and intelligence gathering skills.  
Case 15. 6 start-ups. 14 year career in the same broad industry of photographic services and 
software, including three failures in succession.  Following an interlude to complete a degree and 
recover there was a successful small software venture in a different industry that restored the 
confidence of the serial entrepreneur.  He was approached by a social contact (former house-mate) 
with similar interests who had run into trouble with his own first start-up also in photography.  The 
serial entrepreneur transferred his learning from several failures including the concept of ‘minimum 
viable product’ to make a successful new venture together with his new partner.  
Case 16. 5 start-ups over 19 years.  Same broad industry of engineering CAD/CAM software related 
ventures moving progressively up the value chain from a distributorship to large scale international 
software development.  Took a period of employment and incubation of new opportunities 
following two unsuccessful ventures, the first unrelated to engineering and the second an attempted 
return to a successful CAD/CAM venture.  Illustrates that insufficient learning can stymie an attempt 
at a mature clone.  The break to recover from losses by contracting in another country helped 
develop several new potential opportunities.  One opportunity incubated in employment was 
started on his return to the UK.  
Case 17. 6 start-ups over 14 years in business.  Changed to different industries including mental 
health care.  However, all the ventures are related through the application of the same very 
innovative internet solution and underlying business model.  The innovation is highly transferrable 
and is now used by companies such as Uber.  Mixed results from his own diversifications and so he 
has now returned to the original business using a mature clone. VC involvement from mid-career 
instrumental in growing the business, and also in his eventual exit from the business he founded 
before it made an IPO.  He continually searched for a similar high growth opportunity to his first 
successful venture. 
Case 18. 5 start-ups.  Started a 23 year career by partnering with his mother.  Helped start two 
family businesses before going it alone targeting a growth sector and set out to learn how to start 
his own company in this sector through employment.  Changed industries after a near failure, but 
started a related venture by transferring the standard solution in one B2B industry to another 
industry.  The standard solution proved to be very innovative in the other context.  Later tried to 
start an unrelated high-tech venture and a foreign subsidiary, both of which failed.   
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Case 19. 6 start-ups in just 5 years.  Pushed into self-employment by redundancy.  Started a series of 
relatively small ventures serving the freelance consultancy industry.   Changed industries to youth 
entrepreneurship education using the same networking and event management solution and 
business model from his previous ventures.  Several businesses with mixed fortunes and is very likely 
to return to employment in the same sector.  His ventures appear to be a series of evolutionary 
experiments searching for a break-through venture of sufficient quality.  
Case 20. 4 start-ups.  14 year career history.  Finance, City of London and family business background 
have all proved useful even if relevant knowledge was not used immediately.  Changed from 
property management industry to internet information distribution through the combination of 
relevant knowledge of the property sector and an employee turned partner with high-tech skills and 
a vision of the future unseen by other participants.  While moving up the value chain from service 
supplier to product development he made two unsuccessful but related diversifications brought to 
his attention by collaborators.  The case illustrates how knowledge gaps can be fatal to business 
fortunes.  
Case 21. 3 start-ups.  Significant family background in entrepreneurship. Early entrant and now 23 
years in the same industry of internet based services. Has been at the forefront of the development 
of this industry since its inception.  Progressively larger and more international businesses.  Career 
helped by very significant VC involvement since mid-career as both investors in his start-ups and as 
employers in other ventures in the same sector.   
Case 22. 6 start-ups over 37 years, the majority in the same broad industry of legal services.  He is 
now considering retirement in favour of his son.  Insights gained from investigative services led to 
innovative document management venture serving the same customer base.  Unsuccessful 
unrelated venture from an opportunity introduced by family member.  Returned to same business 
through a mature clone when the foreign acquirer of his former business changed the then 
successful business model.  Being a significant owner of long lasting social capital he was able to 
reconstitute the business from recycled resources quickly.  
Case 23. 3 start-ups over 19 years.  Searched for business opportunity to copy.  Following the failure 
of original business discovered an industry transferable business model that became the basis of the 
search for the third venture, again with the aim of copying it.  Also experienced an unsuccessful 
venture in a foreign market introduced by a third party.  Has sold both successful businesses learning 
how to negotiate a sale.  Retention of minority share in the successful business provided a second 
source of personal profit when the business was sold again for a second time.  
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Case 24.  6 start-ups over 30 years.  Changed industries into emergent sectors and all ventures 
related through common skills and experience in farming and small scale construction and 
engineering projects.  She and husband partner innovated customer services in one firm and 
transferred the approach to a new industry.  Series of related diversifications to form a portfolio of 
firms in renewable energy targeting farmers in the region.  Now searching to make unrelated 
diversifications as renewable energy industry conditions are changing as government subsidies are 
removed.  
Case 25. 2 start-ups.  42 years as an entrepreneur in the same industry moving up the value chain 
from service supplier to product manufacturer spotting and seizing upon a significant technical 
innovation at the same time the market was expanding.  Also experienced an unsuccessful related 
venture project in a foreign market.  The case illustrates how one innovation can revitalise a 
traditional sector of clothing manufacture through product innovation.  
Case 26. 4 start-ups over 19 years.  This case contains another example of innovation by adaptation 
following a failure.  He and his partner copied their employer’s business model to make their first 
start-up in B2B services.  The model was adapted following a severe failure where its basic flaws 
were exposed during a recession.  Banks facilitated the restart by writing off debts and providing 
fresh finance.  The entrepreneur encouraged employees to suggest new ideas e.g. new services, in a 
systematised internal opportunity qualification process.  The adapted business model facilitated a 
start-up to a different industry that was undergoing growth in response to a ‘walk-in’ opportunity 
from a young entrepreneur.  The more experienced entrepreneur was able to see the meta-
connections between the two industries that would allow him to recycle, transfer and implement 
the same business model from B2B to a B2C industry. 
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Appendix III Data Gathering and Analysis – The Use of Coding  
As detailed and discussed in Chapter 6, the methodology is a pragmatic combination of positive case 
study and interpretation using grounded theory.  The researcher interpreted the subjects' responses 
in order to glean their relevance for the phenomenon under investigation (Berglund, 2007) in a 
process similar to the multi-level analysis of critical realism.  The researcher then used positivist 
scientific theory to postulate the existence of objects and relationships which may or may not be 
directly observable in order to build new theory and/or confirm existing research.  
The data gathering phase required the use of constructs derived or synthesised from the relevant 
literature necessary for answering the principal research question of how the ventures of serial 
founder entrepreneurs are related to one another.  Most of the data had to be gathered within the 
context of a scheduled and pre-planned 60 to 100 minute interview using a semi -structured format.  
The interview structure focussed on capturing details of each venture or sub-case, the relationships 
between ventures and the degree of entrepreneurial recycling between ventures.  The interview 
concludes with an open discussion on the origins of opportunities. 
Phase 1. Initial Coding and Data Analysis 
The initial coding of the interviews arose from the questions posed in the research instrument, 
supplemented by the themes and types of data that arose from the actual conversations and 
discussions.  Given below is the list of 53 codes used in the analysis.  Those marked with a * are 
those additional codes derived from the actual responses of the interview.  Extracts or summary 
points were taken from each of the 26 interviews for each of the 116 ventures and labelled using the 
codes.  While, in total there was the potential for 6000 cell entries, some codes were only populated 
by one or two interviews.  
It is clear that the entrepreneurs were willing to discuss each venture at length and reflect on the 
critical events that affected their origin, development and exit. 
Part 1 Background Information  
1. Age/Gender* 
2. Education*  
3. Early Entrepreneurial Experience including family businesses* 
Part 2 The Ventures 
1. Name and sequence of venture 
2. Founding Date  
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3. Exit Date 
4. Peak turnover   
5. Peak no of employees  
6. Profitability   
7. Entrepreneurial Team:  Names, roles and relationships.  
8. Directly Transferrable Skills, Knowledge  
9. The Opportunity  
10. Circumstances of Entry*  
11. Circumstances of Exit: Sales value, Sales process.  Arguments, Fraud and Dissolution*  
12. Failure and its consequences* 
13. Breaks from entrepreneurship* 
14. Bootstrapping from a low resource base* 
15. Financing: Own, Banks and Venture Capital* 
16. Key Decisions* 
17. Objectives* 
18. First Mover Advantage* 
19. Perception of Risk* 
20. Competition 
21. Value Proposition* 
22. Products* 
23. Innovation* 
24. Employees* 
25. Key Customers* 
26. Markets/Market Segments* 
27. Business Model* 
28. Product Development*  
29. Pricing* 
30. Suppliers and the Supply Chain* 
31. Location/Geographic Area and Accommodation*  
32. Impact of New Technology including IT* 
33. Environmental Conditions/Forces* 
34. Strategies* 
Part 3 The Entrepreneurial Process  
1. Resources reused from venture to venture.   
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2. Information acquisition: Search or serendipitous alertness.  
3. The role of networks, mentors and advisors. 
4. Directly Transferable Resources* 
5. A comparison of key activities between ventures including:  marketing, sales, recruitment, 
financial and legal management. * 
6. Insourcing vs. outsourcing of key activities.* 
Part 4 Looking Back and Looking Forward  
1. How one venture is related to others in sequence.  
2. Learning* 
3. Luck: Bad and Good* 
4. The type and origin of opportunities that have triggered venture formation.  
5. Discovery: Search or Alertness 
6. Innovation and Creation 
7. Assembly of Components/Packaging / Jigsaws* 
8. Other Businesses* 
9. Other Insights* 
10. Opportunities not pursued.  
A small section of the coding spreadsheet drawn-up from Case 1 is given below in Table iii.1.  
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Table iii.1 Section of Coding Spreadsheet (Case 1) 
Phase 2. Construct Population and Analysis 
In the second phase of data analysis the sub-cases of ventures were analysed to determine the 
relationship between them using the codes and also additional constructs derived and developed 
from the literature review explained at length in Chapter 6.  These included;  
1. Venture Entry 
2. Venture Exit  
3. Imitative or Innovative: 
3.1 Degree of Diversification  
3.2 Venture Similarity  
Codes Name 1. Name of Entrepreneur
Venture 1
1 Age/gender 70 Male
1 School Age Entrepreneur No
2 Education Young Chartered Accountant
3 Job Experience Chief Accountant of ITEL Ltd, but hated 
accountancy.
4 Entry Invited to be MD for xx% share.
5 Partner Share xx%
6 Bring to table Obviously the finance skills. But more 
the idea behind it and the drive to 
implement it.  Seemed a bit of fun.
7 Directly Transferrable General management. Knowledge of City 
firms as customers. 
8 Idea/Opportunity Origin My idea. 165,000 sq ft building, old Tea 
warehouse. 4000 sq ft a room.  Did two 
things.  1) Design a box that was exactly 
50% of the size of a filing cabinet draw.  
2) Put in a caged area. They had to pay 
£1.75 per sq ft per year. They were 
paying £20 per sq ft.
At ABC Company  we had rented offices 
in the City and knew how expensive they 
could be.
9 Exit Dispute among the founders
10 Perception of risk Minimal
11 Profitable Yes
12 Competition Do it yourself
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3.3 Re-use of Prior Knowledge 
3.4 Innovation:  
3.4.1 Industry Stage  
3.4.2 New Product Development  
3.4.3 Opportunity Components 
 
Each construct and its constituents could occupy several columns.  This second phase of the analysis 
has 30 columns giving 3500 cell entries.  A large number of different pivot tables were produced to 
examine potential patterns.  Most do not reveal patterns with statistical strength such as comparing 
opportunity alertness or discovery with the innovativeness of the opportunity, suggesting a more 
nuanced qualitative judgement is appropriate.  
A small section of the spreadsheet derived from the interview is given below in Table iii.2 and Table 
iii.3. 
 
 
Table iii.2 Venture Similarity (Case 1) 
 
Similarity
Venture Product
Custo
mers
Compe
tition
Suppl
iers
Techn
ology
Managerial 
Skills
Technical 
Skills
1 12 1 5 1 0 1 3 1
2 33 5 5 5 3 5 5 5
3 27 4 4 4 3 3 5 4
4 35 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 4 0 1 0 0 0 2 1
6 26 4 3 3 4 3 4 5
7 30 5 4 3 4 5 4 5
8 35 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
9 34 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
10 25 3 5 3 4 3 4 3
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Table iii.3 Use of Prior Knowledge (Case 1) 
Phase 3. Interpretation and Theory Building 
In the third phase all the data derived from the entrepreneur’s case study and the results of the sub-
case survey now visualised in a set of colour coded spreadsheet entries were analysed and 
interpreted.  This phase had two parallel parts the summarisation of the data using descriptive 
statistics and across and within-case analysis.  
Summary Descriptive Statistics  
This part concentrated on describing the sample accurately and critically examining salient patterns.  
The 2:1 ratio of unsuccessful exits compared to successful exit was scrutinised in detail. This led to 
the refinement of the exit construct.  
Constant Comparative Analysis   
Using constant comparative case analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the 
sub-cases of ventures were grouped into theoretical classifications of alternative modes of venture 
creation.  For example, a high similarity score and a high degree of reuse of prior knowledge suggest 
that the two successive start-ups are much the same and that the entrepreneur is operating within a 
narrow corridor.  The entrepreneur’s case history describes the what, when and how of the 
sequencing of each venture over their career.  For example, a ‘clone’ is important in understanding 
how novice entrepreneurs transition to become serial entrepreneurs.  Using the analysis construct 
perspective, a clone has near identical classification to the preceding venture.  From the 
Use of Prior Knowledge
Market Means Solution 
Customers End user Storage
Customers End user Storage Formula
Customers IT Equipment Distribution Mini computers
Customers IT Equipment Distribution Te minals
Customers # #
Customers Vehicle sales #
Customers Vehicle sales #
Customers Vehicle sales Leasing 
Customers Vehicle sales Leasing 
Customers Vehicle sales #
#  none
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entrepreneurs narrative, they describe a process of ‘rebooting’, starting essentially the same 
business again, commonly following a disagreement between the entrepreneurial team that causes 
the preceding venture to close or fail.  
Further venture sub-cases from other entrepreneurs that were started under very similar 
circumstances were clustered together.  The cluster is given a name and the theory begins to build 
that the circumstances that caused the previous venture to close or fail have a strong bearing on 
why, how and when the next venture was created.   Accordingly, the ventures or sub-cases are now 
grouped by exit conditions to determine if this factor is significant.  This further comparison fleshes 
out the nature of the ‘clone’ sub-type.  Because this sub-type is similar to ‘adaptation’ in second 
ventures these two sub-types were grouped together.   
The same process of across and within-case analysis was used to derive the venture creation paths 
of third, fourth and nth ventures.  Here another similar sub-type ‘mature clone’ was discovered.  
Similar to cloning and adaptation in second ventures, it was added to form Internal Replication.  In 
this way, by constant comparison, sub-types were clustered into a broad theoretical base that can 
be tested and enhanced by other researchers.  The archetypes are grouped into 4 archetypes or 
super-types of behaviour.  
1) Internal Replication, 2) Internal Diversification, 3) Internal Replication and Transfer, and 4) 
External Replication. 
They are listed below and can be compared with the three super-types of novice venture creation.  
 
Figure iii.1 (7.11) Novice and Expert Modes of Venture Creation 
Further analysis revealed that serial entrepreneurs may create ventures by repeating the same 
mode of creation in their careers.  
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